Judgment :- 1. The petitioner filed O.A. 7048 of 1970 before the Land Tribunal, Pattanakkad under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act for purchase Kudikidappu right in respect of the property wherein he was residing. The first respondent denied his status as Kudikidappukaran as defined in S.2 (25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. It came out that the petitioner got under a partition deed and is in possession of 10 cents of dry land and 101/2 cents of wet land. Relying on the above document, the Land Tribunal held that the petitioner is not a Kudikidappukaran and dismissed the petition. The decision was upheld by the Appellate Authority. The revision petition is against the above. When the case came up before a single judge of this Court, reference was made to the decision in Damodaran v. Kunhiraman (1973 KLT.14). The correctness of the above decision was doubted by the learned single judge and that resulted in this reference to the Division Bench. 2. In Damodaran v. Kunhiraman (1973 KLT.14), the applicant was the owner of 71/2 cents of garden land and 121/2 cents of adjoining paddy field The Land Tribunal dismissed the application holding that the applicant was not a Kudikidappukaran under S.2 (25) of the Act. The matter ultimately came up in revision before this Court. The argument put forward on behalf of the applicant was that he was a Kudikidappukaran since be was not in possession of 10 cents of land which was fit to be used for erecting a homestead. Rejecting the above contention, Namboodiripad, J. observed: "If this interpretation is to be accepted it would mean that a person owning 9.99 cents of garden land and a large area of paddy field yielding considerable income Can claim the status of a Kudikidappukaran. I doubt whether the legislature bad any such intention. What is provided for in the Statute is "any land exceeding in extent ten cents in any panchayat area on which he could erect a homestead". The intention of the legislature is only thai the land owned must be capable of being conveniently used for construction of a homestead and not that the entire 10 cents could be used for the purpose of putting up the homestead. The expression' any land" could not be read in any other manner. The intention of the legislature is only thai the land owned must be capable of being conveniently used for construction of a homestead and not that the entire 10 cents could be used for the purpose of putting up the homestead. The expression' any land" could not be read in any other manner. Since the applicant has no case that the 71/2 cents of garden land cannot conveniently accommodate a homestead, and since the contiguous paddy land measuring 121/2 cents also belongs to him he has to be treated as a person who has land exceeding 10 cents. And consequently, he is not a Kudikidappukaran within 'the meaning of the Act. His application was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the Tribunal." 3. There is difference between the above case and the present one. The petitioner herein owns 10 cents of dry land and not something less than 10 cents. Unlike in Damodaran v. Kunhiraman (1973 KLT.14), the paddy field is not contiguous to the dry land. Therefore, the argument that the paddy field can be converted into dry land to make up the deficiency in the dry land for erecting a homestead is not available in this case. 4. S.2 (25) defines a Kudikidappukaran as follows: "Kudikidappukaran' means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and" The stand taken by the petitioner is that going by the definition, a person ceases to be a Kudikidappukaran only when he owns land on which he could erect a homestead the extent of which exceeds 10 cents in a panchayat area. According to him, since the dry land in his possession does not exceed 10 cents, he falls within the definition of Kudikidappukaran and as such entitled to purchase the Kudikidappu right. The contention put forward is that the paddy field should be excluded while considering whether the petitioner is a Kudikidappukaran and possession of 10 cents alone of dry land does not take him away from the definition of a Kudikidappukaran. The contention put forward is that the paddy field should be excluded while considering whether the petitioner is a Kudikidappukaran and possession of 10 cents alone of dry land does not take him away from the definition of a Kudikidappukaran. The expression "any land exceeding in extent 10 cents in any panchayat area or township on which he could erect a homestead" in S.2(25) taken in the literal sense supports the petitioner. But a reference to the other sections dealing with Kudikidappu as also the scheme of the Act may be necessary in arriving at a final decision. 5. Coming to the provisions dealing with rights and liabilities of Kudikidappukars, S.75 (1) (iv) states that a Kudikidappukaran can be evicted if he has obtained ownership and possession of land which is fit for erecting a homestead within a distance of five kilometres from his kudikidappu, provided such land is not more than three cents if it is is a city or major Municipality, five cents in any other Municipality and ten cents in a Panchayat area or township. S.75 (2) deals with shitting of the Kudikidappu in cases where the landlord requires the land bona-fide for his own purposes In such cases, the land-lord should provide an alternate site for erecting a homestead and the extent of the new site should be the extent of the existing Kudikidappu, subject to a minimum of three cents if within the limits of a city or a major Municipality, five cents if within the limits of any other municipality and ten cents if in any panchayat area or township. S.75 (4) deals with the shitting of the kudikidappu in cases where the existence of the Kudikidappu causes inconvenience to the landlord. In such cases also, the landlord is to provide an alternate site which if it is in a Panchayat should be 10 cents in extent. S 80A deals with the purchase of Kudikidappu. S 80A (3) gives the extent of land which a kudikidappukaran is entitled to purchase. It is ten cents in a Panchayat area or township, but if the land available for purchase or the land in which the Kudikidappu is situate is less than ten cents, be shall be entitled to purchase only the land available for purchase or the land is which the Kudikidappu is situate. It is ten cents in a Panchayat area or township, but if the land available for purchase or the land in which the Kudikidappu is situate is less than ten cents, be shall be entitled to purchase only the land available for purchase or the land is which the Kudikidappu is situate. S.80A(4) deals with the maximum extent for purchase in cases where there are more than one Kudikidappukaran. In no case a Kudikidappukaran is entitled to purchase more than 10 cents in a Panchayat area. On the other hand, in cases where the owner of the property has only less than an acre and there are more than one Kudikidappukaran, the maximum extent of land liable to be purchased by all the Kudikidappukars is only 10 cents in a Panchayat area. Under proviso to S.80A(4), in cases where a person owns an acre or more and there are a number of Kudikidappukars, the minimum fixed for purchase by them is three cents. 