JUDGMENT O.P. Trivedi, J. - These two petitions involve common questions of fact and law and may be conveniently disposed of by one judgment. 2. V.N. Chaubey is working as Guard Grade C, in the North Eastern Railway. His contention is that his appointing authority was Chief Operating Superintendent and the Divisional Commercial Superintendent is subordinate in rank to his appointing authority. He claims to be under the administrative control of the Chief Operating Superintendent and not under the administrative control of the Divisional Commercial Superintendent. While working as Guard Grade C, at Gonda the 'petitioner was served with a charge sheet dated 24-4-1970 (Annexure 2) issued by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and by this charge sheet he was informed of the proposal to hold an enquiry against him under rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) It is further alleged that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent appointed Sri P.K. Takru as the inquiry officer to investigate the charges levelled against the petitioner V.N. Citaubey and the inquiry proceedings were conducted against him by Sri P.K Takru. On 11-3-1972 V. N. Chaubey was served with a notice under rule 10 (5) of the Rules to show cause why he should not be dismissed/removed/compulsory retired from service (Annexure (5) V. N. Chaubey challenges validity of this show cause notice and prays that the same may be quashed by certiorari on the ground that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent was not competent to act as disciplinary authority and the appointment of the inquiry officer and the show cause notice were invalid. 3. The position in the other petition is identical. The case of Arjun Singh is that he was initially appointed as an Assistant Guard in 1948 by the erstwhile Oudh Tirhut Railway. He was subsequently absorbed on the North Eastern Railway and his contention is that he is under the administrative control of the Chief Operating Superintendent and not the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and that his immediate controlling officer is the Divisional Operating Superintendent. He disputes that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, opposite party No. 2, had any administrative control over him. The Chief Operating Superintendent was his appointing authority. He disputes that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, opposite party No. 2, had any administrative control over him. The Chief Operating Superintendent was his appointing authority. On 12-11-1959 a charge sheet was issued by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent, North Eastern ;Railway and served on the petitioner informing him of the proposal to hold inquiry against him in respect of certain charges which accompanied the notice (Annexure 7). Sri B. P. Tewari, Assistant Commercial Superintendent, was appointed inquiry officer by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent who held an inquiry against him. Subsequently, Sri R. K. Mullic and K.B. Lal were appointed inquiry officers against Arjun Singh by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent. Thereafter a show cause notice was issued to Arjun Singh by the Chief Commercial Superintendent proposing to impose the penalty of removal from service. Copy of this notice is Annexure 11 of that petition. In this case also the appointment of an inquiry officer by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and the show cause notice issued by the Chief Commercial Superintendent have been questioned on the ground that neither the Divisional Commercial Superintendent nor the Chief Commercial Superintendent had administrative control over Arjun Singh and, therefore, they could not exercise power either of appointing authority or a disciplinary authority. Arjun Singh also therefore, prays for quashing of the charge sheet dated 12-11-1969 (Annexure) and the show cause notice dated 26-10-1972 (Annexure 11). 4. Admittedly the two petitioners are not gazetted Railway servants and major punishments are proposed to be imposed against them. 'Disciplinary authority' has been defined, in rule 2(1)(c) (iii) as follows : "In relating of Rule 9 in the case of any non-gazetted railway servant an authority competent to impose any of the major penalties specified in rule 6." 5. 'Appointing authority' in relation to a Railway servant has been defined in Rule 2(1)(a) (i) to (iv) of the Rules. Rule 9 of the Rules provides that whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a Railway servant it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this Rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. The question arises which is the authority competent to impose a major penalty against the petitioners Schedule II annexed to these Rules shows that major penalties can be imposed on a non-gazetted Railway servant either by the appointing authority or any other higher authority. It is an admitted fact that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent who appointed the Inquiry officers against both the petitioners and issued show cause notice august V.N. Chaubey petitioner and the Chief Commercial Superintendent who issued show cause notice against Arjun Singh were not their appointing authorities within the definition contained in Rule 2. Learned Standing Counsel, however pointed out that Schedule II has been amended with the result that after the words any other authority' the words 'an authority of equivalent rank' have been added. On the strength of this amendment of Schedule II it is maintained that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent is an authority of rank equal it to the Chief Operating Superintendent. It was admitted by learned counsel for the parties in arguments that the appointing authority of V.N. Chaubey is the District Traffic Superintendent and the appointing authority of Arjun Singh is the Chief Operating Superintendent. The contention for the opposite parties is that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent could act as disciplinary authority in respect of V.N. Chaubey because the Divisional Commercial Superintendent is an officer of rank equivalent to District Traffic Superintendent. The short question for decision in these cases is whether in the case of V.N. Chaubey the Charge sheet could be issued by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and the show cause notice could be issued under his signature and in the case of Arjun Singh whether the enquiry officer could be appointed by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and the show cause notice could be issued by the Chief Commercial Superintendent. The sub- mission for the Union of India is that the Chief Commercial Superintendent being a senior scale officer within the meaning of Schedule II, could take steps for imposition of major penalty. In my opinion this contention cannot be accepted. It is not disputed that under the administrative control of the General Manager of the North Eastern Railway there are as many as nine departments Operating, Commercial, Mechanical, Engineering, Accounts, Single, Electrical, Personnel and Medical. In my opinion this contention cannot be accepted. It is not disputed that under the administrative control of the General Manager of the North Eastern Railway there are as many as nine departments Operating, Commercial, Mechanical, Engineering, Accounts, Single, Electrical, Personnel and Medical. The submission on behalf of the petitioners is that under Schedule 11 aforesaid the Senior Scale Officer along is entitled to act as disciplinary authority and to impose major penalties upon non gazetted Railway Servants over whom he exercises administrative control. To my mind, this is the only reasonable interpretation which can be placed on Schedule 11 annexed to these rules. This was also the interpretation of the General Manager contained in the preface to the 'Schedule of Powers on matters relating to Staff Establishment' which reads as follows: "4 Except where the Railway Board or the General Manager by General or special orders directs otherwise, a power may be exercised by an authority to which it is delegated in respect of those railway servants only who are under the control of that authority." 