JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal by the defendant State of Rajasthan against the judgement and decree of the Additional District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City, dated July 17, 1975, reversing the judgement and decree passed by the Additional Munsiff, Jaipur City, dated December 21, 1974. 2. The dispute between the parties relates to a plot of land measuring 11 Bighas 5 Biswas situate in front of Jai Mahal Palace in Jaipur. The full particulars of the plot of land are described in paragraph No. 1 of the plaint. It is common ground between the parties that this plot of land was granted to Pandit Amar Nath Atal, the father of respondents Nos. 1 to 3, by His Highness Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Bahadur of the erstwhile Jaipur State, as a gift by way of "inam grant" vide "patta" dated kartik sudi 8, Samwat Year 2000, corresponding to October 21, 1940. 3. The crucial controversy between the parties before the courts below was whether this "patta" was granted by His Highness Mansinghji Bahadur for residential purposes or for agricultural purposes? The trial court came to the conclusion that the "Patta" was granted for agricultural purposes. The learned Additional District Judge reversed that finding and came to the conclusion that the "patta" was granted for residential purposes. 4. The main question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the said "patta" was granted for residential purposes or for agricultural purposes? 5. The "patta" which is the subject matter of dispute in this appeal is Ex.5. 4. The main question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the said "patta" was granted for residential purposes or for agricultural purposes? 5. The "patta" which is the subject matter of dispute in this appeal is Ex.5. It runs as under:- Jh jketh flf) Jh ljkensjktkgk; fgUnqLrku jkt jktsUnz egkjktkf/kjkt egkjkt Jh lokbZ ekuflag th nsootukr~ if.Mr vejkukFk vVy csVk t;ukFk dk iksrk eksrh yky czkgkze.k d'ehjh cklh lokbZ t;iqj okfn'ks izlkn cSP;k vijps FkkWaus xkWao Hkokuh'kadj iqjk rkYyqd dLck lckbZ t;iqj dkesa 5 ) fcLok /kjrh 45 ) :i;k lkykuk gkfly ij nh xbZ Fkh ijUrq ok ?kjrh ysMh fcfyxwMu vLirky cuk;k tkok esa dke vk xbZ Fkh dh ,ot xkWao cM+ksfn;k ijxuk lokbZ t;iqj dk esa /kjrh 111 ) ch?kk vads X;kjgk ch?kk 5 fcLok 165 iusV dh tsjhc ls egjckuxh ijek; clhxs " buke " c['kh NA bZ they ds vUrj esa iksyk xzkm.M] nf{k.k esa lM+d tkks jsYos QkVd ls ukVk.kh dk ckxus tk; NS] iwjc esa U;w gksVy] if'pe esa ekth dk ckx ls jsyos LVs'ku tkckgkykslM+d Ns] FksbZ /kjrh /kjrh esa vkoknku jg T;ksa FkkWa ls dksbZ rjg ;ks cstk vM+py ugha gkslhA ferh dkfrZd lqnh 8 kqdzokj lEor~ 2000 dk The important words used in this "pata a " are Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ks FkkWals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gkslhA " 6. According to the learned Deputy Government Advocate, these words mean that the plot of land was granted to Pt. Amar Nath Atal for agricultural purposes. In support of his above contention, he has relied upon certain circumstances. In the first place, it was pointed out that this plot of land was granted to Pt. Amar Nath Atal in exchange of agricultural land held by him in village. Bhawani Shanker Pura, in which Pt. Atal had only tenancy rights. It was next contended that the subsequent conduct of the grantee or his sons in cultivating the plot of land in Samwat years 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2013 in accepting settlement "parcha" and in making payment of land revenue for two years, clearly leads to the inference that the plot of land was treated by respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as agricultural land. The learned Deputy Government Advocate also drew my attention to Ex. A.1 (letter dated April 17, 1936) and Ex. 1, 2 and 3 as agricultural land. The learned Deputy Government Advocate also drew my attention to Ex. A.1 (letter dated April 17, 1936) and Ex. A.11 (letter dated December 20, 1960) wherein the grantees described the land in dispute as "khudkasht". My attention was also drawn to Ex. AZ/1, which is "navishtmatmi" dated October 26, 1957, wherein respondent No. 1 Jai Kumar Atal described the land as "barani". The learned Deputy Government Advocate further drew my attention to certain dictionaries showing the meaning of the words " cl " And " vc " but they are not material in the present case, for the words used in Ex.5t are " cl vkcknku jgT;ksa ". The learned Deputy Government Advocate, on the basis of prior and subsequent conduct of the grantees in treating the land as agricultural land persuaded me to hold that the "patta" Ex.5 was for agricultural land and not for residential purposes. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported the judgement of the lower appellate court and attempted to show that the words " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksxhA " have been consistently used in the "pattas" issued by the erstwhile Jaipur State for the premises to be used for residential purposes. 