( 1 ) THESE seven petitions have come up before us as a result of a reference by a learned Single Judge and can be disposed of by a common order as the questions of law and fact arising are common to all of them. In the course of the hearing, M/s. V. L. Narasimha, Murthy and H. K. Vasudeva reddy, learned Advocates, were also permitted to intervene on behalf of some petitioners in other similar matters, which however, had not been referred to a Division Bench for disposal. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY, the facts leading up to these petitions are as follows:- the petitioners in all these petitions are dealers in various commodities witftn the limits of the Corporation of the City of Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as 'corporation') and, therefore, subject to the Octroi Bye-laws framed by the Corporation in accordance with the City of Bangalore municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (hereafter referred to as the 'act' ). Till 8-1-1875 the Corporation was being administered by a duly constituted body of elected representatives and the several standing committees. Since the said body of elected representatives could not be re-constituted before the expiry of the term of the previous body, with effect from 9-1-1975, the Corporation was placed in charge of a sole functionary called the administrator duly appointed in accordance with S. 47b of the Act. ( 3 ) DURING the tenure of the last council of elected representatives, a decision was taken on 20-7-1974 to propose levy of octroi on certain additional commodities and the same was duly published calling for objections in accordance with S. 98 (1) cf the Act. Objections were received in response thereto. Thereafter the council of the Corporation passed a resolution imposing octroi levy oh such additional commodities with effect from 7-2-1975 and duly published a notification in that behalf on 31-12-1974. This notification was challenged on several grounds in W. P. No. 371 of 1975 and other connected petitions, successfully. But this Court struck down the notification on a short ground that the consideration bestowed on the objections concerned, in the light of the facts and circumstances present at the time, was not in accordance with the provisions of S. 98 (1) of the act and that the same had to be real and not merely an empty formality. But this Court struck down the notification on a short ground that the consideration bestowed on the objections concerned, in the light of the facts and circumstances present at the time, was not in accordance with the provisions of S. 98 (1) of the act and that the same had to be real and not merely an empty formality. ( 4 ) SOON thereafter, the Administrator of the Corporation purported to consider the objections and published a final notification, imposing the levy with effect from 6-3-1975, in the Gazette dated 4-3-1975. It is this notificason that is Under challenge in the present Petitions. We shall advert to the relevant pleas of the parties in the course of the consideration of the contentions raised before us. ( 5 ) BEFORE adverting to the contentions, it would be convenient to set tout the relevant provisions of the Act which bear on them:-"38. Saving o/ validity of proceedings.- (1) No act done, or proceeding taken under this Act shall be questioned merely on the ground- (a) of any vacancy or defect in the constitution of the Corporation or of any standing committee, or (b) of any defect or irregularity in such act or proceeding, nor affecting the merits of the case. (2) ** ** ** ** "47-B Power to appoint Administrator in certain cases.- (1) Whenever- (2) Not-withstanding anything contained in this! Act, on the appointment of an Administrator under sub-sec. (1), during the penod of such appointment, the Corporation, the Standing Committees of the corporation and the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor and other authorities (other than the Commissioner), charged with carrying on the provisions of this act or any other law, shall cease to exercise any powers and perform and discharge any duties or functions conferred or imposed on them by or under this Act or any other law, and all such powers shall be exercised and all such duties and functions shall be performed and discharged by the Administrator. (2a) The provisions of sub-sections 2 (A), 2 (B), and 2 (C) of section 47a shall mutatis mutandis be applicable in respect of the administrator appointed under Sub-Section (1)". (rest not set out as unnecessary)"97. Enumeration of Taxes and duties- The Corporation may levy- (a) a property tax, (b) a profession tax,. (2a) The provisions of sub-sections 2 (A), 2 (B), and 2 (C) of section 47a shall mutatis mutandis be applicable in respect of the administrator appointed under Sub-Section (1)". (rest not set out as unnecessary)"97. Enumeration of Taxes and duties- The Corporation may levy- (a) a property tax, (b) a profession tax,. (c) a tax on carriages and animals, (d) a tax on carts, (e) on octro, on animals or goods or both brought within the octroi limits for consumption or use therein, and may, with the previous sanction of the Government, levy (f) a toll on vehicles other than /motor vehicles paying vehicles tax under the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation and Tolls Act 1951 (Act XII of 1951) entering the Corporation limits; (g) a tax on advertisements, (h) a duty on certain transfers of property in the shape of an additional stamp duty. ""98. Powers of control of Government - (1) Before the Corporation passes any resolution imposing a ,tax or duty lor the first' time it shall direct the Commissioner to publish a notice in the Official Gazette and in the local newspapers of its intention and fix a reasonable period not being less than one month from the date of publication of such notice in the Official Gazette for submission, of objections. The Corporation may, after considering the objections, if any, received within the period specified, determine by resolutionb to levy the tax or duty. Such resolution shall specify the rate at which;; the date from which and the period of levy, if any, for which such tax or ditty shall be levied. (2) When the Corporation shall have determined to levy any tax or duty for the first time or at a new rate, the Commissioner shall forthwith publish a notice in the manner laid down in subsection (1) specifying the date from which, the rate at which and the period of levy, if any, for which such tax or duty shall be levied. (rest not set out as unnecessary ). 