JUDGMENT : K.C. Agarwal, J. This case has come up before us in a Full Bench by reason of a reference made by on of us (Satish Chandra, J.) for decision on the following two questions : 1. Whether the consolidation authorities can validly direct the name of the Gaon Sabha or the State Government to be recorded when they find that there is no valid title holder and that under the law, the land had vested in the State Government and then in the Gaon Sabha; even though the Government or the Gaon Sabha has not filed an objection. 2. Whether Section 11C of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act operates retrospectively so as to validate orders passed by consolidation authorities prior to the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974, directing the names of the Gaon Sabha or the State Government etc. to be recorded over plots which had, in law, vested in them. 2. The facts leading to the reference are these: One Smt. Ram Kali, was, admittedly, the bhumidhar of khata No. 69 of village Sikandarpur, district Moradabad. In the basic year the aforesaid Khata was entered in the names of Har Swarup and Har Kishan as bhumidhars. It, however, contained a note to the effect that in pursuance of an order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Moradabad, in Case No. 18, the names of Amir Husain and others, the Petitioners, had to be recorded as Sirdars over the land of this Khata. Har Swarup and Har Kishan filed an objection u/s 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (briefly stated as 'the Act'), claiming that having purchased the land through a registered sale deed from Smt. Ram Kali they became the bhumidhars of the disputed land and as Amir Husain, and others had no concern with the land in dispute their names could not be recorded in the revenue papers. The objection was resisted by Amir Husain and others on the ground, interalia, that they were in possession of the land in dispute since long and, therefore, by virtue of their possession they had acquired the rights of sirdars u/s 210 of UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. I of 1950), (briefly stated as U.P. Act I of 1950). The Consolidation Officer finding that neither Har Swarup nor Har Kishan nor Amir Husain had any right; over the land in dispute, directed that the land be recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha concerned. The order of the Consolidation Officer was maintained by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, in appeal preferred before him u/s 11 of the Act and, thereafter, in revision by the Deputy Director of Consolidation filed u/s 48 of the Act. Feeling aggrieved, Amir Husain filed the present writ petition in this Court. 3. The main controversy raised in the writ petition was that since the Gaon Sabha had not filed any objection, the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to direct that the land be entered as Gaon Sabha property. In support of this plea, the Petitioners placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Gaon Sabha v. Noor Mohammad 1974 RD 350. Controverting the submission, counsel appearing for the Gaon Sabha relied on a decision of another Division Bench decision in Gaon Sabha v. Sanman Singh 1973 AWR 596. Finding that the questions raised by the counsel for the parties were of general importance, the learned Single Judge made the present reference. 4. To understand and consider the submission made by the learned Counsel, it will be useful if we refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and their extent and scope. It will also be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of U.P. Act I of 1950 in this regard. The U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was passed to provide for the consolidation of agricultural holdings in Uttar Pradesh for development of agriculture. It is a self contained special enactment dealing with the matters relating to consolidation. On a declaration made by the State Government by means of a notification issued u/s 4 of the Act, the consolidation authorities are empowered to enter upon and survey as well as to do all necessary acts to ascertain suitability of the area for consolidation. After revision of maps and Annual Register under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, the consolidation authorities publish in the unit the current khasra and the current Annual Register u/s 9 of the Act showing the rights of persons who are found to be in possession. An entry made under this provision is known as entry of the basic year. An entry made under this provision is known as entry of the basic year. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 9, any person to whom a notice under Sub-section (1) has been sent, or any other person interested, is entitled to file an objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer in respect of the entry made under Sub-section (1) of Section 9 disputing its correctness or nature. Section 9A deals with the disposal of cases relating to land and partition. u/s 10, Annual Register is revised on the basis of orders passed under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 9A. Section 11 confers a right of appeal on a person aggrieved by an order passed u/s 9A. Section 11A imposes a bar of further objections. This section reads as under : No question in respect of- (i) claims to land, (ii) partition of joint holdings, and (iii) valuation of plots, trees, wells and other improvements, where the question is sought to be raised by a tenure holder of the plot or the owner of the tree, well or other improvements recorded in the annual register u/s 10, relating to the consolidation area, which might or ought to have been raised u/s 9, but has not been so raised shall be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings. 5. Section 48 of the Act provides for a revision against the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in appeal u/s 