Judgmsnt.- This is an appeal preferred by the Public Prosecutor representing the State, canvassing the correctness of the judgment passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai, in C.A. No. 87 of 1973 on his file, reversing the order of conviction made by the learned Additional First Class Magistrate No. I, Madurai, in C.C.No. 56 of 1973 on his file, and acquitting the respondents-accused of the offence with which they stood charged. 2. The crux of the indictment of the prosecution is as follows: Accused-1 is a factory known as M/s. Standard Industries,of which accused 2 to 6 are partners. The said industry is situate at A, Super I Unit, Industrial Estate, Madurai, manufacturing double graduated person weighing machine under the name and style of “Sentinel”. P.W.1, the Assistant Inspector of Labour, I Circle, and the Inspector of Weights and Measures, Madurai, accompanied by the Deputy Inspector of Labour, Madurai and the Assistant Inspectors of Labour, II, IV, V, VI and VII Circles, Madurai inspected the said industry on 28th October, 1971 at about 4 P.M. Accused-5 (R. Krishnan) was then present. According to P.W.1, the accused were manufacturing person weighing machines with double graduation, without a licence under the Tamil Nadu Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act and Rules and they had sold the machines to Standard Appliances and the Life Insurance Corporation of India, on various dates. P.W.1 seized the bill book bearing Nos. 101 to 179 (Exhibit P-l series) and one Person Weighing Machine (M.O. 1). The accused, according to the prosecution, have not taken the manufacturer’s licence in form A and dealer’s licence in form C, for manufacturing and selling the Weighing Machine. The accused had kept the weights and scales without verification and stamp on due dates as detailed in. the complaint, for the second quarter of 1971, viz., 100 kgs., 50 kgs., 20 kgs., and two/10 kgs. (M.O. 2 series). They were not stamped. Cast iron weights viz., two weights of 2 kgs. one 1 kg., one 500 grams and two 1.00 grams, (M.O. 3 series) had not been stamped for the first quarter of 1963. The counter-scale (M.O. 4) was not stamped for the second quarter of 196?. P.W.1. issued a show cause notice to 1 he accused. Exhibit P-2 is the office copy of the notice dated 30th November. 1971. one 1 kg., one 500 grams and two 1.00 grams, (M.O. 3 series) had not been stamped for the first quarter of 1963. The counter-scale (M.O. 4) was not stamped for the second quarter of 196?. P.W.1. issued a show cause notice to 1 he accused. Exhibit P-2 is the office copy of the notice dated 30th November. 1971. The accused sent Exhibit P-3 dated 11th December, 1971 in reply and Exhibit P-4 dated 15th February, 1972 again in reply. It may be pointed out that these facts are not now in dispute. According to the complainant, the verification should be done once in a year. The articles were seized under receipts Nos. 61 and 62, the carbon copies of which are marked as Exhibit P-5 series, signed by accused 5, on behalf of the firm. One Subbiah, who was the then Inspector in the first quarter of the year 1968, had isued a notice under Exhibit D-l dated 1st February, 1968 to the factory asking for explanation. Then, by a letter under Exhibit D2 dated 15th October, 1971 the Inspector of Labour, Madurai, directed the accused to stop manufacturing Person Weighing Machines until a licence for the manufacture of the machine was granted by the Controller of Weights and Measures, Madras. Exhibit D-3 is a letter dated 3rd February, 1973 from the Controller of Weights and Measures, Madras, addressed to the firm. P.W. 1 then filed a complaint for contravention of the provisions of the above Acts and Rules. 3. Exhibit D-3 is a letter dated 3rd February, 1973 from the Controller of Weights and Measures, Madras, addressed to the firm. P.W. 1 then filed a complaint for contravention of the provisions of the above Acts and Rules. 3. The respondent accused were charged for the commission of the offences (1) under sections 7, 10 and 13 of the Act, for having manufactured double graduated Person Weighing Machines and sold the Articles without licence; (2) under rules 23-A and 23-B and section 13, for having manufactured and sold the above machines without obtaining licence in form A prescribed and in form C prescribed for dealership under the Rules; and (3) under section 11 read with rule 10 (i) and thus render themselves liable for punishment under sections 23, 26 and 25 of the Act and rule 27 of the Rules, for having kept mighty platform scale, counter-scale and cast-iron weights for using them in the business, without being re-verified and stamped by an Inspector of Weights and Measures and for not producing them for such re-verification and stamping before the Inspector in 1971-B quarter 1968-B quarter and 1963-A quarter. The petitioner-complainant examined himself as P.W. 1 and marked Exhibists P-l to P-5 and M.Os. 1 to 4 in support of his case. The respondents-accused examined one G.T. Bose, the manager of the Standard Industries, as D.W. 1, and marked Exhibits D-l to D-3, on their side. The learned Additional First Glass Magistrate, who tried the case, came to the conclusion that the accused had contravened the provisions of sections 7, 10 and 13, read with section 23 of the Act and rules 23-A and 23-B of the Rules and sections 12 and 23 of the Act and section 11 and rule 10(i) read with section 25, and accordingly he found them guilty as charged, convicted them thereunder and sentenced them each to pay a fine of Rs. 50, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks on the first count; each to pay a fine of Rs. 25 in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks on the second count, and finally each to pay a fine of Rs. 10, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks, on the third count. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, the respondent preferred an appeal in CA. 25 in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks on the second count, and finally each to pay a fine of Rs. 10, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two weeks, on the third count. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, the respondent preferred an appeal in CA. No. 87 of 1973 before the Sessions Judge, Madurai, who after an elaborate discussion, held that the respondents-accused were not guilty of the offences with which they had been charged and consequently, he set aside the convictions and sentences against them and acquitted them of all the offences. Hence this appeal by the State. 4. The following contentions were raised by the learned Public Prosecutor before me: (1) The lower appellate Court has erred in holding that the manufacture of M.O. 1 (Person Weighing Machine) and machines of the same type, is not hit by section 7 (i) of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. (2) The finding of the lower appellate Court that neither the manufacture of M.O. 1 nor the possession of M Os. 2 and 3 would constitute violation of section 10, is totally incorrect. (3) The lower appellate Court has misconstrued section 13 of the Act and has completely failed to appreciate the complainant’s case that the respondents had sold the machines to Messrs Standard Appliances and the Life Insurance Corporation, of India, on. various dates. (4) The acquittal is based on the misconception, and mis-interpretation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Mr. V.P. Raman, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, would resist the above points 1 and 2 raised by the appellant, by stating that M.O.I was not used for any transaction in trade and consequently, the respondents have not contravened any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. He would further contend as regards the manufacture of M.O. 1. that it was not intended to be used for any transaction in trade and, as regards M.Os. 2 and 3 (weights), that they were used only for internal purposes and not for any transaction in trade. Regarding the contention of the petitioner on points 3 and 4, Mr. He would further contend as regards the manufacture of M.O. 1. that it was not intended to be used for any transaction in trade and, as regards M.Os. 2 and 3 (weights), that they were used only for internal purposes and not for any transaction in trade. Regarding the contention of the petitioner on points 3 and 4, Mr. V.P. Raman has urged that section 13 when read in conjunction with section 26, would be attracted only if the manufacture, repair or sale of any commercial weight, measure on weighing or measuring instrument is in the course of the trade, business or commerce, but would not be attracted with regard to all weights, measures and weighing machines. Further, he would say that the conspicuous omission of the word “any” qualify ing, weighing or Treasuring instrument in the penal provision of section 26 would support his contention that the Legislature did not intend to include all kinds of these materials. 5. P.W.1 had deposed that he inspected the factory along with the Inspector of Labour and other officens on 28th. October, 1971 at 4 P.M., and that the accused have sold the Person Weighing Machines on various dates to Standard Appliances and the Life Insurance Corporation of India, which are business concerns and which- are using these machines for their business. He seized the bill book bearing Nos. 101 to 179 and one Person Weighing Machine (M.O. 1) on which the name “Sentinel” is affixed. P.W.1 further swears that for manufacturing and selling weighing machines, the respondents have not taken the mar.u-factuer’s licence in Form-A and dealer’s licence in Form-C and they have kept the weights and scales without verification and stamp on the due dates for the second quarter of 1971 (M.O.2 series) and M.O.3 series have not been stamped for the first quarter of 1963. The counterscale (M.O. 4) was not stamped for the second quarter of 1968. Thereupon, be issued a show cause notice to the respondents under the original of Exhibit P-2, to which notice the respondents replied under Exhibits P-3 and P-4 dated 11th December, 1971 and 15th February, 1972 respectively. The counterscale (M.O. 4) was not stamped for the second quarter of 1968. Thereupon, be issued a show cause notice to the respondents under the original of Exhibit P-2, to which notice the respondents replied under Exhibits P-3 and P-4 dated 11th December, 1971 and 15th February, 1972 respectively. D.W. 1 speaking on behalf of the respondents, had sworn that the light fittings and Person Weighing Machines were being manufactured by accused-1 and the weights (M.O. 2 series and M.O. 3 series) were being used only for internal purposes and that the sales as per the bills were not effected by weighing with M.Os. 2 and 3. The petitioner, under Exhibit P-2 (show cause notice) dated 30th November, 1971, has stated that the respondents were found to manufacture Person Weighing Machines for the past two years under the name and style of “Sentinel” Bath Room Scales (Weighing Machines) without obtaining licence therefor and it was further found that the units of measures used in the above Person Weighing Machines indicated measurements other then metric units, i.e., the measurements were graduated in metric and also in non-metric units, in contravention of section 7 of the Act and the said Person Weighing Machines were put on sale to certain parties during the period from 15th May, 19b9 to 20th October, 1971, without getting the said machines verified and stamped and it was further found out that the respondents were in possession of M.O. 2 series and M.O. 3 series, thus infringing certain provisions of the Act and the Rules. Respondent No. 5, on behalf of the firm and the partners, has offered an explanation under Exhibit