JUDGMENT K.N. SINGH, J. 1. BY means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has claimed relief for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the District Judge, Mainpuri, dated October 31, 1972, modifying the order of the Prescribed Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. 2. THE petitioner was in the service of the Northern Railway as Station Master in the pay scale of Rs. 150-240. On November 8, 1957, he was placed under suspension by the Divisional Superintendent of Northern Railway, Allahabad. Enquiry into certain charges was held against the petitioner and he was removed from service by the order of the Divisional Superintendent dated December 18, 1958. The order of removal was affirmed in appeal. The petitioner the thereafter filed Suit No. 4 of 1965 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mainpuri, for declaration and for recovery of arrears of salary for the period between December 17, 1961 to February 16, 1965. The railway authorities contested the suit but it was decreed by the Civil Judge on January 13, 1966. On appeal by the Union of India, the District Judge, Mainpuri, affirmed the decree of the trial court by his order dated October 4, 1966. The decree of the civil court became final as no second appeal was filed by the Union of India, and the Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, paid the decretal amount, namely, Rs. 9408/23 P. to the petitioner. On June 19, 1968, the Divisional Superintendent, Allahabad, issued orders directing that fresh enquiry shall be held against the petitioner on the same set of allegations on which he was earlier removed from service. He further placed the petitioner under suspension with retrospective effect, namely, December 18, 1958. Since the petitioner was paid only subsistence allowance he filed three applications under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Prescribed Authority at Mainpuri for Payment of Wages, each application related to different period of time. The first application was filed on September 30, 1968 (registered as Case No. 867 of 1968) claiming wages for the period February 16, 1965 to September 30, 1968. Later on, an amendment application was filed on August 30, 1969, claiming wages for the period November 8, 1957, to November 30, 1961. The first application was filed on September 30, 1968 (registered as Case No. 867 of 1968) claiming wages for the period February 16, 1965 to September 30, 1968. Later on, an amendment application was filed on August 30, 1969, claiming wages for the period November 8, 1957, to November 30, 1961. The second application was filed on September 30, 1969, (registered as Case No. 616 of 1969) claiming wages for the period October 1, 1968 to September 30, 1969, and the third application was filed on September 30, 1970 (registered as Case No. 523 of 1970) claiming wages for the period October 1, 1969 to September 30, 1970. All the three cases were consolidated and the same were disposed of by a common order of the Prescribed Authority dated August 30, 1971. The Prescribed Authority upheld the petitioner's entire claim and awarded compensation to him. The Divisional Personnel Officer filed appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority which was allowed by the District Judge, Mainpuri, by his order dated October 31, 1972. The District Judge modified the order of the Prescribed Authority and remanded the matter to the Prescribed Authority for recalculation of the amount of wages payable to the petitioner in accordance with the findings recorded by him. Thereupon, the petitioner filed the present petition challenging the validity of the order of the District Judge. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the District Judge committed a patent error of law in holding that the railway administration was entitled to adjust the decretal amount of Rs. 9408/23 towards the subsistence allowance paid to the petitioner during the period of his earlier suspension namely, from December 18, 1958. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to note that the petitioner was removed from service on December 18, 1958, and the suspension order of June 19, 1968 operated with effect from the date of earlier removal, namely, December 18, 1958, as contemplated by Rule 1706(4) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules for Railway servants. The learned District Judge held that since the second order of suspension dated June 19, 1968, was valid the petitioner was not entitled to full salary for the period subsequent to December 18, 1958. The learned District Judge held that since the second order of suspension dated June 19, 1968, was valid the petitioner was not entitled to full salary for the period subsequent to December 18, 1958. The learned Judge further observed that any excess payment made to the petitioner even under the decree of the civil court should be adjusted as the petitioner was not entitled to full salary in view of the subsequent suspension order. The District Judge, held that if the Competent Authority decided to hold fresh proceedings against a railway servant who may have been reinstated on account of the setting aside of the order of removal or dismissal by a court of law, then the Railway servant will not be entitled to any payment off salary even though a decree for the same may have been passed by a court of law. There is no provision either under the Diciplinary Rules or under the Payment of Wages Act permitting modification of a