6. The Legislative purpose in enacting the provisions relating to Kudikidappukars is to see that every person in the State is provided with land for electing a homestead. The underlying principle is that three cents of land in a City or major Municipality, 5 cents of land in any other Municipality and 10 cents of land in a Panchayat area or township would be sufficient for erecting a homestead and for the convenient enjoyment thereof The attempt or endeavour of the law-makers has been to provide the above extent to the needy wherever possible. While this social welfare aspect of the Land Reforms Act should be borne in mind, it should not be forgotten that the Statute is also expropriatory in character so far as land-owners are concerned, It follows that the interpretation to be but to the several provisions should be neither too strict nor too liberal and should be such as to give effect to the purpose of the Statute. 7. The expression'a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent ten cents in a Panchayat area or township on which he could erect a homestead" is capable of different interpretations. It may mean, the person concerned should not own land exceeding ten cents, the whole land lying in a block. 7. The expression'a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent ten cents in a Panchayat area or township on which he could erect a homestead" is capable of different interpretations. It may mean, the person concerned should not own land exceeding ten cents, the whole land lying in a block. It could also mean that the land may lie in different blocks, provided the total extent exceeds 10 cents and there are blocks or at least one block where he could erect a homestead. Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. observed is follows in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (AIR. 1973 SC. 1461): "Ordinarily the legislative intent is gathered from the language used. If the language employed is plain and unambiguous, the same must be given effect to irrespective of the consequences that may arise. But if the language employed is reasonably capable of more meanings than one, (hen the Court will have to call into aid various well settled rules of construction and, in particular, the history of the legislation to find out the evil that was sought to be remedied and also in some cases the underlying purpose of the legislation the legislative scheme and the consequences that may possibly flow from accepting one or the other of the interpretations because no legislative body is presumed to confer a power which is capable of misuse." (See page 1619.) Reference may in this connection be made to the passage at page 20 of the Interpretation of Statutes Maxwell, 10th Edition. "The true meaning of any passage, it is said, is to be found not merely in the words of that passage, but in comparing it with other parts of the law, ascertaining also what were the circumstances with reference to which the words were used and what was the object appearing from those circumstances which the legislature had in view. The same, it would seem, applies to a by-law. The same, it would seem, applies to a by-law. Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and the other clauses of the Act, so as, so far as so possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute of series of statutes relating to the subject-matter." In another passage at page 229 of the same book, the learned author states: "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving as unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, or by rejecting them altogether, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used." 8. By way of further elucidation, we may quote the words of the Privy Council in Shannon Re hies v. St. Mickel (Ville De) (1924 A. C. 185): "Where the words of a statute are clear they must, of course, be followed; but. in their Lordships' opinion, where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system," 9. In the instant case, if the contention of the petitioner is accepted, it would mean that a person having several blocks of land in a Panchayat each having an extent of ten cents will be a Kudikidappukaran, entitled to purchase ten cents of land from another person who may possibly own only in extent of less than one acre or even 15 cents or 20 cents. Such a construction is obviously unreasonable. A legislature which considers that in the case of persons living in cities and municipalities an extent of three cents or five cents and in cases falling under S.80A (4) (a), an extent of even less than 3 cents is sufficient for erecting a homestead could not have intended that an extent of over ten cents would be required for putting up a homestead in a Panchayat. It is impossible to contend that 10 cents of land is not sufficient to put up a homestead. Hardly ever 10 cents are taken up for putting up a homestead or but as envisaged by the Act. In this case, the alleged Kudikidappukaran has 10 full cents of land which will be quite sufficient for putting up a homestead with enough land to spare as appurtenant lands for the needs of a Kudikidappukaran who is expected to live in a homestead or but of the value mentioned in the statute itself. In these circumstances, it will be impossible to ignore the existence of over 10 cents of paddy land in deciding whether the provisions of S.2 (25) have been attracted or not. An insistence that the land on which the Kudikidappu is to be situate should exceed 10 cents will lead to an ambiguous and an unrealistic position. If a person has 9.99 cents or even 10 cents, he will be a Kudikidappukaran but if he has 10.001 cents he will not be a kudikidappukaran Such an interpretation no court can accept; it is not warranted by the provisions of the Act to which reference has already been made in the judgment. 10. In the light of the interpretation that we give to S.2 (25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the decision in Damodaran v. Kunhiraman (1975 KLT.14) does not require reconsideration. The revision petition is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. Dismissed.