Abdul Wahab v. District Judge, Meerut — 1976 DIGILAW 267 (ALL)

JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a landlord's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 6-2-1974 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) passed by the District Judge, Meerut allowing the tenant's appeal and cancelling the release order which was passed in the petitioner's favour by the prescribed Authority. 2. Before proceeding to deal with the facts of the case I want to make it clear that the counsel for the parties canvassed before me many important questions of law some of which had not been actually raised before respondents No. 1 and 3. However, since I felt that on the facts of the case those points emerged for consideration I permitted both parties to argue the same before me and I purpose to adjudicate upon the various questions of law posed by them. 3. The dispute relates to house No. 65, Purwa Jadid, Shapir Gate situate in the City of Meerut. It consists of two floors, the ground floor and the first floor. According to the averments in the petition, on the ground floor there are two living rooms, kitchen and dobari with open land and another room which is used as shop. On the first floor there is one room (over the room on the ground floor which is utilised as shop) and there is yet another room (over the kitchen and dobari on the ground floor). The respondent No. 3 is the tenant of the shop on the ground floor. The petitioner made an application for release under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), inter alia on the ground that his third son had completed his training in embroidery work and was doing embroidery work on the first floor in the room over the shop and he had to be settled in that business but the same could not be commenced for want of sufficient accommodation. It was further asserted that another son of the landlord, namely, Abdul Sattar, also wanted to start embroidery business but it was not possible for him to materialise the project unless he had adequate accommodation at his disposal. It was further asserted that another son of the landlord, namely, Abdul Sattar, also wanted to start embroidery business but it was not possible for him to materialise the project unless he had adequate accommodation at his disposal. It is pleaded on behalf of the petitioner that in the application under Section 21 of the Act it was stated that the entire building in dispute was a residential building, a portion of which on the ground floor was being used as a shop by respondent No. 3. The applicant stated in the application that he actually resided in the same house alongwith his family consisting of himself, his wife, daughters-in-law and their five children. The written statement was filed before the Prescribed Authority by respondent No. 3 denying the allegation made by the petitioner and alleging that the third son of the petitioner was also carrying on business with him, that it was false that he had to be established in some separate business along with his brother Abdul Sattar and that the alleged need of the landlord with regard to the accommodation in dispute, namely, the shop on the ground floor in the occupation of the tenant was not genuine or bonafide. 4. The Prescribed Authority by its order dated 14-9-1973 came to the conclusion that the petitioner had established his genuine need for setting his sons in the shop in dispute which was separately numbered as shop No. 67. It, however, denied the benefit of Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 of the Act to the landlord and held that it was applicable to the facts of the case inasmuch as it applied only to a residential building whereas the building sought to be vacated was a shop. Aggrieved by that order respondent No. 3 went up in appeal and the learned District Judge set aside the release order made by the Prescribed Authority and held that the landlord's need was neither genuine nor pressing. He, however, applied wrong criteria to the decision of the case by instituting a comparison between the needs of the landlord and those of the tenant and being influenced by the consideration that the tenant's hardship in case of grant of the release application would be greater than the landlord's hardship resulting from refusal of the release order. He, however, applied wrong criteria to the decision of the case by instituting a comparison between the needs of the landlord and those of the tenant and being influenced by the consideration that the tenant's hardship in case of grant of the release application would be greater than the landlord's hardship resulting from refusal of the release order. The Appellate Authority did not go into the question as to whether Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 to Section 21 of the Act was applicable to the instant case. It is this order passed by the Appellate Authority on 6-2-1974 which has been impugned in the writ petition. 5. The principal contention raised by Sri L.P. Naithani on behalf of the petitioner before me was that Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 to Section 21(1) of the Act was fully attracted on the facts of the present case and since the petitioner was already in occupation of a part of the building for residential purposes, it was conclusive proof that the building was bonafide required by him. The respondents' contention, on the other hand, was that on a proper construction of Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 the conclusion must be irresistible that the present case was not covered by it. Therefore, the first important question which calls for consideration is the interpretation of Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 and its applicability to the facts of the present case. As a counter blast to the strong reliance placed by the petitioner on Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 Sri Ashok Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents, raised another question of law which was not mooted before respondent No. 1 and 2, which, if accepted, would be sufficient to defeat the landlord's case on a preliminary ground. The respondents' counsel placed reliance on the third proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act which shall be quoted hereafter. 