decree passed by the Civil Court. The decree of the court was passed against the Railway Administration and the petitioner's claim for arrears of salary was decreed and in pursuance of that decree the Railway Administration paid the entire decretal amount to the petitioner. Thereafter there was no question of any adjustment towards any subsistence allowance or any cost paid by the railway administration. A civil court decree is binding on the parties to the suit and unless it is set aside or modified by a competent court of law, the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the decree. It is not open to either of the parties to modify or to defeat the decree by its own unilateral action. Once the civil court passed decree against the railway administration and if it became final, the judgment- debtor was under a legal obligation to pay the entire amount of salary as decreed by the civil court to discharge its obligation. The Railway administration paid the decretal amount, thereby it got rid off the decree. Thereafter it had no authority in law to make any deduction or adjustment from the petitioner's wages which accrued to him after the civil court decree. It is well settled that an employer cannot make deduction from the wages of its employee unless the deduction is permitted by the Act. Thereafter it had no authority in law to make any deduction or adjustment from the petitioner's wages which accrued to him after the civil court decree. It is well settled that an employer cannot make deduction from the wages of its employee unless the deduction is permitted by the Act. Whenever a claim for wages is made and the employee is able to prove subsisting contract of service between the parties and if the employer claims any deduction from the wages the burden is on him to show that the deductions so claimed were made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, if the employer fails to discharge this burden, the deduction would be illegal and the employee would be entitled to receive the amount which may have been deducted from his wages. 4. THE Act contemplates deduction from the wages of employee in the circumstances enumerated in Section 7 of the Act. The Railway Administration claimed deductions under Section 7(2) (h) of the Act. In Divisional Accounts Officer v. Dal Singhar 1972 A.L.J. 56. it was held that before the employer can be allowed to make deduction under Section 7(2) (h) of the Act there must be an order passed by a competent court of law or a competent authority permitting the deductions. In the absence of any such order deductions would not be permissible. In the instant case, the petitioners plea that no order for deduction was issued by competent authority as contemplated by Section 7 (2) (h) is not denied. The respondents have failed to place any order as contemplated by Section 7 (2) (h) either before the Prescribed Authority or before the Appellate Authority. They have failed to produce that order even before this Court. In the circumstances the adjustment sought to be made by the respondent Railway is not permissible. The learned District Judge committed patent error of law in permitting the deductions and adjustment. Learned counsel urged that the District Judge again committed error in holding that the petitioner's claim for wages for the period November 8, 1957 to November 8, 1961, was not maintainable as it was barred by Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no dispute that the petitioner did not claim salary for this period in the suit filed by him, even though he had claimed arrears of salary for coherent periods. There is no dispute that the petitioner did not claim salary for this period in the suit filed by him, even though he had claimed arrears of salary for coherent periods. Admittedly, this claim was for a period prior to the filing of the suit. Normally, if the petitioner file a suit for recovery of arrears of salary for this period the suit would not be maintainable under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If one petitioner had filed a subsequent suit it would not be maintainable as the petitioner had failed to claim salary for this period in his earner suit, thus his claim for salary in respect of the said period was barred by law. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in General Manager v. Abdul Qayum 1972 A.L.J. 276. It is true that in the case of Abdul Qayum a learned Single Judge of this Court held that Payment of Wages Authority has no power to reject a claim under Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. Another learned Single Judge of this Court has however taken a contrary view in P. J. Lartius v. Superintendent, Printing and Stationery 1965 A.L.J. 292. The learned Single Judge held that when arrears of salary cannot be claimed in another suit it cannot also be recovered m a proceeding under the Payment of Wages Act. If the claim for arrears of salary prior to the making of application was barred by Order II, Rule 2, such amount cannot be recovered in a proceeding under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. It appears that the view of the learned Single Judge as expressed in P. J. Lartius case was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the case of Abdul Qayum. Even though there is difference of opinion in the two judgments of this Court, it is not necessary to refer the matter of larger Bench as the question raised by the petitioner can be disposed of an another ground. 5. ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner claimed wages for the period November 8, 1957, to November 30, 1967 by an amendment application filed on August 30, 1969, with a delay of eight years. 5. ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner claimed wages for the period November 8, 1957, to November 30, 1967 by an amendment application filed on August 30, 1969, with a delay of eight years. The claim under the first proviso to Section 15 (2) of the Act claiming wages must be presented within 12 months from the date on which the deduction from wages is made or from the date on which the payment of wages was due to be made. ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner was not paid his wages during the period between November 8, 1957, to November 30, 1967. Application claiming wages for the said period could be filed within 12 months thereof, but no application was made within 12 months. Even assuming that the cause of action for claiming wages arise on October 4, 1967, i.e., the date on which the Appellate Court upheld the decree of the trial court or even on June 19, 1968, when the Divisional Superintendent set aside the earlier order of removal, the application for payment of wages should have been made within 12 months from either of these two dates. But the petitioner filed the application on August 30, 1969, i.e., beyond 12 months from either of the aforesaid dates. Thus petitioner's application for recovery of wages for the period was made beyond the period prescribed by the Act. Therefore the petitioner is not entitled to wages for the said period. The order of the District Judge rejecting the petitioner's claim for November 8, 1957 to November 30, 1961 is sustainable on the ground of limitation. 6. LASTLY, it is urged that the Divisional Superintendent was not competent to pass the order dated June 19, 1968, placing the petitioner under suspension with retrospective effect. Rule 1706 (7) lays down that where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement imposed on a railway servant is declared void in consequence of a decision of a court of law and if disciplinary authority on a reconsideration of the case decides to hold fresh enquiry against the railway servant on the same allegations on which the order of removal or dismissal was passed, in that event the railway servant shall be deemed to nave been placed under suspension by the Competent Authority and such suspension snail operate from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal. Rule 1706 empowers the Disciplinary Authority to take fresh disciplinary proceedings against a railway servant, and if that is done the railway servant shall be deemed to be under suspension with retrospective effect. Rule 1702 defines 'Disciplinary Authority' and Rule 1705 lays down that the authorities specified in Schedules I, II and III appended to the Rules are competent to place a railway servant under suspension. The entries con- tamed in Schedule 11 snow that the Divisional Superintendent who is inter Administrative Officer is competent to suspend a class III railway servant. The petitioner was admittedly a class III employee, and as such the Divisional Superintendent was competent to place the petitioner under suspension under Rule 1705. It was then urged that the Divisional Superintendent was not the Disciplinary Authority within the meaning of clause (4) rule 1702. 'Disciplinary Authority' is defined by rule 1702 the definition includes an authority competent to impose on a railway servant any of the penalties mentioned in rule 1707. The definition further makes exception for imposing penalties of compulsory retirement, dismissal or removal. A different Disciplinary Authority is prescribed for the purpose of imposing a major penalty which may be in the nature of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal but for purposes of awarding minor punishments, like censure, withholding of increment or reduction to lower grade of post as laid down in Rule 1707, the Disciplinary Authority is different than the appointing authority. There is no dispute that the Divisional Superintendent was competent to award any of the minor punishments enumerated in clauses (1) of Rule 1707. Therefore he was Disciplinary Authority within the meaning of Rule 1707. No doubt, the Civil Court held that the General Manager was the petitioner appointing authority competent to pass the order of removal but the Divisional Superintendent being Disciplinary Authority was competent to suspend the petitioner in accordance with Rule 1702 and 1705 read with schedule II to the Rules. Since the Divisional Superintendent was competent to place the petitioner under suspension, the order of suspension dated June 19, 1968 is valid. In my opinion, the findings recorded by the learned District Judge on this question do not suffer from any patent error of law. 7. Since the Divisional Superintendent was competent to place the petitioner under suspension, the order of suspension dated June 19, 1968 is valid. In my opinion, the findings recorded by the learned District Judge on this question do not suffer from any patent error of law. 7. IN view of the above discussion the petition is allowed partly and the order of the learned District Judge dated October 30, 1972, to the extent noted in this judgment, is quashed. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is directed to bear and decide the matter in the light of the observations made in this judgment. Parties shall bear their own costs.