SHARMA, J —This is an application in revision filed by Guman Singh against an order of the Special Judge for C.B.I. Cases, Rajasthan, Jaipur, dated 31st October, 1975, by which objections raised by the petitioner to the taking of cognizance of an offence punishable under section 165, I.P.C against him were overruled and it was ordered hat a charge for the aforesaid offence may be framed against him on the basis of the three allegations mentioned in the charge-sheet by the C.B.I. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to this revision petition may be briefly stated as follows:— 3. The petitioner was posted as Superintendent of Police, Sirohi, during the period between July 1965 and August, 1969. Thereafter he was appointed on the post of the Deputy Inspector General of Police at Kota, where he worked on the said post during the period between 31-1-1970 and 14.4.1972. It is alleged that being a public servant he obtained a plot of land situated at Mount Abu in the year 1965 for Rs. 99/-, from the Ex Maharaja of Sirohi in the name of his son Dhanpat Singh while knowing it well that the market value of the plot was between Rs. 15,000/-. and Rs. 20,000/-. It was further alleged that in the year 1966 he purchased 129-1/2 Bighas of land at Gulab Ganj from Shri Ram Singh, brother of Ex-Maharaja of Sirohi for Rs. 8,000/-, on 28-9-1966 in the name of his grand daughter Kumari Chandra Kanta. While purchasing this land he knew it well that the market value thereof was about Rs. 20,000/-, on the date of the Sale. On 31.3.71 he again purchased 9 Bighas of land in the name of his son Dhanpat Singh for a consideration, i.e. Rs. 9,000/-, which he knew to be inadequate, from the Ex-Maharaja of Kota. The market price of this land was more than Rs. 2 000/-, per Bigha. 20,000/-, on the date of the Sale. On 31.3.71 he again purchased 9 Bighas of land in the name of his son Dhanpat Singh for a consideration, i.e. Rs. 9,000/-, which he knew to be inadequate, from the Ex-Maharaja of Kota. The market price of this land was more than Rs. 2 000/-, per Bigha. An inquiry into these transfers was made which revealed that the Ex-Maharaja of Sirohi and his brother Ram Singh and the Ex-Maharaja of Kota, from whom the lands were purchased by the petitioner for consideration which he knew to be inadequate, were concerned in proceedings or business transacted or about to be transacted by the petitioner in the capacity of a public servant and were having connections with the official functions of the petitioner or were interested in or related to the persons concerned in the proceedings or business transacted or about to be transacted by the petitioner in the following manner: — (1) On 20-3-66 one Sohan Singh cut leaves from a Date tree which was personal property of the Ex-ruler of Sirohi. A case was got registered against Sohan Singh at Police Station, Mount Abu under sections 379, 447, 511, I.P.C. by the employees of Maharaja. The Circle Officer of Mount Abu was of the view that the case should be dropped against Sohan Singh if better evidence was not available. On 30 9-1966 Guman Singh petitioner sent a memo to the Circle Officer, Mount Abu that the case was made out against Sohan Singh and that further action should be taken in the matter after consultation with the Private Secretary to the Ex-Maharaja of Sirohi. In pursuance of the directions of the petitioner, a charge-sheet was filed against Sohan Singh in court on 8.12.1966; (2) One Bheru Singh son of Sadhu Singh of Mount Abu purchased a plot of land from Amritji, vide registered sale-deed. He constructed a house on it in the year 1966 and leased it out to Shri Kalu Ram Purbia. Kalu Ram, however, committed default in the payment of rent to Bheru Singh and put forward a claim that the land belonged to Maharaja of Sirohi. Bheru Singh thereupon approached the police at Mount Abu. The Station House Officer advised him to go to Guman Singh, petitioner, as the latter was a friend of Ex-His Highness of Sirohi. Kalu Ram, however, committed default in the payment of rent to Bheru Singh and put forward a claim that the land belonged to Maharaja of Sirohi. Bheru Singh thereupon approached the police at Mount Abu. The Station House Officer advised him to go to Guman Singh, petitioner, as the latter was a friend of Ex-His Highness of Sirohi. Thereupon, Guman Singh advised him to obtain a patta from the Maharaja of Sirohi. Then Bheru Singh paid a sum of Rs. 2,000/-, to the son of Maharaja of Sirohi and obtained a patta for that land; (3) In the year 1968 Maharaj Kumar Raghubir Singh of Sirohi illegally evicted several tenants from his land with the active help of Guman Singh, petitioner, and succeeded in obtaining signatures of tenants on certain false documents. One of these tenants was Lala Kalvi, who was forcibly taken to the palace of the Maharaja of Sirohi where Maharaj Kumar Raghubir Singh along with Guman Singh, petitioner, Superintendent of Police compelled Lila Kalvi to sell the land. Lila refused to sell the land to Maharaj Kumar. Thereupon he was beaten and taken to jungle where his thumb impression was obtained on some documents; (4) Shri Nihal Chand of Abu Road was compelled by Maharaj Kumar of Sirohi and Guman Singh, petitioner, Superintendent of Police to relinquish his claim to 86 Bighas of land and to sign a deed of relinquishment. Under threats he was made to put his