6. I first propose to deal with the argument relating to Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 to Section 21(1) of the Act. The respondents' counsel placed reliance on the third proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act which shall be quoted hereafter. 6. I first propose to deal with the argument relating to Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 to Section 21(1) of the Act. Explanation 1 opening with the words "in the case of a residential building" consists of four clause and is reproduced below : (i) where the tenant or any member of his family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained. (ii) where the landlord was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment, away from the city municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate by reason of the cessation of such engagement, he needs the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of Clause (a); (iii) where the landlord is a member of the armed forces of the Union and the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1975 has issued a certificate in his favour that he is serving under special condition within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act, then his representation that he needs the building for residential purposes for members of his family whose particulars are specified in the application shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of Clause (a); (iv) the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building, the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bonafide required by the landlord." The key to the interpretation of Clause (iv) is provided by the opening words juxtaposed with the title of the Explanation. Therefore, we have to ascertain precisely the meaning which should be assigned to the term "residential building" occurring in the caption of the Explanation. It is a common place of experience that a large under of buildings are of a mixed variety, they belong to the twilight region in the sense that they are neither exclusively residential nor used solely for business purposes. It is a common place of experience that a large under of buildings are of a mixed variety, they belong to the twilight region in the sense that they are neither exclusively residential nor used solely for business purposes. Therefore, it is not possible to fit the term "residential building into a Procrustean bed and treat a building purely as residential, or non-residential. In a majority of cases both kinds of user would be found inter-mixed and, therefore, the only pragmatic test which can be applied for ascertaining its character is the dominant nature of the user. Substantially the same principle has been adopted by Courts in interpreting similar words when they have come in for construction in connection with other statutes. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. 3 of 1947) which has been replaced by the present Act was enacted to control the letting and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom. The word "accommodation" was defined by Section 2(a) of that Act as meaning residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building etc. but not including any accommodation used as a factory or for an industrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the building was also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. It is clear from the statutory definition that the protected category of accommodation was residential and non-residential building or part of a building and not business in that context. The controversy, therefore, arose as to what would be the criteria for determining whether a building was demised for an industrial purpose. The test formulated by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, 1975 Rent Control Reporter 712 : 1976 Supreme Court Cases 128, was in these words : "In this sense, the dominant intention must be to lease the building qua building. If that be the intention, the rent control law protects. The test formulated by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, 1975 Rent Control Reporter 712 : 1976 Supreme Court Cases 128, was in these words : "In this sense, the dominant intention must be to lease the building qua building. If that be the intention, the rent control law protects. On the other hand, if a going undertaking such as a running or ready-to-launch and fully equipped cinema house is covered by the provision, the emphasis is not so much on the building but on the business, actual or imminent." "How then do we distinguish between a lease of a business or industry housed in a building from a building which has fixtures for more beneficial enjoyment ? The former is a protected 'accommodation' while the later is left for free market operation. In the present case we have to visualise what was the dominant or decisive component of the transaction between the parties, the tenancy of the building qua building or the taking-over of a cinema house as a business, the projectors, furniture, fitting and annexes being the moving factor, the building itself playing a secondary, though necessary, role in the calculations of the parties. Going by the rental apportioned, it is obvious that the parties stressed the cinema equipment as by for the more important Judging by the fact that there had already been a cinema in this house for