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1976 DIGILAW 303 (ALL)

Ram Parshad v. Kalam Nath

1976-04-23

G.C.MATHUR, N.D.OJHA

body1976
JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - One room and one Kothari of house No. 59188, Nachghar, Kanpur were in the tenancy of one Jang Bahadur. The house aforesaid is owned by Snit. Sunder Devi, respondent No. 2 Jang Bahadur vacated the accommodation aforesaid. An application was made by Snit. Sunder Devi for the said portion being released in her favour: Another application was made by Ram Prasad, the appellant, for the allotment of this accommodation. The application for release was rejected on October 7, 1969, and the accommodation was allotted in favour of Ram Prasad on March 17, 1970. The allottee was not delivered possession over the accommodation by respondent No. 2. He made an application under section 7-A of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. An objection was filed by respondent No. 2. According to her, since the accommodation under the tenancy of Jan- Bahadur was comprised of one room and one Kothari and the allotment in favour of Ram Prasad h,,:d been only in respect of one room, the tenancy stood bifurcated as a result of the allotment order, which was illegal. Her objection further was that one Kothari was in her occupation and, as such, Rule 7 of the rules framed under the Act was applicable and no order of allotment could be passed without consulting her. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer accepted the objection of respondent No. 2 in so far as it related to the bifurcation of the tenancy. On this ground alone the order of allotment dated March 17, 1970, was set aside and a fresh order was passed in favour of the appellant on March 30, 1970. By this order was the room as well as the Kothari, which had been vacated by Jang Bahadur was allotted to the appellant. Possession was not delivered to the appellant even after this order of allotment and proceedings under section 7-A were again initiated. Respondent No. 2 filed an objection asserting that even ,he order of allotment dated, March 30, 1970, was illegal in as much as it had been passed without complying with Rule 7 aforesaid. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer asked for a report from the Chief Inspector. A report was given on August 18, 1970 stating that one Kothri was in occupation of respondent No. 2 and that rule 7 was applicable. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer asked for a report from the Chief Inspector. A report was given on August 18, 1970 stating that one Kothri was in occupation of respondent No. 2 and that rule 7 was applicable. On receipt of this report the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated September 19, 1970, required respondent No. 2 to send her nomination within a week. The respondent No. 2 nominated Kalam Nath, respondent No. 1, as the person to whom the accommodation aforesaid may be allotted. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order on September, 30, 1970 whereby he cancelled the order of allotment dated March 30, 1970, in favour of the appellant and directed the accommodation to be allotted in favour of respondent No. 1. A formal order of allotment was issued on October 5, 1970. the appellant made a representation before [he State Government under section 7-F of the Act. Both the respondents nos. I and 2 filed their reply to the representation. The Slate Government came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 2 has subsequently kept some Bhoosa in the Kothari surreptitiously and that Rule 7 was not applicable. In this view of the matter the order dated September 30, 1970 October 5, 1970, referred to above, was set aside. Kalam Nath, respondent No. 1, filed a writ petition in this Court with a prayer that the order of the State Government as also the proceedings under section 7-A, which were initiated in pursuance of the order of the State Government, may be quashed. A Learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition and granted both the reliefs, referred to above, to Kalam Nath respondent No. 1. It is against this judgment of the Learned Single Judge that the present Special Appeal has been filed. 2. It was urged by the Learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the finding recorded by the State Government, referred to above, namely, that respondent No. 2 had surreptitiously kept Bhoosa in the Kothari subsequently just to seek the benefit of Rule 7 and thus Rule 7 was not applicable not having been set aside by the Learned Single Judge, it was not open to him to have quashed the order of the State Government. Having heard Learned counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the finding recorded by the State Government was not clear so as to exclude the operation of Rule 7. Before it can be held that Rule 7 applies, a finding has to be recorded that the landlord was in occupation of some portion of the house other than the accommodation which was sought to be allotted. The further finding needed in this behalf would be that the Landlord was in such occupation on the date when the order of allotment was proposed to be passed. There have been considerable arguments in respect of these two questions of fact before us. We are not required to record a finding of fact in respect of these questions of fact ourselves in this Special Appeal. A perusal of the order of the State Government makes it clear that the State Government has not recorded any specific finding on either of the two questions. In the absence of such a finding it is not possible to determine as to whether Rule 7 is applicable or not. In this state of affairs the only course open to us is to uphold the judgment of the Learned Single Judge, whereby the order of the State Government has been quashed and to direct the State Government to decide the representation made by the appellant Ram Prasad afresh. 3. In the result the appeal is party allowed in the sense that, even though the operative portion of the judgment of the Learned Single Judge is upheld, a direction is issued to the State Government to decide the representation made by the appellant afresh in accordance with Law keeping in view the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs of this appeal as well as of the writ petition.