Judgment 1. THIS appeal by the defendant Hindustan Steel Limited is directed against the concurrent decisions of the courts below. 2. THE suit out of which this appeal arises for a declaration that the order of termination dated 25-11-67 of plaintiff' employment under the defendant is illegal, void and inoperative and for a further declaration that the plaintiff still continues in the employment of the defendant and for a permanent injunction. Facts which anot in dispute, may briefly be stated. The plaintiff respondent was appointed as a loco driver of Hindustan Steel Limited sometimes in December, 1959 and whilst in that employment, the plaintiff absented himself from his duty from 27th to 29th June, 1967. On 30th June, 1967, the plaintiff appeared and submitted a leave application. Subsequent two days viz. 1st and 2nd July, 1967 were weekly off-days. From 3rd July, 1967 onwards the plaintiff absented himself from duty without submitting any application for leave. On 14-7-67, the defendant appellant asked the plaintiff to resume his duties and on 17th July, 1967 the plaintiff applied for leave along with a medical certificate. On 21st July, 1967, the plaintiff was asked to produce a medical certificate from a medical officer of the Durgapur Steel Plant Hospital at Durgapur but he did not respond to the said direction. On 28th August. 1967, the Superintendent, traffic and Raw Materials Department durgapur Steel Plant terminated the service of the plaintiff with effect from 27th June, 1967 on ground of prolonged absence under Rule 16 (x) of the Standing Orders (to be hereinafter referred to as S. O. for the sake of brevity) of the company. The said order was subsequently cancelled by the Superintendent, traffic and Raw Materials Department by another order dated 25th November, 1967 whereby, the service of the plaintiff was terminated with effect from 3-7-67 on ground of prolonged unauthorized absence in accordance with the provisions of Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. The plaintiff unsuccessfully made several attempts for revoking the order of termination and finally instituted the present suit on 12th December, 1967 challenging the order of termination as void inoperative and illegal. 3. THE suit was contested by the defendant, who sought to uphold the order of termination under Rule 16 (x)of S. O. of the Company. 3. THE suit was contested by the defendant, who sought to uphold the order of termination under Rule 16 (x)of S. O. of the Company. The defendant disputed that the order of termination was illegal or void and contended inter alia that in view of the provisions of rule 16 (x) of the S. O., the plaintiff must be presumed to have left the service of the defendant on his own accord and without notice and the order dated 25th November. 1967 regarding termination or removal of his service did not amount to an order of dismissal or removal within the meaning of Rule 30 (ii) of the S. O. 4. THE courts below, on a consideration of the evidence adduced in this case, found in favour of the plaintiff. The learned Munsif declared that the order of termination dated 25th November, 1967 was illegal void and inoperative and made a further declaration that the plaintiff still continues in service and restrained the defendant from giving effect to the said order. On appeal, the learned Subordinate judge Burdwan agreed with the learned Munsif that the termination in question was in violation of the provisions of the S. O. governing the relations between the parties and accordingly dismissed the appeal, subject to the modification that the declaration granted by the learned Munsif to the effect that the plaintiff still continued in service was set aside. Hence this appeal by the defendant. 5. MR. Chunder the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant "has canvassed three main grounds in this appeal. It is contended in the first place that the termination of plaintiff's service in the instant case was an automatic termination within the meaning the Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. of the Company and the Courts below were in error in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff's action amounted to 'misconduct' within the meaning of Rule 29 (v) of the S. O. it would at best amount to a infraction of the contract of employment for which the plaintiff was entitled to sue for damages in a Civil Court but the Civil Court did not have any jurisdiction to grant a decree either for reinstatement or for a declaration of the nature prayed for. As a corollary to this argument, Mr. As a corollary to this argument, Mr. Chunder further contended that even if it be assumed that there was infraction of the provisions of Rule 31 (ii) of the SO. the plaintiff's remedy, if any, lay before the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court would be in a position to examine afresh whether the termination, removal or dismissal was justified or not, the dispute between the parties, being essentially in the nature of an industrial dispute. 6. MR. Sadhon Gupta the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff respondent, on the other hand, contended that the termination in the instant case was clearly an infraction of Rule 29 (v) read with Rule 31 (ii) of the S. O. and as no industrial dispute was raised by the concerned workman, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to make the necessary declaration. Mr. Gupta also contended at length that the automatic termination clause under Rule 16 (x) of the S. would not be attracted unless the initial absence was a permissive one. Before proceeding to examine the respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to quote the relevant provisions of the Standing Orders. Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. runs as follows: - "16. Application for leave. (x) If an employee remains absent beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless he returns within 15 days of the expiry of the leave and explains to the satisfaction of the Management his inability to return before the expiry of the leave. In case the employee loses his lien on his appointment, he shall be entitled to be kept on the 'badli' list. Where, however, the period of such absence exceeds 15 days, the employee shall be presumed to have left the service of the company of his own accord without notice." And Rule 29 (v) are in these terms: "rule 29. Acts of Misconduct. (v) Habitual late attendance and willful or habitual absence from duty without leave or without sufficient cause." 