Muralidhar Barua etc v. State of Assam and others — 1976 DIGILAW 31 (GAU)

Judgement SARMA, J. :- By this judgment we propose to dispose of two applications under Art.226 and/or Art.227 of the Constitution of India directed against the order of the District Judge at Jorhat dated 30-11-1973 passed in Misc. Case Nos. 23 and 24 of 1974 which arose out of two applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and were heard analogously. By the impugned order the learned District Judge directed the parties to adduce further evidence before him to enable him to determine the value of the acquired lands as a Tea Estate. The relevant facts may be stated, in brief, as below. 2. Under five different Notifications under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) - all dated 9-1-1967, the Government of Assam acquired in all 1077 bighas 1 katha 17 lechas of land situate at several villages, namely, Bamchuk, Rangaihabi, Chutiakari and Nawsalia in mauza Charaibahi and village Saliha in mauza Khangia, near Jorhat town, for defence purpose, Similarly, five declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued on 19-6-1967 - and duly published in the Assam Gazette. The Collector started Land Acquisition Case No. 21 of 1965-66 relating to all these Notifications. Of the acquired lands the Rowriah Estates Private Ltd.-petitioner in Civil Rule No. 26 of 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner company) claimed 1072 B. 3 k. 8 lechas of land including the trees and buildings thereon as comprised in their tea estate known as Rowriah Tea Estate and claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,18,06,540/-. Shri Muralidhar Barua petitioner in Civil Rule No. 25 of 1974 (hereinafter referred to as Shri Barua) claimed an area of 4 b. 3 k. 9 lechas of land with the buildings standing thereon and he claimed Rs. 1,04,305/- as compensation. After due enquiry, the Collector, by his award dated 20-9-1969, awarded total sum of Rupees 6,74,095.50 as compensation to the petitioner Company for its lands, buildings and trees. Shri Barua was awarded a sum of Rs. 13,800/as compensation for 3 bighas of land, comprised in a periodic patta and another sum of Rs. 12,080.75 p. for the house standing therein. No compensation was awarded in respect of 1 B. 3 k. 9 lechas of land which was covered by an annual patta. Shri Barua was awarded a sum of Rs. 13,800/as compensation for 3 bighas of land, comprised in a periodic patta and another sum of Rs. 12,080.75 p. for the house standing therein. No compensation was awarded in respect of 1 B. 3 k. 9 lechas of land which was covered by an annual patta. Being aggrieved by the award of the Collector, both the petitioners filed two separate applications under Section 18 of the Act and the Collector referred the same to the District Judge at Jorhat for determination of the compensation. 3. In the Court of the District Judge the application under Section 18 filed by Shri Barua was registered as Misc. Case No. 23 of 1970 and the application of the petitioner Company was registered as Misc. Case No. 24 of 1970. Both the cases were taken up for hearing together. The petitioners examined as many as 12 witnesses and proved a number of documents before the District Judge, in support of their case. The Collector also examined one witness. 4. After the evidence was closed the learned District Judge started hearing arguments in the cases from 28-11-1973. In course of his argument on 29-11-1973 the learned Government Advocate raised a contention that in the acquisition proceedings the entire Rowria Tea Estate was acquired as a unit and not the lands of the tea estate and, therefore, compensation should be awarded on that basis. In spite of serious objections from the learned counsel for the petitioners the learned District Judge, after having gone through certain unproved documents in the file of the Collector, accepted the contention of the learned Government Advocate and by his order dated 30-11-1973 directed the parties to adduce further evidence for determination of the market value of the Tea Estate observing, inter alia, as below :- "According to me though the language of Section 4 Notification and Section 6 Declaration is not very happy, the acquisition appears to be that of the Tea Estate as a unit, as Land within the meaning of Section 3 (a) of the Act includes benefit to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth; and as such acquisition of a Tea Estate as a unit, which comprises of land, various structures on it, tea bushes etc. may not be excluded from the operation of the Act. may not be excluded from the operation of the Act. The parties had also understood it that way. Sri Bhattacharjee had objected to the reference by this Court to the correspondence between the parties which is in the record of the Land Acquisition case of the Collector. I had, however, done so to ascertain the meaning to be given to the language used in Section 4 Notification and Section 6 Declaration. There being no evidence, however, before this court as what could be the valuation of the Tea Estate as such, or that of a similar Tea Estate, I have found it difficult without further evidence on record to determine market value of the Tea Estate. I have, therefore, thought it fit in the interest of justice, to give opportunities to both the sides to lead further evidence on the above point, if they so choose." 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge the petitioners have come up with the present applications under Art.226 and/or Art.227 of the Constitution of India alleging, inter alia, that the learned District Judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in directing the parties to adduce further evidence for determination of the amount of compensation on the assumption that the Tea Estate, as a unit, was acquired. 6. Counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondents in both the Civil Rules denying that the District Judge has committed any error in law or that he had gone beyond his jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. 7. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended before us that the learned District Judge committed an illegality apparent on the face of the record and went beyond his jurisdiction in proceeding to take further evidence in the case to ascertain the amount of compensation on the assumption that Rowriah Tea Estate as a unit was acquired. According to him under the scheme of the Act there is no scope to determine the compensation on such assumption. 8. On examination of the scheme of the Act and the method of determination of compensation, as laid down in the Act, we find that there is sufficient force in the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee. 9. According to him under the scheme of the Act there is no scope to determine the compensation on such assumption. 8. On examination of the scheme of the Act and the method of determination of compensation, as laid down in the Act, we find that there is sufficient force in the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee. 9. As provided in Sec.3 (a) of the Act, the expression land includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Section 4 (1) provides that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land (emphasis supplied) in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a Notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such Notification to be given at convenient places in the locality concerned. Section 9 of the Act provides that the Collector shall, after the land is acquired cause public notice to be given at convenient places at or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land and that claim to compensation for all interests in such land (emphasis supplied) may be made to him. Section 23 of the Act lays down the matters to be considered by the Collector, or for that matter by the Judge, in determining compensation for the acquired land. 10. In the scheme of the Act we do not find any scope for acquiring any tea estate or any other estate, as an estate. What is acquired is land. Section 23 of the Act lays down the matters to be considered by the Collector, or for that matter by the Judge, in determining compensation for the acquired land. 10. In the scheme of the Act we do not find any scope for acquiring any tea estate or any other estate, as an estate. What is acquired is land. In determining the compensation for such land the Collector, or for the matter of that the Judge, is to determine the market value of the land; the damage sustained by the person interested by reason of taking any standing crop or trees which may be on the land at the relevant time; the damage sustained by the person interested at the time of the Collectors taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested at the time of the Collectors taking possession of the land by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other properties movable or immovable in any other manner, or his earnings; if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business the reasonable expenses (if any), incidental to such change and the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land, at the time of the publication of the declination under Section 6 and at the time of the Collectors taking possession of the land. 11. If any estate is acquired as a unit there can be no scope for determining the compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 23. 12. The use to which the land might be put at the time of acquisition is not very material for the purpose of determination of the compensation. What is material is the uses to which such land is reasonably capable of being put in the future. We may usefully refer here to the observation of the Privy Council in Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer. AIR 1939 PC 98, which is as below: "In the case of land, its value in general can be measured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the past for land of similar quality and in similar positions, and this is what must be meant in general by "the market value" in Sec.23. AIR 1939 PC 98, which is as below: "In the case of land, its value in general can be measured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the past for land of similar quality and in similar positions, and this is what must be meant in general by "the market value" in Sec.23. But, sometimes, it happens that the land to be valued possesses some unusual, and it may be, unique features, as regards its position or its potentialities. In such a case the arbitrator in determining its value will have no market value to guide him, and lie will have to ascertain as best he may from the materials before him, what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, for the land in that particular position and with those particular potentialities. For the land is not to be valued merely, by reference to the use to which it is being put at the time at which its value has to be determined (that time under the Indian Act being the date of the notification under S.4 (1)) but also by reference to the uses to which it is reasonably capable of being put in the future. It is the possibilities of the land and not its realized possibilities that must be taken into consideration." 