130. Octroi.-If the Corporation by a resolution determines that an octroi should be levied on animals or goods brought within the octroi limits of the city, such octroi shall be levied on such articles or goods specified in Part 7 of Schedule III at such rates not exceeding those laid down in the said Part in such manner as may be determined by the corporation. ""schedule III paet V octroi on Animals and Goods (See Seciion 87, Clause (e) and Section 130) 18. The Octroi on animals and goods shall be levied at the rate not exceeding the following:- class I .- octroi maximum rate Rs. a. p. **. ** class VI.- Piece goods and other textile fabrics and manufactured articles of clothing and dress 0 0 3 Per rupeesed valorem class VII.- Metals 1 9 0 percent ad valorem class VIII. Other articles which are not specified above and which may be approved by the Corporation by an order in this behalf. (underlining (italics) is ours ). 2 0 0 percent ad valorem ( 6 ) THE several contentions urged on behalf ot the petitioners briefly outlined, are : (i) The power conferred. on the Corporation under Class Vllt of sch. III of Part V of the Act hereafter referred to as 'schedule', is arbitrary and unguided and, therefore,. (underlining (italics) is ours ). 2 0 0 percent ad valorem ( 6 ) THE several contentions urged on behalf ot the petitioners briefly outlined, are : (i) The power conferred. on the Corporation under Class Vllt of sch. III of Part V of the Act hereafter referred to as 'schedule', is arbitrary and unguided and, therefore,. amounts to excessive delegation of (ii) the notification offends the provisions of Part XIIof the Constnrelating to free trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of india; (iii) Item like 'metals' occurring in Class VII of the Schedule cannot be construed as comprising of articles manufactured out of metals of alloys cf metals, but musl- be strictly construed and limited to metals in their pure and unalloyed form; (iv) The powers conferred on the Administrator under S. 47b of the act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation as an individual like him cannot he vested with, the powers normally exercised by a body of elected representatives; (V) the imupugned notification levying octroi is ultra vires in that: (a) the objections received in regard to the notification proposing to lew octroi have not been considered in due compliance with the provisions of S. 98 (1) of the Act which are mandatory; (b) the final notification levying octroi must be based on or emanate from such Sections and cannot alter or change other-wise the originally notified proposal except as regards some incidental and ancillary matters; (c) the lew must be based on the needs of the Corporation to increase the revenue for purposes which ought in some manner be reflected in the budgetary estimates prepared by it for the year or years concerned; (d) the rates of lew cannot be enhanced subsequent to the notification signifying the intention to levy octroi published for the purpose of inviting objections; (e) several of the entries in the final notification have been so drastically altered that they amount to fresh items which were not within the ken cf the first published proposal and in the absence of an opportunity to. the public concerned to state their objections, the levy cannot be said to have been made in due compliance with the provisions of S. 98 of the Act. ( 7 ) WE shall now proceed to consider these contentions in the order set out above. the public concerned to state their objections, the levy cannot be said to have been made in due compliance with the provisions of S. 98 of the Act. ( 7 ) WE shall now proceed to consider these contentions in the order set out above. ( 8 ) IN our opinion, the first two of the above contentions have to be answered against the petitioners as they are no longer res integra in view of certain decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 9 ) IN Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, AIR, 1962 SC. 563 and 1263, the Supreme court was concerned with certain questions arising from the levy of octroi on goods under the provisions cf the very Act with which we are concerned herein and the octroi Bye-laws framed thereunder. This case was dealt with both by Constitution and Div'sicn Benches and the rerorts of the decisions thereon occur in air 1962 SC at pages 563 end 1263 respectively. ( 10 ) THE Constitution Bench (vide AIR 1962 SC 562 ) held that the impugned octoi duty did not contravene Arts. 276 and 301 of the Constn as the Bye-laws concerned were not new regulations made after ths toming into force cf the Constitution, thus requiring compliance with the provisions of Part XII thereof, and the same had been framed pursuant to the clear specification, as to the articles to be so taxed, in the Act itself, the relevant enunciation reads : (9) Therefore the answer to the first question referred is that the impugned octroi duty does not contravene the provision of Articles 276 and 301. ( 11 ) TURNING to the decision of the Division Bench (vide AIR 1962 sc 1263 ), while rejecting a contention relative to excessive delegation of legislative power in the context of Class VIII of tart V Sch. III to the Act (earlier reproduced) it was observed thus : the excessive nature of delegation under Class VIII in Part V of sch. III was also urged but this was not a question which was raised in the High Court nor is there any substance in the matter. III to the Act (earlier reproduced) it was observed thus : the excessive nature of delegation under Class VIII in Part V of sch. III was also urged but this was not a question which was raised in the High Court nor is there any substance in the matter. The argument raised was that the power of the Municipal Corporation to specify goods under Class VIII was excessive delegation which was both uncanalised and uncontrolled and reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 554 ) but that case has no