JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J.: - This second appeal arises out of the Judgment and decree passed by the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge of Kanpur on 30th of July. 1971, affirming the judgment and the decree passed by the First Additional Munsif, Kanpur, in suit No. 423 of 1968. 2. After having heard the learned counsel for both the parties on 23rd March 1976 we passed orders dismissing the appeal. We had then said that we would give our reasons for dismissing the appeal later on. We are accordingly giving reasons for the same now. 3. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed by Israr Ahmad plaintiff-respondent. The following facts were admitted between the parties : 4. The respondent was initially appointed as a fitter-khalasi at Anwargani Railway Station, North Eastern Railway. On 5th of December 1963, he was promoted to officiate as Train Examiner in the scale of Rs. 180-240 in place of another employee Sri N K. Banerji, who was absent from duty on account of prolonged illness. Even after Sri Banerji resumed his duties the respondent continued to officiate as Train Examiner vice Sri G. R. Mehia. Sri N. K. Banerji again proceeded on leave with effect from 13th May 1964, and the respondent was again made to officiate as Train Examiner in his vacancy. Sri Banerji, however, expired some time in 1964-65. The respondent continued to officiate as Train Examiner against the permanent vacancy caused by the death of Sri Banerji till 1967 and during that period he was also given his annual increments as Train Examiner. By an order dated 2nd December 1967 the respondent was reverted from the post of Train Examiner to his substantive post of fitter-khalasi. 5. The plaintiff-respondent contended that the order reverting him from the officiating post of Train Examiner was violative of the directions contained in the Railway Board's circular letter No. E (D & A) 61RG-6-36 dated 30th November 1961 and the letter No. E-232/7 dated 23rd June 1964 issued by office of the General Manager (Personnel Branch), N. E. R. Gorakhpur. The plaintiff-respondent, therefore, claimed the relief of declaration that the order of reversion dated 2nd December 1967 was illegal and ultra vices. He also prayed that he be declared in service as Train Examiner. The plaintiff-respondent, therefore, claimed the relief of declaration that the order of reversion dated 2nd December 1967 was illegal and ultra vices. He also prayed that he be declared in service as Train Examiner. The relief of mandatory injunction restraining the appellant from giving effect to the reversion order was also prayed for. 6. The suit was resisted by the appellant, inter alia, on the ground that the Railway Board's letter and the letter of the General Manager. N.E.R., Gorakhpur referred to by the plaintiff-respondent, were of administrative nature and the violation thereof was not justiciable; that in any case the respondent's promotion as Train Examiner was purely local and tentative arrangement and conferred no right on him to have any lien on that post. 7. The suit was decreed by the learned Munsif. An appeal was then filed against that judgment and decree; and the learned First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge, Kanpur, who heard the appeal, found it devoid of substance and dismissed it. Dissatisfied with it the Union of India came up in second appeal before this Court. 8. The second appeal first came up for hearing before one of us (Honble K. B. Asthana J. as he then was). It was then argued on behalf of the appellant that the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 (Exhibit 17) contained merely departmental directions, that it did not have any statutory force and that both the Courts below committed an illegality in relying on that Circular in order to decree the plaintiff's suit. Feeling that there was some conflict in the decisions of this Court on that point it was then directed that the papers be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the case to a Division Bench. It is thus that the case has come up before us. 9. The contention placed by learned counsel for the appellant in the forefront of his arguments before us also was that the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 (Ext. 17) and the accompanying Circular dated 26th June 1961 were all of administrative nature containing directions for the guidance of the departmental officers and that it was not justiciable and could not be made the basis for decreeing the plaintiff's suit. 10. A contention to the above effect was also raised before the lower Court of appeal. 17) and the accompanying Circular dated 26th June 1961 were all of administrative nature containing directions for the guidance of the departmental officers and that it was not justiciable and could not be made the basis for decreeing the plaintiff's suit. 10. A contention to the above effect was also raised before the lower Court of appeal. In view, however, of the provisions contained in Rules 157 and 158 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, the lower Court of appeal held that the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 (Exhibit 17) and the accompanying Circular dated 26th June 1961 did carry statutory force. The Railway Board have full powers under R. 157 of the Railway Establishment Code to make rules of general application to the non-gazetted railway servants under their control. Under Rule 158 of the said Code the General Managers of the Indian Railways have full powers to make rules with regard to the non-gazetted railway servants under their control, provided they are not inconsistent with any rules made by the Railway Board. It can, therefore, be aptly said that the directions contained in the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 (Exhibit 17), and