JUDGMENT K. Gopalan Nambiyar, J. 1. This appeal is against the judgment of a learned Judge of this court and with leave granted by him, against the decision in S. A. No. 31 of 1971. The appellants before us were the plaintiffs 1 and 2 in O.S. No. 31 of 1967, Munsiff's Court, Kottarakara. The suit was for redemption of Ext. P1 mortgage of 1107. The plaintiffs, defendants 3 to 5 and others were members of Koikkalazhikathu tarwad. The plaint item was mortgaged in the year 1065 to a stranger. It was released in the year 1091 in favour of Govinda Pillai, a member of the tarwad who had instituted O.S. No. 622 of 1089 for redeeming the said mortgage. Neither the release deed nor any of the records relating to the suit for redemption filed by Govinda Pillai have been produced. By Ext. D-5 dated 23rd Kumbham 1101 M.E. there was a partition in the Koikkalazhikathu tarwad. The plaint item was not included in the document. There was a provision in the document that properties of the tarwad, not included in the document shall be held in equal shares by the members of the tarwad. In 1107 Govinda Pillai, a member of the tarwad, as stated earlier, granted the suit mortgage Ext. P1. The rights of the mortgagee have become vested in defendants 1 and 2. The suit was for redemption of Ext. P1 mortgage on behalf of the tarwad. It was decreed by the Trial Court and by the appellate court; but on Second Appeal, a learned Judge of this court reversed the concurrent judgment and decree of the courts below and directed that the plaintiffs suit would stand dismissed. The learned Judge's reasoning was that Govinda Pillai was not the karanavan of the tarwad, that e was therefore not entitled to redeem the 1065 mortgage as he sought to do in O.S. No. 622 of 1089, on behalf of the tarwad; that as a mere junior member of the tarwad who redeemed the mortgage, he would not be entitled to regard himself as an assignee of the mortgage nor claim subrogation in respect of the mortgagee, but can only regard himself as a creditor who had paid off the mortgage debt of the tarwad, and entitled to remain in possession till reimbursement of the tarwad's debt. For this proposition the learned Judge placed reliance on the decision in Krishna Pillai v. Bharathi Amma ( 1957 KLT 732 at 736). It was there observed: "Our view is that the redeeming junior member cannot be equated to the position of an assignee of the mortgagee bat is rather to be taken as the holder of a special interest in tarwad property with right to continue in possession until his accounts are settled and paid off. No question of limitation or adverse possession as against the tarwad could arise in this case. But it is unnecessary however to decide this question finally in this case." (page 736) The learned Judge also placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this court to which one of us was a party in Bharathi v. Ayissa Umma ( 1970 KLT 384 at 388). The learned Judge was of the view that what was mortgaged by Ext. P1 was not the rights of the tarwad, but the individual rights of Govinda Pillai, and the suit brought to redeem Ext. P1 on behalf of the tarwad was not maintainable. 2. We do not demur to the proposition laid down in 1957 KLT 732 . Indeed, we are bound by the said ruling. But we cannot accept the decision as laying down that, irrespective of the facts and circumstances disclosed, a junior member of the tarwad, should, in all circumstances and conditions, be understood as getting only the rights of a creditor and nothing else. On the facts here disclosed, we are of the opinion that Govinda Pillai granted Ext. P1 mortgage without reserving or indicating any special rights of his own, either in antagonism to the rights of the tarwad, or in subordination to such rights. In Ext. D-5 partition of 1101 there was a special stipulation that properties omitted from the same would be held by the members of the tarwad in equal shares. The plaint item was omitted from Ext. D-5. Govinda Pillai who was a party to the mortgage and who cannot disclaim knowledge of its provisions is seen executing Ext. P1 mortgage in 1107 making no sort of reference to any special rights of his. On the other hand, the recital in Ext. P1 is (MALAYALAM). The plaint item was omitted from Ext. D-5. Govinda Pillai who was a party to the mortgage and who cannot disclaim knowledge of its provisions is seen executing Ext. P1 mortgage in 1107 making no sort of reference to any special rights of his. On the other hand, the recital in Ext. P1 is (MALAYALAM). This is all the more significant in view of, what counsellor the appellants stressed before us, namely, that in respect of some of the items, more or less in the same position as the plaint item, where the prior mortgages had been redeemed by Govinda Pillai, there was a special stipulation while allotting them to two groups of sharers under schedules 6 and 7 to the document, that on payment of one half of the mortgage-amount paid off by Govinda Pillai in respect of these items, one half of the properties would be surrendered by the group to which they were allotted to the group paying the proportionate half. In that view, we are of the opinion that the rights mortgaged by Govinda Pillai under Ext. P1 were only the rights of the tarwad. On the strength of the special clause in Ext. D-5, the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem Ext. P1. 3. On the question whether the suit for redemption filed by Govinda Pillai, namely, O.S. No. 622 of 1089, could be regarded as not valid and proper, and the release of the mortgage rights obtained by him could not be said to be on behalf of the tarwad, we think it is unnecessary to deal with that aspect for the purpose of this case. Whether he had any individual rights of his own on redeeming the 1065 mortgage or not, he executed Ext. P1 mortgage without any reservation or indication of his special rights and reciting only the rights of the tarwad. This is significant, in view of the provisions in Ext. D-5 to which we have made reference. 4. We are therefore of the view that the mere fact that Govinda Pillai was a junior member who redeemed the 1065 mortgage, is a matter of no consequence and really does not affect the point in controversy in this appeal. 5. As far as the decision in 1970 KLT 384 at 388 is concerned, that was concerned with the question as to whether a sub-mortgage could be redeemed without redeeming the main mortgage. 5. As far as the decision in 1970 KLT 384 at 388 is concerned, that was concerned with the question as to whether a sub-mortgage could be redeemed without redeeming the main mortgage. In the course of the discussion, we (one of us was a member of the Division Bench) considered the meaning and the content of the expression "property mortgaged" occurring in S.91(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. In agreement with the decision in Jaggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra (ILR 33 Cal. 425) we hold that the property comprised in the mortgage is the interest which the mortgagor is competent to transfer by way of mortgage on the date of the transaction. The principle of the above decision should not, and need not, complicate our conclusion in this case. On the facts and for reasons indicated earlier, we hold that the property mortgaged by Ext. P1 was the right of the tarwad, and that Govinda Pillai had no other separate right which was not the subject of the mortgage. In that view, the above decision of the Division Bench cannot have any application. 6. We disagree with the learned single Judge, and hold that the learned Judge was wrong in directing a dismissal of the suit, on the ground that Govinda Pillai's separate and individual rights were not the subject matter of Ext. P1 mortgage, and therefore could not be redeemed in the suit brought by the plaintiffs. 7. Counsel for the respondents (defendants 1 and 2) contended before us that, in any event, as a mortgagee in possession he was entitled to fixity of tenure under S.4A(1)(b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964). Before the lower appellate court he had filed an application as IA No. 196 of 1970 claiming fixity under the said section. The same was dismissed on the ground that only a preliminary decree had been passed, and the question may be agitated before the Trial Court without prejudice to the petitioner's rights. This view of the lower appellate court is quite consistent with what was pointed out by a Full Bench of this court in Muhammed v. Maya Devi ( 1971 KLT 284 ) that the appropriate stage of claiming the benefits of S.4A in a suit for redemption is when the mortgagee is sought to be dispossessed in pursuance of the final decree. 8. 8. We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge, subject to the reservation that it would be open to the respondents to plead their rights under S.4A(1)(b) of the Act at the stage of the final decree and when they are sought to be dispossessed. There will be no order as to costs.