( 1 ) THE five petitions urder Art. 226 ot the Constitution have been brought up before us as a result rf a reference by a learned single Judge. Since the questions arising are? common to all ot them, they are disposed of by a con men order. ( 2 ) THE material facts in these petitions are briefly as follows:-The petitiorers had served as local candidates in the Ministerial Service of the state for different periods with occasional breaks in service, which are immaterial for the present purpose. ( 3 ) THE State Public Service Commission, hereafter referred to as the commission, by means of a Notification dt. 4-1-1972 invited applications for admission to the competitive examinations held for the purpose of. recruitment to the Ministerial Service (Class III) in various departments of the State Govt. The petitioners had also applied in response to it. They were successful in the said examinations and their names had been included in the lists prepared in that behalf by the Commission for the purpose of appointment to Ministerial Services. ( 4 ) THE Notificaticn cf the Commission had been issued in accordance with the Mysore (new Karnataka) State Civil Services (General Recruitment rules 1957, hereafter referred to as the Rules. According to Cl (b) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 therein, the benefit cf the enhanced age limit for entry into service had been made available to those who were serving temporarily and as local candidates like the petitioners herein, the period of such enhancement being determined on the basis of length of service put in by the candidates as such. It may be mentioned that the said Rule, namely Rule 6 (4) (b) of the Rules, had been introduced by way of an. amendment to the Rules made by the Mysore (now Karnctaka) State civil Services (General Recuritment) (Amendment) Rules, 1971, hereafter referred to as Amendment Rules. ( 5 ) THIS amendment came in for challenge before this Court in certain petitions preferred under Art. 226 cf the Constn on the ground that it was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constn. The petitions were allowed find consequently the said amendment was quashed by the Court in the case of Viswanath v. State of Mysore, (1973) 1 Myslj. 284. 14 and 16 of the Constn. The petitions were allowed find consequently the said amendment was quashed by the Court in the case of Viswanath v. State of Mysore, (1973) 1 Myslj. 284. It was however observed therein that as a consequence of quashing such amendment, the earlier rule, as it stood before such amendment, was not revived, in view of the ruling of this Court in Rudre Gowda v. Anyadj Chikanna, (1972) 1 Myslj. 310 . ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid decision in Viswanath's case (1), the Govt issued an Official Memorandum dt. 14/15th March 1973 (marked Ext. B ). One of the directions in the said Memorandum was tc delete from the select lists prepared by the Public Service Commission the names of candidates who became ineligible for appointment on account of the aforesaid decision of this Court. That is how the petitioners names came to be deleted frcm the lists of selected candidates and they have not been appointed. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the aforesaid Official Memorandum (Ext. B), the petitioners have approached this Court seeking for appropriate reliefs. ( 8 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions urged on behalf of the parties, it is helpful to set out the relevant rule. Rule 6 (4) (b) reads :" (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) the maximum age limit for appointment shall be deemed to be enhanced in the following to the extent mentioned, namely: (a) * * * (b) in the case of a candidate who is or was holding a post linger the Govt or a local authority or a Corporation owned or controlled by the Govt, temporarily, as a local candidate, by the number of years he is or was holding such post: " ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in all the petitions, contended that the decision of this Court in the case of Rudre Gowda v. Angadi Chikkanna (2) was no longer good law in view cf the ruling of the Supreme Court in ihe case of Mahamed Shawkat hussain Khan v. State of A. P. . , AIR. 1974 SC. 1480, and that the result of striking down cl (b) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 6. as amended by the Karnataka State Civil services (General Recruitment) (Amendment) Rules. , AIR. 1974 SC. 1480, and that the result of striking down cl (b) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 6. as amended by the Karnataka State Civil services (General Recruitment) (Amendment) Rules. 