6. It appears that the Railway Board also adopted this interpretation in its letter of ;28-7-1962 referred to in para 7 of the petition of V.N. Chaubey where the Railway Board stated : "It is procedurally wrong for an authority to initiate and finalise disciplinary proceedings against are employee who is not under his administrative control ." 7. This general policy underlines paragraph 2283 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume II also. But it appears that during the pendency of these petitions the Railway Board has placed a different interpretation on this Schedule in its letter of 19-4-1974 referred to in the supplementary counter affidavit. The Railway Board attempted to clarify its earlier direction contained in the letter of 28-7-1962 and stated : "There is no objection for the authorities in the Commercial or Operating Wing of the Department to initiate and finalise disciplinary action against the concerned Station Master/Asstt. Station Master according to the irregularity for which the action is ititiated, relates to Commercial or Operating Wing..." This letter of the Railway Board does not obviously possess the force of law because plainly it was not issued in exercise of power vested by para. 157 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code but is in the nature of an interpretation of these Rules by the Railway Board. 157 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code but is in the nature of an interpretation of these Rules by the Railway Board. The Board has no binding power of interpretation of the Rules and if this interpretation were to be accepted it is bound to lead to administrative difficulties. As already stated earlier, there are nine administrative departments headed any officers of equivalent rank and if it is assumed that all these persons, no matter whether they do or do not exercise administrative control on a Railway servant, can act as disciplinary authority qua an officer belonging to any department it would neither subserve the interests of the administration nor discipline. It is polarisation and concentration of disciplinary powers and not its diffusion which is likely to advance the interest of administration. efficiency an I discipline. administrative power must have some reasonable connection with those against whom it is exercised. Administrative control appears to offer the best nexus in this connection. I hold that in terms of Schedule II of the Rules that particular Senior Scale Officer alone can impose major punishment upon a delinquent non-gazetted Railway employee upon whom he exercises administrative control and not Senior State Officer who has no administrative control over such a Railway employee cannot act as a 'disciplinary authority nor impose major penalties upon him. My interpretation of Schedule II of the Rules is fortified by the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Radhey Shyam Saxena, v. Union of India (Writ Petn. No. 58 of 1971 decided on 6-9-1974. A Special appeal filed against this judgment was dismissed, and, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the Union of India it was decided on a different point and this particular finding of the learned Single Judge was not upset. Similar view was expressed in: General Manager, Northern Railway v. M.M. Kundu (Special Appeal No. 138 of 1970 decided on 6-4-1972 (All) (See also The Divisional Electrical Engineer, Eastern Rly, Dhanbad v. D.N. Dey, (1975 All Serv. L.J. 37 (Pat). Admittedly the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and the Chief Commercial Superintendent did not posses any administrative control over V.N. Chaubey and Arjun Singh. L.J. 37 (Pat). Admittedly the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and the Chief Commercial Superintendent did not posses any administrative control over V.N. Chaubey and Arjun Singh. I, therefore, hold that the Divisional Commercial Superintendent had no jurisdiction to act as disciplinary authority against V.N. Chaubey and Arjun Singh with the result that the orders of appointment of inquiry officer by him in the inquiry against V.N. Chaubey and Arjun Singh were illegal as also the charge sheets issued against them. The show cause notice issued against V N. Chaubey by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent and against Arjun Singh by the Chief Commercial Superintendent were lacking in jurisdiction and therefore, the charge sheet (Anrexure 2) dated 24-9-1970 in the case of V.N. Chaubey and the show cause notice (Annexure 5) dated 7-3 1972 in his case are liable to be quashed and the charge sheet (Annexure 7) dated 12-11-1969 and the show cause notice (Annexure 11) dated 26-10-1972 issued to Arjun Singh are liable to be quashed. 8. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted lastly that these petitioners had participated in the proceedings whereby they acquiesced in the jurisdiction exercised by the aforesaid officers and it was submitted that, therefore they are precluded from challenging that it jurisdiction in this Court. Learned counsel in this connection relied upon observations made in Bankhandi Lal v. Asst. Supdt. of Police ( AIR 1962 All 114 ). As appears from the observations made in this case, participation in the proceedings by the charged officer does not act are an absolute bar to a plea of jurisdiction in a writ petition A writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy and it may in suitable cases be refused but it is open to the person to explain his omission in an adequate manner and there is no complete bar to any such plea because no amount of acquiescence can confer jurisdiction and it does not remedy initial or inherent lack of jurisdiction. 9. Writ Petition No. 4A of 1972 and Writ Petition No. 1506 of 1972 are allowed. Annexure 2 of Writ Petition No. 471 of 1972 dated 24-9.1970 and Annexure 5 of that writ petition dated 7-2-1972 are hereby quashed and Annexure 7 of Writ Petition Na 1506 of 1972 dated 12-11-1969 and Annexure 11 of that writ petition dated 26-10-1972 are quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Annexure 2 of Writ Petition No. 471 of 1972 dated 24-9.1970 and Annexure 5 of that writ petition dated 7-2-1972 are hereby quashed and Annexure 7 of Writ Petition Na 1506 of 1972 dated 12-11-1969 and Annexure 11 of that writ petition dated 26-10-1972 are quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. 10. This Judgment shall govern both the aforesaid connected writ petitions.