Kailasam, CJ.- These two appeals are preferred by the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 624 and 625 of 1976. 2. The appellants filed the writ petitions praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari and to quash the orders issued in G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home, dated 12th August, 1974. The appellants were the tenants under the second respondent. Under section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the Government exempted all buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions from the provisions of the said Act. The writ petitions were filed by the appellants on the ground that it violated Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and that in any event it violated the principles of natural justice in so far as orders of exemption were passed without notice to the affected tenants. Ramanujam, J., dismissed the writ petitions, and hence these appeals. 3. Mr. Venugopal, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the confining of the exemption under section 29 of the Act to the buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions is discriminatory and contrary to the provisions of Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. His submission is that while buildings which belonged to Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious institutions are exempted from the operation of the Act, buildings belonging to the other religious institutions like Sikhs, Jains and Parsis are not exempted from the operation of the Act, and in these cases the provisions of the Act have to be followed. It has to be noted that the appellants are Hindu tenants under the second respondent Hindu trust. Whether a Parsi, Jain or a Sikh religious institution would suffer by not being granted exemption under section 29 is not open to the appellants, as they are not directly affected on the ground of religion. In other words, if the appellants complain that their rights have been affected on grounds of religious discrimination, it would be a different matter. Under section 10 (3) (b) of the Act it is provided that where the landlord of a building is a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution, it may, if the building is required for the purposes of the institution, apply for an order directing the tenant to put the institution in possession of the building. Under section 10 (3) (b) of the Act it is provided that where the landlord of a building is a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution, it may, if the building is required for the purposes of the institution, apply for an order directing the tenant to put the institution in possession of the building. Section 10 relates to exemption that is available under the Act itself irrespective of religion, while section 29 confers power on the Government, that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the Government may, by notification, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act. The Government, under section 29, can certainly exempt any class of buildings, namely buildings belonging to Hindu, Christian and Muslim charitable institutions. A Sikh, Jain or a Buddhist is taken to be included within the term Hindu. The grievance is that a Parsi religious institution, with which we are not concerned at all, has been discriminated against, as the exemption granted under section 29 is not applicable to a Parsi institution. While considering the validity of the order made under section 29, we have got to take the state of affairs in the State of Tamil Nadu for which the Act is intended to apply. There may be one or two Parsi institutions in the entire State. It may be that a Parsi institution may have a grievance and come to Court for relief on the ground that the same facilities that are available to the other religious institutions are not available to it. But we are not inclined to accept the plea of a Hindu tenant under a Hindu religious institution that because Parsi religious institutions are not exempted, the law is discriminatory and is not applicable to him. 4. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarakadas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company1. The learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 37 of the judgment and read to us the extract from the decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon2. He also drew our attention to the decision in Buchanan v. Warely 3. The learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 37 of the judgment and read to us the extract from the decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon2. He also drew our attention to the decision in Buchanan v. Warely 3. In Massachusetts v. Mellon2, it was observed that the party who invoked the power must be able to show not only that the statute was invalid but that he had sustained or was immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffered in some indefinite way in common with people generally. Dealing with the second decision cited above, the Supreme Court observed that although the alleged denial of constitutional rights involved only the rights of coloured persons, and the vendor was a white person, yet the vendor was directly affected. 5. The two decisions cited would indicate that there must be a direct grievance. In the present case, the appellants are not directly affected. Hence, we do not see any ground for interfering with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge. These appeals are dismissed.