B. N. SARMA, J.:- This is an applica­tion under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to quash the Reference made by the Collector, Manipur North Dis­trict, Karong, to the District Judge, Manipur under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) in L. A. Case No. 1 of 1972 and for a writ of the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay to the petitioner the sum of Rs. 59,616/-awarded as compensation by the Collector in respect of the acquired land. The Collector of North District,1 Manipur, the State of Manipur and the Secretary, Government of Manipur, Development Department have been arrayed as defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respec­tively. The relevant facts may be stated, in brief, as below. 2. The village Nungphou is a hill vil­lage within the North District, Manipur, and it is one of the villages grouped under the Sadar Circle No. 1 under the piovisions of the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administra­tion) Regulation, 1947. The petitionei is the headman of this village and he has been in exclusive possession of the lands of the Tillage realising house tax from the residents of the village for the purpose of paying the same to the Government. 3. While the petitioner was the owner hi occupation of the lands of the village, in 1965-66 the respondents took possession of an area of 12.99 acres of land in the said village without any authority, for the pur­pose of construction of some houses for some Government office on the assumption that it was Government khas land. Thereupon the petitioner filed successive applications (Annexures A/3 to A/6) to the respondents, paying for arranging to pay reasonable compen­sation to him for the land so occupied stat­ing that it was his land. At last on the basis of the application at Annexure A/3, the 'Gov­ernment of Manipur caused an enquiry to be made by the S. D. O. Mao Sadar Hill Subdivi­sion to ascertain whether the land in question belongs to the petitioner and falls within his Village Nuncphou or it is Government khas land. The said S. D. O., after an enquiry submitted a report on 1-7-1966 to the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur (Annexure A/7) stat­ing that the land in question falls within the village of the petitioner and is not Govern­ment khas land. 4. The said S. D. O., after an enquiry submitted a report on 1-7-1966 to the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur (Annexure A/7) stat­ing that the land in question falls within the village of the petitioner and is not Govern­ment khas land. 4. On receipt of the enquiry report from the S. D. O., Mao Sadar Subdivision, as above, the Government of Manipur decid­ed to acquire the land in question and issued a preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, vide Noti­fication No. 8/25/63-D dated 28th June, 1969 (Annexure A/8), which was duly published. A copy of this Notification was separately sent to the petitioner. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 issued a Notification No. DC(N) 6/26 dated 2-5-1972 under Section 9 of the Act (Annexure A/10). A copy of this Notification was also separately sent to the petitioner ask­ing him to appear before the Collector on 12-6-1972 to state the nature of his claim and the amount and particulars of his claim. On receipt of this notice, the petitioner appeared before the Collector and lodged an objection as to the area of the land acquired which was notified as measuring 11 acres approximately, but which actually measured 12.99 acres. The acquisition case was registered as L. A. case No. 1 of 1972. Except the petitioner no other person appeared before the Collector to lay any claim to the land or to the com­pensation in respect of the same. After due enquiry the Collector made an award in favour of the petitioner granting Rs. 59,616/-as compensation for 12.99 acres of land, at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per acre. The award was made on 29-1-1973. On the same day the respondent No. 1 wrote to the respondent No. 3 to make available the sum of Rupees 59.616/- for payment to the petitioner vide his letter dated 29-1-1973 (Annexure A/14). In spite of this letter from the respondent No. 1 and also repeated requests from the petitioner the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 avoid­ed payment on this or that plea. At last on 26-3-1975 the Revenue Secretary to the Government of Manipur filed an application, pur­portedly under Section 30 of the L. A. Act, requesting the Collector to refer the case to the District Judge stating inter alia that the respondent No. 2 was "doubting the title of the petitioner to receive the compensation money" {Annexure A/15). At last on 26-3-1975 the Revenue Secretary to the Government of Manipur filed an application, pur­portedly under Section 30 of the L. A. Act, requesting the Collector to refer the case to the District Judge stating inter alia that the respondent No. 2 was "doubting the title of the petitioner to receive the compensation money" {Annexure A/15). The respondent No. 1 wrote back to the Hill Commissioner, Manipur, expressing his doubt about the ap­plicability of S. 30 of the L. A. Act in the case and suggested that the matter might be reviewed in consultation with the law depart­ment; but it appears this request was not heeded to. At last the respondent No 1 made a reference to the District Judge, purportedly under Section 30 of the L. A. Act, in com­pliance with the letter of the Revenue Secre­tary (Annexure A/15). In the letter of re­ference (Annexure A/18) the Collector stated "it is claimed in the petition (of the Revenue Secretary) that Shri Phongseh Misao (peti­tioner) is not entitled to receive the com­pensation" awarded by the Collector in L. A. Case No. 1 of 1972. It is against this refer­ence the petitioner has come up with the pre­sent writ petition with the prayers, as mentioned above alleging, inter alia, that the reference made by the Collector is wholly without juris­diction and that the respondents are bound in law to pay him the compensation awarded by the Collector for the acquired land. 5. The respondents filed a counter affidavit sworn by the Under Secretary to the Government of Manipur, Development depart­ment, resisting the claim of the petitioner. It appears from the counter affidavit that the stand of the respondents is not very clear. At one place in the counter affidavit, it is stated that the land hi question is actually Government khas land and that the report of the S. D. O. Mao at Annexure A/7 where­in it is stated that the land is included with­in the village of the petitioner is not reliable. Again at another place it is stated that the State has been and is the absolute owner of the village Nungphou and the Chief and his villagers are given only possessory right on payment of house tax thereof to the Govern­ment. 6. Mr. Again at another place it is stated that the State has been and is the absolute owner of the village Nungphou and the Chief and his villagers are given only possessory right on payment of house tax thereof to the Govern­ment. 6. Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh, the learn­ed counsel for the petitioner contended before us that the so-called reference by the Res­pondent No. 1 under Section 30 of the L. A. Act is wholly misconceived and without juris­diction. According to him, once the land was acquired and the award was made, the Gov­ernment could have no right to intervene and to ask for a reference under Sec. 30, as has been done in this case. At any rate, he sub­mitted, in the absence of any other claimant, it cannot be said that there is any dispute within the meaning of Section 30 of the Act to give jurisdiction of the Collector to make a reference. 7. The learned Government Advocate, on the other hand submitted that the Gov­ernment having disputed the right of the peti­tioner to receive the compensation money, the Collector was within his jurisdiction to make the reference and this Court, in its writ juris­diction, cannot interfere with the discretion of the Collector. He further submitted that the alternative remedy of the petitioner is still there before the District Judge in the Refer­ence case and he cannot be allowed to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court without exhausting that remedy. 8. Before we go into the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, let us first deal with the preliminary objec­tion of the respondents as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present writ application. It is a settled law that if an administrative or quasi judicial body acts without jurisdiction the High Court can in­terfere with such action in its certiorari juris­diction. It is also a settled law that the find­ing of such a body as to a jurisdictional fact can be re-examined by the High Court to come to its own conclusion. If any authority is needed for this proposition, reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. D. K. Jadav, AIR 1968 SC 1186 and Raza Textile v. I. T. Officer AIR 1973 SC 1362 . If any authority is needed for this proposition, reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. D. K. Jadav, AIR 1968 SC 1186 and Raza Textile v. I. T. Officer AIR 1973 SC 1362 . We may also refer here to the decision of the Patna High Court in Sudhangshu Kumar v. L. A. Officer, AIR 1961 Pat 150 , the facts of which are very much similar to those of the present case. In that case it was held that the existence of a dis­pute as regards apportionment of compensa­tion is a question of jurisdictional fact and unless there is such a dispute existing, the L. A. Officer has no authority or jurisdiction to make a reference to the Civil Court under S. 30. It was further held that where the jurisdiction of an Administrative Authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact, the High Court is entitled, in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari, to determine by its independent judgment whether or not that finding of fact is correct. 9. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the objection of the learned Govern­ment Advocate as to the jurisdiction of this Court is wholly untenable. We now proceed to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, as mentioned ear­lier. 10. The contention of Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh that once an acquisition pro­ceeding is taken up and an award is made, the Government has no right to intervene and ask for a reference cannot be accepted as a general proposition of law. No doubt, if the land belongs to the Government and none else has got any interest therein, there can be no necessity at all for the Government to go for acquisition. But there may be cases where the Government is the owner of the land but some other persons have got some limited interest, say as tenants or as licensees and such persons may have their structures or valuable trees on the land, to which they are legally entitled and which come within the definition of land under Section 3 (a) of the Act. In such a case it is always open to the Government to declare in the Notification under S. 4 of the Act what is the nature of the right of the State over the land. In such a case it is always open to the Government to declare in the Notification under S. 4 of the Act what is the nature of the right of the State over the land. In that case the person who may be interested in dis­puting the title of the Government to the land would be entitled to raise objections be­fore the Collector and then before the Dis­trict Judge and to have a determination ot the question of title on the evidence. This was the view expressed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Makhanlal v. Secretary of State, AIR 1934 All 260. Again in some cases after the acquisition proceeding is started and the award is made, the land may vest in the Government by operation of law or otherwise. In such a case the Collec­tor is within his jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act to make a reference to the Dis­trict Judge for determination of the right of the Government to compensation which may devolve on it after the award. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court in Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 . 11. The question now is whether in the instant case there was any scope to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act at the instance of the Government. Admittedly at the initial stage in 1965-66 the Govern­ment proceeded to start some construction on the land for some Government offices on the assumption that it was Government khas land. Then on the representations made by the petitioner the Government caused an enquiry to be made by a responsible revenue officer, namely, the S. D. O. Mao Sadar Sub-division, who after due enquiry submitted a report stating that the land in ques­tion falls within the village of the peti­tioner and it is not Government khas land. The Government evidently ac­cepted this report; otherwise it would not have initiated the acquisition proceedings. In the notice under Section 4 (1) (Annexure A/8) as well as in the notice under Section 9 of the Act (Annexure A/10) the land was described as situate at Nungphou which is admittedly the village of the petitioner. Copies of these notices were separately sent to the petitioner by the Collector for information. In spite of publicity given to these notifications none else except the petitioner laid any claim for com­pensation. Copies of these notices were separately sent to the petitioner by the Collector for information. In spite of publicity given to these notifications none else except the petitioner laid any claim for com­pensation. The Collector after due enquiry, as required under the Act, by his award dated 29-1-1973 held that the land belonged to the petitioner Shri Phongseh Misao and awarded compensation accordingly. At no stage of the acquisition proceedings, before the Award was made, Government raised any objection about the eligibility of the petitioner to receive such compensation. On the same day the award was made, the Collector wrote to the Develop­ment Commissioner to make available the sum of Rs. 59.616/- awarded as compensation for payment to the petitioner. The Government slept over the matter till 26-3-1975 on which date the Revenue Secretary, Government of Manipur filed an application before the Col­lector for a reference of the case to the Dis­trict Judge under Section 30 of the Act as "the Government is doubting the title of the respondent Shn Phongseh Misao" and as ''the said respondent is not entitled to receive the compensation awarded or is not competent to alienate the land". It was not mentioned in this petition (Annexure A/15) nor in the Setter of reference addressed to the District Judge (Annexure A/18) that either the Gov­ernment or anybody else is entitled to receive the whole or any part of the compensation money. 12. Section 30 of the L. A. Act is in the following terms: "30. Dispute as to apportionment - When the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Col­lector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court." It is seen from the above provisions that a reference under the section pre-supposes anyone of the two kinds of disputes mention­ed therein, namely, (i) any dispute as to the apportionment of the compensation awarded or any part thereof; and (ii) any dispute as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. Admittedly there is no dispute as to the apportionment of the com­pensation nor can it be said that there is any dispute as to whom the compensation is pay­able. Admittedly there is no dispute as to the apportionment of the com­pensation nor can it be said that there is any dispute as to whom the compensation is pay­able. A dispute of this nature pre-supposes the rival claims of two or more contending parties which are to be decided by the Dis­trict Judge. We do not think that a mere doubt about the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money, in the ab­sence of any other contending party laying claim to the whole or any part of the com­pensation money, will constitute a dispute within the meaning of S. 30. 