application to the facts of the present case. In the present case the Legislature has laid down the powers of the municipality to tax various goods. It has enumerated certain articled and animals and Class VIII read with S. 97 (e) of the Act has authorised the Municipality to impose tax on other articles and goods. This power is more in the nature of conditional delegation as was held in Baxter v. Ah Way ( (1909) 8 CLR 626) where it was held that that under S. 52 (g) of the (Australian) Customs Act, 1901, a power given to prohibit by proclamation the importation of certain article was not a delegation of legislative power but conditional legislation because the prohibition of importation was a legislative act of Parliament itself and the effect of sub-sec (g) of S. 52 was only to confer upon the Governor-General in Council, the discretion to determine to which class of goods other than those specified in the section and under what conditions the prohibition shall apply. All that the legislature has done in the present case is that it has speeded certain articles on which octroi duty can be imposed and it has also given to the municipal Corporation the discretion to determine on what other goods and under what conditions the tax should be levied. That, in our opinion, is not a case which falls under the rule laid dawn by this court in AIR 1960 SC 554 . (Underlining italics by Court ). ( 12 ) THE next contention relates to the scope and ambit of the expresssion 'metals' occurring in Class VII of the Schedule and whether it would comprehend articles manufactured out of such 'metals', either singly or in combination of several such metals commonly known as alloys. (Underlining italics by Court ). ( 12 ) THE next contention relates to the scope and ambit of the expresssion 'metals' occurring in Class VII of the Schedule and whether it would comprehend articles manufactured out of such 'metals', either singly or in combination of several such metals commonly known as alloys. The argument is that the levy must be confined strictly to 'metals' and metals only, as the provision is a taxation measure and no liability can be imposed on a subject by implication in the absence of express language to that effect in the statute. It seems clear that the purpose of the Schedule it the Act is only to fix the maximum rates-of levy in regard to octroiable articles subject to the fulfilment of conditions prescribed in S. 97 of the Act thus laying down the legislative policy. That this is so can be seen from the preamble of the Schedule which reads: the octroi on animals and goods shall be levied at the rate not exceeding the following:- this is in the nature of 'a' "limitation imposed on the Corporation while exercising its taxing power in this behalf. The Legislature for that purpose has merely classified the articles and specified the same under broad headings and no attempt has been made by it to make it exhaustive by a detailed enumeration, as the choice of articles for the purpose of me levy has been plainly left to the discretion of the Corporation. That such a conclusion is clearly supportable is manifest by the very general nature of the language employed in Class VIII of the same Schedule, which has the effect of taking in all the articles as would fall within S 97 (e) of the act, which enables the levy of octroi, as has been observed by the Supreme court in the case of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd (1 ). The relevant passage runs thus :". . . . . We are unable to accept this distinction because even though the words used in the present statute are different, the combined affect of Ss. 97 and 130 and Part V of Sch. III including Class VIII which ' have been set out above is that the words are of very general nature and would have the same effect as if all articles were intended to be and were included. 97 and 130 and Part V of Sch. III including Class VIII which ' have been set out above is that the words are of very general nature and would have the same effect as if all articles were intended to be and were included. In view of this it is unnecessary to discuss the second contention. " (Emphasis italics supplied ). ( 13 ) IN this view, the expression in question must be understood in its widest scope and ambit. In this context, it is important to note that the schedule is not by itself creating any charge to tax, as the same is done by S. 97 (e) of the Act and the resolution of that Corporation made in accordance with the provisions of that Act. It, therefore, follows that the Schedule although it has reference to a taxation measure, cannot be construed in the manner suggested on behalf of the petitioners. We are, therefore, unable to agree with this contention of the petitioners. It also seems to us to be devoid of substance for another reason. It is that even on the assumption that the expression 'metals' must be given a narrower and restricted meaning as suggested, any article manufactured out of 'metals' could be brought within the residuary entry designated as Class VIII in the Schedule. The position is the same in regard to the other entries therein. This contention, therefore, must fail. ( 14 ) WE now pass on to the next contention relative to the ultra vires character of the power conferred by S. 47b (2) of the Act on an Administrator appointed when the term of office of the elected Councillors has expired and a new Corporation could not be constituted, as envisaged in s. 47b (1) (c) of that Act. The argument in short is that although the vesting of powers of taxation in a delegate like the Corporation is generally justifiable on the ground that the elected representatives are expected to be responsible to the public, that is the voters, and, therefore, would not act in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, the same cannot be said to be true ot an Administrator who is not elected but only nominated by the govt. Therefore, making an Administrator the sole repository of the power to tax amounts to excessive delegation. So runs the contention. Therefore, making an Administrator the sole repository of the power to tax amounts to excessive delegation. So runs the contention. ( 15 ) SUPPORT for this submission was sought to be derived from certain observations ef