13. In view of the relevant provisions of the Act and the decision of the Privy Council as mentioned above there can be no scope for determination of the compensation for the acquired land air as a Tea Estate. If a tea estate is to be acquired as an estate, resort must be had to some other legislation. It cannot be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 14. Be that as it may, it is evident on the face of the record that the lands were acquired and not the estate as a unit. The acquisition was made not under one. Notification under Section 4 (1) different areas were acquired under five different Notifications. Similarly there were five declarations under Section 6 of the Act. There is not even a mention about any Tea Estate in any of these Notifications. The acquisition was made not under one. Notification under Section 4 (1) different areas were acquired under five different Notifications. Similarly there were five declarations under Section 6 of the Act. There is not even a mention about any Tea Estate in any of these Notifications. It is stated in para 13 of the writ petition that the Tea Estate comprised an area about 1200 bighas of land approximately, out of which only 1077 B.1 K.17 lechas of land was acquired leaving a balance of more than 100 bighas. This statement has not been controverted. The lands were acquired, as these were required for defence purpose. The District Judge had no jurisdiction to go behind the Notifications issued by the Government and to assume with reference to some unproved documents that the Tea Estate was acquired as a unit. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in his argument, could not controvert the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner to our satisfaction. 15. In the result we quash the impugned order of the learned District Judge dated 30-11-1973 in exercise of our powers under Art.227 of the Constitution of India and we direct the learned District Judge to dispose of the case by determining the compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the Act in the light of the observations made hereinabove. Both the applications are allowed and the Rules are wide absolute. In the circumstances of the case, we, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. K. LAHIRI, J. :- I agree. Applications allowed. AIR 1977 GAUHATI 47 "Phongseh Misao v. L. A. Collector" GAUHATI HIGH COURT Coram : 2 B. N. SARMA AND K. LAHIRI, JJ. ( Division Bench ) Phongseh Misao, Petitioner v. Collector of Land Acquisition and others, Respondents. Civil Rule No.572 of 1975 (35 of 1975), D/- 16 -6 -1976. (A) Constitution of India, Art.226 - WRITS - HIGH COURT - Certiorari - Question of fact - Jurisdictional fact - Interference by High Court. It is a settled law that if an administrative or quasi-judicial body acts without jurisdiction the High Court can interfere with such action in its certiorari jurisdiction. It is also a settled law that the finding of such a body as to a jurisdictional fact can be re-examined by the High Court to come to its own conclusion. It is a settled law that if an administrative or quasi-judicial body acts without jurisdiction the High Court can interfere with such action in its certiorari jurisdiction. It is also a settled law that the finding of such a body as to a jurisdictional fact can be re-examined by the High Court to come to its own conclusion. AIR 1973 SC 1362 , AIR 1968 SC 1186 and AIR 1961 Pat 150 , Rel. on. (Para 8) (B) Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), S.30 - ACQUISITION OF LAND - Dispute meaning of - Power of Collector to refer. The section pre-supposes any one of the two kinds of disputes mentioned therein, namely, (i) any dispute as to apportionment of the compensation awarded or any part thereof; and (ii) any dispute as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. The word dispute occurring in S.30 means a quarrel between two or more rival parties laying claim over the whole or any part of the compensation money. The use of the word "persons" i.e. in plural number in the section is also significant. Reference of a dispute as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation is payable is evidently meant for determination as to which person is entitled to receive the money. A dispute of this nature pre-supposes the rival claims of two or more contending parties which are to be decided by the District Judge. A mere doubt about the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money, in the absence of any other contending party laying claim to the whale or any part of the compensation money, will not constitute a dispute within the meaning of S.30. The Collector has no jurisdiction to refer the matter to the District Judge in such case. (Paras 12, 13) (C) Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), S.30 - ACQUISITION OF LAND - Reference under - That the Govt. has got no right to intervene and ask for a reference after acquisition proceedings are taken up and award is made cannot be accepted as a general proposition. (Paras 12, 13) (C) Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), S.30 - ACQUISITION OF LAND - Reference under - That the Govt. has got no right to intervene and ask for a reference after acquisition proceedings are taken up and award is made cannot be accepted as a general proposition. (Para 10) Cases Referred: Chronological Paras AIR 1973 SC 1362 : 1973 Tax LR 684 8 AIR 1968 SC 1186 : (1968) 2 SCR 823 8 AIR 1966 SC 237 : (1965) 3 SCR 576 11, 13 AIR 1961 Pat 150 : 1961 BLJR 486 8 AIR 1934 All 260 : 1934 All LJ 32 (FB) 10 AIR 1932 Bom 386 : 34 Bom LR 791 15 L. Nanda Kr. Singh, for Petitioner, Govt. Advocate, Manipur, for Respondents. Judgement B. N. SARMA, J. :- This is an application under Art.226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to quash the Reference made by the Collector, Manipur North District, Karong, to the District Judge, Manipur under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) in L. A. Case No. 1 of 1972 and for a writ of the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay to the petitioner the sum of Rs.59,616/- awarded as compensation by the Collector in respect of the acquired land. The Collector of North District, Manipur, the State of Manipur and the Secretary, Government of Manipur, Development Department have been arrayed as defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The relevant facts may be stated, in brief, as below. 