11. On the determination of rights in accordance with the procedure, mentioned above the consolidation authorities undertake the work of preparing a consolidation scheme. Thereafter, a provisional consolidation scheme is prepared and published u/s 20. Against the preparation of the provisional consolidation scheme a tenure holder has a right to prefer an objection against the same. An objection decided under this section is also subject to an appeal and a revision. Section 7 lays down that after the final consolidation scheme has come into force, the Deputy District Director of Consolidation shall cause to be prepared for each village a new map, field book and records of right in respect of the consolidation area. Sub-section (2) of this section provides that all entries in the record of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall be presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved. 6. Sub-section (2) of this section provides that all entries in the record of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall be presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved. 6. The Scheme of the Act, mentioned above, shows that before giving consolidated chaks, the consolidation authorities are required to decide the rights of the parties entitled to get the same. There is, however, no provision in the Act dealing with the creation, devolution, and succession of rights of agricultural land. These are the subject matters of U.P. Act I of 1950. U.P. Act 1 of 1950 came into force with effect from 1-7-1952. On its enforcement, the right, title and interest of the intermediaries were extinguished and were vested in the State of U.P. New rights were thereafter conferred by the State of U.P. in favour of various types of tenure holders and the holders of Sir and Khudkasht land. These rights have been conferred under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21. Without going into further details of the various provisions under this Act, we may refer to Sections 171, 172, 174 and 175 of U.P. Act 1 of 1950, which deal with the general order of succession. Section 189 of U.P. Act I of 1950 makes the provision for the extinction of interest of a bhumidhar. Clause (a) of this section provides that the interest of a bhumidhar in his holding or any part thereof shall be extinguished if he dies inter-state leaving no heir entitled to inherit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Similar provision for extinction of right of a sirdar has also been made in Section 190. Consequent upon his extinction of rights, the Land Management Committee can dispossess a person in possession. u/s 194 the Land Management Committee, which is a body of the Gaon Sabha, has been made entitled to take possession of the land comprised in a holding or a part thereof if the interest of a Bhumidhar in such land is extinguished under Clause (a) of Section 189. 7. Now the question that arises for consideration is about the principle or idea behind Section 194(a) of U.P. Act I of 1950, which could justify the enactment of these provisions. 7. Now the question that arises for consideration is about the principle or idea behind Section 194(a) of U.P. Act I of 1950, which could justify the enactment of these provisions. These provisions, it appears to us, are based on the rule of escheat, which denotes falling of an estate into the general property of the State because the owner or the tenant has died inter-state without lawful heirs to take his estate by succession or because of some other disability to take or hold the property imposed by law. This principle of escheat is a well known form of reversion of property in favour of the State. Dealing with the subject, in American Jurisprudence, Volume 27, page 873, it has been said that in England escheats generally go to the King as the Sovereign Lord whereas in the United States when title to land fails for want of heirs and (sic) it escheats to the State as part of its common ownership and this is true even though the land was originally obtained by patent from the Federal Government. The right of escheat, according to the American Jurisprudence, belongs to the people of the State. It appears that this principle of escheat has also been recognised in India since long. Upholding the plea of escheat raised on behalf of the State in Collector of Massulipatan v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah 8 MIR 500, the Privy Council observed as under : But when it is made out clearly that by the law applicable to the last owner, there is a total failure of heirs, then the claim to the land ceases (we apprehend) to be subject to any such personal law; and as all property not dedicated to certain religious trusts must have some legal owner, and there can be, legally speaking, no unowned property, the law of escheat intervenes and prevails, and is adopted generally in all courts of the country alike. Private ownership not existing, the State must be owner as ultimate Lord.... From Mulla's Hindu Law, Thirteenth Edition, para 59, it appears that under the old law, both Mitakshara and Dayabhaga, on failure of heirs, the Crown took the property by escheat. The Supreme Court also in Ram Chandra Arya Vs. Man Singh and Another, AIR 1968 SC 954 , found that the principle of escheat is clearly recognised in India. From Mulla's Hindu Law, Thirteenth Edition, para 59, it appears that under the old law, both Mitakshara and Dayabhaga, on failure of heirs, the Crown took the property by escheat. The Supreme Court also in Ram Chandra Arya Vs. Man Singh and Another, AIR 1968 SC 954 , found that the principle of escheat is clearly recognised in India. It, however, appears that on the basis of this principle while enacting the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, provision for escheat in case of failure of heirs was made in Section 29 of the aforesaid Act. The discussion made above would show that all important systems of law provide for escheat to the Crown or Government of the property of a deceased person in the absence or failure of heirs. 8. As noted above, escheat signifies reversion of property to the State in consequence of a want of any individual competent to inherit. In other words, it indicates the preferable right of the State to an estate left vacant, and without there being anyone in existence able to make claim thereto. This question came up for consideration before the Privy Council in A.G. of Ontreo v. Mercer (1883) 8 AC 767. Accepting that escheat provides for reversion, the Privy Council laid down the law in the following words : The use of the word "revert" in the writ of escheat is manifestly derived from the language of some authorities which speak of escheat as a species of reversion. 9. Accordingly, while dealing with the question of succession and providing for extinction in the event of the failure of heirs, the U.P. Legislature provided for the reversion of an estate or right of a tenure holder vesting in the State, Reference may now be made here to Sections 189 and 194 of U.P. Act I of 1950. Reading those two sections together it would be found that the Legislature has provided that the rights of a bhumidhar would get vested in the Land Management Committee. Reading those two sections together it would be found that the Legislature has provided that the rights of a bhumidhar would get vested in the Land Management Committee. Although it is true that none of the two sections provide for vesting in the State, but as the Land Management Committee is the executive committee of the Gaon Sabha the provision made entitling the Land Management Committee to take possession of the land comprised in an holding of a bhumidhar whose interest is extinguished under Clause (a) of Section 189, would show that the same is, in fact, for the benefit and on behalf of the State. Consequently, whenever death of any bhumidhar takes place and he does not leave behind any heir who is entitled to succeed to his property, his rights get vested. In these circumstances, it becomes the duty of a court of law, if and when an occasion arises, to recognise and to give effect to the right of the State or the Gaon Sabha by taking such steps in this regard as may be required under the circumstances. 10. Sri S.J. Hyder, counsel appearing for the Petitioner, however, relied on Section 11A of the Act and submitted that even if it be true that in the event of a tenure holder dying without leaving any heir his rights are extinguished and get vested in the State or Gaon Sabha, it is necessary for them to file an objection u/s 9 of the Act and as in the instant case no objection was filed the Petitioner having been entered in the basic year was entitled to the continuance of his name in the papers prepared under the consolidation proceedings. Section 11A has already been extracted by us above. It is true that it provides that no question in respect of claims to land relating to consolidation area which might or ought to have been raised u/s 9 but has not been raised, could be permitted to be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of consolidation proceedings. But, in a case where in proceedings u/s 9, the consolidation authorities reached at the conclusion that both the claimants had failed to prove their title, the necessary consequence of the finding was that the land had to be recognised as having vested in the State and in the Gaon Sabha. But, in a case where in proceedings u/s 9, the consolidation authorities reached at the conclusion that both the claimants had failed to prove their title, the necessary consequence of the finding was that the land had to be recognised as having vested in the State and in the Gaon Sabha. In the view which we are taking the entry of the name of the State Government or Gaon Sabha will be made in the proceedings u/s 9 itself, hence the mandate of Section 11A would not be violated. No one wants entry of the State Government or Gaon Sabha to be made at a. stage subsequent to Section 9. Vesting of rights of a deceased bhumidhar under the provisions of U.P. Act I of 1950 is automatic and that no action is required to be taken on behalf of the State or Gaon Sabha. This view of ours finds support from what has been said in American Jurisprudence, Volume 27, on page 886. The law on the subject has been stated in the following words: Inquest of office or other procedure is not always necessary to effect an escheat of property. Thus, neither entry upon the land nor the judgment of a court is necessary to consummate the title of the State under an escheat in some instances. However, it should be borne in mind that even though title may vest in the State without a judicial proceeding, some form of action may be essential to establish the existence of the facts under which the law casts title on the State and to reduce the property to the possession of the State. 11. Accordingly, the submission made by Sri Hyder that if a Gaon Sabha does not file an objection u/s 9, it cannot become owner of the property of a person dying without leaving any heir, is devoid of substance. To require a Gaon Sabha to tile a claim at the commencement of the consolidation proceedings would be placing an impossible burden upon the Gaon Sabha because at that stage the Gaon Sabha could not possibly be in a position to know that the claim of the contending parties would be negatived and the land would be deemed to have vested in the State. In our opinion, the proper course in these cases is that if the authorities find that both the parties have failed to prove their title, and that in law the land has vested in the State under the rule of escheat, they, in order to give effect to their findings, should direct the land to be recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha. 12. In support of his proposition that unless objection u/s 9(2) of the Act is preferred and