the Supreme Court in the case of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birala Cotton, spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi ,. AIB. 1968 SC, 1232 no doubt, it has been laid down therein that one of the checks against arbitrary exercise of the power to tax conferred on a delegate like a local body, is that it can only act through elected representatives, as observed in the following passage :" The first circumstance which must be taken into account in this connection is that the delegation has been made to an elected body responsible to the people including those who pay taxes. The Councillors have to go for election every four years. This means that if they have behaved unreasonably and the inhabitants of the area so consider it they can be thrown out at the ensuing elections. This is in our opinion a great check on the elected Councillors acting unreasonably and fixing unreasonable rates of taxation. This is a democratic method of bringing to book the elected representatives who act an-resonably in such matters. " ( 16 ) IT seems to us, that from this observation, it does not follow that under no circumstances can such power be delegated on any individual or an authority which is not an elected body, in the absence of any statutory mhbton in that behalf, and this is especially so when the Legislature has dearly laid down the policy and the guiding principles which ought to govern the exercise of such power as in the present Act. Support for such a view can be found in certain observations of the Supreme Court in the rase of Gwalior Raven Mills Mfq (Wvq) Co Ltd v. Asst Commr of Sales tar,air. 1074 SC. 1660 In that case, Mathew, J has observed in para 58 of the aforementioned report thus :"it is not clear what difference does it make in principle by saving that s'nce the delegation is to the represenative body that world be a guarantee that the delegate will not exercise the power unreasonably. 1074 SC. 1660 In that case, Mathew, J has observed in para 58 of the aforementioned report thus :"it is not clear what difference does it make in principle by saving that s'nce the delegation is to the represenative body that world be a guarantee that the delegate will not exercise the power unreasonably. for, if ex hypothesi the legislature must perform the essential legislative function, it is certainly no consolation that the body to which the function has been delegated has a representative character. In other words, if no guidance is provided or policy laid down, the fact that the delegate has a representative character could make no difierence in principle. " ( 17 ) A reference to another observation in the same judgment may net be out of place in the present context. Khanna, J in defining the concept of delegation, has observed, at para 37 of the report, thus :" In this context it is necessary to have a clear idea of the concept of deligation. Delegation is not the complete handing over or transference of a power from one person or body of persons: to another. Deegation may be defined as the entrusting, by a person or body of persons, of the exercise of a power residing in that person or body of persons, to another Person or body of persons, with complete power to revocation or amendment remaining in the grantor or delegator. It is important to grasp the implications of this, for, much confusion of thought has unfortunately resulted from assuming that delegation involves, or may involve, the complete abdication or abrogation of a power. This is precluded by the definition. " ( 18 ) IN the light of the above discussion,. we do not find it possible to accept the aforesaid contention urged by the petitioner's Counsel. Henes the same is rejected. ( 19 ) 'we now. pass on to the last contention. It relates to the validity of the impugned final notification levying octroi. This contention consists of seveal facets, as set out earlier. We propose to consider each of them seiatim. ( 20 ) THE first contention is concerned with the manner of consideration of the objections received in response to the proposal to levy octroi pursuant to. S. 98. of the Act. This contention consists of seveal facets, as set out earlier. We propose to consider each of them seiatim. ( 20 ) THE first contention is concerned with the manner of consideration of the objections received in response to the proposal to levy octroi pursuant to. S. 98. of the Act. The specific argument urged is that having regard to the several attendant circumstances, it would be seen that there is clear evidence of want pf application of mind by the authority concerned to the several objections recerved by it. The circumstances on which much reliance was placed1 in support of such a submission may be briefly summarised as follows: (1) That the records called for would disclose that ps many as 3074- objections have been shown as having been considered within a space of 3 or 4 days, soon after the order of this Court made on 26-2-1975 in the earlier writ petition, whereby the previous notification had been struck down. This cannot be accepted as reasonably or humanly possible. (2) That the final notification impugned herein does not correspond to the earlier notification inviting objections in that the number of entries have been reduced and even the specification of classes in accordance with the Schedule to the Act have been altered and many items which properly belong to one class have been shown to belong to another. Furthermore, many of the items have been added to or curtailed in a drastic manner. ( 21 ) WE are unable to accept the above contention as sound. It is no doubt true that 3074 objections had been received as contended. On a perusal of the record, which was made available by the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation, it is seen that nearly 3,000 of them were merely cyclostyled objections being more or less, duplicates of the rema'n ing 74 objections. In this state of affairs, it was sufficient for the Corporation to have considered those 74 objections only. It is further seen that by 27-2-1975 a tabulated summary of such objections had been prepared by the office of the Corporation for the consideration and orders of the Administrator, who was to have exercised the powers of the Corporation