13. The word 'dispute' is not defined in the Act. According to Chambers's Dic­tionary the word 'dispute' means a quarrel; a contest with words; an argument or a debate. The learned Government Advocate submits that when the State has now dis­puted, that means challenged, the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money, there is a dispute. When a word ad­mits of two or more meanings it is to be understood in that sense in which it best har­monises with the scheme or the subject of the enactment. Viewed in such context, we are, of the opinion that the word 'dispute' occur­ring in Section 30 ct the L. A. Act means a quarrel between two or more rival parties ikying claim over the whole or any part of the compensation money. The use of the word "persons" i. e. in plural number in the section is also significant. Reference of a dispute as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation is payable is evidently meant for determination as to which person is en­titled to receive the money. There must be such a person amongst the rival contending parties. In the instant case the respondents in their application filed before the Collector (Annexure A/15) has not stated who is en­titled to receive the money; nor has the Col­lector in his reference asked the District Judge to decide who is the person entitled to receive the compensation money. He has simply asked the District Judge to decide whether not the petitioner is entitled to receive the money. This is not within the scope and ambit of Section 30 of the L. A. Act, in out opinion. He has simply asked the District Judge to decide whether not the petitioner is entitled to receive the money. This is not within the scope and ambit of Section 30 of the L. A. Act, in out opinion. In fact the Collector also took the same view, as we have taken, as is evident from his letter addressed to the Hill Commis­sioner (Annexure A/17). It appears ultimately he had to yield to the pressure of the Gov­ernment in making the reference. It may be mentioned here that under Section 18 of the L. A. Act the Collector is bound to make such a reference. But under Section 30, the Collector is not bound to make such a refer­ence on any application. In Grant v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1966 SC 237 ) (supra) the Supreme Court observed: 'Whereas under Section 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested, the Collector is, under Section 30, not enjoined to make a reference; he may relegate the person raising the dispute to agitate the same in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declar­ed by his award. The powers which are ex­ercised by the Collector under Section 18 (1) and under Section 30 are distinct and may be invoked in contingencies which do not overlap." 14. No doubt, it has been urged in the counter affidavit of the respondents filed in this Court that the finding of the S. D. O., Mao Subdivision, that the land in question falls within the village Nungphou is not cor­rect and that the land is actually Government khas land. Alternatively, it has also been stated that the land comprised in the said village belongs to the Government and the petitioner who is the head of the village as Well as other villagers have got only posses­sory right. But what have been stated be­fore us in the writ petition will not go to give jurisdiction to the Collector to make a refer­ence under Section 30. What was stated be­fore the Collector is only material for that purpose. It was never the case of the res­pondents before the Collector that the acquir­ed land is actually Government khas land or that the State is the owner of the land com­prised in village Nungphou and the petitioner has got only possessory right. What was stated be­fore the Collector is only material for that purpose. It was never the case of the res­pondents before the Collector that the acquir­ed land is actually Government khas land or that the State is the owner of the land com­prised in village Nungphou and the petitioner has got only possessory right. In their appli­cation filed before the Collector it was simply stated that the Government doubts the eligi­bility of the petitioner to receive the com­pensation money. As we have already point­ed out, a mere doubt does not go to consti­tute a dispute within the meaning of Sec­tion 30. 15. Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner further urged before us that the aforementioned claim of the Government, now put before this Court, is barred by the principle of estopped. It was submitted by him that having regard to the terms of the Government Notifications which described the land in such a manner as to negative the suggestion that it was Govern­ment land and having regard to the whole course of the land acquisition proceedings which were utterly inconsistent with the land being Government land, the Government is now estopped from claiming that the land is Government khas land or that the Government is the actual owner of the land com­prised in village Nungphou. In making this submission Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Secretary of State v. Tatya Saheb, AIR 1932 Bom 386. Though this contention ap­pears to have some force, it is not necessary, in our opinion, for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition to decide as to whether or not the Government is estopped from saying so. We have already held that there was no dispute before the Collector as to the per­sons to whom the compensation money is payable. In the absence of such a dispute the Collector could have no jurisdiction- to make a reference to the District Judge. The respondents are bound to pay the compensa­tion money to the petitioner in terms of the award made by respondent No. 1. 16. In the result this petition is allow­ed and the Rule is made absolute. In the absence of such a dispute the Collector could have no jurisdiction- to make a reference to the District Judge. The respondents are bound to pay the compensa­tion money to the petitioner in terms of the award made by respondent No. 1. 16. In the result this petition is allow­ed and the Rule is made absolute. The re­ference made by the Collector to the District Judge under Section 30 of the Act (Annexure A/18) is hereby quashed and we direct the res­pondents to pay the compensation money in terms of the award made by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case we however leave the parties to bear their own costs. K. LAHIRI, J.:- I agree. Petition allowed.