8. I have heard learned Deputy Government Advocate on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and Mr. C.L. Agarwal, Advocate on behalf of the respondents and perused the record. As already pointed out above, the main question that arises for determination in this appeal is what is the meaning of the words " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksxhA " In this connection, I will first advert to Ex.12. This is a letter from the Superintendent, District Archives Office, Jaipur, dated October 23, 1962. It is addressed to the Section Officer Revenue "B" Department, Jaipur. It appears from this letter that it was sent by the Superintendent, District Archives Officer, in reply to Revenue Department's letter dated October 17, 1962. The relevant portion of this letter runs as under:- 'Sub: Acquisition of land at Jaipur belonging to Shri J.K. Atal: Kindly refer to your letter No. F.1(1) Rev. B/61 dated the 17th October, 1962, on the above noted subject. The relevant portion of this letter runs as under:- 'Sub: Acquisition of land at Jaipur belonging to Shri J.K. Atal: Kindly refer to your letter No. F.1(1) Rev. B/61 dated the 17th October, 1962, on the above noted subject. 'Abadi land' in the erstwhile Jaipur State as referred to in your letter under reference means land granted for the grantees own residential purposes only, and not for any other purpose. One form of Patta known as 'Sanad' was in vogue in the erstwhile Jaipur State for all sorts of tree gants viz. Udak, Inam, Muafi, Jagir etc. There was no separate form of Patta for Abadi land. The concluding sentences of a Patta, of course, differed in consideration of the nature of grant. In case the grant of land was meant for residential purpose, the concluding wordings ended with : " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " and in case of grants of land or village in Muafi, Jagir etc. the concluding sentence were: " j;~;i vkcknku jk[kts gkfly oktoks yhts dksbZ rjg dks uoknk jcspy djok iklh ugh " The copies of two Sanads sent under this office letter No. 853/DAO/62 dated 10.9.62 contain the facts stated above. Sd/- Superintendent."This letter is admissible in evidence under section 98 of the Evidence Act, which provides that the evidence may be given to show the meaning of illegible or not commonly intelligible characters, of foreign, obsolete, technical, local and provincial expressions, of abbreviations, and of words used in peculiar sense. The Superintendent, District Archives Office, Jaipur, must be in possession of hundreds of such "pattas", granted by His Highness of the erstwhile Jaipur State. His opinion contained in Ex.12 must be deemed to have been based on the record possessed by him. That apart, this letter is also admissible in evidence under section 35 of the Evidence Act in as much as this letter was written by the Superintendent, District Archives Office, in due performance of his official duty in reply to quarries made to him by the Revenue Department of the erstwhile Jaipur State. This letter was sent by the Superintendent, District Archives Office before the suit was instituted and it has therefore great evidentiary value in as much as there is nothing to hold that incorrect statement was made in this letter. This letter was sent by the Superintendent, District Archives Office before the suit was instituted and it has therefore great evidentiary value in as much as there is nothing to hold that incorrect statement was made in this letter. It follows from this letter that the words " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " meant that the grant of the land was made for residential purposes. 9. The plaintiffs have also produced some "pattas" granted in favour of Raja Jaswant Singh, R.B. Man Singh, and Raja Anand Singh, which are Ex. 6, Ex. 11 and Ex. 13 respectively. In all these "pattas", the same words " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " have been used. PW.6 R.B. Man Singh and PW. 8 Raja Anand Singh have appeared in the witness box and have deposed that vide "pattas" Ex.11 and Ex.13 respectively, they were granted land for residential purposes. It further appears that the land granted to Raja Anand Singh vide "pattas" Ex. 13 was acquired by the State of Rajasthan and compensation was awarded to Raja Anand Singh at the rate of Rs. 7/- per square yard. 10. The plaintiffs have also produced certain more documents wherein similar words have been used. They are Ex.14, Ex.15 and Ex.16. The first document is a sale deed in favour of Malilal Kasliwal. The second document is Ex.15 which is a "patta" granted in favour of Raja Sawaisingh Isarda. The last document Ex. 16 is a sale certificate issued in favour of Govindram by "Adalat Diwani", Jaipur City, of the erstwhile, Jaipur State. All these documents relate to premises meant for residential purposes. No such document was produced on behalf of the State of Rajasthan wherein the words " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " were used for the premises for agricultural purposes. The documents referred to above definitely lead to the inference that the expression " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " has always been used to indicate the intention of the executant that the premises mentioned therein were meant to be used for residential purposes. 11. The documents referred to above definitely lead to the inference that the expression " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " has always been used to indicate the intention of the executant that the premises mentioned therein were meant to be used for residential purposes. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents also invited my attention to certain dictionaries, namely, Manak Hindi Kosh Vrihat Hindi Sabadkosh. Wilson's Glossary and Urdu, Hindi Sabadkosh. In all these dictionaries, the word " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " has been defined as meaning " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA "Again these dictionaries further show that the words " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA " means to reside permanently. The dictionaries meaning of the words " Fks bZ /kjrh esa cl vkoknku jgT;ksa Fkkals dksbZ rjg dh cstk vM+py ugha gksrhA also leads to the conclusion that the premises were granted vide Ex.5 the disputed plot of land was granted as gift or "inam" by his HIghness Maharaja Man Singhji Bahadur of erstwhile Jaipur State to Pt. Amar Nath Atal for residential purposes. 12. Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of a contract of a grant or of any other disposition of the property, have been reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of the property or of such matter except the document itself or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained. It has been laid down in Rustomji Ardeshir Cooner v. Dhairyawan Annassahib Narandas Thakersey Mulji and others, AIR 1930 PC 165 that where the question is one purely of construction of an agreement, the subsequent conduct of the parties is wholly irrelevant. Similarly, it has been laid down in Bomanji Ardeshir Wadia and others v. Secretary of State, AIR 1929 PC 34 where parties have entered into a formal contract, that must be construed according to its own terms and not to be explained or interpreted by the antecedent communing, which laid up to it. Similarly, it has been laid down in Bomanji Ardeshir Wadia and others v. Secretary of State, AIR 1929 PC 34 where parties have entered into a formal contract, that must be construed according to its own terms and not to be explained or interpreted by the antecedent communing, which laid up to it. In my opinion, where the terms of the document are unambiguous, it is not open to the court to say that the document means something else than what it clearly says, merely because the parties have gone on for a long time understanding it differently. It is only in a case of ambiguity that the court can construe the document in a manner which justifies a long user. But where there is no ambiguity, the court will not accept an erroneous interpretation though it is consistent with usage. In the present case, the terms of the "patta" Ex.5 are plain and clear and they unequivocally denote that the land was granted for residential purposes. In such a case the subsequent or prior conduct or statements of the succeeding grantees or the conduct of their kamdar cannot be considered for the purpose of interpreting the "patta" Ex.5. That being the settled law, the various circumstances relied upon by the Deputy Government Advocate, viz. that the disputed plot of land was granted to Pt. Amarnath Atal in lieu of land in which Pt. Amarnath Atal had only tenancy rights that in Ex. A1, A11 and Ex. AZ/1, the plaintiffs cultivated the disputed land and paid land revenue cannot be pressed into service for arriving at the conclusion that the plot of land was granted to Pt. Amarnath Atal for agricultural purposes. 13. The learned Deputy Government Advocate laid considerable stress on the fact that the land in dispute was cultivated and crops were raised therein for several years. That is no doubt true, but simply because, a residential plot is used as agricultural land, its character as residential land cannot be altered by mere user as agricultural land. 14. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has next contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The suit was instituted on November 30. 1964. The new Limitation Act of 1963 came into force from January 1, 1964. 14. The learned Deputy Government Advocate has next contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The suit was instituted on November 30. 1964. The new Limitation Act of 1963 came into force from January 1, 1964. It is common ground between the parties that the present suit is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provided a longer period of limitation than Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and since the suit was instituted on November 30, 1964, section 30(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is attracted, which runs as under:- "30. Notwithstanding anything contained in that Act:- (a) any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), may be instituted within a period of five years next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier; (b) ... ... .... ... ... ... 15. The instance suit is one which falls within sub-section (a) of section 30 quoted above and it is Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which governs the suit. It runs as under:- "120. Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule. Six years When the right to sue accrues" 16. This is a residuary Article. The period of limitation prescribed by this Article is six years and the starting point of limitation is form the date the right to sue accrues. There can be no right to sue until there is accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. (See Mr. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan and others, AIR 1930 PC 270 and Annamalai Chettiar and others v. A.M. K.C.T. Muthukaruppan Chettiar and another, AIR 1931 PC 9 . 17. It may be mentioned here that the settlement proceedings in respect of disputed plot admittedly took place in October, 1958. Pt.Amar Nath Atal, the original grantee, had died on February 2, 1957. Though by the time settlement proceedings started, Pt. 17. It may be mentioned here that the settlement proceedings in respect of disputed plot admittedly took place in October, 1958. Pt.Amar Nath Atal, the original grantee, had died on February 2, 1957. Though by the time settlement proceedings started, Pt. Amar Nath Atal had expired, still the Assistant Settlement Officer, who probably had no knowledge about the death of Pt. Amar Nath Atal as well as of the "inam grant" Ex.5, issued "parcha lagan" in favour of Pt. Amar Nath Atal on October 10, 1958. That clearly leads to the inference that the Assistant Settlement Officer took the decision of treating the land in dispute as an agricultural land at the back of the sons of Pt. Amar Nath Atal as well as in ignorance of "patta" Ex.5. When respondent No. 1, one of the sons of Pt. Amar Nath Atal came to know about the issue of "parcha lagan" by the settlement department, he wrote a letter to the Chief Minister of Rajasthan for getting the settlement entry corrected and in this letter, proceedings were started by the State of Rajasthan and the matter was referred to a Committee consisting of Pt. Devi Shanker, Chairman, Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur, Shri Altaf Ahmed Kherie, Officer-on-Special Duty for Revenue Legislation and the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Revenue Department. The first two members of the Committee, vide Ex. 9 date December 18, 1961, reported to the Government that the land in dispute was Abadi land. The third member D.W.3 Shanbhu Dayal, however, did not agree with the majority view and reported to the Government that the land in dispute was granted as agricultural land. It appears that ultimately the Government took the view on March 26, 1964 that the land was agricultural land. Meanwhile on December 22, 1960, an application was filed in the court of Sub Divisional Officer, Jaipur, by respondents No. 1 to 3 for correction of the settlement record, but that application was dismissed because by that time, the settlement proceedings had come to an end. The sons of Pt. Amar Nath Atal and the transferee respondent No.4, to whom the land was transferred on July 14, 1962, then filed the present suit for declaration that the disputed plot of land granted to Pt. The sons of Pt. Amar Nath Atal and the transferee respondent No.4, to whom the land was transferred on July 14, 1962, then filed the present suit for declaration that the disputed plot of land granted to Pt. Amarnath Atal vide Ex.5 was for residential purposes and the settlement entry regarding the disputed land as agricultural land is incorrect and liable to be declared null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs. All these facts indicate that when true facts came to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, they immediately rushed to the appropriate authorities for correction of the settlement entries. 18. From the circumstances narrated above, it cannot be said that the right to sue accrued to the plaintiffs before October 10, 1958, on which date, "parcha lagan" was issued by the Settlement Department. It is admitted that if the period of limitation of six years is counted from October 10, 1960, the suit is within time after giving credit of two month's period of notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code. There is thus no substance in the contention of the Deputy Government Advocate that the suit is barred by time. 19. It has been next argued by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that the suit was triable by a revenue court as it related to agricultural land. This argument is unsustainable in view of the finding arrived at by me that the land in dispute is "Abadi" land. 20. Lastly, the learned Deputy Government Advocate drew my attention to certain notification issued by the erstwhile State of Jaipur prohibiting transfer of land granted as "inam" and situated in Jaipur without the sanction of the Government. This point was not raised in the courts below or in the memorandum of appeal presented in this Court. This point cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage as it involves questions of fact. Firstly, that the transfer in favour of respondent No. 4 was made without the sanction of the Government and secondly, that the land in dispute is situated within the boundaries of Jaipur. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. 22. Learned Deputy Government Advocate prays for leave to appeal to a Division Bench, which is refused. *******