accompanying Circular of the Railway Board, are tantamount to rules and have statutory force. This view finds support from the observations contained in the case M. P. Patel v. D. R. Khanna, AIR 1965 Born 267 and Spl. Appl. No. 100 of 1971 (All), (General Manager, N. E. R. v. O. P. Saxena), decided by the Lucknow Bench of this Court on 16th of October 1974 by Prem Prakash and S. K. Kaul, JJ. In the latter case also the same two Circulars came up for consideration as are involved for consideration in the present appeal, and it was contended in that case as well that the Circulars did not have statutory force. The contention was. however, repelled with the follow observation : "The directions issued by the Board in the form of letters from time to time for the guidance of the subordinate authorities under Rule 157 of the Code must be taken to be rules made by the Board under the Code itself. They being statutory directions, the breach thereof in a particular case is subject to the limitation of judicial review." 11. They being statutory directions, the breach thereof in a particular case is subject to the limitation of judicial review." 11. In the context of what has been said above, it cannot be said that the conclusion reached by the Courts below, namely that the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 and the accompanying Circular of the Railway Board have statutory force, is erroneous. 12. But, even assuming that the Circular dated 23rd June 1964, and the accompanying Circular of the Railway Board, are of administrative nature, it cannot be accepted that they are not justiciable and that the plaintiff-respondent could not claim any benefit there under. In the case Union of India v. K.P. Joseph, AIR 1973 SC 303 : 1973 Lab IC 191 the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, issued an office memorandum provided for certain benefits to ex-military personnel on re-employment. The respondent of that case, who was an ex-military personnel, claimed that he was entitled to the benefits of the instructions contained in the office memorandum, but the Government rejected his claim. He, therefore, filed a writ petition. The matter ultimately went up before the Supreme Court and one of the contentions raised was that the order being of administrative nature conferred no justiciable right and that the High Court was wrong in issuing a direction for the respondent's pay being fixed in accordance with the order. This contention was repelled with the following observation : "Generally speaking, an administrative order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, like all other general rules, is subject to exceptions. This Court has held in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1968) 1 SCR 111 : AIR 1967 SC 1910 that although Government cannot supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, yet, if the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed and these instructions will govern the conditions of service." Reference was also made by the Supreme Court to an earlier decision Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 718 wherein it was observed: "To say that an administrative order can never confer any right would be too wide a proposition. There are administrative orders which confers rights and impose duties." 13. There are administrative orders which confers rights and impose duties." 13. In the instant case also, the Circular Order dated 23rd June 1964 (Exh. 17) conferred some benefits on the railway employees in regard to their service condition, It was neither shown nor contended that the instructions contained in the circular are inconsistent with any statutory rules. Therefore, even if the circular dated 23rd June 1964, and the accompanying Circular of the Railway Board be of administrative nature, reliance could be placed by the plaintiff-respondent on them to claim the relief asked for in the suit and reliance could be placed on those circulars by the trial Court to decree the plaintiff's suit, in case it was made out that the orders terminating the service of the plaintiff-respondent were violative of the directions contained in those Circular Letters. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the appointment of the respondent as Train Examiner was a purely local and tentative arrangement and it was by no means covered by the Circular dated 23rd June 1964. Learned counsel urged that the Courts below, therefore, committed an illegality in relying on that circular in order to decree the respondent's suit. Our attention in that connection was invited to the fact that in the order dated 17th January 1964 promoting Israr Ahmad to work as TXR vice Sri N. K. Banerji (Exh. 3), in the order dated 20th March 1964 allowing the respondent to continue to officiate as Train Examiner vice Sri G. R. Mehta (Exh. 4), and in the order dated 24th June 1964 allowing Sri Israr Ahmad to officiate vice Sri N. K. Banerji (Exh. 7), it was explicitly mentioned that the arrangement was purely local and tentative. 