7. THE relevant order whereby the plaintiff's service has been terminated has been marked Ext. Acts of Misconduct. (v) Habitual late attendance and willful or habitual absence from duty without leave or without sufficient cause." 7. THE relevant order whereby the plaintiff's service has been terminated has been marked Ext. land it reads as follow: "in cancellation of the office order No. Traffic /ld (24)/7016 dated 28-8-67, the services of Sri K. S. Nair, Loco Driver, T. No. 14521, stands terminated with effect from 3rd July, 1967 an account of prolonged unauthorized absence, as per clause 16 (x) of the standing orders of the company." 8. ALTHOUGH the earlier order dated 28th August, 1967 (Ex. 1/a) on the self-same ground stood cancelled, Mr. Chunder conceded that the order dated 25th November, 1967 (Ext. l/c) purporting to terminate the service of the plaintiff with effect from 3rd July, 1967 could not have any retrospective effect and the order could be effective only from the date of making of it viz. 25th November, 1967. An appeal to the General superintendent, Durgapur Steel Plant against the earlier decision was filed by the plaintiff on 6th September, 1967 (vide Ext. l/b. The General Superintendent found no reason to alter the decision of the Superintendent, Traffic and Raw Materials Department or the order of punishment imposed on the plaintiff by the earlier order and subsequently revised by the latter order (Ext l/c. The plaintiff made a further appeal to the General Superintendent on 9th December, 1967 (vide Ext. l/d) apparently without success. It is no longer disputed that the Superintendent, traffic and Raw Materials department was competent to impose the penalty or to terminate the services of the plaintiff in accordance with the rules formulated by the company from time to time and in fact the plaintiff in his cross-examination admitted that the Superintendent, Traffic was the head of his department. From the Notification dated 7th January, 1965 issued by the General Manager, Durgapur Steel Plant (Ext. A), it would appear that the authorities competent to impose penalties under Rule 30 of the S. O. were duly notified in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 of the S. O. and the fact that the plaintiff made an appeal to the General Superintendent on 6th August. 1967 against the order dated 28th August, 1967 (vide Ext. A), it would appear that the authorities competent to impose penalties under Rule 30 of the S. O. were duly notified in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 of the S. O. and the fact that the plaintiff made an appeal to the General Superintendent on 6th August. 1967 against the order dated 28th August, 1967 (vide Ext. B) would go to show that he was not only aware of this notification but did not also raise any objection as to the competency of the Superintendent, Traffic and Raw Materials Department in imposing the penalty to him. In view of the submission made by Mr. Chunder that the order of termination dated 25th November, 1967 (Ext. l/c) could be effective only from the date of making it, I do not find any infirmity in the said order on the ground alleged. The order purports to recite prolonged unauthorized absence as the ground for termination and Rule 16 (x) was invoked in the instant case. Mr. Chunder contends that for unauthorized absence for more than 15 days, an employee could be proceeded with at the option of the management under either of the two rules but where the initial absence was permissive, it would not ;amount to 'misconduct' within the meaning of Rule 29 (v) of the S. O. Mr. Chunder's argument seems to be that where the requirements of Rule 16 (x) and Rule 29 (v) are satisfied, it was open to the management to remove or dismiss the employee from service with a stigma or to treat his absence as a case of automatic termination without a stigma. Mr. Sadhan Gupta, on the other hand, contended that unless the initial absence was a permissive one. Rule 16 (x) could not be invoked and the employee must be proceeded with under Rule 29 (v) and the procedure contemplated in Rule 31 (ii) of the S. O. must, therefore, be followed and the employee must be specifically charged, informed in writing of the allegations against him and shall also be given an opportunity to make a representation, 9. I am unable to accept this contention of Mr. I am unable to accept this contention of Mr. Gupta and it seems to me that where an employee un-authorisedly remains absent for a period exceeding 15 days, it is open to the management either to invoke Rule 16 (x) or 29 (v) provided those provisions are attracted in the case of such absence While the absence in a case under Rule 16 (x) may be a mere unauthorized absence that in the case of Rule 29 (v) must be either willful or habitual unauthorized absence. I fail to see and it does not stand to reason why in the case of an unauthorized absence exceeding 15 days the management should be compelled to proceed against the employee and brand him with a stigma. Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. is attracted where an employee remains absent beyond the period of leave originally granted to him or subsequently extended and the management may adopt any of the three following courses : (1) if he returns within 15 days of the expiry of the leave and explains to the satisfaction of the management, he will be taken back, (2) in case he fails to do so, he shall lose his lien on his appointment but shall be entitled to be kept on the 'badli' list and (3) where the period of such absence exceeds 15 days, the employee shall be presumed to have left the services of the company of his own accord and without notice. 