JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. Married on 24th August 1972, the parties to this petition, Daniel and Sarala, were living as husband and wife till 9th March 1974. No issue was born out of the marriage. The couple were living at Angamali at the house of the husband. But on the 9th March 1974 Daniel took Sarala back to her house at North Parur and left her there where she has been eversince. The couple has not lived together thereafter. 2. It is said by Sri Daniel that he came to know at the end of 1973 from his wife Sarala that she was a patient prior to her marriage at the Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad. But he did not know, at that time, the details of her illness. He would also say that all medical care was extended to his wife but her condition continued to deteriorate and she gradually became violent in her behaviour with the result that he was forced to take her back to her fathers house in March 1974. It is his case in the petition that, at the time of the marriage, Sarala was a lunatic and by reason of her lunacy was legally incompetent and incapable of contracting marriage. But he is said to have been unaware of this fact and according to him the consent for such marriage was obtained fraudulently. This court has been moved in this petition for granting a decree of nullity of marriage conducted on 24th August 1972 according to the rites of the Brothren Church at the Brothren Assembly Hall at Angamali. Section 18 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 which applies to the case of a petitioner or respondent professing Christian Religion enables the parties to present a petition to the District Court or to this Court, praying for a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Of the several grounds which entitle the petitioner to such a decree, that relied upon for seeking relief in this petition is the ground that the respondent was a lunatic at the time of the marriage, one of the grounds envisaged in section 19(3) of the Act. It is also said that the consent of the petitioner having been obtained by fraud that enables this court to grant a decree for nullity. 3. This petition is hotly contested by the respondent, the wife. It is also said that the consent of the petitioner having been obtained by fraud that enables this court to grant a decree for nullity. 3. This petition is hotly contested by the respondent, the wife. According to her she was never insane and the marriage held in August 1972 was said to have been settled only after negotiations, between the father of the petitioner and that of the respondent and that is said to have taken a fairly long time. The relations of the petitioner and the petitioner himself are said to have met the respondent and conversed with her prior to fixing the marriage. It is also said that the marriage ceremony was conducted in the normal manner and the parties entered into the ceremony knowing all the implications of the relationship they were entering into. The wife was living for a fairly long time with her husband without giving room for any complaint and discharging all obligations and responsibilities of a duly wedded wife. She graduated in Physics in 1970. Her younger sister is said to have passed B.Sc. in Botany in First Class in the same year. The younger sister got admission for M.Sc. and though the respondent, Sarala, is also said to have attempted to get admission for M.Sc., she could not get it because she had only a Second Class. This, it is said, gave rise to some frustration ultimately resulting in slight weakness of the body. On account of this the respondent is said to have consulted the doctor at the Mental Health Centre at Kakkanad and the advice she is said to have obtained from the Hospital was to take some vitamin pills. According to her she was never under treatment at the time of marriage much less any continued treatment. In short, she denies having been of unsound mind at the time of the marriage or being incapable of consenting to marriage. The plea of fraud on her part or on the part of her father in inducing her husband to consent to the marriage, is also denied by the respondent. On these pleadings the following issues have been raised for trial: 1. Whether the respondent was a lunatic at the time of the marriage? 2. Whether the marriage was brought about by the fraud of the respondents father in collusion with the respondent? 3. On these pleadings the following issues have been raised for trial: 1. Whether the respondent was a lunatic at the time of the marriage? 2. Whether the marriage was brought about by the fraud of the respondents father in collusion with the respondent? 3. Whether the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void? 4. What, if any, is the relief to be granted in this petition? 4. Seven witnesses including the petitioner have been examined in support of the case of the petitioner while respondent has examined two witnesses, herself and her father. 5. In the petition the respondent Smt. Sarala was shown as incapacitated to conduct the case, thus requiring a guardian to be appointed to represent her and therefore notice was taken to the father of the respondent as guardian. Sarala was aged 26 on the date of the petition. Her father appeared in answer to the notice to him and submitted that there was no question of any guardianship of the respondent, that the respondent was competent to look after herself and he was not the guardian. The respondent herself appeared in the court on 1st September 1975 and she was examined by the court. The court noticed nothing abnormal in the way the respondent stood the examination. The court held that there was no case for appointment of a guardian for the respondent. 6. The parties to this petition are well-to-do middle class people belonging to two respectable families. The husband, Sri Daniel is a medical representative. He is an M.A. in English Literature. He is aged 32. The wife, as I indicated earlier, is a graduate who, at the moment, is a student undergoing B.Ed. degree course. Sri Daniel belongs to Angamali where he was living with his parents prior to the marriage. His father appears to have been a prominent member of the Brothren Community at Angamali, a community which is a small group of Christians. Smt. Sarala was, prior to her marriage, residing with her parents at Vadakkekkara, North Parur which is only about 20 miles from Angamali. The parties appear to have known each other even prior to the marriage. The marriage was fixed up not directly by the parties thereto but, as is usual, by discussion between the members of the two families. Normally the boy visits the house to see the girl prior to the marriage. Sri. The parties appear to have known each other even prior to the marriage. The marriage was fixed up not directly by the parties thereto but, as is usual, by discussion between the members of the two families. Normally the boy visits the house to see the girl prior to the marriage. Sri. Daniel admittedly visited Sarala at her house about a month before the date of the marriage and he talked to her. In the usual course the marriage was fixed up. A sum of Rs. 15,000 was the dowry agreed. The parties agreed that the marriage may be conducted at Angamali. It was conducted in the presence of a good number of people of their community. The Minister conducted the service and the rites of the marriage were gone through. Thereafter the couple went over to the house of the husband where they lived together. The petitioner has no case that at that time he had reason to feel that the respondent was of unsound mind. That was the case for a fairly long time thereafter, till about December 1973. During this period, admittedly, the parties had been cohabiting with each other living in every way as husband and wife and visiting their friends. In fact they had come even as far as Ernakulam to attend reception parties given to them by their friends. Sri Daniel had a Jawa motorbike and it was in this that they used to move about. It is agreed that they had thus travelled together from Angamali to Trichur on the north and Angamali to Thiruvalla, nearly 90 miles away, on the south. Going by the case of Sri Daniel he is said, to have been shocked when his wife told him about the treatment that she had undergone prior to the marriage. According to him this was so told to him in December 1973 and it is thereafter that her symptoms became such as compelled him to take her back to her house in March 1974. He is said to have made further enquiries thereafter and on such enquiries he came to understand that prior to the marriage she had been treated at the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad where she underwent treatment even thereafter. He is said to have made further enquiries thereafter and on such enquiries he came to understand that prior to the marriage she had been treated at the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad where she underwent treatment even thereafter. She is said to have attended that hospital for treatment on four occasions, on 30th September 1972, 27th October 1972, 12th July 1973 and 14th August 1973, all these without the knowledge of the petitioner. He would also say that after 14th August 1973 the symptoms of respondent lunacy exacerbated and therefore she was taken to Calicut by her parents for observation and treatment by the Superintendent of the Mental Hospital there from 20th August 1973 to 28th August 1973 and subsequently she was taken to Trivandrum for treatment by the Superintendent of the Mental Hospital there. It is also the petitioners case that after he left her at Vadakkekara in March 1974 she had attended the Mental Health Centre at Kakkanad in April 1974 as also later. Subsequently she is also said to have attended the Mental Hospital at Vellore for further treatment. According to him he was seeking counsel from his relations and friends as to the possible future course of action. He also says that he was gathering all possible details of the disease of the respondent and the treatment that she had, in order that he may be satisfied about the exact nature and extent of the respondents unsoundness of mind and that is mentioned as the reason for the delay in coming to this court. The petition is moved in this court towards the end of January 1975. 