Judgment :- 1. Both these appeals have come up before this Court since the office of the High Court has noticed that the court-fees paid for these appeals are inadequate. The question arising for decision in both these cases is similar and that is why the cases have been heard together. They are appeals against the judgments of the Subordinate Judges Courts under the Land Acquisition Act, the former appeal being from L. A. R. No. 776 of 1973 of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam and the latter from the decision of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Mavelikara in L. A. R. 31 of 1974. The question that arose for decision in L. A. R. No. 776 of 1973, which question is now before this Court in the appeal is based on the claim by the appellant that he should have been paid compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land on which he was running a photographic studio for many years. He had been evicted from the business premises thereby resulting in loss of earnings to him. According to him he was a tenant of the premises for a quarter of a century and though he is now thrown out he was paid only a nominal sum as compensation by way of shifting charges. He claims that he has been denied the legitimate compensation due to him under the provisions of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The learned judge did not accept his case for compensation, evidently since the learned judge did not find any provision under which such compensation could be awarded. He refers to lack of precedent which enabled him to award compensation. The decision of the Calcutta High Court cited before the learned judge did not, according to the judge, apply to the facts of the case. The result was that the appellant substantially failed in his claim for compensation. We say, substantially, because what was awarded was only a sum of Rs. 75/- and that was by way of shifting charges. In the appeal, he has challenged the decision of the court below and for the purpose of jurisdiction, he has valued the revised claim Rs. 22,420/-. But court-fee of only Rs. 10/-has been paid and the provision applicable has been shown as Schedule II, Art 3(iii) A (1)(a) of the Court Fees Act, 1960. In the appeal, he has challenged the decision of the court below and for the purpose of jurisdiction, he has valued the revised claim Rs. 22,420/-. But court-fee of only Rs. 10/-has been paid and the provision applicable has been shown as Schedule II, Art 3(iii) A (1)(a) of the Court Fees Act, 1960. It is S.51 of the Court Fees Act that is applicable and the Office noticed that ad valorem fee had to be paid on the amount to be claimed. That having not been paid, the matter has come up for hearing. 2. In the other appeal, there is a dispute as to the extent of the property acquired. The court accepted the case of the extent as urged by the State and awarded compensation on that basis. The rate at which the land was valued is not in dispute. But the dispute concerns the finding of the Subordinate Judge that compensation will be awarded for 3.65 acres of land only which was the extent acquired by the State while the claimant was given liberty to take possession of any land in excess of the red shaded plot marked in the plan produced by the State and do whatever he liked with regard to that land. There is also a further observation in the judgment that the claimant was given liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings against the respondent-State for getting the compensation for the excess land if any, taken by the respondent over and above the land shown in red colour in the plan attached to the decree. The appellant's case here is that the directions made in the judgment, which have been adverted to just now, are incompetent and virtually what the learned judge bad done was to abdicate his function to decide the extent of the land acquired and, therefore, what is in dispute is not actually the quantum of compensation but the impropriety of the impugned directions in the judgment. 3. It is the contention of the learned counsel Sri. Manual T. Paikaday, appearing in both these appeals that there is no dispute as to the amount of compensation as such in these appeals and the subject-matter of the appeals cannot be said to be any particular sum of money claimed by the appellants in these cases. 3. It is the contention of the learned counsel Sri. Manual T. Paikaday, appearing in both these appeals that there is no dispute as to the amount of compensation as such in these appeals and the subject-matter of the appeals cannot be said to be any particular sum of money claimed by the appellants in these cases. In the proceedings before the Subordinate Judge's Court though no compensation has been allowed to the appellant in regard to loss of earnings, its failure to find that the appellant was entitled to such earning is challenged in the appeal and hence the challenge is said to be not to the quantum. The learned counsel would contend that the quantum would automatically follow when once the right is determined. It is more so in the other appeal where there is not even any dispute as to the rate of value per cent for the land. Therefore, in that case, if the claim of the appellant that larger area was acquired was accepted, what exactly was the relief to be granted in terms of money had only to be worked out and, therefore quantum was not a matter which called for adjudication. Hence according to the learned counsel, in both these cases the subject-matter is not any specific amount but is only an adjudication of the right of the appellants to get compensation. That being the case, it is contended that S.51 which deals with a claim for specific amount does not arise. 4. S.51 of the Court Fees Act may be adverted to with advantage. That reads: "The fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purposes shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant." It may be profitable to refer to S.52 in this context, for, that section refers to the terms 'subject-matter of the appeal', a term on which considerable emphasis was placed in the course of the argument in these two proceedings. That section without the proviso and the explanations which may not be necessary for the purpose of these cases reads: "The fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject-matter of the appeal:" Therefore, when an appeal under S.52 is before Court and the question of payment of court fee on the appeal arises for consideration, we have necessarily to determine what exactly the subject-matter of the appeal is. We are called upon to apply S.51 here and we shall confine our consideration to that section. It is agreed that the memoranda of appeal before us are against the decisions relating to compensation under the law for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purposes. That being the case, the fee shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. An award in proceedings by way of reference to the Court would arise on a claim made by the parties. If a party is not satisfied with the amount awarded, a right of appeal is conferred on him which he could exercise. The amount awarded may in some cases be nil and even in such cases, a person may claim that some amount should have been awarded S.51 provides for the payment of the Court fee on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed which difference in the particular instance would be the amount claimed, for, no amount was awarded at all. The court may award a lesser amount than the amount claimed or direct that no amount need be paid for sufficient reason. The real attack is against the failure to award what has been claimed. In other