1971, was that cl (b) of that sub-rule, as it stood before such amendment was revived. ( 10 ) ON behalf of the respondent-State, Sri B. B. Mandappa, the learned high Corrt Govt Pleader, submitted that the law as laid down by this court in Rudre Gowda's case (2) applied on all fours to the facts of the instant case and that the principled the decision in Mohamed Shaukat hussin Khan's cose (3) was clearly inapplicable, in that the decision therein turned on a principle that the Amendment Act was still-born and, therefore, void frcm its inception and could never have been operative at any time and could not repeal any earlier enactment. ( 11 ) IN the case of Rudre Gowda (2) a Bench of this Court had occassion consider a question similar to the one arising in the case on hand. The facts of that case were: The Mysore Agriculturists Relief Act, 1928, stood repealed by S. 64 (2) cf the Mysore Agricultural Debtors Relief act of 1966. The latter Act subsequently came to be struck down by the court in the case of Thropeswami v. State of Mysore, (1970) 1 Myslj. 43 , on the ground that Ss. 4 and 61 thereof were violative of Art. 14 of the Constn , and that these sections were not severable from the rest of the provisions of that act. Subsequently, in two judgments of this Court rendered by learned single Judges, conflicting views had teen expresse in regard to the question whether consequent upon the judgment in Thippeswamii's case (4), the earlier Mysore Agriculcurists Relief Act, 1928, stood revived and continued to operate. This position resulted in a reference being made to the division Bench. The Divisicn Bench, placing reliance princinaliy on the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. N. Tewari v. Union of India, AIR. This position resulted in a reference being made to the division Bench. The Divisicn Bench, placing reliance princinaliy on the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. N. Tewari v. Union of India, AIR. 1965 SC, 1430, held that the repealed Act would not revive and observed thus :"as long us the competence of the Legislature to repeal the earlier acts is not questioned, lull effect will have to be given to the provision relating to the repeal of earlier Acts and as already stated it spent itself out immediately it came into force and there was nothing thereafter in S. 64 (repealing provision) for the Court to strike down. " ( 12 ) THE facts in Tiwari's case (5) were concerned with two orders made by the Union Govt relating to what has come to be known as 'carry forward' rule in the context of reservations of posts in civil services made in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in exercise of the power conferred by Art. 16 (4) of the Constn. The first order had been made in 1952 and the second modifying the earlier one, in 1955. The latter order was struck down by the Supreme Court on the ground of its unconstitutionality by the decision in the case of Devadasan v. Union of India, AIR. 1964 SC 179. It was contended in Tiwari's case (5) that as a result of the decision in devadasan's case (6) the earlier 'carry forward' rule of 1952 did not stand revived as a result of which there would be no 'carry forward' rule in existence. The Supreme Court upheld this contention but denied relief to the petitioner therein on another ground with which we are not concerned for the present. The relevant observation reads :"the carry forward rule of 1952 was substituted by the carry forward rule 1955. On this substitution the carry forward rule of 1952 clearly ceased to exist because its place was taken by the carry forward rule in 1955. Thus by promulgating the new carry forward rule in 1955 the Govt of India itself cancelled the carry forward rule of 1952. On this substitution the carry forward rule of 1952 clearly ceased to exist because its place was taken by the carry forward rule in 1955. Thus by promulgating the new carry forward rule in 1955 the Govt of India itself cancelled the carry forward rule of 1952. When, therefore, this Court struck down the carry forward rule as modified in 1955 that did not mean that the cany forward rule of 1952 which had already ceased to exist, because the Govt of India itself cancelled it and substituted a modified rule in 1955 in its place, could revive. " ( 13 ) BUT it is however contended for the petitioners that in view of the subsequent decision ot the Supreme Court in Mohamed Shaukat hussain Khan's Case (3), the decision in Rudre Gowda's case (2) must be held to be no longer good law and, therefore, impliedly over-ruled. We are not persuaded to agree with this contention. ( 14 ) THE material facts in Mohamed Shaukat Hussain Khan's case (3), briefly are: the appellant therein was an Inamdar in the former State of Hyderabad. By virtue of the Hyderabad Inams Abolition