P-3 dated 11th December, 1971, stating that the Person Weighing Machines could not be used for any Commercial purposes and it was intended to be used for the personal use of the person who purchased it, and in fact it has also been specifically printed on. the machine itself, to the effect that the said machine could not be used for any legal trade and therefore they were under the impression that this could not be construed as a weighing instrument as defined under section 2 (A) of the Act, and that they have immediately stopped the manufacture of such machines from 22nd October, 1971 after the receipt of the letter from the Inspector of Labour, Madurai, in R.C. No. 5683 of 1971 dated 15th October, 1971, instructing them to stop the manufacture of the said machines and that they subsequently confirmed this stoppage of manufacture of the machines, through then letter No. 27-A of 1383 dated 3rd November, 1971, addressed to the officer concerned, and that under those circumstances they were not manufacturing machines on 28th October, 1971, i.e., on the date of the inspection. Further he would submit in his explanation that they have not contravened rule 9 since their machines were not intended to be used in transactions for trade etc. As regards the weighing instruments referred to in the show cause notice in Exhibit P-2 it is explained that they were manufacturing electric light fittings and for that purpose, rivets, washers,sheetsarods etc., were being used in required sizes and numbers, and for drawing those materials from their stores in order to save time in counting the said materials, they were using these weighing machines (M.O. 2 series and M.O. 3 series,) but they were not used or intended to be used in transactions of trade and that the finished products of the said firm were being sold only on the basis of quantity and not by weight. In reply to the charge of violation of rule 10(1) of the Rules, it is contended that as these machines were intended only to be used for internal purposes and not in transactions of trade, business or commerce, there is no question of verification or stamping. However, by this reply, the respondents have made it clear that they were ready and willing to obtain licence and requested the Inspector to kindly give his decision in this matter under section 20(1) of the Act in view of the complicated question of law and fact involved in this case, so as to enable them to take necessary action. However, by this reply, the respondents have made it clear that they were ready and willing to obtain licence and requested the Inspector to kindly give his decision in this matter under section 20(1) of the Act in view of the complicated question of law and fact involved in this case, so as to enable them to take necessary action. Then, the respondents, under Exhibit P-4 dated 15th February, 1972 have confirmed their letter under Exhibit P-3 and has made a further request to the Inspector of Labour, to clarify certain legal factors and give his decision at the earliest possible, so as to resume their production,. Further they have requested to drop all further proceedings as contemplated under Exhibit P-2. Exhibit D-l dated 1st February, 1968 is a letter sent by the Assistant inspector of Labour, asking the respondents to let him know the manner in which the weights and measures were being used by them for their internal purposes, since the respondents had explained that they had not used the weights and measures in their transactions of trade or business, which explanations had been given by the respondents in reply to the letter of the Assistant Inspector asking them to produce the weights and measures of their firm for verification and stamping. Exhibit D-2 is another notice given by the Inspector of Labour on 15th October, 1971, directing the respondents to stop the manufacture of Person Weighing Machines until licence for the manufacture of the same was granted by the Controller of Weights and Measures, Macras. Exhibit D-3 dated 3rd February, 1973 is a letter addressed to accused-1 by the Controller of Weights and Measures, Chepauk, Madras-5. This letter is by way of reply to the application of the respondents dated 31st May, 1972 requesting the Controller to issue the manufacturer’s licence for Person, Weighing Machine. The said letter reads as follows: "It is observed that the Tamil Nadu Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Rules, 1967, do not provide for the manufacture of Person Weighing Machines of the type proposed by you. It is, therefore, requested that a specimen of the ‘Sentinel’ Person. Weighing Machines may be sent to this office immediately in order to enable me to examine the suitability of its manufacture and issue a licence therefor. It is, therefore, requested that a specimen of the ‘Sentinel’ Person. Weighing Machines may be sent to this office immediately in order to enable me to examine the suitability of its manufacture and issue a licence therefor. " Section 2(a) of the Act defines the term "the commercial weight or measures " as a weight or measure purporting to be a standard weight or measure used in any transaction for trade, business or commerce. Section 2(k) defines "weighing instrument " as any instrument for weighing a ad as inclusive of "scales with the weights belonging thereto, scale beams, balance, spring balances, steel yards and other weighing machines. In section 3, in Chapter 2, under the sub-heading " Standard Weights and Measures", the working standards are laid down. It is seen from sub-section (1) of section 3 that such working standards are laid down for the purpose of verifying the correctness of commercial weights and measures and weighing and measuring instrument used in transactions for trade. business or commerce. Section 7 of the Act prohibits weights and measures ether than the standard weights and measures in any transaction for trade, business