7. The case of the petitioner is that the illness for which the respondent underwent treatment prior and after the marriage at the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad, the Mental Hospital at Calicut and the Mental Hospital at Vellore was schizophrenia. Large doses of largactyl have been prescribed by the consultants in all these hospitals and she was taking this all along. Large doses of largactyl have been prescribed by the consultants in all these hospitals and she was taking this all along. It is the case of the husband that even when they were living together as husband and wife at Angamali when the petitioner did not have reason to assume that she was a mental patient, she was taking doses of largactyl and the petitioner was told at that time by her that she had regular attacks of headache which required treatment and the doses of the pills she was taking was for that purpose. Schizophrenia, according to the petitioner, is a form of unsoundness of mind and since the material gathered by him as to the treatment that the respondent underwent even prior to the marriage confirmed his suspicion of unsoundness of mind of the respondent he is seeking a decree for a declaration that the marriage between him and his wife, which had all the attendant formalities of a valid marriage, was null and void because at the time of the marriage the respondent was, according to him, unable to give her voluntary and free consent for the marriage, she had no capacity to understand the relationship which she was entering into and that would be sufficient to nullify the marriage. Alternatively he would say that a fraud having been played upon him by keeping the information as to the treatment of the respondent prior to the marriage away from him and having obtained his consent under such circumstances, such consent was vitiated by fraud practised upon him and that, in turn, would be sufficient to declare the marriage null and void. 8. I will come to the question whether the consent of the petitioner was obtained by fraud later. In that context I will also consider whether that would be a ground for annulling marriage under section 18 of the Indian Divorce Act. The main question in this case is whether the respondent Smt. Sarala was a lunatic at the time of marriage which was on 24th August, 1972. This is the subject-matter of Issue No. 1 in this petition. 9. The term lunatic� is not defined in the Indian Divorce Act. The Hindu Marriage Act 25 of 1955 provides in section 12, sub-section (1) clause (b) for annulment by a decree of nullity of any marriage which contravenes section 5 clause (2) of the Act. This is the subject-matter of Issue No. 1 in this petition. 9. The term lunatic� is not defined in the Indian Divorce Act. The Hindu Marriage Act 25 of 1955 provides in section 12, sub-section (1) clause (b) for annulment by a decree of nullity of any marriage which contravenes section 5 clause (2) of the Act. Section 5 clause (2), in turn, provides for solemnisation of marriage between two parties if neither party is an idiot or a lunatic at the time of the marriage. Therefore lunacy of one of the parties to the marriage is a ground recognised under the Hindu Marriage Act for granting a decree of nullity. The term lunatic has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. 10. The Lunacy Act 4 of 1912 defines the term 'lunatic. Section 3 clause (5) of the Act defines a lunatic as meaning an idiot or a person of unsound mind. It appears to be safe to adopt this definition of the term lunacy in the absence of a definition in the Indian Divorce Act particularly because the definition of the term lunatic in the Lunacy Act is in accordance with the meaning of the term as used in common parlance. The question for determination, therefore, would be whether one of the spouses to the marriage was of unsound mind at the time of marriage. Though the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act or that of the Hindu Marriage Act do not specify consent of the spouses as requisite for a valid marriage, the provision that such a person should not be an idiot or one of unsound mind is to provide for the principle that the parties should have the capacity to consent to the marriage. Consent is the essential ingredient of a valid marriage. This principle is as ancient as the Roman law which stated the rule in the form nuptias consensus non concubitus facit. The canon law of Rome and later the English canon taw are said to have adopted this principle. To quote the words of John Nicholl in Countess of Portsmouth v. Earl of Portsmouth (1). This principle is as ancient as the Roman law which stated the rule in the form nuptias consensus non concubitus facit. The canon law of Rome and later the English canon taw are said to have adopted this principle. To quote the words of John Nicholl in Countess of Portsmouth v. Earl of Portsmouth (1). When a fact of marriage has been regularly solemnized, the assumption is in its favour; but then it must be solemnized between parties competent to contract capable of entering into that most important engagement, the very essence of which is consent: and without soundness of mind there can be no legal consent none binding in law: insanity vitiates all Acts. (Vide 1953 (3) W.L.R. 307 at 313). 11. It cannot be said that every degree of unsoundness mind affects the capacity to give consent to a marriage, unlike the understanding required for the execution of a statement or even the execution of a conveyance the degree of comprehension required for giving consent to a marital union is less. That is because the contract of marriage is a simple one, one that does not require a high degree of comprehension to understand its implications. Marriage is an engagement between a man and a woman who agree to live together and love one another as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others. The mind of the parties consenting to a marriage must be able to comprehend the significance of promises made and vows taken at the marriage. But in the normal course a person has the capacity to understand that the relationship of a husband and wife is and if he or he gives consent to enter into the matrimonial tie understanding the obligations arising therefrom the consent would be valid. But in several other matters such as in the execution of a will the degree of comprehension must be more, or, the consequences of the dispositions, and the legal implications thereof must be known to the executant and consent should have been given voluntarily without any coercive force behind it. But in several other matters such as in the execution of a will the degree of comprehension must be more, or, the consequences of the dispositions, and the legal implications thereof must be known to the executant and consent should have been given voluntarily without any coercive force behind it. Therefore in a case where a motion is made under the Indian Divorce Act for a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground that one of the parties to the marriage is a lunatic the question would be whether the unsoundness of mind, if there was, was of such a degree as would have disabled the consenting party from understanding the significance of the relationship to which he or she was entering into in undergoing the ceremony of marriage. 12. The case of Durham v. Durham, 1885 (10) L.R. Probate Division p.80 has been cited time and again by Courts in the context of the definition of soundness of mind. Sir J. Hannen said in that case thus: I accept for the purposes of this case the definition which has been substantially agreed upon by the counsel to whom I have to express my obligations for the very able assistance they have given me, namely, a capacity to understand the nature of the contract, and the duties and responsibilities which it creates. It is to be observed, however, that this only conceals for a moment the difficulties of the inquiry, for I have still to determine the meaning to be attached to the word "understand". If I were to attempt to analyse this expression, I should encounter the same difficulties at some other stage of the investigation with reference to some other phrase, and I should still have to determine, on a review of the whole facts, whether the respondent came up to the standard of sanity which I must fix in my own mind, though I may not be able to express it. I may say this much in the outset, that it appears to me that the contract of marriage is a very simple one, which does not require a high degree of intelligence to comprehend. It is an engagement between a man and a woman to live together, and love one another as husband and wife, to the exclusion of all others. It is an engagement between a man and a woman to live together, and love one another as husband and wife, to the exclusion of all others. This is expanded in the promises of the marriage ceremony by words having reference to the natural relations which spring from that engagement, such as protection on the part of the man, and submission on the part of the woman. I agree with the Solicitor-General, that a mere comprehension of the words of the promises exchanged is not sufficient. The mind of one of the parties may be capable of understanding the language used, but may yet be affected by such delusions, or other symptoms of insanity, as may satisfy the tribunal that there was not a real appreciation of the engagement apparently entered into�. In Hunter v. Edney, 1885 (10) L.R. Probate Division p.93 (3) the question for determination was in this manner: The question which I have to determine is not whether she was aware that she was going through the ceremony of marriage, but whether she was capable of understanding the nature of the contract she was entering into, free from the influence of morbid delusions upon the subject.� 13. The High Court of Calcutta noticed in the decision in Anima v. Mohan Roy, A.I.R. 1969 Cal. 304 that in the absence of a definition of the term lunatic in the Hindu Marriage Act the definition of the term in the Lunacy Act may be adopted. The burden to prove that the respondent was a lunatic lies on the petitioner. Reference was made by the High Court of Calcutta in this context to the treatise of Rayden on Divorce, 8th Edition, page 221. 14. I may refer to an instructive passage in the decision of Tek Chand J. in Muniswar Datt v. Indra Kumari, A.I.R 1963 Punjab 449 wherein the learned Judge discusses the degree of insanity or lunacy required for invalidating the marriage. The learned Judge said in that context thus: It is, therefore, not every form or degree of insanity of lunacy that invalidates a marriage. The mental derangement must be such as to adversely affect the capacity to solemnise marriage. The test applied is that a person should have the capacity to understand the nature of contract of marriage and the duties and responsibilities entailed by it. The mental derangement must be such as to adversely affect the capacity to solemnise marriage. The test applied is that a person should have the capacity to understand the nature of contract of marriage and the duties and responsibilities entailed by it. It is not possible to define in more precise terms the extent or the degree of mental capacity. Broadly, the mental incapacity to enter into marriage should, approximate to mental incapacity which disables a person from entering into contracts generally. A view has also been expressed that marriage depends to a great extent on sentiment, attachment and affection which persons with weaker intellects may also feel and the discerment or soundness of judgment while contracting marriage is of lesser degree than in the case of an ordinary contract. It will suffice to say that persons solemnising marriage must possess a mental capacity sufficient to understand the nature of marital obligations and willingness to shoulder them. Complete want or entire dethronement of reason is not the test for the validity of a marriage. On the other extreme, a mere weakness of intellect will not justify annulment. Ability to understand the nature of marital union and the probable consequences is an acceptable test for determining validity of marriage.