the same is allowed the entry in the basic year would become final, reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on Subba v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1969 RD 30, Gaon Sabha, Kucha v. Noor Mohammad 1974 RD 350, Ram Pyare Shukla v. Vindya Din 1974 RD 175 and Salig Ram v. B.S. Rawat 1974 RD 97. It is no doubt true that all these cases support the contention of the Petitioner, but we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in them. It ignores the relevant principle behind which Sections 189 and 194 have been enacted. These cases have also laid undue emphasis on the filing of the objection by the State or Gaon Sabha u/s 9(2), without having regard to the nature of rights which the State or Gaon Sabha gets on extinction of the right of a bhumidhar. The insistence of Sri S.J. Hyder that the basic year entry can be modified only when an objection u/s 9(2) is filed appears to us to be without substance. The various provisions of the Act would show that a duty has been cast on the consolidation authorities to maintain correct record of persons entitled to the land. This purpose cannot be achieved if the name of a person entered in the basic year is permitted to continue despite the finding of the consolidation authorities that he does not have any right or semblance of title on the land. The purpose would be achieved more by recording the name of the State or Gaon Sabha inasmuch as according to the findings it is the State or the Gaon Sabha which is entitled to get the land. 13. The basic year entry is a document which can be altered or modified in accordance with the findings reached in proceedings arising on an objection u/s 9(2). 13. The basic year entry is a document which can be altered or modified in accordance with the findings reached in proceedings arising on an objection u/s 9(2). The view which we have taken in this case finds support from the judgment of a Division Bench in Gaon Sabha v. Sanman Singh 1973 AWR 596. We are in complete agreement with the view taken in this case as we find that it lays down the law correctly. 14. Reliance was also placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Shyam Sunder v. Sia Ram 1973 RD 88. This case, however, is altogether on a different controversy and not on the point with which we are concerned in the present case. In that case the constitutionality of some of the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was challenged. One of the grounds raised in support of the challenge was that the procedure of deciding the objections u/s 9 without impleadment of the State Government and Gaon Sabha being different from that of Section 229-B of U.P. Act I of 1950, was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Repelling the submission, the Bench observed that Section 9(2) does not prohibit or forbid the State Government or the Gaon Sabha from filing an objection claiming that land as against the person whose name is recorded in the village papers. Therefore, merely because the provision for impleadment has not been made in the proceedings u/s 9, that could not invalidate Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. This would show that the context being different, the law laid down in the said case is of no avail to the Petitioners. It is settled law that it is the duty of a court of law to adopt an interpretation of a provision of an Act which is just and reasonable and should avoid making a mechanical interpretation of the words as far as the context permits. In the instant case, if we were to accept the mechanical interpretation of the words used in Section 11A, as was urged by the Petitioners' counsel, we would, in fact, be reducing some of the provisions of the Act to a futility inasmush as in that event a person having no right would have to be treated as one entitled to continue. We, however, wish to make it clear that even though title by escheat was vested in the State automatically without a judicial proceeding, it does not necessarily follow that the right to possession is also vested. Where possession is vacant and title has vested, the State may take possession of the property by entering upon it without any judicial proceeding. If, however, the property is held adversely, the parties in possession must be dispossessed by appropriate proceedings. If an action is not brought or has not been brought within the period of limitation prescribed under U.P. Act I of 1950, in that event the Gaon Sabha will have no right to get its name recorded in the revenue papers. 15. For these reasons, we decide the first question in the affirmative. 16. On the second question, the main controversy raised before us was whether Section 11C of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is retrospective in operation. Section 11C reads as under : In the course of hearing of an objection u/s 9A or an appeal u/s 11, or in proceedings u/s 48, the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or the Director of Consolidation, as the case may be, may direct that any land which vests in the State Government or the Gaon Sabha or any other local body or authority may be recorded in its name, even though no objection, appeal or revision has been filed by such Government, Gaon Sabha, body or authority. 17. The submission raised on behalf of the Respondents was that since the aforesaid section is clarificatory and declaratory in nature, the same should be given retrospective effect. This was, however, controverted by the counsel appearing for the Petitioner and it was urged that as the ingredients for treating Section 11C as declaratory are not present, it cannot be given retrospective effect. As we have answered the first question against the Petitioner and in favour of the Respondents, we do not consider it necessary to give our concluded opinion on this question. 18. Let the papers of the case be laid before the learned Single Judge with the answers given above.