10. IT is contended on behalf of the respondent that the expression 'such absence' occurring in the last part of the rule refers to the absence beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended or in other words unless the employee had initially been granted leave or such leave was subsequently extended, Rule 16 (x) would not be attracted even though other conditions are fulfilled. Rule 16 (x). Mr. Gupta contended, was introduced into the S. O. in order to prevent an employee overstaying after the grant of leave or extended leave, which is very common in an industrial establishment; and in such a case where the employee remained absent for more than 15 days, the management was entitled to presume that the employee has left the service of the company of his own accord and without notice. This presumption, according to Mr. This presumption, according to Mr. Gupta, cannot be drawn where the employee had not initially been granted leave not was any such leave subsequently extended. It is possibly true that this particular provision in the S. O. was introduced with a view to prevent the employees from overstaying beyond the period of leave granted to them or subsequently extended but there seems to be no reason why the management cannot treat unauthorized absence for a long period as a case of automatic termination of service by the employee. In the case of (1) M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co. v. The Workmen (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 130) the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the S. O. No. 9 of the Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. relating to absenteeism had repelled a similar argument now sought to be advanced by Mr. Gupta. The provisions of the relevant standing order was as follows : "absenteeism-Workers absent without leave will be subject to disciplinary action. Overstaying leave will be considered as absence without leave. Any worker who is absent for 14 consecutive days without permission will be automatically discharged. Also, any worker who is absent for 14 individual days during any period of 12 months is liable to discharge. " In Indian Iron and Steel Co.'s case (A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 130), seven workmen were taken into custody by the police on different dates and were remanded to custody for sometime. They applied for leave whilst in custody and the leave was refused. The Industrial Tribunal in that case was of the opinion that the S. O. No. 9 was not an inflexible rule and a mere application of behave was sufficient to arrest the operation of the S. O. This view of the Tribunal was not supported by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the workmen in appeal but the appellate Tribunal considered each case on merits and held that the company in the circumstances of the case were not justified in refusing leave to these workmen. The Supreme Court after quoting their decision in (2) Burn and Company's case (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 38 at page 48) with approval, observed that the same principle should apply in M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co.'s case. The Supreme Court after quoting their decision in (2) Burn and Company's case (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 38 at page 48) with approval, observed that the same principle should apply in M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co.'s case. It was pointed out that the arrested men were not in a position to join their work and although this was unfortunate so far as the workmen were concerned, it would be equally unjust to hold that in such circumstances the company must always grant leave when an application for leave was made. Such principles, the Supreme Court pointed out, will not be just; nor will it restore harmony between labour and capital on ensure normal flow of production whether in such circumstances leave should be granted or not must be left to the discretion of the employer. 11. FROM the above discussion, it will be clear that the management cannot be compelled to invoke the provisions relating to imposition of major penalties, where the case of workmen could be brought under any of the other provisions of the S. O. Instant case, in my view, may fall within the third part of Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. and if the management in such a case treats the unauthorized absence as a case of termination simpliciter, they cannot be compelled to treat it as a case of misconduct under Rule 29 (v) and to proceed under Rule 31 (ii) of the S. O. of the company. Mr. Gupta, however, contended that where the management chooses to terminate the services of an employee without assigning any reason, they could have recourse to the Provisions rule 34 of the S. O. by giving one month's notice in the case of a permanent employee and no other course is open to the management for terminating the service of an employee. This argument, in my view, cannot be accepted. Not only did the management choose to assign a reason for the termination in the instant case, they have drawn the requisite presumption under Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. that it was the employee who left the service of his own accord and without notice. This argument, in my view, cannot be accepted. Not only did the management choose to assign a reason for the termination in the instant case, they have drawn the requisite presumption under Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. that it was the employee who left the service of his own accord and without notice. It is true that in a case where the workman had originally been granted leave or where his leave was subsequently extended, the management could not invoke the provisions of Rule 29 (v) of the S. O. in order to remove on dismiss him from service with the stigma but the converse is not necessarily true. Where an employee without obtaining leave absents himself for a period exceeding 15 days, it would be open to the management to treat such absence as a misconduct under Rule 29 (v) or to treat it as a case of automatic termination under Rule 16 (x. Whether in such circumstances the company should proceed under one or the