� 15. The High Court of Calcutta, in considering the scope of the term lunacy� as applied to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, observed thus in Kartik Chandra v. Manjurani, A.I.R. 1973 Cal. 545: For, question often may arise in absence of statutory meaning given under the Act as to what is lunacy or who is a lunatic person. In absence of any such definition, the word lunacy must be taken in its ordinary significance i.e., a person suffering from unsoundness of mind or insanity, which may again be intermittent or permanent. The question nevertheless is a complex one and must be decided by the courts on the facts of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down to deduce a conclusion on a set pattern. Medical evidence may not always be given in all cases or may not be in all circumstances a determining factor but nonetheless it is one of the most important elements of evidence. No hard and fast rule can be laid down to deduce a conclusion on a set pattern. Medical evidence may not always be given in all cases or may not be in all circumstances a determining factor but nonetheless it is one of the most important elements of evidence. Even in a case of intermittent insanity we think many factors have to be considered including both pre-nuptical and post nuptical physical and mental state of the wife or the husband, as the case may be, to determine whether he or she suffered from lunacy at the time of marriage. The question was discussed at some length in a decision of Allahabad High Court in Titli v. Alfred Robert Jones, A.I.R. 1934 All. 273 at pp. 282-283, it was held amongst other things following the principle laid down in Danial-Mcnaughtens case that the medical science might have a long category of various degrees of abnormality considered to be insanity but that is not the legal view.� The law has set up a very high standard as the only test which has been laid down is as to whether the person was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the mature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. In an english decision in (1953) 2 All. E.R. 1411. In the Estate of Park, the question was discussed in some details and relying on the same principle in Mcnaughtens case and on the long line of other decisions it was held that the dispute was to be resolved by finding whether he or she was capable of understanding the nature of the contract of marriage into which he or she was entering free from the influence of morbid delusion of the subject and not whether lie or she was only passing through the ceremony of marriage.� 16. What has been discussed here gives only the guidelines to determine in any given case whether one of the spouses had the capacity to give the requisite consent. The ultimate decision must be reached by courts in every case on the appreciation of the facts and circumstances appearing in the case. It would not be possible to lay down any hard and fast rule. The ultimate decision must be reached by courts in every case on the appreciation of the facts and circumstances appearing in the case. It would not be possible to lay down any hard and fast rule. If the court is satisfied on the evidence on record that one of the spouses was not, at the time of-marriage, possessed of sufficient capacity of mind to understand the nature of the contract of marriage and the duties and the responsibilities it gave rise to between the parties as husband and wife, then, of course, the marriage may be annulled on the ground that one of the spouses was not of sound mind. May be that he or she was subject to intermittent or recurring fits of insanity. There are varying degrees of mental infirmity. Generally lunacy affects the process of reasoning and thought and upsets the equilibrium of rational thinking. This may be to a slight degree in some cases, exhibiting certain attitude of mental aberration. It may, in some cases, affect the thought process to such an extent that the patient does not know the consequences of what he or she is doing. There is a wide range in between. The conduct of the parties just before and after the marriage, at the time of marriage, the nature and severity of the illness and other allied circumstances will have to be properly weighed and assessed by a court to reach its decision on the question whether the person was of such degree of unsound mind as could justify the finding that he or she had not really consented to the marriage understanding the significance of the relationship that was being entered into. 17. That each case has to be considered on the facts involved needs no authority in support of it. The High Court of Calcutta which noticed this rule in Pronab Kumar v. Krishna, A.I.R. 1975 Cal. 109 rightly said that” It is, therefore, the incumbent duty of the court to consider the materials on record the circumstances arising therefrom the reliability of the witness and such other things which may arise for its consideration before passing such a decree, specially when the effect of which is to put an end to a marital home.� The Court pointed out that” ......the courts conscience must be satisfied before such a decree annulling the marriage be passed.� 18. Why any state of mind which falls short of lunacy or idiocy has not been allowed to be urged successfully as a ground for annulment of a marriage is considered by Mukerji, J., speaking for the Division Bench, in Mt. Titli v. Alfred Robert Jones, A.I.R. 1934 All. 273 at 278 thus: A marriage is no doubt described as a civil contract, but it is far from being in the nature of an ordinary contract. A contract, which is induced by fraud or force coercion or misrepresentation, is voidable at the instance of the party whose consent has been obtained by such influence and is not void in itself: see section 19, Contract Act. In the case of marriage it is either void or good. It would be impossible to talk of a marriage as voidable at the option of one of the parties while should be binding on the other party. The observation to be found in the well known case of Moss v. Moss are very pertinent on the point. Persons differ from one another in the degree of intelligence possessed by them. It would be a dire calamity if it could be said as a matter of law that a marriage, entered into by a person who is neither a lunatic nor an idiot, is void, simply because one of the parties lacks in intelligence, although he is able to understand the nature of bonds of matrimony into which he is entering. As observed by Hannan P. in Durham v. Durham, the contract of marriage is a very simple one, which does not require a high degree of intelligence to comprehend.� 19. To sum up this part of the discussion:(1) The term lunatic as used in section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act refers to a person of unsound mind.(2) There may be different degrees of unsoundness of mind. But what vitiates a marriage is unsoundness of such a degree as to enable the court to infer that one or other of the parties to the marriage did not have the capacity to consent to the marriage. Consent being an essential ingredient of a valid marriage, the question would be whether the party had the capacity to understand the nature of the relationship that was being entered into by the ceremony of marriage and the duties and responsibilities that such relationship engenders. Consent being an essential ingredient of a valid marriage, the question would be whether the party had the capacity to understand the nature of the relationship that was being entered into by the ceremony of marriage and the duties and responsibilities that such relationship engenders. (3) It is not sufficient to show that the party understood the language of what was said in the promises and vows taken, but that he or she understood the significance of the promises and vows made, the degree of intelligence required to understand being not high. (4) It is for the petitioner who pleads that the respondent was incapacitated at the time of marriage from giving consent, to establish that case. (5) Unsoundness of mind must be shown to be at the time of marriage and not before or after. Insanity may be permanent and intermittent. In the latter case consent may not be vitiated unless it is shown that at the time of marriage there was such attack of insanity. (6) There is no formula to determine whether in a given case one of the spouses lacked the requisite capacity, for, ultimately the decision is one to be reached objectively by the Court on assessment of all the facts and circumstances. 20. The evidence adduced by the petitioner in the case before me in support of the plea of lunacy of the respondent amounts to an attempt to prove that the respondent was a schizophrenic patient, both before and after marriage. She is said to have consulted the Doctors in regard to her ailment at the Kusumagiri Hospital prior to the marriage and such ailment is said to have been diagnosed on the basis of symptoms disclosed as schizophrenia. Even during the time she was living with her husband she is said to have consulted men of the medical profession who are said to have treated her for schizophrenia, though at that time her husband did not realise that his wife was a schizophrenic patient. After the respondent was taken back to her fathers house in March 1974 the respondent is said to have undergone treatment in the Vellore Medical College Hospital for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is said to be a form of mental illness resulting in unsoundness of mind of the patient. After the respondent was taken back to her fathers house in March 1974 the respondent is said to have undergone treatment in the Vellore Medical College Hospital for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is said to be a form of mental illness resulting in unsoundness of mind of the patient. It is therefore, said that in this case there is proof that the respondent was wanting in the requisite capacity at the time the petitioner entered into marriage with her. This may call for examination of the nature of illness of schizophrenia and the degree of that illness which may vitiate the thought process to the extent of invalidating the consent given to the marriage. The evidence in the case as to the illness of the respondent will have to be assessed in the background of that discussion. 