2. The village Nungphou is a hill village within the North District, Manipur, and it is one of the villages grouped under the Sadar Circle No. 1 under the provisions of the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947. The petitioner is the headman of this village and he has been in exclusive possession of the lands of the village realising house tax from the residents of the village for the purpose of paying the same to the Government. 3. While the petitioner was the owner in occupation of the lands of the village, in 1965-66 the respondents took possession of an area of 12.99 acres of land in the said village without any authority, for the purpose of construction of some houses for some Government office on the assumption that it was Government khas land. 3. While the petitioner was the owner in occupation of the lands of the village, in 1965-66 the respondents took possession of an area of 12.99 acres of land in the said village without any authority, for the purpose of construction of some houses for some Government office on the assumption that it was Government khas land. Thereupon the petitioner filed successive applications (Annexures-A/3 to A/6) to the respondents, praying for arranging to pay reasonable compensation to him for the land so occupied stating that it was his land. At last on the basis of the application at Annexure A/3, the Government of Manipur caused an enquiry to be made by the S. D. O. Mao Sadar Hill Subdivision to ascertain whether the land in question belongs to the petitioner and falls within his village Nungphou or it is Government khas land. The said S. D. O., after an enquiry submitted a report on 1-7-1966 to the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur (Annexure A/7) stating that the land in question falls within the village of the petitioner and is not Government khas land. 4. On receipt of the enquiry report from the S. D. O., Mao Sadar Subdivision, as above, the Government of Manipur decided to acquire the land in question and issued a preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, vide Notification No. 8/25/63-D dated 28th June, 1969 (Annexure A/8), which was duly published. A copy of this Notification was separately sent to the petitioner. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 issued a Notification No. DC(N) 6/26 dated 2-5-1972 under Section 9 of the Act (Annexure A/10). A copy of this Notification was also separately sent to the petitioner asking him to appear before the Collector on 12-6-1972 to state the nature of his claim and the amount and particulars of his claim. On receipt of this notice, the petitioner appeared before the Collector and lodged an objection as to the area of the land acquired which was notified as measuring 11 acres approximately, but which actually measured 12.99 acres. The acquisition case was registered as L. A. case No. 1 of 1972. Except the petitioner no other person appeared before the Collector to lay any claim to the land or to the compensation in respect of the same. After due enquiry the Collector made an award in favour of the petitioner granting Rs. The acquisition case was registered as L. A. case No. 1 of 1972. Except the petitioner no other person appeared before the Collector to lay any claim to the land or to the compensation in respect of the same. After due enquiry the Collector made an award in favour of the petitioner granting Rs. 59,616/as compensation for 12.99 acres of land, at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per acre. The award was made on 29-1-1973. On the same day the respondent No. 1 wrote to the respondent No. 3 to make available the sum of Rupees 59,616/- for payment to the petitioner vide his letter dated 29-1-1973 (Annexure-A/14). In spite of this letter from the respondent No. 1 and also repeated requests from the petitioner the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 avoided payment on this or that plea. At last on 26-3-1975 the Revenue Secretary to the Government of Manipur filed an application, purportedly under Section 30 of the L. A. Act, requesting the Collector to refer the case to the District Judge stating inter alia that the respondent No. 2 was "doubting the title of the petitioner to receive the compensation money" (Annexure A/15). The respondent No. 1 wrote back to the Hill Commissioner, Manipur, expressing his doubt about the applicability of S.30 of the L. A. Act in the case and suggested that the matter might be reviewed in consultation with the law department; but it appears this request was not heeded to. At last the respondent No. 1 made a reference to the District Judge, purportedly under Section 30 of the L. A. Act, in compliance with the letter of the Revenue Secretary (Annexure A/15). In the letter of reference (Annexure A/18) the Collector stated "it is claimed in the petition (of the Revenue Secretary) that Shri Phongseh Misao (petitioner) is not entitled to receive the compensation" awarded by the Collector in L. A. Case No. 1 of 1972. It is against this reference the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition with the prayers, as mentioned above alleging, inter alia, that the reference made by the Collector is wholly without jurisdiction and that the respondents are bound in law to pay him the compensation awarded by the Collector for the acquired land. 5. It is against this reference the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition with the prayers, as mentioned above alleging, inter alia, that the reference made by the Collector is wholly without jurisdiction and that the respondents are bound in law to pay him the compensation awarded by the Collector for the acquired land. 5. The respondents filed a counter affidavit sworn by the Under Secretary to the Government of Manipur, Development department, resisting the claim of the petitioner. It ap pears from the counter affidavit that the stand of the respondents is not very clear.At one place in the counter affidavit, it is stated that the land in question is actually Government khas land and that the report of the S. D. O. Mao at Annexure A/7 wherein it is stated that the land is included within the village of the petitioner is not reliable. Again at another place it is stated that the State has been and is the absolute owner of the village Nungphou and the Chief and his villagers are given only possessory right on payment of house tax thereof to the Government. 6. Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended before us that the so-called reference by the Respondent No. 1 under Section 30 of the L. A. Act is wholly misconceived and without jurisdiction. According to him, once the land was acquired and the award was made, the Government could have no right to intervene and to ask for a reference under Sec.30, as has been done in this case. At any rate, he submitted, in the absence of any other claimant, it cannot be said that there is any dispute within the meaning of Section 30 of the Act to give jurisdiction of the Collector to make a reference. 7. The learned Government Advocate, on the other hand submitted that the Government having disputed the right of the petitioner to receive the compensation money, the Collector was within his jurisdiction to make the reference and this Court, in its writ jurisdiction, cannot interfere with the discretion of the Collector. He further submitted that the alternative remedy of the petitioner is still there before the District Judge in the Reference case and he cannot be allowed to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court without exhausting that remedy. 8. He further submitted that the alternative remedy of the petitioner is still there before the District Judge in the Reference case and he cannot be allowed to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court without exhausting that remedy. 8. Before we go into the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, let us first deal with the preliminary objection of the respondents as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present writ application. It is a settled law that if an administrative or quasi judicial body acts without jurisdiction the High Court can interfere with such action in its certiorari jurisdiction. It is also a settled law that the finding of such a body as to a jurisdictional fact can be re-examined by the High Court to come to its own conclusion. If any authority is needed for this proposition, reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. D.K. Jadav, AIR 1968 SC 1186 and Raza Textile v. I.T. Officer AIR 1973 SC 1362 . We may also refer here to the decision of the Patna High Court in Sudhangshu Kumar v. L.A. Officer, AIR 1961 Pat 150 , the facts of which are very much similar to those of the present case. In that case it was held that the existence of a dispute as regards apportionment of compensation is a question of jurisdictional fact and unless there is such a dispute existing, the L. A. Officer has no authority or jurisdiction to make a reference to the Civil Court under S. 30. It was further held that where the jurisdiction of an Administrative Authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact, the High Court is entitled, in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari, to determine by its independent judgment whether or not that finding of fact is correct. 9. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the objection of the learned Government Advocate as to the jurisdiction of this Court is wholly untenable. We now, proceed to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, as mentioned earlier. 10. The contention of Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh that once an acquisition proceeding is taken up and an award is made, the Government has no right to intervene and ask for a reference cannot be accepted as a general proposition of law. We now, proceed to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, as mentioned earlier. 