Act, 1955 (Act 8 of 1955) the inams granted to him vested in the Government. Thereafter, the Government discontinued payment of Baithak of Sendhi shops and tree tax under the wrong impression that the said Act prohibited such payments. On April 20, 1956 the said Act was amended by Act 10 of 1956 whereby the provisions relating to payment of compensation were superseded while those relating to vesting continued in force. It had however been provided in the Act that the provisions relating to compensation were to come into force on and from a notified date, which, however, had not been done even after a lapse of three years. The appellant had challenged these Acts as unconstitutional on several grounds. Ultimately the said proceedings reached the Supreme Court by way of an appeal. ( 15 ) WHEN the said appeal had been pending before the Supreme court, the State Legislature passed the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) abolition of Inams Act (Act 9 of 1967) whereby the earlier Act 8 of 1955 as amended by Act 10 of 1956 was repealed and vested all the Inams in the Government retrospectively from July 20, 1955. ( 15 ) WHEN the said appeal had been pending before the Supreme court, the State Legislature passed the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) abolition of Inams Act (Act 9 of 1967) whereby the earlier Act 8 of 1955 as amended by Act 10 of 1956 was repealed and vested all the Inams in the Government retrospectively from July 20, 1955. This Act was challenged both before the Supreme Court and the High Court by means of writ petitions The High Court quashed the said Act for unconstitutionally and the State allowed the matter to rest there. In regard to the writ petition filed before the Supreme Court, the same was withdrawn on account of certain altered situation which it is unnecessary to detail herein. ( 16 ) THE Supreme Court then took up the appeal mentioned earlier. In the appeal, one of the contentions urged has been set out by the Court thus:"the learned Advocate for the appellant has urged that the effect of striking down Act 9 of 1967 by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was not to revive Act 8 of 1955 as amended by Act 10 of 1956 which being dead could not be revived. Accordingly the vesting of the Inams in the Goverenment under the repealed Act 8 of 1955 and Act 10 of 1956 has no legal validity. " ( 17 ) IN repelling this contention, the Court referred to B. N. Tiwari's case (5) and indicated that the principle therein would not be applicable to the case before it. Jagan Mohan Reddy, J. , speaking on behalf of the division Bench, then proceeded to observe as follows :"in the case before us it has attempted to do something which the Legislature could not do, namely to abolish inams which did not exist and which hod already vested in the Government and which the legislature could not abolish again. In these circumstances, the repeal of on enactment, which had already been given effect was a device for depriving the inamdars whose rights had been abolished, of their right of compensation, and was accordingly struck down as still-born, null and void, as such unconstitutional from its inception and cannot have the effect as if it had repealed the previous Act. In these circumstances, the repeal of on enactment, which had already been given effect was a device for depriving the inamdars whose rights had been abolished, of their right of compensation, and was accordingly struck down as still-born, null and void, as such unconstitutional from its inception and cannot have the effect as if it had repealed the previous Act. On this analysis the provisions of Act 8 of 1955 as amended by Act 10 of 1956 could not be held to have been repealed at all, and therefore they are in existence. " ( 18 ) IT is clear from the above enunciation that if a law is struck down as being still-born, null and void and unconstitutional, the entire Act, inclusive of the repealins provision therein, must be deemed never to have been enacted at all, with the result the enactment repealed thereby continues to exist. In the cases on hand the position is different in as much is certain words had been substituted in clause (b) of sub-rule (4) of rule 6 b the Amendment Rules of 1971. It is plain from the decision in viswanath's case (1) that the said amendment had not been struck down on any ground like the one which prevailed in Mahamed Shaukat Hussain khan's case (3), but only on the ground that it was violative of constitutional injunctions enshrined in Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Hence the contention must fail, and is accordingly rejected. ( 19 ) IN the result, all the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .