JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - These three special appeals are directed against a common judgment of a learned Single Judge of this court disposing of four writ petitions filed by the appellant against four of its tenants. 2. The points involved in the three special appeals being common, they are being disclosed of this common judgment. 3. The facts leading to these appeals can briefly be stated as under :- The appellant is a charitable trust constituted under a deed of endowment executed by one Sri Sohan Lal on 1st of April /13th May, 1926. In pursuance of the provisions of the deed of endowment, the trustees constructed a Dharamshala with the object of providing lodging and shelter to Hindus visiting temporarily the town of Unnao. It was also provided in the deed of endowment that the building of the Dharamshala shall also include shops to be let out on rent. The respondent No. 2 in special appeal No. 213 of 1975 was tenant of shop No. 43, the respondent nos. 2 & 3 in special appeal No. 214 of 1975 were tenants in shop No. 49 and respondent No. 2 in special appeal No. 215 of 1975 was tenant of shop No. 42 situate in the said Dharamashala. On 30th August, 1966 a resolution was passed by the Board of Trustees to the effect that the aforesaid shops, and one more shop No. 47 under the tenancy of Smt. Sheorani Shukla, were needed for providing further accommodation to the Yatris by converting them into residential rooms. By the same resolution, the Manager of the Dharamshala was authorised to take legal steps to get these four shops vacated from the tenants. Accordingly, the appellant filed four applications against the tenants of the aforesaid shop; under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be called 'the Act,) The applications were resisted by the tenants and it was pleaded by them that the need of the petitioner was not genuine while their need was of a pressing nature, The Rent Control and Eviction officer allowed the applications through his order dated 16th June 1969. The tenants then filed revisions before the commissioner which too were dismissed on 6th May, 1971. The tenants then filed revisions before the commissioner which too were dismissed on 6th May, 1971. Thereafter, the tenant: filed petitions under section 7-F of the Act before the State Government, and the latter by a common order dated July 19, 1972, allowed the petitions, set aside the order of the commissioner and that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, and rejected the petitioner's application under section 3 of the Act. Against that common order of the state Government, the appellant filed four writ petitions in this court. The learned single judge, however, found the petitions devoid of substance and accordingly dismissed them. Against the order of the learned single judge, the appellant filed special appeals. The present three appeals being ripe have come up for hearing before us. 4. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before us was that the avowed object of the trust was to provide accommodation for the stay of travellers visiting Unnao and, pressure of travellers having increased, addition) accommodation was required for fulfilling the object of the trust, viz., providing accommodation to the travellers coming to the town. It was urged by the learned counsel that the learned single judge has committed on error. in holding that 'the need for additional residential accommodation may be a need of the Tatris visiting Unnao but it can only be called a pressing need of the trust itself'. We have perused the English version of the trust deed, which, is on file. Paragraph 4 thereof states as follows : "the Committee shall he entrusted with the management and collection of rents of all the in tending building, viz., shops and upper storeys which will be meant for dwelling purposes and all "the monies accruing from rent shall be applied over the repairs and maintenance of the Dharamshala and whatever is left unspent shall be kept in any safe custody fort he benefit of the Dharamshala" 5. The opening part of paragraph 5 and sub-paragraph (d) read as follows. "(5) That besides the other powers herein vested in the Managing committee, the following obligations are attached to the said committee. (d) Letting out on rent the Dharamshala building which is meant for rent and realising rent and getting it vacated according to the necessity." 6. The opening part of paragraph 5 and sub-paragraph (d) read as follows. "(5) That besides the other powers herein vested in the Managing committee, the following obligations are attached to the said committee. (d) Letting out on rent the Dharamshala building which is meant for rent and realising rent and getting it vacated according to the necessity." 6. From the above, it would appear that while the primary object of the Dharamshala no doubt was to provide shelter to the travellers visiting Unnao, it was also an essential part of the endowment that part of the building constructed thereunder shall consist of shops which shall be rented out so that the income accruing from the shops could be utilised in incurring expenditure for the maintenance of the Dharamshala. It (does not appear on a perusal of the deed of endowment that the trustees were given any option to alter that part of the scheme viz., to convert that part of the building which was intended tinder the endowment to consist of shops, into residential accommodation for the travellers. And that was logical too, for, unless some source of income is created for its maintenance, such an endowment cannot exist for long. In that view of the matter, it does not appear that the aforesaid observation contained in the judgment of the learned single judge was wholly unfounded. The number of travellers visiting the town of Unnao may grow immensely in number with its industrial development. It cannot, however be expected that the Dharamshala constructed under the endowment can cater to the needs of all those travellers and for all time. Even the conversion of all the shops into residential accommodation may at a particular point of time run short. The existence of shops, on the other hand, is a matter of necessity for the Dharamshala, for if they do not exist, there may be no source of income for the maintenance of the Dharamshala. The conversion of shops into residential accommodation for the visitors in that light cannot be in the interest of the Dharamshala, and, looked at from that angle, it may constitute a proper and pressing need of the trust. 7. The conversion of shops into residential accommodation for the visitors in that light cannot be in the interest of the Dharamshala, and, looked at from that angle, it may constitute a proper and pressing need of the trust. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to the last portion of sub- paragraph (d) of paragraph 5 in order to contend that, under the deed itself, the trustees had a right to get the shops vacated according to the necessity. Learned counsel urged that the necessity referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 5 means the necessity for enlarging the, accommodation for the visiting travellers. We are, however, unable to agree with the learned counsel on that point. All that it means is that if the trustees find it necessary to get the shop vacated from a particular tenant, they may do so. It certainly does not mean that after getting the shop vacated, the trustees may change the character thereof from rental accommodation to a dwelling accommodation. 8. Learned counsel then contended that the decision of the State Government stands vitiated because the Government did not have the full file before it. It was urged that, in the absence of complete file, there could be no application of mind on the part of the Government to the matters involved and, consequently, the order passed by the State Government was not a valid order. It was stressed that the learned Single Judge committed an error in not attaching any weight to that contention raised on behalf of the appellant. We are once again unable to agree. The order passed by the State Government mentions that the Government had the complete file before it. According to the learned counsel for the appellant also, it were only some registers which were not before the Government at the time of deciding the application under section 7-F. We, however find that part of the relevant material contained in those registers had been incorporated in the revision petitions filed by the respondent, and part of it in the counter affidavit filed by the appellant in reply to these revision petitions. Therefore, whether or not the registers were before the State Government, the relevant matter contained in those registers was available to the Government. Therefore, whether or not the registers were before the State Government, the relevant matter contained in those registers was available to the Government. No infirmity can, therefore, attach to the order of the State Government for the reason that the State Government did not have those registers while deciding the revisions. 9. Learned counsel lastly contended that the Government misread the evidence on record which shows that the Government did not apply its mind to the case and gave its decision in a mechanical manner. It was also urged by learned counsel that this contention was also raised by him before the learned Single Judge, but he has disposed of in a summary manner. In view of the stress that was laid on this argument we may deal with it in some detail. 10. Learned counsel invited our attention in connection with the above argument to five statements of fact occurring in the order of the State Government which, according to him, are based on misreading of evidence. They are - (1) Jin kamron men log rahte paye gave we kirayedar the. (2) Dharamshala kaupri bhag jo rihayash ke liye upykta hai kai kiridaron ko uthodiya gaya hai. (3) Avlekh se yeh bhi pata chlata hai ki yatriyon ke aane ki sankhya dhirey dhirey ghatti jaa rahi hai. (4) Vivad grah tha asthan ke sameep hi ab do our dharmshala ban gaye hain. (5) Kirayedaron ke pass jo onyatra dukaane batai gain hain, vivadgra as tha as thano se kaafi door hain our gali men hain to tha mukhy baazar men bhi nahin hain. 11. Taking up the statements of facts mentioned at Nos. 1 and 2 above, we find on a perusal of the commissioner's report that on the first floor of the Dharamshala he found a family in one of the big rooms and it was represented on behalf of the respondents that it was the family of Shyam Sunder Lal, who was living in that room since eight months. On behalf of the appellants it was urged that he was a temporary visitor like other travellers. A child belonging to that family, on inquiry by the commissioner, gave out his father's name as Shyam Sunder Lal. On behalf of the appellants it was urged that he was a temporary visitor like other travellers. A child belonging to that family, on inquiry by the commissioner, gave out his father's name as Shyam Sunder Lal. When Shri Om Prakash Agarwal entered the witness-box on behalf of the appellants, he was questioned on that point and he avoided to give any information by saying that he did not know if Sri Shyam Sunder Lal, Supply Inspector, was living in the Dharamshala with his family. It appears that on the basis of this material the Government inferred that Sri Shyam Sunder Lal was a tenant in the Dharamshala. Further, Sri Ong Prakash Agarwal also admitted that the portion on the first floor of Dharamshala which faced the road had been rented out. 12. In the context of what has been stated above, it cannot be said that the statements of fact, mentioned at Nos. 1 and 2 above were based on misreading of facts. On the other hand, it appears that the Government took into consideration material on record and drew its own inferences from them. 13. The statement of fact mentioned at No. 3 also does not appear to us to be based on any misreading of evidence. In Para 10 of the application tinder section 7-F of the Act the respondent gave figures of the travellers who stayed in the Dharamshala during the years from 1959 to 1967. It shows that between 1951 and 1959 the number of travellers staying in the dharamshala was over 14000 each year. In 1960 the number was 13499. In 1961 it was 13414 and between 1961 and 1966 it never touched the figure of 13000. The appellant filed a counter-affidavit in reply to the revision application and the figures given in the counter affidavit for the years from 1951 to 1966 tally with the figures given by the respondent. It has, been further shown by the appellant that since the year 1968 there was again increase in the number of travellers. It could not, however, be ignored that, according to the admission contained in the statement of Sri Om Prakash Agarwal, litigation for vacation of two of the disputed shops had started since the year 1966. The applications, out of which the present appeals have arisen, were moved in April 1968. It could not, however, be ignored that, according to the admission contained in the statement of Sri Om Prakash Agarwal, litigation for vacation of two of the disputed shops had started since the year 1966. The applications, out of which the present appeals have arisen, were moved in April 1968. It appears that the Government did not for that reason take into consideration the figures of the years 1967 and onwards. Taking the figures of the previous years into account, it certainly appears that the number of travellers staying in the Dharamshala had declined during the years 1961 to 1966. The impugned statement of fact occurring in the order passed by the State Government cannot, be said to be based on a misreading of evidence. 14. Taking up the statement of fact mentioned at serial No. 4 earlier, it was stated in para 19 of the ground of revision, submitted to the State Government, that two more Dharamshalas had been constructed in Unnao. In para 10 of' he counter-affidavit filed by the appellant, in the revision proceedings pending before the Government, the appellant also admitted that fact. There is also a mention of the fact two more dharamshala had been constructed in Unnao, in the order of the Commissioner. Therefore, the impugned statement of fact, in so far as it refers to the construction of two more dharamshalas at Unnao, is consistent with the appellant's own counter-affidavit. All that can be said is that there was no material on record to indicate that those to dharamshala had been constructed in the vicinity of the dharamshalas in which disputed shops existed. Accepting that it is based on some misreading of the evidence, it is of a very minor nature and nothing can turn on it. 15. This takes us to the last statement of fact referred to by learned counsel for the appellant and mentioned at serial No. 5 earlier. There appears some substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that this particular statement of fact is not wholly consistent with the material on record. In fact what the respondents tried to show in their deposition was that the shops constructed by them did not exist at a place where they could fetch a good market. The misreading occurring in this statement of fact, is also however, of very minor nature. 16. In fact what the respondents tried to show in their deposition was that the shops constructed by them did not exist at a place where they could fetch a good market. The misreading occurring in this statement of fact, is also however, of very minor nature. 16. We thus agree with the learned single judge that the misstatement occurring in the order of State Government are of a very minor nature and that broadly stated the finding of the State Government are well supported by the facts on record. 17. In the result, therefore, we find that these appeals have no substance. 18. The appeals accordingly fail and are hereby dismissed with costs.