other provisions of the S. O. must be left to the discretion of the management and unless the order of termination is challenged either on ground of victimisation or colorable or mala-fide exercise of power, it would not be open to Court to interfere but that is not the case here. It makes little difference whether in a case of this description the employee had applied for and obtained leave so as to bring the case within the provisions of Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. The expression "such absence" in Rule 16 (x) must, therefore be referable to unauthorized absence of the employee whether he is on leave or without leave and in fact the employee here had applied for leave for three days and if the management, had granted it the case would clearly, on Mr. Gupta's own admission, come under rule 16 (x). It is difficult to see what useful purpose would therefore be served by asking for an application for leave and granting the same in order to bring the case within the letters of Rule 16 (x) but the spirit of the aforesaid Rule, in my view, has rightly been invoked in the instant case. It is difficult to see what useful purpose would therefore be served by asking for an application for leave and granting the same in order to bring the case within the letters of Rule 16 (x) but the spirit of the aforesaid Rule, in my view, has rightly been invoked in the instant case. If this interpretation is not accepted, an employee, who absents himself without obtaining leave but such absence is neither habitual nor willful (e. g. where he is prevented from joining his duty for reasons beyond his control), the management cannot perhaps take any action against him except under Rule 34 of the S. O., which it seems to me was meant to serve a different objective. In the above view of the matter, it must be held that the learned Courts below have proceeded on an erroneous construction of Rule 16 (x) of the S. O. of the company and the decisions of the Courts below, as such cannot be upheld. 12. IT follows therefore that this finding would be sufficient to dispose of the appeal. But both Mr. Chunder and Mr. Gupta have addressed the court at length on the question of jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit or to grant the relief in the instant case. Mr. Gupta contends that the standing orders are statutory terms and conditions of service and confer a status on the workmen so that a suit would lie in the event of an infraction of any of the aforesaid terms and conditions. Mr. Chunder, on the other hand, contended that this was part of the personal contract between the workmen and the management and could not as such, be enforced in a civil court except by way of defence. The further contention of Mr. Chunder was that even assuming that there was no proper enquiry under rule 31 (ii) for contravention of Rule 29 (v), that by itself would not render the dismissal improper or illegal and the matter could be investigated by an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court on being referred to in accordance with the provisions, of the Industrial Disputes Act but the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the question. Mr. Sadhan Gupta attempted to answer this point by contending that where no dispute had been raised with the management there could be no reference to the Tribunal and. Mr. Sadhan Gupta attempted to answer this point by contending that where no dispute had been raised with the management there could be no reference to the Tribunal and. at any rate the relief prayed for in the suit could not be canvassed or prayed for before the Industrial Tribunal. Lastly, Mr. Gupta contends that even assuming that it is a dispute of industrial nature, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act does not provide for any machinery for redress and the only machinery contemplated is in the S. O. itself. So where no such machinery has been brought into operation, the right to move to the Civil Court cannot be said to be barred. The question came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of (3) The Premier Automobiles ltd. v. K. S. Wadke and others (A. I. R. 1975 B. C. 2238) and the principle applicable to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Court in relation to an Industrial dispute was laid down in the following words : "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act, (Industrial Disputes Act) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy." Elaborating this point, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 9 in the following words : "If the dispute is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of within the meaning of section 2a of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for adjudication of such disputes under the Act. Civil Courts will be the proper forum. But where the industrial dispute is for the purpose of enforcing any right, obligation or liability under the general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability created under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving an election to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the machinery under the Act or to approach the Civil Court. It is plain that he can't have both. It is plain that he can't have both. He has to chose the one or the other. But we shall presently show that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. In that event Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract is one which is recognized by an enforceable under the Act alone." Mr. Gupta's contention that the standing orders are statutory terms and conditions of service and confers a status on the workmen would, therefore, be a self defeating argument in that the Civil Court will then have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate where the dispute concerns the enforcement of certain rights and liabilities created only under the S. O. s. promulgated under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The question also came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of (4) Calcutta Electric supply Corporation v. Ramratan Mabaio (78 C. W. N. 628) The point for consideration