several years, with the necessary certificates under the various statutes for running a cinema theatre obtained by the landlord and that the lease itself was to commence only from the date of the first show of the films, doubts regarding the essential object and subject of the bargain stand dispelled. The mere circumstance that the licence for showing films was taken by the tenant is of little consequence as the law itself requires it to be in his name. The further circumstance that the term of the lease in one case may vary from the other also where, as here, two deeds are executed, is not a telling factor, in view of the clear admission by Counsel for the respondent that the two lease deeds together constituted a single transaction and that the lease was for an industrial purpose, to wit, running a cinema business. The conspirator of factors - no one circumstance taken by itself-thus settles the issue in favour of the landlord who contends that what has been granted is a lease of a cinema business and, at any rate, the real the intent of the parties to the lease was to demise primarily the cinema equipment and secondarily the building, the lease itself being a composite one." 7. In my opinion the same rule of the 'dominant intent' or primary purpose must govern the decision with regard to the legal character or category of a building for the purposes of the present Act. To determine whether a building is a residential building or otherwise no single factor taken by itself can be conclusive; it is the concatenation of factors which would in the end determine its real character. If it is used by and large for residential purpose and only a small or insignificant portion is put to business use, the building must be characterised as residential because the former user is the principal one and the latter is secondary or incidental. The vice versa is also true. If most of the building is being put to a commercial use and a little portion of the same is utilised for residential purpose also, the latter user will be only secondary or incidental and certainly ancillary to the cardinal purpose, namely, business for which the accommodation is being utilised. Ultimately the authority concerned will have to take it to consideration all the relevant factors existing in a particular case and then arrive at a finding as to whether the building as a whole can be assigned the label of residential. 8. Another important aspect for construing Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 to Section 21 of the Act is whether the opening words or the Explanation, namely "residential building" are referable to the totality of the building or that part of the building or accommodation which is in the tenancy of the tenant against whom release is sought. 8. Another important aspect for construing Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 to Section 21 of the Act is whether the opening words or the Explanation, namely "residential building" are referable to the totality of the building or that part of the building or accommodation which is in the tenancy of the tenant against whom release is sought. Sri Ashok Gupta for the respondents vehemently argued that this term must be given a consistent and uniform meaning throughout the whole gamut of the section and it would be against the canons of the statutory interpretation to assign it one meaning for the purpose of Clause (iv) of the Explanation 1 and another meaning where the same term is considered for the purpose of interpreting Clause (ii) of the third proviso which runs as under : "Provided also that no application under Clause (a) shall be entertained in the case of any residential building, for occupation for business purposes." On the other hand, Sri L.P. Naithani appearing for the petitioner contended that the words "residential building" can legitimately hear two different connotations within the same section. I am inclined to agree with the submission of Sri Naithani that the opening words of the Explanation which is followed by Clause (iv) must be interpreted as relating to the total building or the structure whereas the same words occurring again in Clause (ii) of the proviso must be confined to the accommodation under tenancy of a tenant who is sought to be evicted. This conclusion cannot be resisted if the scheme and purpose of the Act are carefully examined. Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 manifestly confers a special advantage or benefit on the landlord who wants to evict a tenant. Certain protection is given to him when he happens to occupy for residential purposes a part of the building of which another part is in the occupation of the tenant. Obviously, the desirability of the benefit to be conferred on the landlord in this situation can be properly decided only by taking stock of the whole building or structure. If consideration is confined to the accommodation in tenancy, Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 would become a dead letter and would really serve no purpose. Obviously, the desirability of the benefit to be conferred on the landlord in this situation can be properly decided only by taking stock of the whole building or structure. If consideration is confined to the accommodation in tenancy, Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 would become a dead letter and would really serve no purpose. If a building as a whole was predominantly used for residential purpose and the landlord also occupied a portion of such building for residential purpose the Legislature considered it advisable to accept his request for release of additional accommodation and, therefore, enjoined that a conclusive presumption must be raised in such circumstances that it was bonafide required by the landlord. This kind of extraordinary privilege conferred upon a class of