JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the order and decree dated 20-1-1973 passed by Sri S.K. Ahmed. Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, partly reversing and partly confirming the decree dated 6-2-71 passed by Sri M.L. Agarwal, Assistant Collector First Class, Banda in suit No. 26 of 1969 under Section 176/178/182, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent No. 1 Bhola Nath, had filed a suit claiming to be a co-tenant in certain plots situated in seeking the division of holding. The defendant-appellants contested the suit by denying that the plaintiff had any co-tenancy rights. The trial court dismissed the suit wit regard to plots Nos. 538/1 and 584/2, but decreed it for half share in the land given in list 'A' and 'B' and for ?rd share for the land given in list 'C'. An appeal as well as a cross-objection was filed against this order. The lower appellate court set aside the order of the trial court in respect of plots Nos. 583/1 and 584/2 and decreed the suit. Daya Shanker, Gopi Nath and Onker Nath new come up in second appeal before this court. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is the the learned Additional Commissioner failed to notice that there was no evidence on the record that plot no. 583/1 was the acquisition of Sukhuwa. It was recorded for the first time in the name of Sheonandan and after his death it continued to be recorded in the name of his descendants i.e., the defendants. Thus, the plaintiff-respondent could have no claim to this plot. The contention of the learned counsel cannot be upheld. It is correct that in the beginning the name of Sheonandan, and Kedar Nath were recorded on this plot, but the learned Additional commissioner has found that after Kedar Nath's death the names of his three real brothers as well as Bhola Nath, plaintiff were entered and this entry continued for twenty years. In the face of this, the claim of the plaintiff-respondent for co-tenancy of this plot is fully established and the finding of the learned Additional Commissioner can in no way be considered perverse. 5.
In the face of this, the claim of the plaintiff-respondent for co-tenancy of this plot is fully established and the finding of the learned Additional Commissioner can in no way be considered perverse. 5. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the name of the plaintiff was introduced in the main column in the year 1365 Fasli and this entry was illegal and conferred no rights on the plaintiff-respondents. The learned counsel for the respondents has on the other hand, argued that the entry of 1365 Fasli has been continued since then. Under Section 44 of the Land Revenue Act, there is the presumption of correctness of the entries in revenue records and the burden was on the defendant-appellants to get this entry corrected. Since they failed to do so, they cannot now take plea that the entry itself was illegal. 6. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Additional Commissioner has referred to certain Receipts of one year which were not proved and which cannot confer any co-tenancy rights on the plaintiff-respondent. The legal position is that rent receipts by themselves do not establish either tenancy or co-tenancy, but are to be treated as corroborative evidence. The rent receipt in question is paper no. 103 in the trail court's record. It is an official document in Z.A. Form 64 and does not require to be proved. However, it would be incorrect to say that the learned Additional Commissioner has only relied on this document for upholding the co-tenancy of the plaintiff-respondents. He has merely referred to this paper corroborative evidence. Thus, there was no illegality committed by the learned Additional Commissioner. 7. The forth contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in law is introducing a new case for plaintiff-respondent for plot No. 583/2, which was never pleaded by him. This plea has no force. A perusal of the plain filed by the plaintiff-respondent shows that he claimed to be co-sirdar of this plot over half share has and not given any specific history of the plot.
This plea has no force. A perusal of the plain filed by the plaintiff-respondent shows that he claimed to be co-sirdar of this plot over half share has and not given any specific history of the plot. The learned Additional Commissioner has found that there was some dispute regarding plot No. 584/2 between the plaintiff and the defendants on the one hand and one Mata Bada on the hand, and a compromise deed was written on 6-10-1970 in which Girja Shanker, defendant No. 1, was a party and he had signed it. This compromise deed is paper No. 70 on the trial court's records. It has been clearly recorded in the compromise deed that the plaintiff Bhola Nath was also a co-sharer in plot No. 584/2. The argument of the learned counsel that this admission of Girja Shanker cannot bind other defendants is certainly correct, but there is no force in the argument of the learned counsel that the admission has no evidentiary value. On the other hand, the admission is good evidence to show that Girja Shaner, who is the elder brother of Daya Shanker, appellant no. 1, recognised the claim of the plaintiff-respondent over this plot in 1967. Girja Shanker and Daya Shanker are both sons of Amar Nath and their written statement filed before the trial court shows that they had put up a common defence. Thus, the learned Additional Commissioner has not committed any error in law in referring to the admission of Girja Shanker. 8. The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned Additional Commissioner only dealt with two plots and dismissed the cross-objection without assigning any reasons. The legal position is that a cross-objection has to be distinguished from a cross-appeal. A cross-objection is merely an objection to the appeal filed by another party and it contests the appeal and not the entire judgment of the lower court. A cross-appeal, on the other hand, can challenge the entire judgment or lower court. A perusal of the lower appellate court's record shows that Bhola Nath Dwivedi had filed an appeal in that court against the order of the trail court dismissing his suit for plots Nos. 583/1 and 584/2. He did not file an appeal against he remaining portion of the trail court's judgment.
A perusal of the lower appellate court's record shows that Bhola Nath Dwivedi had filed an appeal in that court against the order of the trail court dismissing his suit for plots Nos. 583/1 and 584/2. He did not file an appeal against he remaining portion of the trail court's judgment. The present appellants filed no cross-appeal against the trial court's judgment but only filed a cross-objection against the appeal filed by Bhola Nath. The lower appellate court, therefore, rightly gave a judgment only with respect to plots Nos. 583/1 and 584/2. It was not required to adjudicate upon the trial court's judgment in respect of the remaining plots. This contention of the learned counsel, therefore, must be rejected. 9. The result is that I find no force in this second appeal and hereby dismiss it with costs.