signatures on a stamp-paper and thereby he was dispossessed from his land with the active help of the petitioner; (5) Guman Singh purchased land from Ex-Maharaja of Kota who was likely to be involved in official dealings with the petitioner. Under threats he was made to put his signatures on a stamp-paper and thereby he was dispossessed from his land with the active help of the petitioner; (5) Guman Singh purchased land from Ex-Maharaja of Kota who was likely to be involved in official dealings with the petitioner. The C.B.I. after making the usual investigation into the case filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner in the court of the Special Judge for G.B.I. Cases, Rajasthan, Jaipur, under section 165, I.P.C. The petitioner appeared before the learned Special Judge for G.B.I. Cases, Rajasthan, Jaipur and raised certain objections to the taking of cognizance of the aforesaid offences against him on the following grounds :— (1) that the Special Judge is not empowered to take cognizance of the offence punishable under S. 165, I.P.C. after the expiry of 3 years because the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years; (2) that the offence is alleged to be committed by the petitioner in the position of his official duty as a public servant. Hence the case squarely falls within the purview of section 197, New Criminal Procedure Code and the petitioner cannot be prosecuted without obtaining necessary sanction to prosecute him; (3) that the C.B.I. was not authorised to make investigation into this case as no prior general or special sanction was obtained for such investigation from the State Government of Rajasthan under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. The learned Social Judge, upon considering the report of the C.B.I. and the documents sent with it under S. 173, Cr.P.C. and after making examination of the petitioner and after giving the prosecution and the petitioner an opportunity of being heard, overruled all the referred to above objections and came to a conclusion that there was ground for presuming that the petitioner had committed an offence under S. 165, I.P.C. which he was competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him. He, therefore, passed the impugned order directing that a charge for the aforesaid offence be framed against the accused-petitioner. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has comp-up in revision to this Court as stated above. 4. I have carefully gone through the record and heard Mr. S.R. Singhi appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. He, therefore, passed the impugned order directing that a charge for the aforesaid offence be framed against the accused-petitioner. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has comp-up in revision to this Court as stated above. 4. I have carefully gone through the record and heard Mr. S.R. Singhi appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. R.S. Parihar counsel for the C.B.I. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of this revision petition was raised by Mr. Parihar learned counsel for the C.B.I. The objection is that the order of the Special Judge is an interlocutory one within the meaning of sub-section (2)of S. 397, new Cr.P.C. and that no revision can be entertained against such interlocutory order. Mr. S. R. Singhi appearing on behalf of the petitioner, on the other hand, contended that the impugned order passed by the Special Judge was without jurisdiction and was a nullity in the eye of law which can be interfered with in revision irrespective of the fact whether it was or was not of interlocutory nature. In support of his above contention he placed reliance on Bhima Naik vs. State (1) and Deena Nath Acharya vs. Daltari Charan Patra and others (2). 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. It is undoubtedly true that an order framing charge does not terminate criminal proceedings against the accused but, on the other hand, keeps them alive until the question of his guilt or innocence is finally decided by the trial court. In this view of the matter, it cannot be safely held that the impugned order was a final order and the power of revision conferred on the High Court can be exercised in relation to it. Reference in this connection may be made to Bhupendra Kumar Bhatnagar vs. State (3) where in a similar view was held in respect of an order framing the charge. The further question that arises for consideration is whether a revision petition against an interlocutory order, which has been challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction is barred by sub section (2) of S. 397, new Cr.P.C. In my opinion, an interlocutory order passed without jurisdiction can be interfered with in revision, because being a nullity, it has no existence in the eye of law. Reference in this connection may be made to Bhima Naik vs. State (Supra) wherein the following observations were made by Honble G.K. Misra, C.J. and Honble Mohanti, J:— "The last contention urged by Mr. Das is that the impugned order is a complete illegality and without jurisdiction as was held in Madhu Limaye vs. Ved Murti and Udayanath Pradhan vs. State. Being without jurisdiction it is a nullity and is non-est in the eye of law and,there fore, it is no order at all despite the fact that it was passed at an intermediate stage of the proceeding