under S. 47b (2) in accordance with the requirements of S. 98 of the Act. It is further seen that by 27-2-1975 a tabulated summary of such objections had been prepared by the office of the Corporation for the consideration and orders of the Administrator, who was to have exercised the powers of the Corporation under S. 47b (2) in accordance with the requirements of S. 98 of the Act. The record discloses that the Administrator had examined such objection: and passed orders in regard to each of the objections individually to the best of his judgment and discretion before the passing cf the necessary final resolution levying octroi. In this state of things, if the Administrator has been able to dispose of them in a few days, it is not at all reasonable to conclude that he had done something which was humanly impossible. The administrator has also filed an affidavit refuting the allegations months behalf and we see no reason to disbelieve or reject the same. On the while, we are quite satisfied that the provisions of S. 98 (1) relating to consideration of objections have been substantially complied with by the Administrator. Therefore, the contention based on non-application of mind must fail. ( 22 ) THE next facet of this contention relates essentially to the total recasting of the earlier proposal as embodied in the impugned notification. It is true that the impugned notification has altered the arrangement of the articles in the earlier proposal and rearranged and regrouped them, and in doing so it has disturbed the classification so much so it has failed to correspond with the classification made in the Schedule, or the earlier proposal inviting objections. But such changes, in our view, do not militate against the validity of the notification concerned, so long as no totally new articles are sought to be brought within the net of taxation. As we have noticed earlier, the primary object of the Schedule is to fix the ceiling on rates leviable on the articles specified therein. The classification made therein is only for the sake of convenience. Therefore, if certain articles have been shifted from one class to another, it is not of any consequence at all so long as it is attributable to one or the other of the classes mentioned in the Schedule. In our opinion, from these circumstances no inference of non-application of mind can be readily drawn. Therefore, if certain articles have been shifted from one class to another, it is not of any consequence at all so long as it is attributable to one or the other of the classes mentioned in the Schedule. In our opinion, from these circumstances no inference of non-application of mind can be readily drawn. On the other hand, these circumstances would in a way indicate that there has been "application of mind by the authority concerned. This contention, therefore, must fail. . ( 23 ) THE next contention is that any alterations that may be made in the final notification must be based on the objections, received, except as to matters of an incidental and ancillary nature. No warrant for such a submission could be found in the statutory provision concerned therewith. The relevant provision in S. 98 of the Act provides that 'the Corporation may, after considering the objections, if any, received within the period specified, determine by resolution to levy the tax or duty'. From this it would not follow that the Corporation was bound to accept the objections or that no changes could be made unless the same were based on such objections. It seems clear from the provisions of S. 98 (1) of the Act that the same have been intended to provide for a machinery merely to consult the wishes of these that might be affected by the intended impositions and nothing more. By this we do not mean to lay down that such objections ought not to be reasonably or properly considered. This is quite different from saying that such objections alone ought to form the basis for any changes to be effected in the ultimate resolution imposing the tax. Hence this contention too must fail. ( 24 ) IN regard to the next point, it was contended that there was no need at all for this additional levy, as could be gathered from the budgetary proposals for the year 1973-74. To examine this contention, we shall assume, without deciding, that such need must be reflected in any such budget of the Corporation. The argument is that there is no specific reference in such budget to any projects or other developmental plans requiring additional funds, presented on behalf of the respondent-Coporation. To examine this contention, we shall assume, without deciding, that such need must be reflected in any such budget of the Corporation. The argument is that there is no specific reference in such budget to any projects or other developmental plans requiring additional funds, presented on behalf of the respondent-Coporation. A copy of the budget for the year 1974-75 has been brought to our notice wherein it is seen that the Corporation had to meet a substantial enhanced demand towards water rates levied by the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage board, to mention only one item by way of example. In our opinion, in this context, it is the budget of the year 1974-75 that becomes relevant. This contention, has therefore, to be rejected. ( 25 ) THE next contention is that the rates of levy specified in the earlier proposal cannot be enhanced by means of the final notification, without an opportunity being afforded to those that might be affected thereby, to state their objections in accordance with the provisions of S. 98 (1) of the Act. We are not persuaded to agree with this submission. The provision in Sec 98 (1) relevant in this context states that on the Corporation deciding by a resolution to levy tax or duty for the first time, it shall cause a. notice to be published in the official Gazette and newspapers of it's intention to that effect S. 98 (1) further provides that the final resolution to. levy such tax or duty, passed after the consideration of the objections received, should specify 'the rate at which such tax or duty is to be levied among other matters. It seems to us, therefore, that on a fair and reasonable construction of the provisions of S. 98 (1), it would be apparent that