21. An averment has been made in paragraph 4 of the petition that the respondent was a lunatic and that by reason of her lunacy she was legally incompetent and incapable of contracting marriage. It is also averred in paragraph 5 of the petition that she was suffering from schizophrenia, that for treatment she was admitted in the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad on 25th January 1972 and that she remained there till 9th February 1972. It is evident therefore that the plea of insanity is based upon the illness of schizophrenia for which the respondent is said to have undergone treatment. The case of lunacy of the respondent is disputed by her, though no doubt she admits having been treated. But according to her such treatment was not for schizophrenia. The petitioner has relied upon the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 7 to support the case that the respondent had undergone treatment for schizophrenia in various mental institutions. P.Ws. 1 and 4 are attached to the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad, P.W. 1, Sister Polly being the Administrator and P.W. 4. Dr. C.P. Somasundaram being the Clinical Psychologist. The case records relating to the respondent were produced by P.W.1. That is Ext. P-1 in the case. It is said to be under the custody of P.W. 1. Ext. P-1 file contains the writings by Dr. Santhi Karunakaran and Dr. Chandasekharan is said to be in England and therefore is not available for examination. The case records relating to the respondent were produced by P.W.1. That is Ext. P-1 in the case. It is said to be under the custody of P.W. 1. Ext. P-1 file contains the writings by Dr. Santhi Karunakaran and Dr. Chandasekharan is said to be in England and therefore is not available for examination. P.W. 4 who holds a doctorate in Clinicalpsychology is said to have been working in the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad from 1972. Prior to that he was in Vellore. Ext. P-1 file contains the entries in the handwriting of P.W. 4. These entries at pages 7 and 8 have been proved as Ext. P-1 (a). According to him he is familiar with the handwriting of Dr. Santhi Karunakaran and proves her writing in the file. So is the case with the writing of Dr. Chandrasekharan in the file, Ext. P-1. The entries made by P.W. 4 in the file are of the date 1st June 1974 and these relate to the assessment made by him on the patient, the patient being the respondent in this case. From the entries so made by him he states that the patient was not normal at that time. The symptoms noted in Ext. P-1 are said to be the symptoms as explained by the patient herself. According to him any patient showing such symptoms has to be diagnosed as one showing symptoms of psychyatric disorder, psychiatric reaction, most probately schizophrenia. He also refers to another entry made by him at page 8 of the file on 14th June 1974. At that time the symptoms noted therein are those reported by the patients father. As a Clinical psychologist in the mental hospital he made the psychological assessment of the patient to assist the psychiatrist in the treatment programme. It may be mentioned here that the entries made by P.W. 4 are said to be on the basis of information given by the father of the patient. But in the evidence he refers to it as information given partly by the patient and partly by her father. That refers to obsession on the part of the patient, in that she wanted always to be clean, always felt a power impelling her to do something, forgetfulness, sleeplessness and a feeling like talking to herself. But in the evidence he refers to it as information given partly by the patient and partly by her father. That refers to obsession on the part of the patient, in that she wanted always to be clean, always felt a power impelling her to do something, forgetfulness, sleeplessness and a feeling like talking to herself. Later, on 14th June 1974, he notes that too many ideas are running through the mind of the respondent. The petitioner desires this court to relay upon the entries in Ext. P-1 file made by Dr. Santhi Karunakaran and Dr. Chandrasekharan who, it is said, treated the patient for schizophrenia. According to the petitioner in the absence of these persons who, for reasons beyond the control of the petitioner, are not available for examination the best evidence has been given to prove the file and therefore that could be acted upon. The file, Ext. P-1, shows that the respondent visited the Kusumagiri Hospital for the first time in January 1972 prior to the marriage. It also shows that subsequent to the marriage also the petitioner has visited the Hospital. It is sufficient for the purpose of this case to refer to the evidence of P.W.4 and of Ext. P-1 file so far as it is proved by him. P.W.5, Dr. Vijayan, is the Superintendent of the Mental Hospital, Calicut and P.W.6 is Dr. Rose Chacko, Professor of Psychiatry in the Vellore Medical College Hospital. Dr. Vijayan was working in the Mental Hospital, Calicut eversince 1971. He knew the respondent as a patient and treated her in 1973. The treatment was for schizophrenia. The respondent was treated as an outpatient. The respondent is said to have visited Dr. Vijayan seven or eight days. It was on consecutive days. It was not at the hospital but at the residence of Dr. Vijayan. According to him he had noted the name of the respondent and the diagnosis in his records. He would say that he diagnosed the illness of the respondent on the very first day she consulted him. The conclusion as to the illness of the respondent was drawn from what the patient, her parents, and her husband told to him. All of them are said to have gone to his residence along with a friend of theirs. That is said to have been towards the end of 1973. The conclusion as to the illness of the respondent was drawn from what the patient, her parents, and her husband told to him. All of them are said to have gone to his residence along with a friend of theirs. That is said to have been towards the end of 1973. He would say that he observed excitement, anxiety, periodical outbursts of laughter, crying and the like symptoms in the patient. According to him he took about 30 to 45 minutes for the examination. He does not remember whether he asked her the reasons for such behaviour or whether she had given him reasons for such behaviour. He is said to have prescribed largactyl on the very first day. He does not remember whether there was any improvement when the respondent left him. Though she was asked to meet him again, she did not report to him. He is of the view that hallucination, delusion, sleeplessness or irrelevant talk (which according to the petitioner were the symptoms exhibited by the respondent) can be taken as the symptoms of schizophrenia. He says that he does not remember whether he advised the respondent to be hospitalized. According to him if the illness of schizophrenia was anything other than a mild one, he would have advised hospitalisation. For the purpose of observation it is not necessary that a person need be hospitalised. He is unable to say whether the respondent was able to give reasonable answers to all his questions. He was asked whether it was necessary to observe a person for a number of days before diagnosing that that such person was suffering from schizophrenia and according to him that was not necessary. According to him there was a normal pattern for interviewing the patient and that pattern was followed in regard to the respondent also. He admits that even to patients with mild form of schizophrenia largactyl is prescribed but the difference is that it will be in smaller doses. To a question specifically put to him in the cross-examination If a man and woman are living together for an year and a half and one is a schizophrenic will not this be understood by the other?� his answer is Yes. According to him schizophrenia is not curable in the literal sense of the word. To a question specifically put to him in the cross-examination If a man and woman are living together for an year and a half and one is a schizophrenic will not this be understood by the other?� his answer is Yes. According to him schizophrenia is not curable in the literal sense of the word. As to the intellectual ability of a schizophrenic patient, P.W.5 says” I cannot say that a schizophrenic does not know what he or she does. That depends upon the acuteness of the ailment. A schizophrenic can attend to his usual avocations in life.� Dr. Rose Chacko, P.W. 6, is a Specialist in Psychiatry working in the Medical College at Vellore. She produced the case records of the respondent. The file has been marked as Ext. P.3. Some of the entries therein are in her handwriting and some in that of her Assistant. She had treated the respondent. The entries in the file relate to the diagnosis and treatment of the respondent. According to her the respondent went to her for the first time on 19th June 1974 for treatment of mental disorder. This was diagnosed by her as catatonic schizophrenia. The symptoms exhibited by the patient are those seen mentioned in page 3 of Ext. P-3 file, namely, Recurrent attacks of abnormal changes associated with sleeplessness, restlessness, irrelevant talk, disinterest; slow in doing things.� The clinical impression is noted as schizophrenia. There is further information about the patient at page 23 of the file and that relates to the mental examination. As to general appearance, it is stated: A tall, well built girl in her twenties, properly dressed, oily face dull and (?) pre-occupied.� Orientation and memory have been noticed as normal. As to thought process it is stated "Is scared. Says she sometimes thinks she is possessed by evil spirits. Hears voices. Someone orders: suggestions etc. has been hearing since 1973 July, even now. A black image wandering up and down"� Her speech is noticed as relevant, normal. Mood is noticed as apathetic-she says has proper emotion.� Her intelligence is noticed as normal, insight and judgment as good and general information as good. These symptoms have been noticed by Mr. Bright, the Assistant of Dr. Rose Chacko. According to her usually the case is presented to her and she examines the patients. Mood is noticed as apathetic-she says has proper emotion.� Her intelligence is noticed as normal, insight and judgment as good and general information as good. These symptoms have been noticed by Mr. Bright, the Assistant of Dr. Rose Chacko. According to her usually the case is presented to her and she examines the patients. The patient was directed to be hospitalised and after discharge the patient came to her twice. The patient was advised to write about her progress and the letters written by the respondents father as well as the respondent are also produced by her along with the file. The office copies of the replies sent by Dr. Rose Chacko are also in the file. They too have, been marked. According to P.W. 6 the judgment of a schizophrenic patient is affected usually. But in the case of the respondent she has noted that it is good and she also noted that there was no irrelevant talk at that time. When asked specifically” What inference that you drew as a result of the mental examination made you think that the case is one of schizophrenia?� P.W. 6 answers” The patient was dull and pre-occupied. She said she was scared. She had delusions and hallucinations. She was in an apathetic mood. She lacked interest in things around her.