and has the physical form and shape of an interlocutory order and as such section 397(2) is no bar for interference by this Court in exercise of its power under section 401 or section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case the first contention put forward by Mr. S.R. Singhi is that the conduct of the petitioner complained of having been in the discharge of his official duties, prior sanction of the Government was necessary for his prosecution and the cognizance taken of the case in the absence of such sanction was illegal and without jurisdiction. His another contention is that the Special Judge could not take cogni-zance of an offence punishable under section 165, I.P.C. after the expiry of the period of limitation, because the aforesaid offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, and because despite knowledge of the commission of the offence the police did not prosecute the petitioner within three years from the date of such knowledge The third contention raised by Mr. S.R. Singhi before me is that the C B.I. Officers, who made the investigation into the case, were not empowered to do so without the previous consent of the State Government under S. 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. If the first two contentions put forward on be-half of the petitioner are not devoid of substance, the order framing the charge passed by the Special Judge becomes illegal and without jurisdiction, because the Special Judge was not empowered to take cognizance of the aforesaid offence after the expiry of the period of limitation and in the absence of prior sanction of the competent authority to prosecute the petitioner. The questions relating to limitation and prior require sanction to prosecute the petitioner are of vital importance for the just decision of this case and require determination before a charge is framed against the petitioner for the offence under section 165, IPC. If the revision-petition is dismissed merely on the ground that the impugned order framing the charge is of an interlocutory nature and the aforesaid questions of vital importance are left undecided, the petitioner will be put to great harassment if at the end of the trial or at any advanced stage thereof, the trial court considers these objections well-founded. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. R.S. Parihar regarding the maintainability of the revision* petition is overruled. 6. Now I take up the objections raised by Mr. S.R. Singhi, learned counsel for the petitioner, one by one. The first objection put forward by him relates to prior sanction for prosecution under section 197, Cr.P.C. (new). His contention before me is that after the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, protection under section 197, Cr.P.C. is given to a public servant after his retirement also in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or pur-porting to act in the discharge of his official duties. According to him, it is evident from the allegations made in the charge-sheet against the petitioner by the prosecution itself that he obtained land from the Ex-Maharaja of Sirohi and his brother Ram Singh and the Ex-Maharaja of Kota for consideration which he knew to be inadequate and that the aforesaid persons were to his knowledge concerned in proceedings or business transacted by the petitioner in his capacity as Superintendent of Police, Sirohi, and Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kota, or were having connection with the official functions of the petitioner. He invited my attention to certain acts mentioned in the charge-sheet which were alleged to have been committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties for the purpose of obtaining valuable properties from the Ex rulers for a consideration which he knew to be inadequate. Mr. R. S. Parihar, appearing on behalf of the C.B.I., on the other hand, contended that the offence complained of was not committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. Mr. R. S. Parihar, appearing on behalf of the C.B.I., on the other hand, contended that the offence complained of was not committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It was further urged by him that no previous sanction for prosecution is required under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, after the retirement of the petitioner from service. The Special Judge over-ruled the objection relating to sanction on the ground that the properties were not obtained by the petitioner in the discharge of his official duties and that he merely used his official position to obtain them illegally and so he cannot claim benefit of S. 197, Cr.P.C. (new). I have carefully considered the rival contentions. In my opinion, the learned Special Judge did not apply his judicial mind to the materials placed before it. A decision as to whether sanction for prosecution under S. 197, Cr.P.C. (new) is necessary in a particular case must be a judicial decision and must be arrived at after taking into consideration all the materials properly and lawfully placed before the Court. The Special Judge ought to have determined whether the acts complained of and mentioned in the charge sheet were intimately or inseparably connected with the duties attached to the office of the petitioner, because, without such determination, no correct decision