before the Division Bench in the above case was whether the standing orders framed under the industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 have statutory force and secondly even if, those have statutory force whether an order of termination of service in violation of the provisions of the S. O. would make the order a nullity so as to entitle a civil court to make a declaration that in spite of the termination of service, the employee still remains in service of his employer. A contract of personal service it was pointed out therein, was not enforceable by specific performance and the employee could not be heard to say that in spite of the termination of service he was still in employment. In Ease there was a wrongful termination in breach of the contract for service, the remedy of the employee would be by way of damages. In certain exceptional cases, of course, the civil Court was entitled to make a declaration that) in spite of the termination of service, the employee concerned would remain in the employment of his employer. In Ease there was a wrongful termination in breach of the contract for service, the remedy of the employee would be by way of damages. In certain exceptional cases, of course, the civil Court was entitled to make a declaration that) in spite of the termination of service, the employee concerned would remain in the employment of his employer. These exceptions, as laid down by the Supreme Court and as pointed out by the Division Bench in paragraph 1u of its judgment was as follows: "(1) a public servant who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311, (2) reinstatement of a dismissed under Industrial Law or Labour or Industrial Tribunal and (3) a statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute. But it is not every breach of a statutory provision that will entitle the employee to ask for such a declaration. It is only when statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provision of a statute while terminating the service of such an employee the latter will be entitled to get a declaration that the order is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not be a mere case of a master terminating the service of a servant." In that case, the respondent instituted a suit in the Civil Court against the appellant Calcutta Electric Supply corporation for a declaration that the verbal order of termination of the respondent's service was illegal, void, inoperative and ultra vires and that the respondent was and continued to be in permanent service of the appellant corporation and was as such entitled to his salary and damages, as also for an injunction. The case of the plaintiff employee was that he was appointed in the permanent post of Vendor-cum-Cleaner-cum-Plate-washer by the appellant Corporation on and from a certain date and he automatically became permanent in his post on competition of 6 months continuous service, but the appellant has dispensed with his service in contravention of the provisions of the S. O. of the company without assigning any reason or without holding any enquiry. Plaintiff respondent accordingly filed the above suit for the declarations enumerated hereinbefore. Plaintiff respondent accordingly filed the above suit for the declarations enumerated hereinbefore. The trial court dismissed the suit on the finding that the respondent was a temporary workman under the appellant Corporation and was not entitled to any notice and accordingly upheld the order of dismissal as legal and valid. On appeal, the learned lower appellate court agreed with the finding of the trial court that the respondent was a temporary workman in the employment of the appellant corporation but disagreed on certain other points. The lower appellate court took the view that the appellant Corporation could not dispense with the service of the respondent without giving him the requisite notice or without holding an enquiry in view of the provisions of Rule 13 (b) of the S. O. of the Company inasmuch as it amounted to a breach of a statutory obligation. In that view of the matter, the learned lower appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in to-to. The appellant thereupon filed a second appeal to this court and one learned Judge of this court sitting singly upheld the decision and dismissed the appeal holding that the S. O. on being duly certified became the statutory terms and conditions of service and a breach of any of the provision of the S. O. would give rise to a legal right in favour of the aggrieved party so as to enable him to file a suit before the civil court. The appellant thereupon appealed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the Division Bench after considering a large number of authorities held that the above case did not fall within any of the three recognized exceptions enumerated in paragraph 11 of the judgment (quoted above), where a Civil Court could grant such a relief. The Division Bench further held that the case also did not fall within the fourth category, where a statutory status was conferred upon an employee or the dismissal complained of affected his status. In that view of the matter, Division bench allowed the appeal and restored the decision of the trial court. Normally, I would be bound by this decision of the Division Bench, but Mr. Gupta appearing for the respondent strenuously contended that the Division Bench decision did not consider certain Supreme Court decisions on the point and in fact it runs counter to some of them. Mr. Normally, I would be bound by this decision of the Division Bench, but Mr. Gupta appearing for the respondent strenuously contended that the Division Bench decision did not consider certain Supreme Court decisions on the point and in fact it runs counter to some of them. Mr. Gupta thus contends that this matter should, therefore, be considered by a larger bench in the context of the Supreme Court decisions he was citing. For this purpose, Mr. Gupta relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of (5) Roshanlal v. Union of India (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1889), (6) Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Pathan and Ors. (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 439), (7) Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate and ors. v. Their Management (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1458), (8) Rohtak and Hissar Districts electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesi (A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1471), (9) Western India Match Co. v. Workmen (A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 2650) and several other decisions of the different High Courts to which reference will be made later. Of these decisions cited by Mr. Gupta it appears that the decisions in the case of Bagalkot Cement Co., Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate, Western India Match Co. and Matipur Sugar Factory were elaborately considered by the Division Bench and clearly distinguished. 