Judgment :- 1. The second defendant in a suit filed before the Inspecting Officer's Court at Androth is the appellant. The property involved in the suit belonged to the tarwad of the plaintiff and the first defendant. On 3 3 1959, the first defendant executed a document of assignment in respect or the property in favour of the second defendant. The plaint averred that although the document was executed on 3-3-59, no steps were taken by the second defendant in assertion of his title and that the plaintiff happened to know about the document when the survey operations were in progress in the island during 1962 He instituted the suit on 3-3-1963 alleging that the first defendant had no authority to assign the property and praying for a decree setting aside the document. One of the contentions raised by the defendants was that the suit was barred by limitation. The plea was upheld by the trial court. An appeal was filed before the Administrator, which was transferred to the District Court. Calicut and thereafter to the Subordinate Judge at Kavaratti. The Subordinate Judge set aside the decree of the trial court and remanded the suit to the Munsiff's Court, Androth for fresh disposal in the light of the findings recorded. The order of remand is challenged in this appeal. 2. Whether the suit filed on 3 31963 was barred by limitation is the point to be considered. Reference may in this connection be made to S.21A which was added to the Laccidive Islands and Minicoy Regulation, I of 1912 (for short 'the Regulation') in the year 1926. The section reads: "Every suit instituted after a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence " The contention put forward on behalf of the appellant is that the limitation started from the date of the document which in this case was 3 3 59. The case of the respondents on the other hand, is that the starting point of limitation was the date of his knowledge of the document which, according to him, was in July, 1962. The latter plea was accepted by the Subordinate Judge. 3. The expression "cause of action" is not defined in the Regulation. The case of the respondents on the other hand, is that the starting point of limitation was the date of his knowledge of the document which, according to him, was in July, 1962. The latter plea was accepted by the Subordinate Judge. 3. The expression "cause of action" is not defined in the Regulation. It is generally understood as the bundle of material facts which give rise to an enforceable claim. In the limited sense, it refers to facts which constitute the infringement of a right. If it is understood in the strict sense the plaintiff in the instant case got a cause of action against the defendants as soon as the document was executed. It follows, the date of execution of the document is one of the dates when the Cause of action arose. But the plaintiff could have instituted the suit only if he had come to know about the execution of the document. Therefore, justice and fair play require that in deciding when the cause of action arose the date on which the plaintiff knew about the document or could have known about the document should also be taken into account. Reference may in this connection be made to S.21 of the Regulation of 1912 which reads: "All questions relating to any rights claimed or set up in the Civil Courts of the islands shall be determined in accordance with any custom not manifestly unjust or immoral governing the parties or property concerned, and, in the absence of any such custom, according to justice, equity and good conscience." It would appear that the Laccidive Islands were owned by the Bibi of Cannanore and were ceded to the British Government only in the year 1908. There is no evidence of any custom prevailing in the islands similar to the law of limitation. The Indian Limitation Act or the principles thereunder had no application to the islands. (See Ahmedkoya v. Aisamma AIR. 1926 Madras 657). 4. The prominent among the statutes in force in the main land like the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Registration Act were extended to the Lakshdweep for the first time as per the Laccidive, Minicoy and Aminidivi Islands (Laws) Regulation of 1965. It is under S.3 of the Transfer of Pro-periy Act that a person is deemed to have notice of an instrument from the date of its registration. It is under S.3 of the Transfer of Pro-periy Act that a person is deemed to have notice of an instrument from the date of its registration. In the absence of evidence of the existence of a similar provision in the law of the islands, codified or customary, it may not be salutary to hold that a person whose rights are affected by the execution of a document by another should have sued to set aside the document within a period of three years eventhough he had no knowledge or occasion to know about the execution thereof In other words, to hold that a suit to set aside the transaction got barred even before the plaintiff came to know of the document is against justice, equity and good conscience and hence contrary to the provisions of S.21 referred to above. 5. The case in hand bears some analogy to the decision of the Supreme Court is H. Chandra R. Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (1961 SC. 1500 =1961 All Law Journal, 650), which arose under the Land Acquisition Act. S.18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act deals with limitation in the matter of application for reference to Court. Sub-section (b) fixes a maximum period of 6 months from the date of the Collector's award. The application in the above case was made beyond a period of 6 months. The plea put forward was that the appellant had no occasion to know about the award. The Supreme Court held that the expression "from the date of the Collector's award" in the proviso to S.18 meant "from the date of the knowledge of the award by the party concerned." The Supreme Court observed: "The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression "date of the award" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award", used in the proviso to S.18 in a literal or mechanical way." The Supreme Court quoted with approval the observations of Rajamannar, C. J. in O. A. O. A. M Muthia Chettiar v. The Commissioner of Income tax, Madras (ILR. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award", used in the proviso to S.18 in a literal or mechanical way." The Supreme Court quoted with approval the observations of Rajamannar, C. J. in O. A. O. A. M Muthia Chettiar v. The Commissioner of Income tax, Madras (ILR. 1951 Madras 815), a case relating to the interpretation of S.33-A (2) of the Indian Income tax Act: "If a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had the knowledge of the order." A similar reasoning was adopted by the Madras High Court in Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J. G. Closte (1883) ILR. 6 Madras 189) and K. V. E. Swaminathan alias Chidambaram Pillai v. Letchamanan Chettiar and Ors. (1930) ILR. 53 Madras 491). 6. The Supreme Court had again occasion to decide the question in connection with S.17 of the Indian Forest Act in Madal al v. State of U. P. (AIR. 1975. S C. 2085). S.17 prescribed a period of three months for presenting an appeal against an order passed on a claim by the Forest Settlement Officer. No mention is made in the section regarding communication of the order. The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in H. Chandra R. Singh v Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (1961 SC. 1500) and held as follows: "The Act we are concerned with does not state what would happen if the Forest Settlement Officer made an order under S. H without notice to the parties and in their absence. Ia such a case if the aggrieved party came to know of the order after the expiry of the time prescribed for presenting an appeal from the order, would the remedy be lost for no fault of his? It would be absurd to think so. It is a fundamental principle of justice that a party whose rights are affected by an order must have notice of it." 7. It would be absurd to think so. It is a fundamental principle of justice that a party whose rights are affected by an order must have notice of it." 7. On a parity of reasoning, it is unjust to hold that limitation in the instant case began to run from the date of execution of the document eventhough the appellant did not do anything in assertion of his title or in order to let the respondent know about the existence of the document. It follows that cause of action so far as the plaintiff was concerned accrued only on the date when he came to know of the document. 8. It is interesting to note that before the passing of the Limitation Act of 1963, the Law Commission had nut up three proposals and one of the proposals was that the starting point of limitation should be from the date of accrual of the cause of action. The Government did not accept the above recommendation. The Deputy Minister for Law in his speech before the Lok Sabha said: "It is well-known that cause of action is a bundle of facts, that has to be proved, and sometimes, the lawyers have to go through a labyrinth of arguments in order to prove when actually the cause of action arises Therefore, it will put the litigants and the plaintiff in a very difficult position to find out when actually the cause of action in a suit arises. Therefore, it was thought that the present method is more suitable, and, therefore, the said recommendation of the Law Commission has not been accepted." The present case is a practical illustration as to how different interpretations are possible when the starting point of limitation is the date of the cause of action. 9. It is a well-known principle that the provisions of the statute of Limitation should be strictly construed and that wherever two interpretations are possible, that which gives the larger period of limitation should be preferred. There is, therefore, nothing improper in holding that the starting point of limitation in the instant case was the date when the plaintiff came to have knowledge of the transaction. For reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.