the Legislature had no intention of imposing a condition as to the specification of the rates of levy even as regards the earlier notification proclaiming) its intention to levy such tax or duty. It also seems to us to be unnecessary to specify the rates in such a notification, as the maximum thereof has already beeu fixed by the Schedule to the Act. It is, therefore, open to the Corporation to fix the rates, subject to such prescribed maximum and in accordance with its needs, and the same has been made mandatory too by the statute. It is, therefore, open to the Corporation to fix the rates, subject to such prescribed maximum and in accordance with its needs, and the same has been made mandatory too by the statute. This being the true legal position, any reference to the rates in the notification proposing to levy tax, is really uncalled for and superfluous and, therefore, the objections received, if any, on this score are not of any materiality. Hence the rates of levy finally determined cannot be assailed on the ground of enhancement as urged. Hence, this contention too must fail. ( 26 ) WE now come to the last contention which is based on the scope and extent of the alterations made in the entries as finally published. We shall advert to only such of those entries to which our attention was drawn in the context of both the notifications in point. The contention is that many new items, which had not found a place in the earlier punished notice of the intention to levy the tax have now been added in the impugned notification and, therefore, the same would be bad to that extent as no opportunity to file objections had been afforded in accordance with the requirements of S. 98 (1) of the Act, which were mandatory in character. ( 27 ) BEFORE proceeding furher to examine the entries in point, it may be mentioned that it is common ground between the parties that such additions or alterations of the entries ought to be confined to only articles which are of an incidental or ancillary character and thus would not require compliance with such procedural provisions of S. 98 (1 ). and that any such changes relating to altogether new items could not dispense with such compliance. It is of course contended on behalf of the Corporation by its learned Counsel, Sri A. Jagannatha Shetty, that all changes so made were only of an incidental or ancillary character and, at any rate, the petitioners had no locus standi to complain about most of such entries as they were not dealers in the articles affected by such entries. ( 28 ) WE may at this stage dispose of the later contention relative to locus standi. ( 28 ) WE may at this stage dispose of the later contention relative to locus standi. The petitioners are no doubt only dealers as claimed but, in our view, they have also another capacity as consumers who are in fact the most affected by the levy. The objections, therefore, are also attributable to their character as such consumers and as such maintainable. In addition, we do not also see any such qualification having been prescribed for filing such objections by S. 98 (1) of the Act on its own terms. Hence we cannot accede to this contention. ( 29 ) WE now turn to the specific entries in question. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the entries in the first notice inviting objections as those of 'old Schedule' and those in regard to the impugned notification as of 'new Schedule'. ( 30 ) THE first of the entries seriously assailed relates to Entry 3 of the new Schedule which corresponds to Entry 2 of the old Schedule. They are set out below : old Schedule new Schedule motorvyehicles including motor cars motor taxi cabs, motor cycles and motor cycles combinations, motor scooters, motorettes, motor omnibuses, motor vans, motor lorries inclusive of chassis of motor vehicles and all component parts thereof. Motor cycles, motor cycle combinations, motor scooters, scooterettes and their parts and all accessories, assemblies and spares, of all motor vehicles. ( 31 ) ON a comparison of the above entries, it will be seen that 'motor vehicles melding motor cars, motor taxi, motor omni buses, motor vans, motor lorries inclusive of chassis' heve been omitted and 'spares' has been substituted for 'components'. Some of the other changes relate to the introduction of 'scooterette' and 'accessories' in the new Schedule for the first time. ( 32 ) THE contention urged is that a 'spare part' is different from a component' of a motor vehicle. The difference lies according to the argument, in the fact that a 'spare' is normally associated with some part or a vehicle which will wear out frequently thus requiring replacement, as for. example a tyre, battery etc, whereas a component is not one such, such as an engine, chassis etc, and therefore, a component cannot normally be regarded as including a spare. example a tyre, battery etc, whereas a component is not one such, such as an engine, chassis etc, and therefore, a component cannot normally be regarded as including a spare. We do not think we can accede to this argument, as in our view all spares of motor vehicles are components but all components are not necessarily spares. Such of the components which are not strictly spares may, therefore, be treated as falling outside the purview of this entry. But from this it cannot be inferred that 'spares' must be regarded as an item introduced for the first time in the new Schedule. ( 33 ) THE next contention is that 'accessories' have been newly introduced as they are mere extra attachments to a vehicle intended more for the convenience of the owner or user of a motor vehicle than as a necessary adjunct for the actual running of such vehicle, and therefore, are not 'components' as such. We think that this contention must be accepted as correct. Such accessories cannot with any show of reason be said to fall within the purview of the expression 'components', which are really those parts of the vehicle which are necessary to make it roadworthy. Hence, we hold that the levy on 'accessories' as bad. ( 34 ) THE next contention relates to the reference to 'scooterette'. In our view, the expression 'motor vehicles' occurring in the old Schedule was perfectly capable of taking within its purview such a scooterette. If instead