13. IT appears that the decision in the case of (5) Roshanlal v. Union of india (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1889), and (8)Rohtak and Hissar Districts Electric supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Vitar Pradesh (A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1471) were not considered by the Division Bench in the case of Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation v. Ram Ratan Mahato. In the first cited case, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of sections 6-K and 6-R (1) of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act (28 of 1947) and the proviso to that sub-section. In the context, the Supreme Court observed that it was true that the S. O., when certified, in substance embodied statutory conditions of employment but they cannot be treated as a contract within the meaning of the proviso to the above section. 14. In the context, the Supreme Court observed that it was true that the S. O., when certified, in substance embodied statutory conditions of employment but they cannot be treated as a contract within the meaning of the proviso to the above section. 14. IN (5) Roshanlal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the terms of service of railway employee could be unilaterally altered by the Government in the context of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and held that the legal position of the Government servant was more one of status than a contract and the hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The Supreme Court further pointed out that relationship between the Government and its servant was not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and a servant and the legal relationship was something entirely different, something in the nature of status. The duties of status were fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society had an interest It is obvious that the Supreme Court made a distinction between dismissal of an employee in the context of contractile relationship of a master and a servant and the dismissal of an employee by a statutory authority in breach of previsions of a statute, which regulates the exercise of that power. The principle was further elaborated by the Supreme Court in the case of (10) Sukadev Singh v. Bhagatram (A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1331) wherein dismissal of a servant of statutory authorities, such as, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance corporation and Industrial Finance Corporation prose for consideration of the Supreme Court. It was held that the employees of those statutory bodies have a statutory status and they were entitled to declarations of being in employment, when their dismissal or removal was in contravention of statutory provisions, although they were not servants of the Union or the State. The basis of the Supreme Court decision was that these bodies were or are to be treated as authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and rules and regulations framed by those authorities have the force of law. The basis of the Supreme Court decision was that these bodies were or are to be treated as authorities within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and rules and regulations framed by those authorities have the force of law. The test thus laid down by the Supreme Court was, however, held not to be applicable in the case of a librarian of a school when his services were terminated by three months' notice. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of (11) S. N. Sinha v. H. S. Havalakha (73 C. W. N. 672) held that a school simpliciter would not come within the definition of 'authority' in Article 12 of the Constitution of India having regard to the provisions of West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act and the Rules and Regulations framed there under. Such a school was hold not to be a statutory body because it was not created by the statute but in accordance with the provisions of the statute and its employees as such, did not acquire a statutory status. In that view of the matter, the division Bench dismissed the appeal of the Librarian. In the instant case although the S. O. incorporated certain provisions in the contract of service between the respondent and the appellant company, it cannot be contended that it actually conferred a statutory status on the respondent pursuant to the certification of the S. O. The Allahabad High Court in the case of (12) Western India Match Co. Ltd, v. Rameshwar Prasad (1971) Lab. I. C. 1447 took an exactly opposite view and held that by virtue of the S. O. the plaintiff in that case before the Allahabad High Court, got a statutory status end accordingly violation of the provision of the S. O. would entitle the plaintiff to ask for a declaration before the Civil Court. The Division Bench in the case of Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation v. Ramratan Mahato (Supra) expressly differed with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court and held that, the S. O. did not confer any status upon the employee but only incorporated certain terms and conditions in the contract of service by virtue of the certification of the S. O. Mr. Gupta's contention, therefore, that the Division