or commerce. The learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the words "any instrument for weighing" used in section 2 (k) of the Act would indicate that the Legislature has intended to include all machines of all varieties and that when rule 23 is read in conjunction with section 13 of the Act, in. the light of the Explnation given under sections 2(k) and 2(a), it car. well be seen that the Legislature has not intended to exclude the Person Weighing Machine, since section 13 also reads that no person shall, in the course of trade, business or commerce, manufacture, repair or sell any commercial weight or measure or any weighing or measuring instrument, unless he has obtained, in the prescribed manner, a licence in this behalf from the Government or any officer authorised by them. The learned Public Prosecutor then relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Quebeg Railway v. Vandry1, where the Privy Council, while interpreting certain statutes, has observed that only if the enactment is not plain, can light be usefully sought from exterior sources and that effect must be given to all the words used, for the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words. Reliance was also sought to be placed on the decision in Aswin Kumar v. Arabinda Bose2, wherein the Supreme Court has held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. Reliance was also placed on the following observations in Jugal Kishore v. Raw Cotton Company3, in support of the case of the appellant: “The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the Legislature, their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning.” Then, he placed reliance on State of Bihar v. Mohamed Ismail4, in which the Full Bench of the Patna High Court laid down the following propositions: “A cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes is that when the language and grammatical construction of particular provision in the statute are without any ambiguity, they should receive the plain and natural meaning”. The learned Public Prosecutor then brought to my notice the following opinion expressed in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition (1962), page 66 (Section 2-Beneficial Construction): “Even where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the Legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if they are fairly susceptible of it. The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words.” Relying on the above observations and opinions, the learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the words used by the Legislature in section 13 of the Act are plain and unambiguous. If the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning is given to the word “any” appearing in section 13 of the Act, it will lead to no apparent difficulty or absurdity and there is absolutely no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction of statutes, and it is the duty of the Judge to give a beneficial construction to a statute and to give a more extended meaning when it is fairly susceptible of it. According to his submission, if section 13 is construed in the sense that only persons who weigh and do business are prosecuted, the manufacturers may escape criminal liability and the section will become nugatory. According to his submission, if section 13 is construed in the sense that only persons who weigh and do business are prosecuted, the manufacturers may escape criminal liability and the section will become nugatory. At this juncture, he would bring to my notice section 25, in which also the word “any” is used. A further submission was made by him that when machines similar to M.O.1 were admittedly found in the business premises of the respondents, it could be safely concluded that dealing in this type of machine is itself a trade within the meaning of the expression “trade, business on commerce”. He would cite the decision in Kesavan Nair v. Babu Naidu5wherein it has been held that the phrase “carrying on business” implies a repetition of a series of acts and that where, in pursuance of a business venture, a person has been performing several acts like erecting building for the factory, shifting machinery from one place to another and applying for licence to the concerned authority, etc., the person is deemed to be carrying on the business and it cannot be said that he only intends to carry on business. The word “business” is discussed in the said decision as follows: “The term ‘business’ includes every trade, occupation and profession. According to section 2 (4) of the Income -tax Act, 1922, ‘business’ includes any trade, commerce, or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. The word ‘business’ has no technical meaning, but is to be read with reference to the object and intent of the Act in which it occurs. The term ‘business’ means an affair requiring attention and care; that which occupies one’s attention and labour as his chief concern; mercantile pursuits; that which one does for a livelihood; occupation, employment.” Another decision cited on, behalf of the appellant, is Krishan Kumar Narula and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir1, wherein the Supreme Court observed that the word “business” is ordinarily more comprehensive than the word “trade” and one is used as synonymous with the other and that the word “business” connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organized course of activityor conduct with a set purpose. Next, he pointed out that in Hindustan Steel Limited v. State of Orissa2, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the Orissa Sales Tax Act, has held that a person to be a dealer within the meaning of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, must carry on the business of selling or supplying goods in Orissa. The learned Public Prosecutor relying on the above decisions in support of his contention, would urge that the respondents were manufacturing and selling Person Weighing Machines similar to M.O. 1, thus coming under the definition of the word “business” and that therefore, the respondents, are liable to be punished for the contravention of the provisions of section 13 of the Act and that this aspect has been lost sight of by the lower appellate Court, and the judgment of the lower appellate Court suffers from a grave and manifest illegality. 