persons, namely, landlords must be confined to cases where the dominant character of the building as such is in keeping with the purpose for which the landlord is also using part of it. For applying Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 the totality of the building has to be examined. According to Sri Ashok Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents the words "in the case of a residential building" mentioned as the title of the Explanation should be referable only to the accommodation in the tenancy of the tenant. I am unable to accede to this contention. Firstly, in Clause (iv) of the Explanation it is expressly provided as a condition precedent that the building under tenancy is a part of the building, the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord. Therefore, so far as the accommodation in the tenancy is concerned, that is material and relevant only when construing the language of Clause (iv). If the same meaning were to be assigned to the words "residential building" occurring at the outset to the Explanation the Legislature would not have mentioned the phrased "the building under tenancy" the Clause (iv). Thus, it is quite clear that while employing those words at the beginning of the Explanation some different meaning was intended from the meaning which has been expressly incorporated in the opening words of Clause (iv) itself. 9. Secondly, the Act obviously did not intend to place a blanket ban on a release application by a landlord with respect to a residential building as such. 9. Secondly, the Act obviously did not intend to place a blanket ban on a release application by a landlord with respect to a residential building as such. Section 21(1)(a) contemplates release of a building in favour of a landlord on either of the two grounds i.e. either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling. The term 'building' is defined in Section 3(i) of the Act as meaning "a residential or non-residential roofed structure." The object of a proviso can only be to carve out an exception in the field covered by a substantive provision of the statute and not to destroy the field of its application altogether. Therefore, if a release application was to be thrown out on the ground that the building as a whole was a residential building, then the scope of Section 21 itself would be circumscribed in a manner not intended by the Legislature. Its utility would be rendered to half or even less, as it would rule out release applications relating to all buildings which can be characterised as "residential". Take an instance, the landlord own a building which is occupied by two tenants who used it for residential purposes and there is a third tenant also who occupies a shop in which he carries on business. The building due to the dominant user to which I have already adverted would be primarily a residential building. In such a case if the landlord applied for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act of the shop used by the third tenant for business purpose the application would not be thrown out on the ground that since the whole building bears the character of a residential building an application for release for business purpose is not maintainable in view of clause (ii) of the third proviso. There cannot be any rational basis for rejecting a release application of this kind and the Legislature surely could not have intended to prohibit the release of accommodation to the landlord for business purposes when the accommodation in question was itself being used by the tenant for business purposes. There cannot be any rational basis for rejecting a release application of this kind and the Legislature surely could not have intended to prohibit the release of accommodation to the landlord for business purposes when the accommodation in question was itself being used by the tenant for business purposes. That is why the Legislature in its wisdom limited this preliminary embargo to case where an accommodation in the occupation of a tenant was used for residential purposes and as a residential building in that sense and the landlord wanted to alter its use for business purposes. It the tenant used the accommodation in his tenancy for business purposes, the Act did not prohibit the landlord from claiming release on the ground of his bonafide need, despite the fact that the building as a whole was of a residential nature. 10. The central ideas appear to permeate the entire Act like subterranean currents and can be safely gleaned from its various provisions. Firstly, the framers of the Act whenever they use such term as "residential building" or "non-residential building" they appear to have intended them to be understood in a pragmatic sense and not like two completely exclusive categories. In other words, such expressions must be meant to be applied in accordance with the dominant use to which a building is put. The second idea which is writ large in the Act is that the user of a building or residential purposes has been placed on a higher footing than the user for non-residential purposes such as business etc. These two preliminary points must govern our interpretation of the various provisions of the Act. It has already been seen that clause (iv) of Explanation 1 has given a very substantial protection to the landlord only where he is occupying the remaining part of a building for what I have described as a dominantly residential purpose. The Legislature appears to have intended similar protection to a tenant who was occupying a building for residential purposes. The idea seems to be that no landlord should be permitted for personal aggrandisement to evict a tenant who is in occupation of the disputed accommodation for residential purpose and no person should live without a roof over his head. The Legislature appears to have