Bench in the ease of Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation v. Ramratan Mahato (Supra) took a view different from that taken by the Supreme Court in some of the cases cited above, cannot be accepted and the question of referring the matter to a larger Bench, therefore, did not arise. Mr. Gupta next contended that an Industrial Court would not have any jurisdiction in this matter as no dispute had been raised with the management and the existence of a dispute was a sine quo non for making a valid reference to any Industrial Court. In support, he relied on the decisions in the case of (13) C. P. Sarathy v. State of Madras (A. I. R. 1951 Madras 191) and (14) S. R. Corporation Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat (A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 529. The Madras High Court in the first cited case was considering a reference by a learned single Judge on the question whether the criminal court had jurisdiction to proceed with a certain enquiry in relation to an award made under the Industrial Disputes Act, that was alleged to have been contravened. It was held that for a dispute to arise, the two parties, viz., the employer and his workmen, must both come into conflict and a difference must ensue there from and it was improper to assume that a dispute can come into existence by a one-sided demand or a unilateral action of one of the parties which had not been communicated to the other party. In S. R. Corporation's case, the Supreme Court held that if no dispute was raised by the employees with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. In S. R. Corporation's case, the Supreme Court held that if no dispute was raised by the employees with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. It would however be unnecessary for me to enter into this aspect of the case, in view of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles (Supra) and the instant case would not clearly fall within any of the two formulations quoted at pages 11 and 12 above and in fact it would come within the third formulation made by the Supreme Court in (3) Premier automobiles case (supra) in the following words : - "(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act." 15. IN the above case, the Supreme Court whilst considering the applicability of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act appear to have been guided by the consideration that as the aggrieved individual cannot approach the Tribunal or the Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance, without the intervention of the appropriate government, it was legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under the Act was not such as to completely oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for trial of industrial disputes (Vide observations in paragraph 9. It was further pointed out in paragraph 24 of the said judgment that there would hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Act and yet will be the arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, the Supreme Court further pointed out by way of illustration, would arise in regard to the dismissal of a unsponsored workman, which in view of the provision of law contained in Section 2a of the Act, would be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. The Act creates a special machinery under section 33. C to enforce specially created rights and the parties could not, therefore, approach the Civil Courts for relief in so far as enforcement of those rights were concerned. The Act creates a special machinery under section 33. C to enforce specially created rights and the parties could not, therefore, approach the Civil Courts for relief in so far as enforcement of those rights were concerned. To the extent, Civil Court would not have jurisdiction but a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal would be maintainable in a Civil Court even though a special remedy was provided in the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication of the dispute relating to dismissal and even for reinstatement. Above view was taken by a Division Bench of the Calcutta high Court in the case of (5) M/s. Austin distributors Pvt. Ltd. v. Nil Kumar Das, 1970 Lab. I. C. 323 (Cal) and the Supreme Court in approving the said decision observed that such a suit would be maintainable on the footing that the dismiss was in violation of the contract of service recognized under the general law. Mr. Chunder pointed out that the mere fact that no enquiry or defective enquiry was held by an employer, did not by itself render the dismissal of workman illegal. If the dismissal was challenged and a dispute was raised the employer was competent to justify its action before the Tribunal or the Labour Court and for the purpose relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (16) Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v. The management and Ors. reported in A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 1227. 16. FROM what has been discussed above it will be clear that the right or liability in the instant case did not arise under the general common law but relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act and the only remedy of the plaintiff would, therefore, be to get an adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act in terms of third formulation made by the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles' case and the instant suit before the Civil Court must, therefore, be held to be not maintainable. It follows therefore that in any view of the matter the Courts below were not right in granting a decree in the instant case and the appeal accordingly succeeds. 17. THE Appeal is accordingly allowed. It follows therefore that in any view of the matter the Courts below were not right in granting a decree in the instant case and the appeal accordingly succeeds. 17. THE Appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decrees of the Courts below are hereby set aside and the suit is dismissed, with this modification that the order of dismissal will be effective from 25. 11. 1967. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.