6. Mr. V.P. Raman would very vehemently resist the above contention of the learned Public Prosecutor as follows: Before going into the question of law, he brought to my notice certain admissions of P.W.1 in his cross examination. P.W.1 would admit that accused-1 is manufacturing electric fittings; that nuts, bolts, sheets, knots, washers etc., have to be supplied from the stores for their manufactures and instead of giving these articles in number, for convenience sake,they were supplied by weights; that the bill Nos. 103 and 121 were only seen by him for the sale of other articles and that he did not witness any sale personally and did not ask any article to be sold to him. After a perusal of the bills Nos. 103 and 121, he would say that these bills did not show that the articles contained therein were sold with the help of the machine. As regards M.O.1,P.W.1 testifies that a dealer cannot sell with the use of M.O.I, but would add that a business can be done by using it. But, in the same breath, the admission of the witness is that no sale or business was done by accused-1 by using M.O.1, and the machines similar to M.O.1 were sold to the Life Insurance Corporation for being given to doctors for medical examinations. But, in the same breath, the admission of the witness is that no sale or business was done by accused-1 by using M.O.1, and the machines similar to M.O.1 were sold to the Life Insurance Corporation for being given to doctors for medical examinations. According to this witness, he received Exhibit P-3 on 19th December, 1971, whereby he was asked to give a decision, but would say that he did not give any decision and if he had given any adverse decision, an appeal would have been filed against the same, that the Inspector of Labour, who is his superior, had stopped manufacturing all Person. Weighing Machines as per his reference Exhibit D-2 dated 15th October, 1971 and. he did not know that the manufacturing was stopped by the respondents on receipt of Exhibit D-2. Exhibit D-3 is the letter dated 3rd February, 1973 from the Controller of Weights and Measures with reference to the manufacture of Person Weighing Machines like M.O. 1. The witness would state that the delay in sending the reply Exhibit D-S is an administrative delay. Mr. V.P. Raman would argue that section 20 of the Act makes provision for appeal by an aggrieved person by any decision under this Act. Under section 20, if a decision has been made by an Inspector, the aggrieved person, can prefer an appeal against that decision within sixty days from the date on which such decision is communicated to him, to the Controller. But if, the decision is by the Controller himself, not being a decision made in appeal, the aggrieved person can prefer an appeal to the Government or to any officer specifically authorised in this behalf. On receipt of such an appeal, the Government or the appellate officer, after giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellant and after making such an enquiry as they deem fit, shall decide the appeal and the decision of the Government 01 the appellate officer she 11 be final. In the instant case, Mr. V.P. Raman, argued, admittedly under Exhibit P-3, the fifth respondent, on. In the instant case, Mr. V.P. Raman, argued, admittedly under Exhibit P-3, the fifth respondent, on. behalf of the other respondents, had made the following request: “However, if the Inspector is of the opinion that we (respondents) have committed the offence mentioned in the show cause notice (Exhibit P-2), we would request the Inspector to kindly give his decision in the matter under section 20 (1) of the Act, in view of the complicated question of law and facts involved in this case, so as to enable us to take necessary action.” P.W.1, as stated above, has admitted that he did not give any decision on receipt of Exhibit P.3. Then Mr. Raman would point out that from Exhibit D-3 it can be seen that an application dated 31st May, 1972 was sent by accused-1, which application was forwarded to the Controller by the Inspector of Labour, Madurai on 27th January, 1973 and the decision of the Controller was given on 3rd February, 1973 to the first respondent, stating that the Tamil Nadu Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Rules of 1967 did not provide for the manufacture of Person Weighing Machines of the type proposed by the respondents. 7. From the above facts culled out from the evidence and documents marked in this case, it is contended that the respondents took all efforts to get a clarification and a decision as to the position of law from the authorities, so that they may either apply for the licence and act according to the instructions or prefer an appeal against their order. It is seen from Exhibit P-3 that the respondents stopped the manufacturing of the machines after receipt of Exhibit P.2. No reply by the Inspector was given clarifying the position as sought by the respondents. Despite the fact that they applied for a licence, they received a reply nearly eight months afterwards under Exhibit D-3 which reply also does not give any decision on that point, and therefore Mr. V.P. Raman would contend that the respondents were totally deprived of their right of filing an appeal provided under the enactment and the prosecution now launched by the authorities is nothing but a misuse of power. I fully agree and accept the above arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondents. 