JUDGMENT K.N. Seth, J. The defendant appellant is a tenant of the preraises in dispute. The landlord moved an application under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (Act No. Ill of 1947) seeking permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the tenant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application. The revision filed by the landlord was dismissed by the Commissioner. Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner, the landlord approached the State Government under Section 7F of the Act. The State Government, by its order dated March 19, 1968, granted the requisite permission, On the strength of the order of the State Government, the landlord filed a suit in the court of Munsif, Allahabad, for ejectment of the tenant and for recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was contested, inter alia, on the ground that the order of the State Government was illegal and vofd as it was not in conformity with law, and it did not confer any right on the plaintiff to sue for ejectment. The trial court decreed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. On appeal by the tenant, the first appellate court confirmed the decree eiectment but set aside the decree for arrears of rent. The tenant has come up in appeal to this Court. During the pendency of the second appeal, the tenant filed a petition under Article 22fi of the Constitution challenging the legality of the order of the State Government dated March 19, 1968 passer under Section 7F. This Court allowed the petition on the ground that the order of the State Government did not contain any reason for setting aside the order of the Commissioner. The impugned order was quashed. The State Government was directed to restore the revision and to decide it in accordance with law. The second appeal filed by the tenant was directed to be listed for hearing after disposal of the petition under Section 7F by the State Government in pursuance of the order of this Court. Parties are agreed that the state Government, by its order dated September 29. 1973. reiected the landlord's petition under Section 7F and that order has become final. The only question for consideration in the present appeal is whether thesuit was validly instituted and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for ejectment. Parties are agreed that the state Government, by its order dated September 29. 1973. reiected the landlord's petition under Section 7F and that order has become final. The only question for consideration in the present appeal is whether thesuit was validly instituted and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for ejectment. It was contended by Sri Tripathi that the suit was filed on the strength of the permission granted by State Government, the permission has since been quashed by this Court; the State Government on a reconsideration of the matter reiected the position of the landlord for grant of the requisite permissionin view of these developments the suit must be deemed to have been filed without requisite permission and hence no decree for ejectment could be validly passed; the appeal being a continuation of the suit, the appellate court is competent to take into consideration the situation as it exists on the date of passing the decree. For the respondents it was urged that Act No. Ill of 1947 imposed a bar on the institution of the suit but once that bar was removed by granting the requisite permission to the landlord, a suit could be validly instituted and any subsequent development should not render the institution of the suit itself invalid nor could it effect the validity of the proceeding in the suit. Once the suit was instituted the permission under which it was instituted exhausted itself. The permission not being vofd ab initio its subsequent quashing or revocation did not have any bearing on the institution of the suit and a decree for ejectment could be validly passed. Reliance was placed on Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 971. In that case the District Magistrate rejected the application of the landlord for permission to institute a suit against the tenant for his eviction. The Commissioner reversed the order of the District Magistrate and granted the requisite permission. Against that order the tenant moved the State Government under Section 7F. During the pendency of the petition before the State Government the landlord instituted a suit seeking eviction of the tenant from the suit premises. The suit was decreed by the trial Court, it was appealed against. During the pendency of the appeal, the State Government revoked the permission granted by the Commissioner. The first appellate court allowed the appeal of the tenant. The suit was decreed by the trial Court, it was appealed against. During the pendency of the appeal, the State Government revoked the permission granted by the Commissioner. The first appellate court allowed the appeal of the tenant. The High Court allowed the second appeal filed by the landlord following the decision in Bashi Ram v. Mantri Lal A.I.R. 1965 All. 498 (F.B.). The Supreme Court held that the order of the District Magistrate is subject to any order passed by the Commissioner under subsection (3) of Section 3 and if the permission is subsequently revoked by the Commissioner a suit filed on the strength of the permission of the District Magistrate ceases to be maintainable. To that extent the Supreme Court approved the Full Bench decision of this Court. The Supreme Court, however, held that the suit does not cease to be maintainable if the State Government revokes, after the institution of the suit, the permission granted. The State Government's power to revoke the permission granted under Section 3(1) gets exhausted once the suit is validly instituted. The same view was reiterated in Mohd. Ismail v. Nanney Lal A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1919. It was observed: the words of Section 7F in our opinion, indicate that the State Government can only exercise its jurisdiction to review the order of the Commissioner before the actual institution of the suit. The language of Section 7F shows that on the facts of the case before it the State Government must consider whether the grant of or refusal to grant, permission for the filing of a suit should be upheld or not. The section does not seem to be aimed at invalidating a suit already instituted and can only operate at a stage before the landlord launches his proceeding. There is nothing in subsection 5 (4) of Section 3 read with Section 7F to show that a landlord should wait till the powers of the revising authorities have been exhausted. If the legislature had so intended, it could have used words in subsection (1) of Section 3 to indicate that the grant of permission by the District Magistrate would also be subject to an order under Section 7F. Sri Tripathi urged that the principle laid down in Bhagwan Das's case (supra) was departed from in Purshottam Das v. Smt Raj Mani Devi A,I.R. 1970 S.C. 763. Sri Tripathi urged that the principle laid down in Bhagwan Das's case (supra) was departed from in Purshottam Das v. Smt Raj Mani Devi A,I.R. 1970 S.C. 763. which was decided after the decision in Bhagwan Das's case (supra). In that case the suit was filed after obtaining permission from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Section 3(1). The Commissioner revoked the permission. The State Government acting under Section 7F set aside the Commissioner's order and granted leave to the landlord to file the suit. The trial court decreed the suit and that decree was affirmed by the first and the second