regarding requirement of the sanction for prosecution under S. 197 Cr.P.C. (new) was possible. The Special Judge merely observed in his order that the acts of purchasing properties fell outside the scope of the official duties of the petitioner and, therefore, no sanction for his prosecution under S. 197 Cr.P.C. (new) was necessary. If the reasoning given by the Special judge is accepted, then sanction of Government is no necessary in every case before prosecution is launched against a public servant for an offence punishable under S. 165 I.P.C. To my mind, it cannot be held, as a general rule, that sanction of the Government is not required before a person is prosecuted for an offence under section 16, I.P.C. It is a question of fact in each case whether the alleged offence under S. 165,I.P.C. has been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. Consequently, I think it proper that the question relating to sanction should be determined afresh by the Special Judge after applying his judicial mind to the materials placed on the record. If after applying his judicial mind to the materials on the record, the Special Judge arrives at a conclusion that there is no intimate connection between the acts complained of and the performance of the duties attached to the office of the petitioner, he may hold that sanction under S. 197 Cr.P.C. (new) is not necessary. The Special Judge must also bring his mind to bear on the materials and decide whether sanction under S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is or is not necessary in this case. 7. The next contention put forward by Mr. S.R. Singhi relates to the period of limitation provided for such cases under section 468 Cr.P.C. (new). This question was determined by the Special Judge in favour of prosecution after considering all the documents sent by the C. B.I. along with the charge sheet under section 173, Cr.P.C. From a bare perusal of the impugned order of the Special Judge it appears that he did not take certain documents filed by the petitioner into consideration while giving his decision on the question of limitation. The documents were ignored on the ground that copies thereof were filed by the petitioner and on the ground that documents filed by the accused cannot be looked into at the stage when the court considers whether the charge against the accused is or is not groundless. Mr. S. R. Singhi vehemently contended before me that the Special Judge ought to have looked into all the documents filed by the petitioner while determining the question whether taking of cognizance of the offence was barred on account of expiry of the period of limitation. It will not be out of place to mention that Mr. S. R. Singhi has filed the original documents in this Court along with a list thereof. The documents are as follows: — (1) D. O. letter dated 19-10-1967 from the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur to Shri Guman Singh, Superintendent of Police, Sirohi. (2) D. O. letter dated 19 10-1967 from the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur to Shri Guman Singh Superintendent of Police Sirohi. The documents are as follows: — (1) D. O. letter dated 19-10-1967 from the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur to Shri Guman Singh, Superintendent of Police, Sirohi. (2) D. O. letter dated 19 10-1967 from the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur to Shri Guman Singh Superintendent of Police Sirohi. (3) Copy of reply of the petitioner which he sent to the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Jaipur, in connection with the above letter. (4) Letter from the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur, dated 28.11.1967. (5) Copy of reply sent by the petitioner in connection with the above letter dated 28.11.1967. (6) Letter from the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Jaipur, dated 15.12.1967. (7) Reply of the petitioner sent in connection with the letter dated 15-12 67. (8) Letter from the Dy. I.G. Anti-Corruption Department, Rajasthan,Jaipur to the petitioner, dated 17.8.1968. The Special Judge overlooked the provision? of Sec. 294, Cr.P.C. new, which provide for admission in evidence of certain documents without formal proof. Under this section when any document is filed before any court either by the prosecution or by the accused, the particulars thereof shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be required to admit or deny its genuineness. If the genuineness thereof is not disputed, it may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code without proof of the signature of the person by whom it purports to be signed. The Court, however, is given a discretion to require such signature to be proved. If copies of the documents were filed by the petitioner, the Special Judge could direct the petitioner to furnish the originals thereof He should not have brushed aside these documents merely on the ground that copies thereof were filed by him. These documents which are now produced in original may be helpful in determining the question of limitation at this stage, if their genuineness is not disputed by the prosecution It may be further observed that these documents may be looked into at this stage for arriving at a correct conclusion whether the taking of cognizance of the offence against the petitioner is hatred on account of lapse of the