8. V.P. Raman would contend that the respondents were totally deprived of their right of filing an appeal provided under the enactment and the prosecution now launched by the authorities is nothing but a misuse of power. I fully agree and accept the above arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondents. 8. The next contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the machine M.O.1 was not intended for sale and it has also been specifically printed on the machine itself that it would not be used for any legal trade, that M.O.1, which is now in Court, also contains a prohibition, against sale and that the said machine was intended to be used only for the personal use of the person who purchased it, but not intended to be used in transactions of trade, business or commerce, and therefore there is no question of infringement of section 13, punishable under section 26 of the Act. It was also brought to my notice that P.W.1 has admitted that no dealer could sell anything with the use of M.O. 1 and no sale or business was done by accused-1 by using M.O. 1 and in fact he did not witness any sale personally, nor did he ask any article to be sold to him and therefore, the contention that the sale of this type of machine has contravened the provisions of the Act is totally incorrect. Similarly, M.Os. 2 to 4 were also not used for sale and no inference could be drawn that they were used only for the purpose of sale in the absence of any tangible evidence to prove the same. Under these circumstances, the charge of the prosecution that the respondents used the weights and measures other than the standard weights and measures as contemplated under section 7 of the Act, cannot be sustained. I see some force in the above argument of the learned Counsel. 9. Coming to the interpretation of the word “any” appearing in section 13, Mr. V.P. Raman would strenuously argue that if the word “any” is given a wide interpretation and an extended meaning, so as to bring all the machines, measures and weights, then it would lead only to an absurdity. 9. Coming to the interpretation of the word “any” appearing in section 13, Mr. V.P. Raman would strenuously argue that if the word “any” is given a wide interpretation and an extended meaning, so as to bring all the machines, measures and weights, then it would lead only to an absurdity. As an example, he would state that the scale used by students is also a measuring instrument, but the question is whether a licence for manufacturing this measuring instrument is necessary and if that scale is misused by any one for measuring any cloth or any such thing in the course of a business, then whether the persons who manufacture such kind of scales would also be liable to be punished under section 13 of the Act. Similarly, he cites the case of weighing instruments, measures etc., used in individual households for household purposes. In support of this contention, Mr. Raman would bring to my notice the observation of the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore v. Raw Cotton Company1, that if a reading of the statute leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same; but if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. To my mind, this argument stands to reason. While interpreting the word “any” we have to find out whether all kinds of machines, measuring instruments and weights would attract the provisions of this Act. Though section 2 of the Act gives a definition of these materials, section 13 is very clear that the offence is committed only when such kind of materials are manufactured, repaired or sold, in the course of trade, business or commerce, to make them liable to be punished under section 26. Mr. V.P. Raman would lay emphasis on the conspicuous omission of the word “any” before the words “weighing or measuring instrument” and contend that the Legislature did not intend to bring all kinds of weighing or measuring instruments within the purview of section 26. In support of this contention, he would cite sections 3 and 21 of the Act, wherein also the word “any’ is completely omitted. In support of this contention, he would cite sections 3 and 21 of the Act, wherein also the word “any’ is completely omitted. On a careful reading of all these sections, I am not able to accept the above contention of the learned Counsel, because as per the defining section 2(e) and (k),”measuring instrument“and”weighing instrument“mean respectively”any measuring instrument“and”any instrument for weighing“. Therefore, the omission of the word”any“cannot be taken advantage of. Even otherwise, the omission of the word”any“before”weighing or measuring instrument“insertion 26, does not make any difference for our purpose. However, the learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the word”any“appearing before the words”commercial weight“in section 26, would qualify the”weighing instrument“and”measuring instrument“also. If we read section 26 along with section 13 as it stands now, the omission of the word”any“before”weighing or measuring instrument“is not at all significant, because what are made punishable under section 26 are the acts prohibited by section 13. From the above discussions therefore I hold that the respondents accused would be punishable under section 26, only if they manufacture, repair or sell any commercial weight or measure i or any weighing or measuring instrument, in the course of trade, business or commerce, without a licence as contemplated under section 13 of the Act. The expression”in the course of trade, business or commerce“is not defined in our Act. But the Bombay Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act of 1958 defines the term”use in transaction for trade or commerce“in section 2(h)(ii) of that Act, as”use for the purpose of determining or declaring the quantity of anything in terms of’ measurement of length, area, volume, capacity or weight