� She was asked particularly whether a diagnosis can be safely allowed to rest on these symptoms alone and her definite answer was in the negative. She said that observation over a long period of time was necessary. She also admitted that the patient did not show any evidence of affect. As to whether a schizophrenic patient would show progressive deterioration in the level of performance at work and socially the answer was, it would, if not treated and it varies with the type also. She was specifically asked whether intellectual performance may be taken as a reliable index in the diagnosis of schizophrenia and her answer was No. She also said that she noticed nothing distinctly queer or odd about the patient. 22. The respondent as R.W. 1 categorically avers that she was not a lunatic at the time of marriage. After the marriage, the friends of her husband are said to have given receptions for the couple at the Sea Lord Hotel, Malabar Hotel and Oberoi Hotel at Cochin and she is said to have attended all these parties. 22. The respondent as R.W. 1 categorically avers that she was not a lunatic at the time of marriage. After the marriage, the friends of her husband are said to have given receptions for the couple at the Sea Lord Hotel, Malabar Hotel and Oberoi Hotel at Cochin and she is said to have attended all these parties. She also said that the medical representative, friends of her husband arranged a party at Trichur and that also she attended. According to her she visited Trivandrum, Thekkadi and Kovalam along with her husband after the marriage. She also visited her husbands sisters houses at Elanthoor, Kundanad and Peermade along with her husband. Whenever they went outside Angamaly, it was in the Jawa Motorbike of her husband. She said that she travelled up to Elanthoor on the south and Trichur on the north. She joined the Home Science College in January though the parents of her husband were against this. That was said to be a 6 months course with a written examination at the end and also a practical examination to follow. There were 7 papers in the examination and the respondent is said to have passed the examination and taken the diploma. The petitioners father who was a leader among the Brothren Sect was conducting a magazine, Sathyaprakasini. It is said that the licence of this magazine was changed to the name of the respondent. This is the agreed case. But according to the petitioner notwithstanding the licence being changed to the name of the respondent, the petitioner himself looked after the conduct of the magazine. The respondent swears that she was doing the work in connection with the printing and publishing of the magazine. She is said to have taught in the Sunday School from March 1973 to March 1971. There was a book depot in her husbands house and the respondent is said to have been effecting sales in the depot and writing the bills and the accounts. She had authorisation to receive the postal articles and accordingly she was receiving postal articles on behalf of her husband. She also says that she was attending to the work in the kitchen at her husbands place. The explanation for the petition for divorce is offered by the respondent in her examination as on account of the respondents father being unwilling to pay a sum of Rs. She also says that she was attending to the work in the kitchen at her husbands place. The explanation for the petition for divorce is offered by the respondent in her examination as on account of the respondents father being unwilling to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000 demanded by the petitioner for starting a press. She would say that her husband had the feeling that the dowry paid was inadequate. Her younger sister was married on 31st January 1974 at which marriage her husband also cooperated. After that marriage the respondent, along with her husband, her sister and sisters husband had gone to Malampuzha for a short stay. She also says that prior to the marriage she attempted to join the college for M. Sc., but since she had only a Second Class for B. Sc. she did not get admission whereas her younger sister is said to have obtained admission for M. Sc. This is said to have disappointed her. Consequently she is said to have suffered from headache, irregular menstruation, slight temperature and nausea. It is in this connection that she is said to have met Dr. Santhi Karunakaran at Kusumagiri Hospital where she is said to have been treated for 8 days. She is said to have recovered from the illness soon and after one week she is said to have met the doctor again. This was in February 1972 and there was no necessity to consult a doctor till 1973 November when she visited Dr. Vijayan in the Mental Hospital at Calicut. She had gone to Calicut at that time to see the child of a first cousin of her mother at Calicut. It was not for visiting Dr. Vijayan that she is said to have gone to Calicut. She is said to have gone there with her husband. Dr. Vijayan whom she met is said to have prescribed certain medicines for her. She also admits that she had gone to Vellore Medical College Hospital in June 1974 and had stayed there as a patient. This is said to be because she had headache and general weakness. She left Vellore after being cured. She says that besides this she had no other illness. She would also refute the petitioners case that in December she told him that she had mental illness and she was treated in the Kusumagiri Hospital on that account. This is said to be because she had headache and general weakness. She left Vellore after being cured. She says that besides this she had no other illness. She would also refute the petitioners case that in December she told him that she had mental illness and she was treated in the Kusumagiri Hospital on that account. She would also say that she had not taken largactyl at the time of marriage. Reference is made to one Kunjumon by the petitioner in the petition as a person to whom she would constantly make reference. But she denies having made any such reference to her husband. She denies having talked to herself or having laughed without reason. From 1975 June she had been studying for B. Ed. The respondent was asked why she visited Kusumagiri Hospital if her illness was only headache and the reason given by her is that there was a lady doctor there and besides the house of her brothers friend was also there. Though at North Parur there were doctors, there were no lady doctors. She would say that she decided upon consulting lady doctors because there was menstruation trouble She would say that she was given some B-complex and some pills. 23. Summing up her evidence one might say that according to her she underwent treatment at the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre before the marriage, she was treated by Dr. Vijayan at Calicut and she also underwent treatment at Vellore, but the illness is said to have been not schizophrenia. Her husband, P.W. 7, speaks in his evidence to oddities in her behaviour and also speaks to having taken her to Calicut to Dr. Vijayan in 1973. According to him she was taken to Dr. Santhakumaran at Trivandrum later. His evidence seems to indicate that even then he was not aware that the respondent was a mental patient and he came to understand this only when she mentioned to him in December 1973 that she was an inpatient in the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre, Kakkanad. What she is alleged to have said, in the words of P.W. 7, is this: Malayalam He would say that he thought he would take the respondent to some Ayurvedic Physician and took her to Ollur Moose in the beginning of 1974. What she is alleged to have said, in the words of P.W. 7, is this: Malayalam He would say that he thought he would take the respondent to some Ayurvedic Physician and took her to Ollur Moose in the beginning of 1974. One day she insisted upon being taken home and further warned him that if she was not taken immediately, only one of them would survive. He would say that for fear of his life he took her to her house. It would appear from the evidence of P. W. 7 that apart from noting the oddities in the attitude and behaviour of the respondent he had no reason to suspect that the respondent was a lunatic and that was the reason why when he heard about this from his wife in December 1973 he was shocked. It is not easy to reconcile this part of the evidence with the statement in paragraph 10 of the petition where the case does not appear to be the same. It is stated therein that thereafter (after 14th August 1973) when the symptoms of the respondents lunacy exacerbated, with the knowledge of the petitioner, she was taken to Calicut by her parents, for observation and treatment by the Superintendent of the Mental Hospital there from 20th August 1973 to 28th August 1973. It is also mentioned that the petitioner had taken her to Trivandrum for treatment by the Superintendent of the Mental Hospital there. 24. Two witnesses have been examined to show that the respondent did not behave in the normal fashion after the marriage. These witnesses are P.Ws. 2 and 3. I will come to their evidence in due course. 25. The evidence of P.W. 1 and of P.W. 4 who had examined the respondent at Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre and also the evidence furnished by the file Ext. P-1, to the extent it can be relied upon in this case in the light of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 4, coupled with the admission of the respondent herself proves beyond doubt that the respondent had been an inpatient in the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. 4 who speaks to having seen her after the date of the marriage at the Mental Hospital when she went there for treatment. 1 and 4, coupled with the admission of the respondent herself proves beyond doubt that the respondent had been an inpatient in the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. 