appellate courts. The Supreme Court after referring to Bhagwan Das's case (supra), observed: "......the present suit though validly instituted after obtaining the permission under Section 3(1) became incompetent when the permission was revoked by the Commissioner under Section 3 (3). But the order under Section 3 (3) itself was set aside by the State Government under Section 7F during the pendency of the suit. The question is what is the effect of this order under Section 7F. Now, Section 3(4) provides that the order of Commissioner under Section 3 (3) is subject to an order passed by the State Government, under Section 7F. If the State Government acting under Section 7F sets aside the order of the Commissioner revoking the permission, the order under Section 3(1) granting permission is revived. The result is that there is an effective permission to institute the suit under Section 3(1) and the suit is validly instituted." The Court further observed that the State Government acting under Section 7F had power to revise and set aside the Commissioner's order and restore the permission granted under Section 3(1) so as to make the suit competent and when the decree in the suit was passed, there was an effective permission to institute the suit. On the strength of these observations it was urged that the law requires the existence of the permission not only on the date of the institution of the suit but also on the date of the decree. In this connection reference of Smt. Prabhawati v. Dr. case the District Magistrate mission which was affirmed was also made to the Pritam Kaur A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1910. In this connection reference of Smt. Prabhawati v. Dr. case the District Magistrate mission which was affirmed was also made to the Pritam Kaur A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1910. In granted the requisite by the Commissioner case that perThe tenant's representation under Section 7F was allowed by the State Government and it set aside the permission granted. The landlord challenged the legality of the order made by the State Government in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the State Government and the case was remanded to the State Government to rehear the representation under Section 7F. The landlord instituted the suit after the order of remand passed by the High Court. The State Government dismissed the tenant's representation on the ground that it had become infructuous as the suit had already been filed. The tenant's writ petition was dismissed by the High Court confirming the view taken by the State Government. While dealing the appeal of the tenant the Supreme Court observed: The true effect of the order made by the High Court in the writ petition was that the question whether the respondent should be permitted to file a suit for eiectment of the apnellant or not must be gone into and decided afresh by the State Government. One of the implication flowing from that order is that the respondent is precluded from filing the intended suit for eviction till the State Government decides the revision petition. Otherwise the direction given by the High Court would remain unobeyed. The respondent cannot be permitted to obstruct the implementation of that direction and that too a direction given at her instance. Consequently it was not open to the respondent to file the suit before the revision petition was disposed of by the State Government. In our opinion, the suit filed by the respondent was a premature one. Such a suit does not bar the State Government from disposing of the revision petition in pursuance of the order made by High Court, The State Government was not justified in dismissing the revision petition as being infructuous." The landlord was allowed to apply for staying further proceedings in the suit. Such a suit does not bar the State Government from disposing of the revision petition in pursuance of the order made by High Court, The State Government was not justified in dismissing the revision petition as being infructuous." The landlord was allowed to apply for staying further proceedings in the suit. It was urged that the ratio of this case was that the permission; must exist throughout the pendency of the suit otherwise the State Government would not have held the suit to be premature. Moreover, if the order of the State Government would have been of no consequence once the suit had been instituted, the Supreme Court could not have allowed the tenant's appeal. Prima facie there appears to be considerable merit in the contention raised by the appellant. However, it is not necessary to probe deeper into the ratio of the various decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. In the present case the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as the Commissioner refused to grant the requisite permission. The suit was filed on the strength of the permission granted by the State Government. This Court quashed the order of the State Government with a direction to the State Government to rehear the landlord's petition under Section 7F. The State Government ultimately dismissed the landlord's petition. The net result is that the suit will be deemed to have been instituted without a valid permission for when this Court quashed the order of the State Government it ceased to have any existence in the eye of law. Whatever may be the ambit of the power of the State Government in relation to a suit instituted on the strength of the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or the Commissioner, the consequences flowing from the order of this Court under Section 226 of the Constitution quashing the permission granted by the State Government are that the proceedings initiated on the basis of the State Government's order cease to be valid and no decree for eviction can be passed in such a suit which is rendered in competent since its very inception. The appeal being a continuation of the suit, it is not even open to the appellate court to ignore this position. The appeal being a continuation of the suit, it is not even open to the appellate court to ignore this position. Moreover, in the present case the State Government itself refused to grant the requisite permission when it reconsidered the matter on a direction issued by this Court which it was bound to obey. At present no permission exists which could provide a valid basis for the suit for eviction. Sri Haider for the respondent urged that this Court quashed the order of the State Government on the ground that it did not contain any reasons, that defect in the order of the State Government only made it irregular and it could not be characterised as a nullity. The courts below could not possibly ignore the order and till it was quashed; it remained valid and a decree for eviction could be legally passed. There being no legal error in the decree of the courts below, it was not competent for this Court to set aside that decree in second appeal. It is true that the order of the State Government could not be treated as a nullity but once that order was quashed and the State Government on reconsideration of the matter refused to grant permission, the very foundation on which the suit was based disappeared. This change in the legal position cannot be ignored by this Court while hearing the second appeal and it must: be held that the present suit has been filed without a valid permission and consequently no decree for eviction can follow. In the result this appeal is allowed. The decree of the courts below is set aside and the plaintiffrespondent s suit is dismissed, in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.