intended similar protection to a tenant who was occupying a building for residential purposes. The idea seems to be that no landlord should be permitted for personal aggrandisement to evict a tenant who is in occupation of the disputed accommodation for residential purpose and no person should live without a roof over his head. It is wholly inconsistent with these two central ideas present in the whole Act what clause (ii) of the third proviso should also be construed to mean that a tenant who is using an accommodation in his tenancy for business purpose should not be deprived of the same where the avowed purpose of the landlord is also to use it after eviction for business purpose and not for residential purpose. In this context it will be wholy besides the point to regard the words "residential building" in clause (ii) of the third proviso as meaning the whole-building or structure. It is a consideration of the compelling need of the tenancy for his own residence who is likely to be deprived of the same they an adverse order under Section 21 which must have been responsible for the enactment of the third proviso with clause 2 thereof. What is the nature of the building as a whole or the purpose for which the entire edifice is being used by the landlord or by other tenants has obviously no bearing on the fate of the tenant who is likely to be affected in proceedings under Section 21. It is only to save him from being obliged to fore go an accommodation which is essential for the pare continuance of his residence that clause (ii) of the third proviso has been introduced in the Act and, therefore, in this content this meaning is the only appropriate meaning which must be given to the words any "residential building". 11. I am also not impressed by the rigid bar of the rule of statutory construction urged by the respondents' counsel. He submitted that the same meaning must necessarily be assigned to the same words occurring in different parts of the statute. No doubt, the general presumption is that a consistent meaning should be given to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act but the rule is by no means rigid or inflexible. He submitted that the same meaning must necessarily be assigned to the same words occurring in different parts of the statute. No doubt, the general presumption is that a consistent meaning should be given to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act but the rule is by no means rigid or inflexible. It the exigencies of the situation demand a contrary construction, the same must be accepted without demur. It is observed in Craise on Stature Law (Sixth Edition) at page 168-69 that "the presumption that the same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight and it is proper, if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act. The rigidity of the rule of assigning the same meaning to the words was criticised by Fry, U.J. in Re. Moody and Yates' Contract, (1885) 30 Ch. D. 344, thus : "A word is used accurately in one section of a statute it must not be assumed to have been used inaccurately when it occurs in another section of the same statute. And in fact a word may be used in two different senses in the same section of an Act." 12. 'It is obvious" said North J. Re. Smith Green v. Smith, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 672, "that the word 'property' is used in Section 54 of the repealed Bankruptcy Act, 1869, in the totally different senses." This cannon of construction that different meanings may be accepted depending upon the context in which the words occur is so well established that it has now become very common for Legislatures to insert in the interpretation clause of every Act such words as "unless a contrary intention appears", "unless the test otherwise requires" or other similar words. The variation in context may be spelt out either in different parts of an Act or even within different parts of the section. Ultimately it is the particular situation which a specific provision in the section is intended to cover which must be determinative of the meaning to be assigned to the words used in that particular part of the section. Ultimately it is the particular situation which a specific provision in the section is intended to cover which must be determinative of the meaning to be assigned to the words used in that particular part of the section. When it is clearly conceivable that two different situations are contemplated by two different provisions within the same section occurring, close to each other, there is nothing to reject the two different meanings being proposed with regard to the same expression. Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 and clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21(1)(a) are in my opinion applicable to two distinct and different situations and, therefore, the very context justifies different constructions being put on the words 'residential building' as they occur in these provisions respectively. 