10. The contention of Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh that once an acquisition proceeding is taken up and an award is made, the Government has no right to intervene and ask for a reference cannot be accepted as a general proposition of law. No doubt, if the land belongs to the Government and none else has got any interest therein, there can be no necessity at all for the Government to go for acquisition. But there may be cases where the Government is the owner of the land but some other persons have got some limited interest, say as tenants or as licensees and such persons may have their structures or valuable trees on the land, to which they are legally entitled and which come within the definition of land under Section 3 (a) of the Act. In such a case it is always open to the Government to declare in the Notification under S.40 of the Act what is the nature of the right of the State over the land. In that case the person who may be interested in disputing the title of the Government to the land would be entitled to raise objections before the Collector and then before the District Judge and to have a determination of the question of title on the evidence. This was the view expressed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Makhanlal v. Secretary of State, AIR 1934 All 260. Again in some cases after the acquisition proceeding is started and the award is made, the land may vest in the Government by operation of law or otherwise. In such a case the Collector is within his jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act to make a reference to the District Judge for determination of the right of the Government to compensation which may devolve on it after the award. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court in Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 . 11. The question now is whether in the instant case there was any scope to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act at the instance of the Government. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court in Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 . 11. The question now is whether in the instant case there was any scope to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act at the instance of the Government. Admittedly at the initial stage in 1965-66 the Government proceeded to start some construction on the land for some Government offices on the assumption that it was Government khas land. Then on the representations made by the petitioner the Government caused an enquiry to be made by a responsible revenue officer namely, the S.D.O. Mao Sadar Sub-division, who after due enquiry submitted a report stating that the land in question falls within the village of the petitioner and it is not Government khas land. The Government evidently accepted this report; otherwise it would not have initiated the acquisition proceedings. In the notice under Section 4 (1) (Annexure-A/8) as well as in the notice under Section 9 of the Act (Annexure- A/10) the land was described as situate at Nungphou which is admittedly the village of the petitioner. Copies of these notices were separately sent to the petitioner by the Collector for information. In spite of publicity given to these notifications none else except the petitioner laid any claim for compensation. The Collector after due enquiry, as required under the Act, by his award dated 29-1-1973 held that the land belonged to the petitioner Shri Phongseh Misao and awarded compensation accordingly. At no stage of the acquisition proceedings, before the Award was made, Government raised any objection about the eligibility of the petitioner to receive such compensation. On the same day the award was made, the Collector wrote to the Development Commissioner to make available the sum of Rs. 59,616/- awarded as compensation for payment to the petitioner. The Government slept over the matter till 26-3-1975 on which date the Revenue Secretary, Government of Manipur filed an application before the Collector for a reference of the case to the District Judge under Section 30 of the Act as "the Government is doubting the title of the respondent Shri Phongseh Misao" and as "the said respondent is not entitled to receive the compensation awarded or is not competent to alienate the land". It was not mentioned in this petition (Annexure-A/15) nor in the letter of reference addressed to the District Judge (Annexure-A/18) that either the Government or anybody else is entitled to receive the whole or any part of the compensation money. 12. Section 30 of the L. A. Act is in the following terms : "30. Dispute as to apportionment - When the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the appointment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court." It is seen from the above provisions that a reference under the section pre-supposes anyone of the two kinds of disputes mentioned therein, namely, (i) any dispute as to the apportionment of the compensation awarded or any part thereof; and (ii) any dispute as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. Admittedly there is no dispute as to the apportionment of the compensation nor can it be said that there is any dispute as to whom the compensation is payable. A dispute of this nature pre-supposes the rival claims of two or more contending parties which are to be decided by the District Judge. We do not think that a mere doubt about the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money, in the absence of any other contending party laying claim to the whole or any part of the compensation money, will constitute a dispute within the meaning of S.30. 13. The word dispute is not defined in the Act. According to Chamberss Dictionary the word dispute means a quarrel; a contest with words; an argument or a debate. The learned Government Advocate submits that when the State has now disputed, that means challenged, the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money, there is a dispute. When a word admits of two or more meanings it is to be understood in that sense in which it best harmonises with the scheme or the subject of the enactment. The learned Government Advocate submits that when the State has now disputed, that means challenged, the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money, there is a dispute. When a word admits of two or more meanings it is to be understood in that sense in which it best harmonises with the scheme or the subject of the enactment. Viewed in such context, we are of the