period of limitation prescribed in Sec. 468, new Cr. P.C. Mr. Parihar strenuously urged before me that even if these documents are taken into consideration, the prosecution of the petitioner under section 165 IPC is not barred by the period of limitation prescribed in Sec 468, new Cr.P.C. According to him, these documents do not reveal that the commission of the offence was known to any police officer before three years from the date of filing of the charge-sheet. This argument also requires consideration by the Special Judge. Hence it is necessary that the question of limitation must be considered afresh by the Special Judge after carefully going through the documents filed by the petitioner and the prosecution. There is no bar on taking into consideration any document filed by the accused at the stage contemplated under Sec 239, Cr.P.C. Sec. 239, clearly lays down that the prosecution and the accused should be given an opportunity of being heard before determining the question whether accused should be discharged or charge-sheeted. If the accused at this stage refers to any document, which has an important bearing on the question whether the charge against him is or is not groundless, the Court trying him should lock into the documents and arrive at a correct conclusion. 8. The third contention raised by Mr. Singhi before me relates to investigation of this case by the C.B.I. The argument in this behalf is that no prior consent of the State Government of Rajasthan was obtained under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, to enable the C. B. I. to make investigation into such cases and, therefore, the C. B. I. officers were not authorised to conduct investigation of this case. According to him, this defect, if pointed out at the earliest stage, could be remedied by directing fresh investigation into the case, after compliance with the mandatory provisions of Sec. 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. This point was raised in the lower court also. The Special Judge overlooked this objection on the ground that although no document showing prior consent of the State Government has been filed by the prosecution, but it may be produced during the course of the trial also. Another reason given by the Special Judge is that taking of cognizance of an offence by the Court is not barred on account of any defect in the investigation. Mr. Another reason given by the Special Judge is that taking of cognizance of an offence by the Court is not barred on account of any defect in the investigation. Mr. Parihar appearing on behalf of the C.B.I. has filed the following documents to show that in fact prior consent of the State Government of Rajasthan was obtained to empower the C.B.I. to make investigation into such offences as the present one which are or were committed in the ten hones of the State of Rajasthan: — 1. Notification No. 7/51/55-ABD dated 6 11-56 issued by the Govt. of India, u/s. 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. 2. Letter No. 6/45/56-ABD dated 6.11.66, issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India. 3. Letter No. F. 3(27)36 Home A/55 dated 8.12.56 from Chief Secretary, Rajasthan Govt. to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India. 4. Letter No. 6/45/56-ABD of Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India to the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Rajasthan. Mr. S.R. Singhi further contended that if these documents are admitted in evidence after admission and denial under Sec. 294, new Cr.P.C., the letters relied upon by Mr R. S. Parihar do not reveal that in fact consent was given by the State Government empowering the C. B. I. to make investigation into such offences like the present one, which are or may be committed in the territories of Rajasthan. His another submission is that even if the letters disclose prior consent of the State Government the consent suffers from the defect of proper authentication under the mandatory provisions of the Constitution of India. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. To my mind, all these questions relating to investigation of the case by the C.B.I. should be again determined by the Special Judge after going through all the documents filed by the prosecution or by the accused, if any. The Special Judge must give a definite finding as to whether prior consent was given by the State Government in compliance with the provisions of section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, to empower the C. B. I. to conduct investigation into such offences like the present one which are alleged to have been committed in the territories of the Rajasthan State. The Special Judge may take extraneous evidence, if necessary, to decide this question which has a vital bearing on this case in view of authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Major E. G. Barsay vs. State of Bombay (4) and Delhi Development Authority vs. Lila D. Bhagat (5). 10. The result of the above discussion is that the revision-petition is accepted, the impugned order passed by the Special Judge dated 31st October, 1975, is set aside and the case is sent back to him for fresh determination of the aforesaid objections raised by the petitioner in the light of the observations made above and after applying his judicial mind on the materials lawfully brought on the record.