in or in connection with any contract, whether by way of sale, purchase, exchange or otherwise; or any assessment of royalty, toll, duty or other dues; or the assessment of any work done or services rendered, otherwise than in relation to research or scientific studies or in individual households for household purposes“. Thus, it car. be seen that the Bombay Act has exempted these materials if they are used in relation to research or scientific studies on in individual households for household purposes. Of course, in the Bombay Act, the word”business“is not used in section 2 (h) (ii),unlike our Act which includes”business“along with”trade or commerce“. But, as pointed out in Kesavan Nair v. Babu Naidu1, the term,”business“includes every trade, occupation and profession. Of course, in the Bombay Act, the word”business“is not used in section 2 (h) (ii),unlike our Act which includes”business“along with”trade or commerce“. But, as pointed out in Kesavan Nair v. Babu Naidu1, the term,”business“includes every trade, occupation and profession. Similarly in Krishna Kurrar Narula v. State of Jammu and Kashmir2, also it has been held that the word”business“is ordinarily more comprehensive than the word”trade“and that one is used as synonymous with the other. 10. Then the question is whether the respondents manufactured or sold the Person Weighing Machine in the course of a trade, business or commerce. The various figures given in the Rules and Notifications issued under this Act, regarding the Person Weighing Machines, do not include the figure of M.O.1. The learned Public Prosecutor would say that the figures given under the Rules and. Notifications are not exhaustive but only illustrative and therefore the omission of the figure of M.O.1 or the like in those illustrations, would not mean that the kinds of machines like M.O. 1 are exempted from the rules requiring a licence. I would have accepted this argument but for the fact that the authorities concerned themselves, viz., the Inspector of Weights and Measures and the Controller are not definite in their minds as to whether manufacture or sale of this type of Person Weighing Machine needs a licence under the Act or not. It is true that the respondents have taken a consistent defence that M.O.1 was not intended to be used for any commercial purposes, but only for the personal use of the person who purchased it, and if any anybody abuses it, the manufacturer or seller would not be liable to be penalised. As per the charge, the respondents are alleged to have manufactured the double-graduated Person Weighing Machines and sold the same without a licence before 28th October, 1971. Exhibits. P-2, P-3, and D-W.3 are later to the date of inspection by P.W.1 and despite that inspection, the authorities are not able to a advise the respondents that a licence is needed for the manufacture or sale of M.O.1. Mr. V.P. Raman would at this juncture bring to my notice the Report of the Weights and Measures (Law Revision.) Committee (Maitra Committee) submitted to the Government of India on 15th May, 1972, wherein the Committee, which included Mr. Mr. V.P. Raman would at this juncture bring to my notice the Report of the Weights and Measures (Law Revision.) Committee (Maitra Committee) submitted to the Government of India on 15th May, 1972, wherein the Committee, which included Mr. Jeelani Hussain, the Controller of Weights and Measures of the Government of Tamil Nadu (who, has given the reply under Exhibit D-3) has given the following opinions and suggestions: “The enforcement of the 1956 Act having been limited to the commercial field, the time has come for the enforcement the provisions of that Act in other fields of human endeavour.” (page 11.) “The State laws, as in force at present, are restricted to the field of commercial transactions only.” (Page 35.) “As the application of the existing State laws in restricted to the field of commercial transactions, a practice has developed in the country of marking certain wights or treasures with the words ‘Not for trade’. This is being done with a view to evading the provisions of the State law with regard to the verification and stamping of such weights and measures. Taking advantage of the said restrictions in the State law some manufacturers have also gone to the length of manufacturing: weights and measures in, accordance with the non-metric units and they are evading the law in relation to such weights and measures by marking them as ‘Not for Trade’” (Page 36). “Suitable provisions have, therefore, been included in the Central Bill, as also in the Model State Bill with a view to ensuring that the distinction between weights and measures intended for trade and those not intended for trade is abolished. Since neither the Central law nor the State law provides for any punishment for the manufacture of any weight or measure which is not in accordance with the established standards thereof, the manufacturers who blatantly violate the law are going scot free. The committee, therefore, Seels that this loophole in the law should be plugged and both the Central and the State laws should be made so complementary to each other that they may not given any chance to a person who violates the law to go scot free”. (Page 57.) “State Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act: — There was a general discussion or the scope of the State Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Acts. (Page 57.) “State Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act: — There was a general discussion or the scope of the State Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Acts. It was noted that the Constitutional provision did not restrict the laws to any particular activity, but covered the entire field of weights and measures. While the Central Act at least defined the six basis units and certain other units of weights and measures and was to a large extent