4 who speaks to having seen her after the date of the marriage at the Mental Hospital when she went there for treatment. It is too much to believe that the respondent visited a Mental Health Centre for the purpose of treatment of headache, and that too because there were no lady doctors at North Parur. Taking the evidence in the case as a whole, I am inclined to think that the respondent, in denying that she had mental illness for which she had been all along consulting competent doctors, is not honest. The evidence of Dr. Vijayan to the extent he is said to have treated the respondent for schizophrenia has necessarily to be accepted. There is no reason to assume that what he has spoken about the symptoms of the patient when she was taken to him is in any way distorted. Whether on the materials available to him he could have properly diagnosed the case as one of schizophrenia is another matter. But the fact that the respondent was taken to him at the Mental Hospital at Calicut for consultation or treatment and that he did examine her and treat her for schizophrenia appears to be established by the evidence in the case. So is the case with the treatment later in 1974 at Vellore Medical College Hospital as evidenced by the file Ext. P-3 and also the evidence of P.W. 6, Dr. Rose Chacko. Here again the treatment was for schizophrenia. The doctors who had been treating her had prescribed doses of largactyl a tranquilliser, normally prescribed for schizophrenia. At Vellore the respondent was treated with E.C.T. which again is, according to P.W. 6, a treatment for schizophrenia. In this background, I see no reason to assume that the symptoms noticed by the doctors were non-existent. According to them irrelevant talk, sleeplessness, hallucinations and delusions were symptoms noticed and this led them to diagnose the case as one of schizophrenia. In this background, I see no reason to assume that the symptoms noticed by the doctors were non-existent. According to them irrelevant talk, sleeplessness, hallucinations and delusions were symptoms noticed and this led them to diagnose the case as one of schizophrenia. It is seen mentioned in the evidence of P.W. 7, the petitioner, that Sarala, the respondent, quite often used to mention the name of one Kunjumon, used to imagine seeing him in her mental vision now and then, used to believe that Kunjumon had come to call her and in fact was exasperatingly referring to Kunjumon. This Kunjumon is not an imaginery name, for, according to the respondent he once proposed to marry her and for that purpose went over to her house to see her, but the marriage did not take place. But according to the respondent as R.W. 1 and her father as R.W. 2, there was nothing more and the mention of Kunjumons story by R.W. 7, the petitioner, was absolutely without basis. But the evidence of medical witnesses go to support the case of the petitioner in this respect to a considerable extent. 26. Though the petitioner speaks to queer or odd behaviour of the respondent even at the marriage dais at the time of taking the marriage vows and subsequently in her attitude to the friends and relatives of the petitioner who went over to his house on visits, I am not very much impressed with this part of the evidence. According to him she was unconcerned and indifferent and such unconcern was shown in her face, behaviour and attitude when any friends or relatives came to their place to visit them. This is very graphically and elaborately described by him in his evidence as P.W. 7. As rightly pointed out by counsel for the respondent, this seems, to a great extent, an embellishment of his story intended to promote his case that the respondent was a schizophrenic patient. It is strange that if the respondent exhibited such behaviour the petition should have been silent about this, particularly in the background of the statement that for the first time she disclosed about her illness to the respondent only in December 1973, nearly about 2 years after the marriage. It is strange that if the respondent exhibited such behaviour the petition should have been silent about this, particularly in the background of the statement that for the first time she disclosed about her illness to the respondent only in December 1973, nearly about 2 years after the marriage. The conduct of the petitioner in taking the respondent with him on his motorbike to far off places to visit friends and relatives and for taking part in receptions given to them belies the case of indifference and unconcern spoken to by P.W. 7 in his evidence. If, as a matter of fact, the petitioner felt that the respondent was behaving in an abnormally irresponsible manner, it is unlikely that after marriage the licence of Sathyaprakasini magazine would have been transferred to the name of the respondent. The fact that the respondent was undergoing a course of studies in the Home Science College while living with the petitioner at Angamali and that she obtained a Diploma on successfully completing her examination also is not irrelevant. Even if there were oddities in the behaviour of the respondent at that time, these might not have been taken as serious enough to merit any complaint and would have been taken as within the range of adjustable eccentricities of one or other of the spouses quite often visible in married life. The evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 intended to speak to such odd behaviour of indifference on the part of the respondent does not impress me in the background of what I have already mentioned. 27. On the medical evidence in this case, I am prepared to find that the respondent was treated as a schizophrenic patient before and after marriage. Largactyl was being administered to her under the advice of doctors who were consulted. She underwent E.C. Therapy at Vellore. Before the marriage she was a patient at Kusumagiri Mental Heath Centre. Later, in 1974, after the spouses practically parted, the wife was admitted in the Vellore Hospital where she was under treatment for 49 days. 28. Schizophrenia is a form of mental illness. There is a case for the respondent that even it is found that she was treated for schizophrenia it does not necessarily follow that she was schizophrenic patient. Later, in 1974, after the spouses practically parted, the wife was admitted in the Vellore Hospital where she was under treatment for 49 days. 28. Schizophrenia is a form of mental illness. There is a case for the respondent that even it is found that she was treated for schizophrenia it does not necessarily follow that she was schizophrenic patient. Her case is that the symptoms which were noticed by the medical men who treated her need not necessarily be symptoms of schizophrenic patient. Her case is that the symptoms which were noticed by the medical men who treated her need not necessarily be symptoms of schizophrenia. Even assuming they are, what has to be found is not that the respondent had schizophrenic attack on some occasion or other, but that on the date of the marriage she was of unsound mind. Unsoundness of mind, it is said, cannot be equated with any mental illness as such. In other words, all persons who have some mental disorder or other are not lunatics. A person of unsound mind in law is not the same as a person who is considered to have some mental disorder by the medical men. The degree of illness would be the most relevant factor. The evidence in this case does not, according to the respondent, in any event, establish the invalidating circumstances justifying a decree for nullity. This calls for examination of the nature of the illness schizophrenia, its symptoms, diagnosis and to some extent, the treatment and prognosis. There is scope for controversy as to whether prognosis would be relevant, for, the possibility of a complete recovery could have bearing only on the ultimate fate of the marital life of the spouses. If that has no bearing on the question whether the marriage should be held to be null and void that need not be looked into. If at the time of the marriage both the spouses were well in mind, even if one of them becomes mentally deteriorated and the resultant lunacy is incurable, that would in no way be relevant to nullify a marriage. Whether that would be relevant to dissolve the marriage tie is not the question with which I need be concerned, for I am dealing at the moment with the question of a decree for nullity. 29. Whether that would be relevant to dissolve the marriage tie is not the question with which I need be concerned, for I am dealing at the moment with the question of a decree for nullity. 29. The term schizophrenia is used by Mayor-Gross and Slater Roth in Clinical Psychiatry (II Edition) to mean” "..a group of mental illness characterized by specific psychological symptoms and leading, in the majority of cases, to a disorganization of the personality of the patient."� Kraepelin, for the first time, gave the name dementia praecox paifying varied clinical pictures of ailments which had till then been considered as different diseases on account of different clinical pictures. This was in 1896. This concept slowly gained recognition. It was confirmed and consolidated by Bleuler who introduced the term schizophrenia for dementia praecox cases. Schizophrenia, in its most typical form, consists in a slow deterioration of the entire personality, which often manifests itself at the period of adolescence. It involves a great part of the mental life, and expresses itself in disorder of feeling, of conduct, and of thought, and in an increasing withdrawal of interest from the environment. Handerson and Gillespies Text Book of Psychaitry, 10th Edition, p.247. "30. It would appear that the controversy whether schizophrenia is a clinical entity is not yet set at rest. To quote the words of the learned authors” "Research into the many problems posed by schizophrenia has been frustrated by doubts and uncertainties about the heterogeneity of the clinical material being studied. Possibly the majority of observers now think that schizophrenia is not a clinical entity but a group of syndromes, of different aetiologies though with similarities in their clinical features: yet research has usually proceeded on the assumption that a biological entity was being investigated. The varieties of schizophrenia shortly to be described are clinical groupings of symptoms, they have no known pathological basis: but it might well now be more profitable to select for biochemical research these clinical subdivisions rather than schizophrenia as a whole, and particularly the most typical cases of hebephrenia and catatonia."� 31. Kraepelin differentiated three principal types of schizophrenia, (1) hebephrenic, (2) catatonic and (3) paranoid and later he added a 4th, simplex. Kraepelin differentiated three principal types of schizophrenia, (1) hebephrenic, (2) catatonic and (3) paranoid and later he added a 4th, simplex. Catatonic schizophrenia with which I am concerned here for, the respondent is said to have been a catatonic schizophrenic patient is usually described as an alternating stage, characterised by a stage of depression, a stage of excitement and a stage of stupor. This type of schizophrenic reaction is said to develop much more acutely than the other types. There is no group of symptoms which can be looked upon as in any way premonitory. The usual history is a more or less general statement that there has been a general falling of in interest, an apathy, a lack of concentration, a dreaminess and often episodes of an odd nature.� Henderson and Gillespies Text Book of Psychiatry. 