opinion that the word dispute occurring in Section 30 of the L. A. Act means a quarrel between two or more rival parties laying claim over the whole or any part of the compensation money. The use of the word "persons" i.e. in plural number in the section is also significant. Reference of a dispute as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation is payable is evidently meant for determination as to which person is entitled to receive the money. There must be such a person amongst the rival contending parties. In the instant case the respondents in their application filed before the Collector (Annexure-A/15) has not stated who is entitled to receive the money; nor has the Collector in his reference asked the District Judge to decide who is the person entitled to receive the compensation money. He has simply asked the District Judge to decide whether or not the petitioner is entitled to receive the money. This is not within the scope and ambit of Section 30 of the L. A. Act, in our opinion. In fact the Collector also took the same view, as we have taken, as is evident from his letter addressed to the Hill Commissioner (Annexure-A/17). It appears ultimately he had to yield to the pressure of the Government in making the reference. It may be mentioned here that under Section 18 of the L. A. Act the Collector is bound to make such a reference. But under Section 30 the Collector is not bound to make such a reference on any application. It appears ultimately he had to yield to the pressure of the Government in making the reference. It may be mentioned here that under Section 18 of the L. A. Act the Collector is bound to make such a reference. But under Section 30 the Collector is not bound to make such a reference on any application. In Grant v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1966 SC 237 ) (supra) the Supreme Court observed : Whereas under Section 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested, the Collector is, under Section 30, not enjoined to make a reference; he may relegate the person raising the dispute to agitate the same in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared by his award. The powers which are exercised by the Collector under Section 18 (1) and under Section 30 are distinct and may be invoked in contingencies which do not overlap." 14. No doubt, it has been urged in the counter affidavit of the respondents filed in this Court that the finding of the S.D.O., Mao Subdivision, that the land in question falls within the village Nungphou is not correct and that the land is actually Government khas land. Alternatively, it has also been stated that the land comprised in the said village belongs to the Government and the petitioner who is the head of the village as well as other villagers have got only possessory right. But what have been stated before us in the writ petition will not go to give jurisdiction to the Collector to make a reference under Section 30. What was stated before the Collector is only material for that purpose. It was never the case of the respondents before the Collector that the acquired land is actually Government khas land or that the State is the owner of the land comprised in village Nungphou and the petitioner has got only possessory right. In their application filed before the Collector it was simply stated trial the Government doubts the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money. As we have already pointed out, a mere doubt does not go to constitute a dispute within the meaning of Section 30. 15. Mr. In their application filed before the Collector it was simply stated trial the Government doubts the eligibility of the petitioner to receive the compensation money. As we have already pointed out, a mere doubt does not go to constitute a dispute within the meaning of Section 30. 15. Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner further urged before us that the aforementioned claim of the Government, now put before this Court, is barred by the principle of estoppel. It was submitted by him that having regard to the terms of the Government Notifications which described the land in such a manner as to negative the suggestion that it was Government land and having regard to the whole course of the land acquisition proceedings which were utterly inconsistent with the land being Government land, the Government is now estopped from claiming that the land is Government khas land or that the Government is the actual owner of the land comprised in village Nungphou. In making this submissions Mr. Nanda Kumar Singh relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Secretary of State v. Tatya Saheb, AIR 1932 Bom 386. Though this contention appears to have some force, it is not necessary, in our opinion, for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition to decide as to whether or not the Government is estopped from saying so. We have already held that there was no dispute before the Collector as to the persons to whom the compensation money is payable. In the absence of such a dispute the Collector could have no jurisdiction to make a reference to the District Judge. The respondents are bound to pay the compensation money to the petitioner in terms of the award made by respondent No. 1. 16. In the result this petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute. The reference made by the Collector to the District Judge under Section 30 of the Act (Annexure-A/18) is hereby quashed and we direct the respondents to pay the compensation money in terms of the award made by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case we however leave the parties to bear their own costs. K. LAHIRI, J. :- I agree. Petition allowed.