words, in determining the court-fee, what the court is primarily concerned with is the relief sought by the person and not the reason why the Court of first instance refused to award the amount claimed or in some cases any amount at all. 5. In the case before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam, the amount claimed by way of compensation for loss of earnings was refused for the reason that the court did not find any provision which enabled the appellant to succeed in his claim. May be the reason is good or may be it is bad. 5. In the case before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam, the amount claimed by way of compensation for loss of earnings was refused for the reason that the court did not find any provision which enabled the appellant to succeed in his claim. May be the reason is good or may be it is bad. But the result is that the petitioner did not get any amount awarded on this count and if, according to him, he was entitled to any particular sum and for that purpose, he seeks relief from this Court, it cannot be said since he really seeks only an adjudication from this Court that he is entitled to claim compensation by way of loss of earnings, no court-fee need be paid. S.51, according to us, provides that if he makes a claim and that has not been allowed in part or in full, he should pay the court-fee on that part of the monetary claim that is pursued in the appeal. That is what is expressed by the words in S.51. In the case before the Subordinate's Court, Mavelikkara, though the petitioner claimed compensation on the basis that the extent acquired was larger, the court chose to award compensation for a lesser extent. Whether the direction to take possession of 'the rest of the area in independent proceedings was right may arise for decision in the appeal. But the relief that the petitioner could obtain in the appeal is based on his success in claiming compensation for the entire extent. If S.51 is applied, the appellant is to pay court-fee on the difference between the amount awarded as compensation and the amount, which, according to him, is due as compensation if he succeeds in the appeal. 6. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the High Court of Madras in S. Appavoo Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition Town Planning (1964 (II) MLJ. 487). That was a case where the question of payment of court-fee arose in an appeal under S.6 (41 (a) of the Madras Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, XI of 1954. 487). That was a case where the question of payment of court-fee arose in an appeal under S.6 (41 (a) of the Madras Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, XI of 1954. S.6 of the Act lays down that the amount payable as compensation shall be lesser of the two amounts: (1) an amount equal to five times the net annual average income derived from such land during the period of five consecutive years immediately preceding the publication of the notice: (2) the amount that would have been payable as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 in respect of such land, had such land been acquired under that Act After holding an enquiry in the prescribed manner, the amounts contemplated by S.6 are determined and under sub-section 3 of S.6, a notice has to be published in the Gazette setting out the amount so determined and calling upon every person interested to intimate before a specified date whether such person agrees to the amounts determined and if not, what amount he claims to be the net average annual income or the amount that would be payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is in that context that a provision has been made for an appeal from such determination That enables any person who does not agree to the amount of the net average annual income or to the amount that would have been payable as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and claims a sum in excess of that amount, to prefer an appeal. It was the question of court-fee payable in such an appeal that arose for consideration. Whether S.51 of the Court-Fees Act would apply to such a case had to be decided. The court preferred to S.8 (1) of the Madras Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, XI of 1954 which provided for the actual tendering of the amount computed to be the amount of compensation payable to the persons entitled. The offer of the amount under S 8 (1) of the Madras Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act was understood by the court to be in the nature of an award, but not so the determination of the amount of net average annual income and the amount that would have been payable as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The offer of the amount under S 8 (1) of the Madras Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act was understood by the court to be in the nature of an award, but not so the determination of the amount of net average annual income and the amount that would have been payable as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the Court noticed the essential distinction between the language employed in S.6 (3) and S.8 (1) of the Act. Since the offer made under S.6 (3) was not an award, there was no question of any amount having been awarded by the State at that stage. If that be the case there would be no question of applying S.51. Reference was made to the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, relating to compulsory acquisition of land where a person in whose favour an award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, which award was taken to be in the nature of an offer being entitled to move for reference without payment of court-fee. The appeal provided under S.6 (4) (a) of the Madras Slum Improvement Act, XI of 1954 was taken to be something akin to the right of a claimant under the Land Acquisition Act moving for reference to the Court without payment of court-fee. We therefore feel justified in observing that the decision of the Madras High Court will be of no assistance to the appellants in these cases in support of their contentions. 7. We do not think that any assistance will be derived from a consideration of the scope of the term "subject-matter". As we are not concerned with the interpretation of the term "subject-matter" appearing in S.52 of the Act, we do not advert to the decisions on this aspect. 8. We hold that in these two cases, the appellants are bound to pay court-fee on the amount of claims made in the respective memoranda of appeal. In the case of the first of the two appeals, the claim is for a sum of Rs. 22,420/-and the other Rs. 3,520/-. Ad valoram fee has to be paid on these amounts. Time for payment of court-fee-two weeks. The office has further noticed in the appeal against the decision of the Second Additional Sub Judge, Ernakulam in L A. R. No. 776 of 1973 that counsel for the appellant has not filed his vakkalath . 22,420/-and the other Rs. 3,520/-. Ad valoram fee has to be paid on these amounts. Time for payment of court-fee-two weeks. The office has further noticed in the appeal against the decision of the Second Additional Sub Judge, Ernakulam in L A. R. No. 776 of 1973 that counsel for the appellant has not filed his vakkalath . He has filed a statement that he had filed his vakkalath before the Subordinate Judge and his contention is that that vakkalath authorised him to appear before this Court. For the present, the argument is accepted. If, at the final hearing, any objection is taken on this point, it will be considered then. The office may direct the lower court to send up the vakkalath of the party filed in the lower court along with the other records of the case.