13. The other submission of the respondents with regard to clause (iv) was that the words "remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purpose should be so strictly construed as to exclude its application to a case where any portion of the remaining part of the building occupied by the landlord was used for purpose other than residential. I am unable to accept this contention either. As I have already observed, the building may be partly residential and partly non-residential and, therefore, the words "residential purposes" have not to be construed liberally but it is the dominant purpose of the user which must be held as conclusive. In this context also I am inclined to adopt the governing rule of dominant user evolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Dwarka Prasad (supra). Where the major portion of the building occupied by the landlord is being used primarily for residential purposes, then the insignificant portion thereof used for other purposes will not move convert the building into one for non-residential purposes than a single swallow can make a summer. Taking a practical view of the matter it is only the primary or dominant user which must determine the legal complexion of a building as residential or non-residential. Taking a practical view of the matter it is only the primary or dominant user which must determine the legal complexion of a building as residential or non-residential. The crux of clause (iv) of Explanation 1 is the compactness of the two parts of the building and if that particular test is satisfied and the two accommodations can be deemed to constitute single unit for purposes of allotment no account of their being vitally and integrally connected with each other, clause (iv) would be attracted notwithstanding the fact that some portion of the building in the occupation of the landlord may be used for non-residential purpose. The essence of clause (iv) is the close identity between the two accommodations born of proximity or enjoyment of certain common facilities and amenities and not merely a minor deviation from the norms of user for residential purposes. The anomalous position which a strict construction suggested by the respondents would lead to can be demonstrated by numerous examples. 14. In Purshottam Dass v. The VIII Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad, Civil Misc. Writ No. 335 of 1975 decided by me on 2-2-1976 in which I had occasion to deal with this aspect of clause (iv) of Explanation 1, I observed :- "When the word 'building is used for the second time in explanation (iv) the words should be construed as signifying an accommodation. If this restricted construction were not adopted, it would lead to an absurd position. These words are immediately followed by the words "the remaining part whereof". If "building" occurring in the second and third places were identified with the whole structure or edifice, the explanation would be completely excluded unless the entire remaining portion of the building irrespective of contiguity etc. was in the exclusive occupation of the landlord. This would be manifestly unjust. To take an illustration, if a building consists of twenty rooms out of which eighteen are occupied by the landlord himself, one by a tenant against whom an application under Section 21 has been made and another occupied by another, tenant, it cannot be said that the remaining part of the building is in the occupation of the landlord alone. The remaining part would be in the occupation of the landlord besides one other tenant. The remaining part would be in the occupation of the landlord besides one other tenant. Still, however, if the room occupied by the landlord is contiguous to the one in dispute or approachable through a common passage, or a common latrine, bath room etc. have to be shared by the inmates of the two, there is no reason why the landlord should not be able to invoke the benefit of explanation (iv)". "Similarly, if the words 'part of a building' are equated with the whole building or structure, it may in certain cases give undue benefit to the landlord which would not be justified. Again, to take an illustration, if a building consists of 20 rooms out of which the room in dispute is situate at one extremity of the building and another room at the other extremity is occupied by the landlord and the remaining 18 rooms are occupied by different tenants and there is nothing in common between the two rooms at the respective extremities the landlord cannot successfully invoke the benefit of Explanation (iv), even though he is literally in occupation of a part of the same building. Where the portion in dispute sought to be vacated is a small or insignificant portion and there is no vital link between the two portions except that they are parts of the same big building, it would be highly unjust to give any special protection to the landlord and make such accidental factor conclusive proof of his bonafide requirement. It would be wholly repugnant to the spirit of the Act." It was further observed by me. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that since one of the two rooms in dispute was admittedly used by the landlord as a shop, explanation (iv) would be ruled out. This contention must be rejected. Once the preliminary conditions for the applicability of explanation (iv) are fulfilled, any superfluous factor can be safely omitted. The use of the outer room as a shop is a wholly irrelevant factor. Therefore, I am of opinion that the prescribed authority and the learned District Judge arrived at the right conclusion. "The Courts must naturally lean in favour of a reasonable construction and not a literal interpretation which can commend itself only to a finickly grammarian. The use of the outer room as a shop is a wholly irrelevant factor. Therefore, I am of opinion that the prescribed authority and the learned District Judge arrived at the right conclusion. "The Courts must naturally lean in favour of a reasonable construction and not a literal interpretation which can commend itself only to a finickly grammarian. Hence, clause (iv) will be attracted when the landlord is substantially using the remaining part of the building for residential purposes." 