JUDGMENT M. P. Saxena, J. 1. THIS is a defendants' revision under Section 115 CPC against the judgment and order dated 24-8-1974, passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Allahabad. 2. FIVE persons, namely, Raja Ram, Masuriyadin, Gajadhar Prasad, Ram Lal and Bahadur Lal, who are plaintiff-opposite parties, filed a suit after obtaining permission of the Advocate General, Uttar Pradesh, under Section 92 CPC against the defendant-revisionists nos. 1 to 5 alleging that they are the trustees but they are not managing the property properly and are liable to be removed. It was prayed that after removing these five trustees, new trustees may be appointed. Defendants nos. 1 to 5 filed their written statements contesting the suit inter-alia on the grounds that Ram Lal, plaintiff, who had also obtained permission from the Advocate General had not signed the plaint and the suit cannot be said to have been instituted by him and that the trust property was managed by a registered society through a committee consisting of seven members including the five defendants and as no permission under sec. 92 CPC was obtained against the society and these two members the suit is not maintainable. 3. AFTER the said defence the plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaint by impleading the registered Society as well as the remaining two other members of the committee. The application was allowed and the society and these two persons were arrayed as defendants nos. 6 to 8. 4. THE defendants nos. 1 to 5 moved an application (73-C) for dismissal of the suit on the aforesaid grounds. The defendants nos. 6 and 7 also moved a similar application, 74-C. the learned Additional District Judge Allahabad disposed of these points as preliminary issues. He left the first point to be decided, lateron and negatived the second contention by holding that the suit was not bad for want of permission against the newly impleaded defendants. the defendants have therefore, come up in revision. So far as the first point is concerned the learned lower court has not disposed it of so far. It will be decided later on as a result of enquiry. Therefore, the revisionists can have no ground to come up in revision against it. 5. ON the second point the learned counsel for the revisionists has urged that the suit is bad for want of permission against defendants nos. 5 to 8. It will be decided later on as a result of enquiry. Therefore, the revisionists can have no ground to come up in revision against it. 5. ON the second point the learned counsel for the revisionists has urged that the suit is bad for want of permission against defendants nos. 5 to 8. It is also contended that the Advocate General while according permission under Section 92 CPC exercises administrative powers and before passing any order he should have issued notices to the defendants so that they could show that permission should not be accorded. As it was not done the sanction cannot be held to be valid. In my judgment both the contentions carry no force. The relevant portion of Section 92 reads as follows : "In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, may institute, a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction........................to obtain a decree- (a) removing any trustee ; (b) appointing a new trustee ; (c) to (h)..............................". 6. IN C. R. Neelakantan v. Saidanet Annadhana Samajam, AIR 1967 Madras 303, a suit under section 92 was filed against a secretary of a charitable trust registered under the Societies Registration Act after obtaining sanction of the Advocate General. Later on an application for amendment of plaint by way of addition of society as party defendants was moved. It was held that the application was maintainable as party sought to be added was necessary party and no further sanction of Advocate General was necessary as nature of suit was not altered. Reliance was placed on an earlier case of Selyam Mudaliar v. Raju Mudaliar, AIR 1953 Madras 816. It was held that the application was maintainable as party sought to be added was necessary party and no further sanction of Advocate General was necessary as nature of suit was not altered. Reliance was placed on an earlier case of Selyam Mudaliar v. Raju Mudaliar, AIR 1953 Madras 816. IN this case also it was held that sanction given by the Advocate General under Section 92 CPC is one generally for the institution of the suit for the removal of person purporting to act as the trustees of a public religious institution and that an amendment sought for subsequently by way of addition of a party is merely formal and does not alter the nature of the suit. IN such a case, a further sanction of the Advocate General is not necessary. I most respectfully agree with this view. The addition of defendants nos. 6 to 8 does not alter the nature of the suit. Their addition is merely formal. Therefore, no further sanction of the Advocate General was necessary. As regards the powers exercised by the Advocate-General in according permission under section 92, reference may be made to the case of Swami Shantanand Sarswati v. Advocate General U. P. Allahabad, AIR 1955 Allahabad 372 in which it has been held that the act of the Advocate-General in giving his consent for the filing of a suit under Section 92 CPC cannot bo called a quasi-judicial act. It is merely an administrative or executive act. Section 92, or any other provision, of the Code does not require him to hold any enquiry or to give an opportunity to the party to be affected of being heard. The rules framed for the guidance of the Advocate General which are contained in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual, even if they are treated as statutory rules, do not make it incumbent upon "the Advocate General in all cases to give an opportunity to the party concerned of being heard. He is at liberty to act upon his own pure discretion inspire of the report of the District Officer. When he gives his consent to the institution of a suit, he does nothing more than this. He does not affect the rights of the person against whom the suit is filed. He is at liberty to act upon his own pure discretion inspire of the report of the District Officer. When he gives his consent to the institution of a suit, he does nothing more than this. He does not affect the rights of the person against whom the suit is filed. That person has still full opportunity to present his case before the court in which the suit is filed and the court is not to be influenced in deciding the case by the fact that the Advocate General has given his consent to the institution of the suit. It makes it clear that it is not at all necessary for the Advocate General to give an opportunity to the persons against whom the suit is to be filed to have their say. 7. THIS question was also considered in the case of Nanhoobeg v. Gulam Hussain, AIR 1951 Nagpur 394 in which it was held that "where there is a consent all that the court is concerned to see is whether there is a valid sanction by a competent authority. It cannot go behind the sanction and enquire whether the sanctioning authority had heard the parties or changed its mind though it can enquire into the competency of the authority to act under those sanctions." 8. IN Shavak A. Lal v. Syed Masood Hosain, AIR 1965 Andhra Pradesh 143 it was observed that in exercising the powers vested in him under section 92, the Advocate General does not perform a judicial function. A notice by the Advocate General to the institution of the suit is not obligatory and the absence of such notice does not invalidate the sanction granted by the Advocate General. All that has to be satisfied about before granting a sanction is that there is a prima facie case and that it is worthwhile that the suit should be tried by a Court in the interest of a public charitable trust. The learned counsel for the revisionists relying on the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 has contended that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. The learned counsel for the revisionists relying on the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 has contended that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. Therefore, rules of natural justice should be applied to the exercise of administrative powers also as the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice, or to put it negatively,> to prevent miscarriage of justice. In my opinion it does not advance his contention much further because even if the principles of natural justice are applied to the exercise of administrative powers there can be no manner of doubt that notice to the opposite party wilt be necessary if the Advocate General decides rights and obligations of the parties at the time of according sanction. There can be no manner of doubt that he does not do so. It is done in the suit. While according permission the Advocate General has simply to see whether the persons who propose to sue have interest in the trust, whether the trust is a public trust of the character defined in the section and whether there are prima facie grounds for thinking that there has been a breach of the trust. Hence it is not necessary for him to give any notice to the opposite party before giving permission to institute the suit. 9. THE revision application is dismissed with costs to the opposite parties. Stay order dated 1-4-75 is vacated. Revision dismissed.