32. Discussing the symptomatology of schizophrenic reaction types, Henderson and Gillespie in their book observed: "The detailed symptomatology is extraordinarily varied, but there are certain groups of symptoms which stand out more prominently than the others, and are common to all the varieties. A most prominent symptom is the failure of affect, or emotional blunting showing itself in apathy and indifference. This description applies more definitely to cases of some duration. In the early stages the affect may be lively enough, and even in advanced cases there are sometimes more evidences pointing to affective activity than would, on the surface, be suspected. The emotional deterioration leads to a state of mental facility, in which the patient is, up to a point, easily suggestible, and his conduct is more easily affected by those in contact with him,"� * * * * * The result of the mental disintegration is a widespread change in the patient's personality, which vividly impresses itself on his friends. The patient loses his pride in his personal appearance, gradually becomes untidy and slovenly add needs constant attention. "Ideas of reference, illusions hallucinations and delusions constitute another group of symptoms which are present at one time or another during the course of the illness."� Schizophrenia is therefore an ailment which gradually affects the personality of the patient. Without any gross physical signs or symptoms, disorganisation of the personality often results in chronic invalidism. Personality changes occur which are often irreversible. Without any gross physical signs or symptoms, disorganisation of the personality often results in chronic invalidism. Personality changes occur which are often irreversible. F. J. Fish in his treatise Schizophrenia� observes: Although Bleuler held that schizophrenia always left behind a defect of the personality, he believed that in some cases the defect was so slight as to be undetectable. He and his pupils used the term ˜schizophrenia for a large number of mild illness which many other psychiatrists did not consider to be schizophrenic. Thus schizophrenia became a very fashionable diagnosis in Switzerland and has remained so as to the present day.� 33. Undue emphasis on some or other symptoms of the disease in diagnosing the disease is liable to mislead the very process of diagnosis. Ultimately the test is whether the intellectual faculty of the patient and his personality has been so affected as to infer the existence of the disease. It may be useful to refer to the following passage in Handerson and Gillespies Text Book of Psychiatry in this context. Probably mistakes in the diagnosis of schizophrenia are made most often because undue attention has been paid to single symptoms and the clinician has failed to view these in perspective. Certain symptoms in a young person, feelings of influence and passivity, for example, and hypochondriacal complaints of a wholly unexpected, unjustified or bizarre kind, will quite strongly suggest the diagnosis of schizophrenia: but the diagnosis cannot safely be allowed to rest on isolated symptoms. Gillies (1958) in an illuminating account of the symptoms which are most characteristic of early schizophrenia, has drawn attention to the importance of recognizing the often subtle and transient evidence of disorders of thinking, affect and volition, and autistic withdrawal, before the numerous secondary symptoms have become manifest: and he makes the observation that a social group setting, in hospital or elsewhere, tend, to bring out a schizophrenic patients anomalies. Disorders of thinking, including the replacement of abstract by concrete thinking and thought-blocking, may be elicited by asking the patient to interpret proverbs. Later, when the illness is obviously a psychotic one, the persistent presence of auditory and visual hallucinations occurring when there is no excitement and when there is no toxic basis, are very much more in favour of schizophrenia than of anything else. 34. A few words about prognosis of the disease. Later, when the illness is obviously a psychotic one, the persistent presence of auditory and visual hallucinations occurring when there is no excitement and when there is no toxic basis, are very much more in favour of schizophrenia than of anything else. 34. A few words about prognosis of the disease. There are different features in a case which may play a part in determining the prognosis of a disease and that applies to schizophrenia too. Family history is considered by some experts on the subject as relevant in prognosis though F. J. Fish in his treatise already adverted to observes that it is now generally held that the family history has no bearing on prognosis. Physique, it is said, plays a part in prognosis, as summed up in the well-known phrase the aglier the patient the worse the prognosis. According to the same author a pre-morbid schizoid personality is associated with a poor prognosis, while a good well-integrated pre-morbid personality is usually associated with recovery or minimal defect. An I.Q. below the average is usually associated with a poor prognosis. Recovery is less common when the illness begins in adolescence and in early adult life or middle age. An acute onset favours a good outcome, whereas a subacute or ingravescent onset has a very poor prognosis. Social factors play a great part in the final adjustment of the patient. Social recovery is often more dependent on the environment than on the clinical features. The same author observes” It has been shown, for example, that the "possession of immediate family" is in favour of discharge from hospital.� Referring to the evidence that the prognosis has improved over the past thirty years, Menderson and Gillespie in their book observe at page 282 thus: Over half the patients in our mental hospitals are suffering from a state of mental deterioration, which particularly involves the emotional sphere and habits, due to chronic schizophrenia; soschizophrenia continues to have in general a very serious prognosis. At the same time, an increasing number of these patients are re-adjusting themselves satisfactorily. There are more who make a social rather than a complete recovery; and many who though still disabled reach a quiescent stage so that they can be cared for at home. There is good evidence that the prognosis has improved over the past thirty years. At the same time, an increasing number of these patients are re-adjusting themselves satisfactorily. There are more who make a social rather than a complete recovery; and many who though still disabled reach a quiescent stage so that they can be cared for at home. There is good evidence that the prognosis has improved over the past thirty years. Three groups of workers gave the following percentage of total remissions in cases followed up prior to the Second World War: Stalker (1939), 12 per cent, and Guttmanu, Mayer-Gross and Slater (1939), 21.5 percent, both in Britate; and Renrie (1933), 24.6 per cent, in the USA. In contrast wing (1966), in a follow up study of early schizophrenic patients after 5 years, found that 33 per cent of his cohort had no symptoms in the final 6 months: while about one-quarter were still severely ill and another quarter were handicapped by less severe symptoms. One can say, therefore, that nearly half of the first-admitted schizophrenic patients now have a fairly good prognosis, and will require little or no after-care in the following few years.� 35. Mayor-Gross and Slater both in Clinical Psychiatry observe in regard to the question of degree of recovery thus: The question of degree of recovery is another source of difficulty. Judged by their subsequent achievements, many schizophrenics are practically cured after their first or second attack. For this reason Kraepelin and others have frequently been blamed far being for too gloomy in judging the outlook. The reproach has some justification; but it must be realised that a recovery, complete for social and practical purposes, may not amount to complete restitution. In the single case, says E. Bieuler, ˜the Judgment that a cure has occurred depends on the psychological skill and, above all, on the time at the disposal of the psychiatrist for observing and examining the patient. Mental health cannot be diagnosed directly; one takes it for granted if one cannot find any symptoms in spite of a careful search. He who has no time for a thorough examination finds many patients recovered whom others would consider as only improved Bleuler also stressed the point that restitution of the status quo before the acute psychosis cannot be claimed as a complete recovery, if an insidious change had already taken place before the acute outbreak.� 36. There are degrees of illness in schizophrenia. There are degrees of illness in schizophrenia. The methods of treatment deviced by modern science serves to arrest, if not cure, the disease and to retain the personality of the patient at status quo level. That social recovery is possible is admitted by modern medical science. Whether clinical recovery is possible is a moot point. The thought process of the patient may be seriously affected if the ailment is serious. But where that is not the case, though it may be affected, it would only be lightly. There has been no attempt to adduce evidence in this case as to the degree to which the mental capacity and the thought process of the respondent has been affected, much less is there any evidence as to the degree of the illness with particular reference to the capacity to think and act on ones own volition on the date of the marriage. It cannot be postulated that every schizophrenic patient is so mentally unsound as to characterise him as a lunatic within the meaning of the term in the Indian Divorce Act. The validity of a marriage under the Hindu law challenged on the ground that one of the spouses did not have the consenting capacity on account of lunacy was considered by the Federal Court in the decision in Ratneshwari Nandan v. Bhagwati Saran, A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 142. The Court said in that decision thus: There are undoubtedly various degrees of insanity and the fact that a man has been adjudicated a lunatic may mean and imply that he is not competent to manage his own affairs, but it does not necessarily show that he suffers from complete mental aberration. He may have sufficient amount of reason still left in him which would enable him to understand the ceremonies of marriage and take an intelligent part in them. This view finds full support from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mouji Lal v. Chandrabati, 38 I.A. 122 (38) Cal. 700 (P C.). This appeal arose out of certain applications for letters of administration to the estate of one Ishriprasad and the controversy centred round the point as to whether Ishriprasads marriage with one Girijabati was invalid by reason of Ishriprasads insanity at the time of marriage. 700 (P C.). This appeal arose out of certain applications for letters of administration to the estate of one Ishriprasad and the controversy centred round the point as to whether Ishriprasads marriage with one Girijabati was invalid by reason of Ishriprasads insanity at the time of marriage. The District Judge held the marriage to be void primarily on the ground that Ishriprasad was so mad as not to know that he was being married and that he was even incapable of uttering the mantras. On appeal to the High Court this decision was reversed by Pargiter and Woodroffe, JJ. Pargiter, J. who delivered the main judgment, expressly held that the mental condition of Ishriprasad was not such at the time of marriage as to render him incapable of understanding the ceremony of accepting the bride and assenting to the marriage. Great reliance was placed by the learned Judge upon the facts that for a considerable period of time after the alleged marriage, the parties were recognised by all person concerned as man and wife and so described in important documents and on important occasions. On appeal to the Privy Council the Judicial Committee entirely concurred in these views. Sir Arthur Wilson in delivering the judgment of the Board observed as follows: Their Lordships agree with the learned Judges of the High Court in thinking that, to put it at the highest, the objection to a marriage on the ground of mental incapacity must depend on a question if degree, and that in the present case the evidence of mental infirmity is wholly insufficient to establish such a degree of that defect as to rebut extremely strong presumption in favour of the validity of marriage.� 37. The question therefore is not merely whether the respondent was a schizophrenic patient at the time of marriage. Assuming that she was, the evidence only goes to show that prior to that she had undergone, treatment in the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre as a schizophrenic patient and there is no direct evidence that at the time of marriage she had any relapse that would not be sufficient to nullify the marriage. The degree of incapacity is the relevant factor. The degree of incapacity is the relevant factor. Whether the respondent was, at that time, in a position to understand the significance of the marriage obligations, whether she was willingly and of her own volition entering into the contract of marriage and whether she understood that she was entering into a new status in life obliging her to pay allegiance to her husband and demanding of her loyalties as a wife is the question relevant for decision in this case and on that it is difficult to find on the material before me that she was incapacitated. She was, at the time she was examined in court, possessed of all mental faculties. She stood her examination as any normal person would. There is no reliable evidence to show that she was in any way mentally unsound at the time of marriage. Assuming that complete recovery is not possible, as contended by petitioners counsel and the consequence would be that throughout the respondents life she will have to live under the shadow of possible relapses, that would in no way justify the assumption that she did not consent to the marriage knowing its implications. On that there is no acceptable evidence in this case. Hence it is not possible to find for the petitioner that the marriage is void. 38. Having found on this aspect of the case, I may proceed to consider the next issue, namely whether the marriage is void on account of the fraud practised on the petitioner in obtaining consent. I do not think this is a ground available for the petitioner in a petition under section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act. That is not made a ground for nullifying a marriage. The provision in section 19 that nothing in that section shall affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to make decrees of nullity of marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud only saves the existing rights, if any, to move the High Court for that purpose. There is no jurisdiction for this Court to pass a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground that consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud. There is no jurisdiction for this Court to pass a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground that consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud. If it is a right available to a party under the general law to invalidate a marriage, the remedy lies in ordinary proceedings before the Civil Court wherein such actions are to be instituted. 39. I do not see any basis on the materials in the case to find that the consent of the petitioner was obtained by force or fraud. It is not as if any active misrepresentation was made to the petitioner at the time of the marriage. The parties knew each other even prior to the marriage. The evidence shows that the parties belong to a small group of Christians, and knowing each other through relatives. The petitioner, as is customary, went to see the girl and talked with her. No allegation which would justify a plea of fraud has been made in the petition, unless it be that it is assumed that the respondent was, to her knowledge and that of her parents a schizophrenic patient prior to the marriage and it is further assumed that there is an obligation in the respondent to disclose this fact to the petitioner. Even assuming that the respondent felt the necessity of consulting a doctor as she did at the Kusumagiri Mental Health Centre prior to the marriage, it is not proper to expect her parents to mention this fact to the petitioner during the discussion relating to the marriage settlement. Non-disclosure in such circumstances of such a fact cannot be treated as active concealment. There may be many facts with regard to a girl which, her parents may not disclose when negotiating a settlement. If the girl is too poor in her studies or is unhealthy such as by recurrent attacks of asthma or is very poor at attending to domestic duties, the parents will naturally be not anxious to volunteer the information to the prospective bridegroom, for, it may sometimes be foolish on their part to mention these as the normal result would be to scare away even those who would after the marriage take these as matters of course and adjust themselves to it. In the case before me I find no reason to hold that any fraud was practised upon the petitioner in getting his consent. In the case before me I find no reason to hold that any fraud was practised upon the petitioner in getting his consent. Nothing was actively concealed from him. There is no evidence that it was done. The parties had occasion to know each other and in the normal course enquiries would be made by the petitioner and his relatives about the respondent. If any information had been concealed from the petitioner at that time possibly there might be a case for a charge of fraud. The mere fact that the respondents parents did not volunteer information which, in the normal course, they may not be expected to volunteer and possibly information which they may not consider as very material at that time will not be sufficient to sustain a plea of consent having been obtained by fraud. Therefore, apart from finding that in this petition the question whether consent was obtained by fraud is irrelevant, I hold that such a plea even if it is a ground for nullity has not been established in this case. 40. In the result, the Original Petition fails. 41. Though I am finding against the petitioner on the merits, I am not prepared to doubt his bonafides in resorting to this Court. He must have felt genuinely aggrieved that a situation has arisen where he has to spend the rest of his life with a girl who, he apprehends may be liable to have relapses of her illness and whose entire life is liable to be shadowed by the fear of the recurrence of the schizophrenic attacks. I do not believe the story of the respondent that the petitioner asked for a further dowry of Rs. 50,000 for starting a press of his own and it was the negative attitude of the father of the respondent that prompted the petitioner to come to this Court. That story set up by the respondent and attempted to be corroborated by her father does not impress me and there is no evidence to corroborate the version of these two witnesses, who are interested. 42. It is unfortunate this matter has come to this Court, for, it would necessarily estrange the spouses further. At the marriage the man and woman take the vow to live together lifelong, respecting the obligations incidental to their union. 42. It is unfortunate this matter has come to this Court, for, it would necessarily estrange the spouses further. At the marriage the man and woman take the vow to live together lifelong, respecting the obligations incidental to their union. Assurance of mutual loyalties and affection to the exclusion of others is implicit in the marital tie. The spouses enter upon the threshold of a new life full of promise of happiness and contentment which the prospect of a blessed partnership through life holds out for them. Normally they do live a happy life, subject, sometimes, 10 occasional frictions. Man being what he is, either of the spouses may find in the opposite number, quite a few irritants, but the status of matrimony calls for adjustments. Marriages are scarcely wrecked nor is married life rendered unhappy merely because of the angularities, oddities or even eccentricities of one or other of the spouses. Divorce, even permanent estrangement, is comparatively rare, particularly in our society. On the ability to tolerate, to excuse, to ignore, to accommodate and to adjust on the part of the spouses depends domestic peace and happiness. Granting that all is not well with the respondent, Sarala, in this case and at any moment she may perhaps suffer a relapse of the schizophrenic attack, still the petitioner, Daniel, will do well to compromise himself to the situation to make the long voyage ahead as calm and enjoyable as possible in the circumstances. He had lived with his wife for nearly two years and that without any appreciable disharmony. She is an educated girl of a respectable family. Schizophrenia is an illness from which, according to modern medical science, social recovery is possible. Complete recovery depends upon conditions created at home and in society. The wife, Sarala, who, despite the propensity to schizophrenic attack, appears to be a normal intelligent girl and she would also do well to consciously adjust herself to render the matrimonial home happy. I do believe the parties will see reason to come together and live in harmony and contentment despite whatever circumstances appear to be adverse to such a course at the moment. 43. Before I close, I must place on record my thanks to the eminent counsel on both sides for placing before me the questions of law and fact very thoroughly and exhaustively. I must specially mention Dr. 43. Before I close, I must place on record my thanks to the eminent counsel on both sides for placing before me the questions of law and fact very thoroughly and exhaustively. I must specially mention Dr. George Mathew Kalapurakkal, counsel for the petitioner, who has taken considerable pains in enlightening me on the relevant aspects of medical science. If I have been a little too elaborate in profusely quoting from books on psychiatry, it is only to do justice to Dr. George Mathew Kalapurakkal who, though not a medical man, has taken sufficient pains to qualify himself to deal effectively with this case in this Court. In the result, the Original Petition is dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer costs.