in line with international development. The State Acts applied only to Commercialised transactions in a rather narrow sense. It did not go far enough in consumer protection which is an essential task in the present context. The reason for this restricted application was that State Act was modelled on a similar Act which was in force in the State of Bombay from 1932, which in its turn was based on the Weights and Measures Act of 1878 as enforced in U.K. Thus the present State Act was a reflection of the century-old U.K. practices. At the time the State model Act was prepared to (sic; it should be ‘the’) International Organisation of Legal Metrology(OIML) had just come into existence in 1955. Just as the CGPM works in the field of basic units of weights and measures, the OIML works in the field of the law of weights and measures, i.e., legal metrology. India became a member of the OIML only in 1958. The work of the OIML had gathered momentum during the last 10 years. It had also drawn up a study programme which, by the International Convention, was expected to be reflected in the laws on weights and measures of the member States. (Page 129)” From the above opinions of the Committee, it can be seen that there are certain lacunae in the State Act, which everyone is naturally inclined to take advantage of until they are pluged as suggested by the Committee. So long as the Act has not been amended, the respondents are perfectly entitled, to take advantage of such lacunae entitling themselves to the benefits thereunder. 11. So long as the Act has not been amended, the respondents are perfectly entitled, to take advantage of such lacunae entitling themselves to the benefits thereunder. 11. As the offence of manufacture, repair or sale of any materials is complete only if it is done in the course of trade, business on commence, it cannot be said that the respondents have offended any provision of this Act, since it is not satisfactorily shown that they did so in the course of any trade, business or commerce. For the reasons mentioned above, I am not able to accept the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that the mere sale of the machine like M.O. 1 would by itself attract the provisions of section 13 of the Act. 12. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the respondents’ act was in the course of business, it has to be seen whether the respondents would be liable for any penalty. The Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Limited v. The State of Orissa1, while dealing with the question of penalty for failure to register as a dealer under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, has observed as follows: “But the liability to pay penalty does not arise merely upon proof of default in registering as a dealer. An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted, in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the Statute. Those in charge of the affairs of the company in failing to register the company as a dealer acted in the honest and genuine belief that the company was not a dealer. Granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty was made out." The above principles laid down by the Supreme Court would apply in all fours to the facts of the present case. Here, the respondents have not acted deliberately in defiance of law, nor were they guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, nor did they act in conscious disregard of the obligations. On the other hand, the correspondence that passed between the parties would show that the breach if any, has flown under a bona fide, belief that the respondents were not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the Act. As already mentioned, the respondents have not only immediately stopped the manufacture of the machine, but also requested the authorities under Exhibit P-3 to give their decision under section 20 of the Act as to whether the licence is necessary. But, the authorities did not reply. Above all, the Controller himeslf has stated under Exhibit D-3 by way of reply to the application of the respondents dated 31st May, 1972, that the rules framed under the Act do not provide for the manufacture of Person Weighing Machines of the type proposed by the respondents. This cannot on any stretch of imagination be said to be a clear and precise decision. Had the authorities given any decision as required under section 20 of the Act, the respondents would have been in a position to agitate the matter before the Government, whose decision would have been final. On the other hand, the reply given under Exhibit D-3 is very vague and confusing. Under these circumstances, it would not be justifiable to penalise the respondents. 13. On the other hand, the reply given under Exhibit D-3 is very vague and confusing. Under these circumstances, it would not be justifiable to penalise the respondents. 13. To sum up, the prosecution has not made out a case for an offence under sections 7, 10 and 13 of the Act against the respondents, for having manufactured the double graduated weighing machines and sold the same without licence infringing the said provisions, or under rules 23-A and 23-B and section 13, tor having manufactured and sold the same without obtaining the licence in Form A prescribed Form C prescribed, for dealership under the Rules; or an offence under section 11 of the Act, read with rule 10(1) of the Rules, for having kept mighty platform scales, counter-scales and cast iron weights for using them in the business without being verified and stamped by the Inspector of Weights and Measures and for not producing the same for the said purpose for the relevant period mentioned in the charge, as the evidence on the side of the prosecution is not clinching and acceptable that these M.Os. 2 to 4 series were being used by accused-1 in their business. 14. In the result, the appeal preferred by the State is dismissed.