15. We have given our careful thought to the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, but we fail to find any substance therein. Whether the arrangement was local or tentative it was in any case an appointment of an officiating nature which continued much beyond the period of 18 months. The Circular D/- 23-6-1964 (Exh. 17) makes provisions for those employees who have officiated in higher grades in clear vacancies for over 18 months. In para. 2 thereof it is stated that the procedure mentioned in it was introduced for strict compliance by all concerned. The Circular D/- 23-6-1964 (Exh. 17) makes provisions for those employees who have officiated in higher grades in clear vacancies for over 18 months. In para. 2 thereof it is stated that the procedure mentioned in it was introduced for strict compliance by all concerned. Para 6 of the Circular carries a mandate that if it is proposed to revert an employee who has completed more than 18 months officiating period, otherwise than by following the disciplinary procedure, the personal sanction of the General Manager must be obtained in the case of Class III staff. Para 8 of the Circular states that if an employee is not confirmed in higher grade for want of permanent vacancy, he cannot be reverted after he has completed 18 months officiating period on the charge of unsatisfactory working, except after following the disciplinary procedure prescribed for an officiating employee. It was not disputed before us that the respondent continuously officiating as Train Examiner from 13th May 1964 to 2nd December 1967 in the clear vacancy of Sri N. K. Banerji. It is, therefore, obvious that he officiated as a Train Examiner for a period far beyond 18 months against a clear vacancy. The mere fact that in the orders. referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant, it was mentioned that the arrangement was local and tentative cannot take the case of the respondent as Train Examiner outside the ambit of the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 (Exh. 17). Indeed, the circular Exh. 17 does not state that the provisions contained therein would not apply to a local or tentative arrangement, even if the arrangement continued beyond 18 months. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant next invited our attention to the following sentence occurring in the opening paragraph of the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 (Ext. 17) : "As per Board's directions, efforts are to be made to confirm staff officiating in higher grade in clear vacancies, if they are found suitable after trial for a reasonable period not exceeding 18 months." Stress was laid by learned counsel for the appellant on the underlined words in the above sentence and it was contended that those words imply that a railway employee should appear before a selection board to meet the test of being found suitable to the post and that unless it is done he cannot claim any benefit under the Circular. To us it appears that the words "found suitable after trial for a reasonable period not exceeding 18 months" would be read along with the subsequent paragraphs, which lay down the method for assessing the suitability of a person officiating in the higher grade. Paragraph 3 of the Circular states that an assessment report about the working of the employee should be made by his immediate superior after he has completed six months officiating period, and if that report is unsatisfactory similar further re ports should be sent on the expiry of nine months and on the expiry of 12 months of officiating period. Paragraph 5 states that if the third report at the end of 12 months period is also unsatisfactory, he should be reverted and that, if he is to be given a further chance, the sanction of the Head of the Department in the case of Class III employee should be obtained. It further states that if the work of the employee is not satisfactory thereafter, he should be promptly reverted before completing 18 months of officiating service. The expression "found suitable" occurring in the opening paragraph of the Circular relates to the method of assessment of the suitability of the employee concerned. In the instant case, the fact that the plaintiff-respondent has officiated for over four years without any break should be indicative of the fact that he was found suitable for the post. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant, however. in order to fortify his arguments, referred us to the following observation of this Court in the case of General Manager, N.E. Railway v. O.P. Saxena, (Spl. App. No. 100 of 1971, D/d.- 16-10-1974 (All) (supra), wherein it was observed : "The safeguard in Annexure 6, in our view, applied to only those employees who have acquired a right to the officiating post by virtue of their impanelment or having been declared suitable by the competent authorities. Indeed the opening part of the Circular manifests its intention. namely `to confirm staff officiating in higher grades in clear vacancies if they are found suitable." (Annexure 6 referred in the above observation corresponds with Exhibit 17 of this case). Even agreeing with the aforesaid interpretation of the Circular in question, we find from the document Exh. 10 on the record of this cage that the plaintiff-respondent had passed the suitability test for the post of TXR. Even agreeing with the aforesaid interpretation of the Circular in question, we find from the document Exh. 10 on the record of this cage that the plaintiff-respondent had passed the suitability test for the post of TXR. Consequently, even if the contention raised on behalf of the appellant is accepted, the respondent would be entitled to claim the benefit of the Circular Exh. 17. 18. Having thus cleared the ground, the only question that remains for consideration is whether the order reverting the plaintiff-respondent from the post of TXR was violative of any directions contained in the Circular dated 23rd June 1964 (Exh. 17). As already stated earlier, according to paragraph 6 of the said Circular, if it is proposed to revert an employee of Class III staff who has completed more than 18 months of officiating service, otherwise than by following the disciplinary procedure, the personal sanction of the General Manager is necessary. There was no dispute before us about the fact that the personal sanction of the General Manager had not been obtained to revert the respondent from the officiating post of TXR. The reversion order was, therefore, clearly Illegal and the respondent's suit was rightly decreed. 19. We thus found the appeal devoid of substance and have accordingly dismissed it with costs.