JUDGMENT M.P. Malhotra, J. By this petition, the landlady seeks to get rid off the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and thereafter by the appellate authority under the U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The brief facts are these: The petitioner moved an application under Section 21 of the said Act for the release of the accommodation in the occupation of respondent No. 3 situated in Mohalla Shahganj, Sultanpur. The said respondent occupies the said accommodation as a tenant thereof on a monthly rent of Rs.15/ and keeps his shop and deals in German silver utensils, Chalini and other articles. The petitioner pressed her application under Section 21 of the ground that the accommodation in dispute was bona fide needed by her for occupation. She also claimed that a part of the accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and needed reconstruction. The petitioner's point was that her husband Ramdeo happened to be a tenant in a shop which was situated in the premises owned by one Ram Bharosey. The said Ram Bharosey had initiated proceedings for the release of the shop against her husband under Section 21 of the said Act. It was alleged that the extent of the shop was insufficient for the needs of her husband. Moreover in view of the pendency of the application under Section 21 in respect of the said shop, it was incumbent that the landlady in the interest of her husband's business should herself initiate proceedings under Section 21 against the respondent No. 3 in respect of the accommodation in dispute. It was a] so alleged by the landlady that the respondent No. 3 had three houses of his own and he could shift to any one of them. The respondent No. 3 resisted the application under Section 21 on various grounds. The genuineness of the need of the landlady was denied. It was further denied that any part of the accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and needed reconstruction. The extent of the shop in the tenancy of the husband of the landlady was said to be sufficient. It was also contended that the application under Section 21 was not maintainable as the accommodation in question was outside the purview of U.P. Act 3 of 1972. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that the landlady had failed to make other case for personal occupation. It was also contended that the application under Section 21 was not maintainable as the accommodation in question was outside the purview of U.P. Act 3 of 1972. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that the landlady had failed to make other case for personal occupation. It was also held that no part of the building was dilapidated or needed reconstruction. When the matter went to the lower appellate court, the latter held the application to be maintainable and the accommodation in dispute was held to be covered by the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. In view of Rule 17 of the rules framed under the said Act, the lower appellate court affirmed the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the question whether the building was liable to be released on the ground of its alleged need for reconstruction. It was held that as the requirements of Rule 17 had not been applied in the instant case, therefore it was not open to the landlady to seek release of the accommodation on the ground that any part of the accommodation needed reconstruction. On the question of the landlady's need to occupy the accommodation in dispute the lower appellate court held that the application which was pending against the husband of the petitioner under Section 21 of the said Act could not afford a good ground to the landlady for initiating action under Section 21 in respect of the disputed accommodation in as much as the former application against the landlady's husband had not till then been decided by the Prescribed Authority. The lower appellate court, however, itself observed: "The matter would be different and certainly the need of the appellant will become bona fide and genuine if the application of Ram Bharosey for release of the room in which her husband keeps his shop is allowed. The lower appellate court, however, itself observed: "The matter would be different and certainly the need of the appellant will become bona fide and genuine if the application of Ram Bharosey for release of the room in which her husband keeps his shop is allowed. However, since that application is still pending (as was discussed on behalf of the parties by their learned counsel before me during the course of the arguments), there arises no question of treating the appellant's need bona fide and genuine on that score at this stage." In my opinion, the lower appellate court was not right in thinking that a landlord must necessarily wait for a decision against him under Section 21 of U.P. Act 3 of 1972 before he can himself initiate action against his own tenant. Such a course seems to be very impractical and fraught with much inconvenience and difficulty for such a landlord. In my opinion, if a landlord who happens to be a tenant in some accommodation is threatened with eviction, he can certainly initiate proceedings against his own tenant so that in case the former is evicted under Section 21, then he may have his own accommodation available to him to fall back upon. If such a landlord is complied to keep waiting for the decision of the release application against him, then much time may be lost and in the meantime such a landlord may be thrown on the streets and may be in great trouble. As a protective measure and also as a measure of prudence, such a landlord can certainly initiate proceedings under Section 21 on the ground that similar steps are being taken against him in reference to an accommodation where such a landlord happens to be a tenant. In such circumstances, in my opinion, the best course would have been to have stayed the hearing of the petition and to have awaited the result of the proceedings under Section 21 against the husband of the petitioner. The respondent No. 3 as the tenant of the disputed accommodation would not have been prejudiced by such a stay. If any prejudice was likely to be caused by such a stay, then the prejudice would be to the petitioner and not to the tenant opposite party. The respondent No. 3 as the tenant of the disputed accommodation would not have been prejudiced by such a stay. If any prejudice was likely to be caused by such a stay, then the prejudice would be to the petitioner and not to the tenant opposite party. The learned counsel for, the respondent No. 3 has alleged that his client's allegation was that the proceedings under Section 21 against the husband of the landlady were collusive. This allegation cannot be accepted without evidence and material to support it. The lower appellate court has not found that the proceedings under Section 21 against the husband of the petitioner were collusive. In view of what the lower appellate court has itself and in the impugned order (the relevant portion of the order has been extracted above). I think the said court should have stayed the proceedings in the appeal pending before it. That course would have been to the interest of both the parties. The result of the proceedings under Section 21 against the husband of the petitioner should have been awaited. In my view, therefore, the lower appellate court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by not staying the appeal pending before it. I also hold that it committed a manifest error in the view that it took about the maintainability of an application under Section 21 on the ground that similar proceedings under Section 21 had been initiated against the husband of the petitioner. The lower appellate court, in my view erroneously found that such a circumstance was not material or relevant in considering the application under Section 21. For the aforesaid reasons, I allow this petition and set aside the lower appellate court's order dated October 10, 1974. The appeal before the said authority shall be kept stayed and shall be proceeded with after the decision in the application under Section 21 against the petitioner's husband. I should like to make it clear that it will be open to the respondent No. 3 to substantiate before the lower appellate court that any order passed in the proceedings under Section 21 against the husband of the petitioner is the result of a collusion and not a genuine order obtained on merit. The parties shall bear their own costs.