15. In short, before giving the benefit of clause (iv) of Explanation I of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act to a landlord the authority concerned must be satisfied on the following points : (a) That the building or the structure as a whole is a residential building. (b) That the totality of the entire building is used dominantly for residential purposes. (c) That the accommodation in dispute and the one in occupation of the landlord are so vitally connected with each other either on account of their proximity or the sharing of common amenities etc. that they can be said to constitute one independent allottable unit or accommodation. (d) That in the independent allottable unit or accommodation the portion occupied by the landlord is used by him primarily for residential purposes. (e) It is not necessary that the landlord should be literally in occupation of the remaining part of the entire building or structure; what is intended is that in that independent unit of accommodation, apart from the portion sought to be vacated, the remaining portion must be in the occupation of the landlord. 16. Another subsidiary argument addressed by Sri Ashok Gupta with regard to clause (iv) of Explanation 1 was that it would not be applicable to a case where a landlord sought release of the building for non-residential purposes such as business purposes. In substance this argument amounts to asking the Court to supply the words "for residential purposes" at the end of clause (iv). Sri Ashok Gupta attempted to fortify his submission by referring to clause (ii) and (iii) of Explanation 1. It was suggested that in clauses (ii) and (iii) special protection was given to the landlord where he needed the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes and clause (iv) is in 'pari material' with clauses (ii) and (iii). This argument is not well-founded. It was suggested that in clauses (ii) and (iii) special protection was given to the landlord where he needed the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes and clause (iv) is in 'pari material' with clauses (ii) and (iii). This argument is not well-founded. The Legislature has expressly used the words "for occupation by himself for residential purpose" in clause (ii) and clause (iii) but has deliberately omitted that phraseology in clause (iv). It appeals to have been advisedly done by the Legislature in order to provide for some situation contemplated by clauses (ii) and (iii) but absent in the case of clause (iv). The Court should not add words by implication into a statute unless it is absolutely necessary to do so to give the language sense and meaning in its context. The following passage may be quoted which succinctly states the law of construction of statutes In "Craies on Statute Law" Sixth Edition, it is observed at page 109 : "If the meaning of a statute is not plain, it is permissible in certain cases to have recourse to a construction by implication, and to draw inferences or supply obvious omissions. But the general rule is not to import into statutes words which are not to be found there and there are particular purposes for which express language 'is absolutely indispensable. Words 'plainly should not be added by implication into the language of a statute unless it is necessary to do so to give the paragraph sense and meaning in its context.' "It has already stated that if a matter is altogether omitted from a statute, it is clearly not allowable to insert it by implication, for to do so what 'not to be construed the Act of Parliament, but to alter it.' But there the alternative lies between either supplying by implication 'words which appear to have been accidentally omitted' or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply to the words." Thus where the omission is deliberate, a contrary intention must be attributed to the Legislature. For applying Clause (iv) of Explanation 1, therefore, it is wholly irrelevant whether the landlord asks for release for residential use or for non-residential purposes, as for business or shop etc. 17. For applying Clause (iv) of Explanation 1, therefore, it is wholly irrelevant whether the landlord asks for release for residential use or for non-residential purposes, as for business or shop etc. 17. It is manifest that neither the Prescribed Authority nor the Appellate Authority in the instant case was alive to the important questions of law which arose on the pleadings of the parties and without deciding which substantial justice could not be done. The case bristles with most points of law and interpretations which I have dealt with and it is necessary that the case must be remanded and decided after rehearing the parties and taking into consideration the legal aspects of the case. Preliminary points such as whether the building in question is a residential building or not and the remaining part of the building in occupation of the landlord is being used or not for residential purpose, whether the two portions were so connected with each other as to be said form an independent compact unit, etc. have still to be gone into and finding recorded thereon. The learned District Judge also fell into the error of making a compassion between the needs and hardship of the landlord and tenant respectively and refusing the release on that basis. The criterion which has been finally laid down by the full Bench decision of this Court in Chandra Kumar Shan v. The District Judge, 1976 Rent Control Reporter 274 : 1976 A.L.J. 226, is that the release shall be ordered under Section 21(1)(a) after the landlord has established his bonafide and genuine need. It is reported that the Legislature is shortly amending this provision and if the amendment is actually made, a different principle according to the new language employed by the Legislature in the amended provision will govern the cases of release of applications made by landlords. 18. In the result this writ petition is allowed and the order of the respondent No. 1 dated 6-2-1974 passed under Section 21(1) of the Act is quashed and the case is sent back to the Appellate Authority for deciding the appeal afresh after rehearing the parties in the light of the observations made by me above. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.