of motor vehicles, motor cycles, scooters and scooterettes are separately specified, we fail to see how it could be regarded as a new item at all. Hence this contention must fail. ( 35 ) THE next entry challenged is Entry 4 of the new Schedule which corresponds to Entry 3 of the old Schedule. The entries may be set out: old Schedule new Schedule tyres and tubes of all kinds and sizes and rubber sheets of all kinds inclusive of rubber treads. Tyres and Tubes of all kinds and sizes (excepting those used for push cycles) inclusive of rubber treads and all manufactured items of rubber. It may be seen from these entries that the phrase 'all manufactured. items of rubber' makes a substantial departure from the old Schedule and therefore, constitutes a new addition. Tyres and Tubes of all kinds and sizes (excepting those used for push cycles) inclusive of rubber treads and all manufactured items of rubber. It may be seen from these entries that the phrase 'all manufactured. items of rubber' makes a substantial departure from the old Schedule and therefore, constitutes a new addition. But it is contended for the Corporation that none cf the petitioners before us could be said to be aggrieved by it. We cannot accede to such a contention in the light of our earlier conclusion on the general question of locus standi of the petitioners and their capacity to question the same as consumers or persons residing within the limits of the Corporation. We, therefore, hold that the levy of octroi on such commodities as invalid. ( 36 ) THE position is similar in regard to the levy on the commodity 'rope' occurring in Entry I of the new Schedule. We accordingly hold that no levy could be made on the said commodity pursuant to the new Sch. ( 37 ) THE next entry relates to Entry 7 of the new Schedule which corresponds to entry 12 of the old Schedule. They read thus : old Schedule new Schedule welding electrodes, welding rods and welding cables, carbons both high and law intensity inclusive of as welding rods. Welding electrodes, welding rods, and welding cables, carbon both high and low 'intensity inclusive' of welding roads. The ergument in this context is that gas welding rods' have 'been omitted in the new Schedule and. therefore, this commodity was outside the purview of the entry and could not be subjected to octroi levy. On behalf of the Corporation it is contended that this was nothing but a printer's error, as would be evident from the repetition of 'welding rods' there in. Whether or not the omission of the word 'gas' in the collocation of words "inclusive of gas welding rods", was a printer's error, the words 'welding rods' occurring after the words 'welding electrodes' at the commencement of the entry, are in our opinion, wide enough to include gas welding rods. ( 38 ) THE next entries relating to electronic devices are Entries 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the old Schedule which together correspond to Entry 8 of the new Schedule. The only complaint regarding these entries is that 'spares of electronics have teen newly added. ( 38 ) THE next entries relating to electronic devices are Entries 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the old Schedule which together correspond to Entry 8 of the new Schedule. The only complaint regarding these entries is that 'spares of electronics have teen newly added. It seems to us that that is indeed a new item. Although the expression 'electronics' would, according to chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary, include electronic devices, the' inclusion of 'spares' is clearly unwarranted. We, therefore, hold that 'spares of electronics' cannot attract the levy in question and the same has to be excluded from Entry 8 of the impugned notification. ( 39 ) THE next grievance relates to Entry 11 of the new Schedule corresponding to Entry 19 of the old Schedule. The entries read : old Schedule new Schedule x-Ray apparatus and equipments and spares. X-Ray apparatus and equipment and spares including films. The item regarding 'films' is pointed out as new. But on behalf of the. Corporation, it is stated that this entry falls within Entry 10 of the new schedule and, therefore, a superfluity We cannot agree. Entry 10 relied on relates to films used in cinematographic and. photographic and other. . cameras and not X-Ray equipment which has been separately spacified. It is, therefore, clearly a new item the levy on which could not be enforced without following the procedure enjoined by S 98 of the Act. Hence the portion of this entry relating to the levy on this commodity has to be struck down as invalid and inoperative. ( 40 ) THE next entry complained of is Entry 26 of the new Schedule which Corresponds to Entry 25 of the old Schedule. They read : old Schedule new Schedule bright steels, special steels, high silicon steel products, bars, washers, bolts and nuts, screws of all kinds, and of all metals and nails. High silicon steel and its products. It is contended that 'high silicon steel as a species of steel has been altogether a new addition. We do not think so, as in our view this was already included in the expression 'special steels occurring in the old Schedule. Hence, this contention has to be rejected. ( 41 ) NEXT it was contended that several new items have been added in entry 13 of the new Schedule which. corresponds to entries 26 to 28 of the old Schedule together. Hence, this contention has to be rejected. ( 41 ) NEXT it was contended that several new items have been added in entry 13 of the new Schedule which. corresponds to entries 26 to 28 of the old Schedule together. The relevant entries are set out below : old Schedule new Schedule 26. All types of tiles and bricks, marble and Shehabad slabs, chips, glasspanes of all kinds. 27. Sanitary fittings of every des-cription. 28 Ashestos sheet and pipes, hard, boards, plywood and the like. All tyres of tiles and slabs used for roofing flooring or dadoing, chips glass panes of all kinds and saqnitary fittings of every desription ashestas cement sheets, pipes care! boards, straw boards pain boards either plane or corrugated and their manufactured items. The contention urged in th's behalf is that the commodities in the above entry of the new Sch have all been newly added and they were not in the nature of incidental or ancillary items. This contention, in our view, deserves acceptance only as regards commodities described as 'manufactured items' and 'asbestos cement sheets' On behalf of the corporation, in regard to the latter, it was contended that the same was in the nature of a clarification of the item'asbestos sheets'. We find same difficulty in accepting such a submission. It seems to us that 'asbestos sheets' were different from 'asbestos cement sheets' and it has not also been shown to be otherwise. As regards other items, we are inclined to think that they substantially fall within the purview of the expression 'hard boards' occurring in the old Schedule. We therfore hold that the portion of Entry 13 in the new Schedule relating to manufactured items' and 'asbestos cement sheets' as invalid and inoperative. ( 42 ) SIMILAR is the position in regard to Entry 15 of the new Schedule. The 'manufactured items' occurring therein cannot be supported with reference to the entry in the old Schedule. We hold, therefore, that this portion of the entry is bad and cannot, therefore, be made the basis for the levy of duty. ( 43 ) WE, now pass on to the next entry challenged. It is Entry 20 of of the new Schedule which corresponds to Entries 38 and 39 together of the old Scheduler The entries read : old Schedule new Schedule 38. Trunk clips, handles and locks. 39. ( 43 ) WE, now pass on to the next entry challenged. It is Entry 20 of of the new Schedule which corresponds to Entries 38 and 39 together of the old Scheduler The entries read : old Schedule new Schedule 38. Trunk clips, handles and locks. 39. Plastic PVC sheets, CN sheet, compounds, tapes and plastic goods of all kinds inclusive of kesophane papers. Cellulose film, plastic sheets, PVC sheets and CN sheets and their manufactured items and plastic compounds. It is argued that the commodities underlined in the above entry of the new Schedule were all fresh additions and therefore, the levy thereon could not be supported. It seems to us that no serious exception could be taken as regards 'manufactured items' as the same may reasonablv be held to be included in the items described as 'plastic goods of all kinds' occurring in the old Schedule. But we find difficulty in equating 'cellulose film' with 'kesophane papers', the latter of which, as it seems to us, is only a brand of cellulose film. In this view the new entry (cellulose film) enlarges the scope of the levy and extends it to all types of cellulose films which would be impermissible in the absence of compliance with the procedure enjoined by S 98 of the Act. We. therefore, make a declaration that the levy on 'cellulose films' other than 'kesophane papers' is invalid and unenforceable. ( 44 ) THE next complaint relates to Entry 24 of the new Schedule which corresponds to Entry 44 of the old Schedule. The entries may be set out. Old Schedule new Schedule stationery goods like ink, water colour paints, ball point pens, refills, fountain pens, nibs pencils, rubber, paper, diaries and calendars etc. Stationery goods of all variety other than news print and reading material. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the new entry effects a drastic change and completely enlarges the scope and ambit of the entry in the old Schedule. The specific argument is that articles enumerated in the old entry are not exhaustive of the items that may properly fall within the" scope of the description 'stationery goods'. That being so, by the new entry, the entire field of 'stationery goods' is sought to be brought within the net of taxation. The specific argument is that articles enumerated in the old entry are not exhaustive of the items that may properly fall within the" scope of the description 'stationery goods'. That being so, by the new entry, the entire field of 'stationery goods' is sought to be brought within the net of taxation. Such an entry, therefore, cannot be made the basis for the lew of duty and the same is liable to be struck down. We are inclined to think there is force in this submission of the petitioners. On behalf of the Corporation, it has been contended that what had been done was merely to do away with the enumeration of the articles as done in the old Schedule and the same would be permissible having regard to the word 'etcetera' ('etc'.) occurring therein. We are not persuaded to agree with this contention of the Corporation. It was not disputed on behalf of the Corporation that the new entry was capable of taking within its urview many items other than those specified in the entry of the old Schedule. We do not think that the use of the word 'etcetera', as suggested fur the Corporation, would enable it to enlarge the scope cf the entry so drastically, without complying with the mandatory requirements of S. 98 cf the Act. In this view, levy of Octroi would be bad on stationery goods other than those like ink, water colour paints, ball point pens, refills, fountain pens, nibs, pencils, rubber, paper, diaries and calendars. ( 45 ) AS a result of the foregoing discussions, these petitions party succeed and only to the extent indicated above. They are accdrdingly partly' allowed and dismissed as to the rest. ( 46 ) AS to the reliefs to be granted, it is to be noted that we have held only portions of entries 1, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13, 15, 20 and 24 in the impugned notification dated 4-3-1975 as bad and unenforceable. Therefore in respect of such offending portions of those entries, writs in the nature of certiorari and mandamus will have to be issued quashing them with a direction to the respondent-Corporation to forbear from enforcing them. It is so ordered. Therefore in respect of such offending portions of those entries, writs in the nature of certiorari and mandamus will have to be issued quashing them with a direction to the respondent-Corporation to forbear from enforcing them. It is so ordered. ( 47 ) WE, however, desire to make it clear that this judgment will not be in the way of the Corporation from reimposing the levy on the items affected provided the requirements of the statute are complied with. ( 48 ) TAKING the circumstances into consideration, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .