JUDGMENT Prakash, Satish Chandra, JJ. 1. THESE two special appeals have been heard together as they raise a common question of law : whether, a retrenched "workman" claiming re-instatement and continuity of service for non-compliance with the requirements of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (to be hereinafter referred as the Act) by an industrial employer and who invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court without exhausting the remedy available under the Act, is entitled to a high prerogative writ, under Article 226 of the Constitution. Or does the Act prescribe an adequate alternative remedy, leaving it to the discretion of the High Court to refuse the writ where an aggrieved workman has not taken recourse to such remedy. 2. IN Writ Petition No. 683 of 1974 (giving rise to Special Appeal No. 29 of 1975) Durgesh Kumar, who had completed more than three year's service as an 'unskilled staff" in the Railway Workshop, challenged the order terminating his services, made in purported exercise of the power under Rule 149 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I, on the ground that, in substance, it being 'retrenchment' within the meaning of sec. 2(oo) of the Act and the Railway Administration having not fulfilled the conditions postulated by Sec. 25-F, he was entitled to continue in service and to the accrued salaries and allowances. The Railway Administration contested the claim, taking also the plea that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief under Article 226 which he could obtain by invoking the machinery under the Act. The learned single Judge upon a scrutiny of the affidavits exchanged between the parties held that the petitioner being a 'workman' and the Railway Establishment an 'industry' with in the meaning of the Act since no retrenchment compensation was paid to the petitioner, the termination order was invalid. The plea of alternative remedy being available under the Act was repelled on the ground that on the mere possibility that some other remedy was available to the petitioner, the Court under Article 226 ought not to drive him out of Court. In the result, the impugned order was quashed and the petitioner was declared to have continued in the service of the Railway Administration. In the result, the impugned order was quashed and the petitioner was declared to have continued in the service of the Railway Administration. In Writ Petition No. 114 of 1973 (giving rise to Special Appeal No. 58 of 1975) the petitioner, claiming himself to be a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2 (s), challenged a similar order made by the Railway Administration on the ground that it being 'retrenchment' of his services and the employer having not fulfilled the conditions prescribed by section 25-F of the Act, the termination was wrongful and accordingly the petitioner continued in service of the Administration. The learned single Judge, however, taking the view that the termination of the services of the petitioner did not fall within the ambit of a case of 'retrenchment' as defined by section 2 (oo) of the Act, dismissed the petition, and accordingly the petitioner has come up in special appeal. 3. COUNSEL for the Railway Administration contends that since the dispute raised by the petitioners is an 'industrial dispute', it is to be settled by the machinery provided by the Act and, therefore, the petitioners should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High-Court under Article 226, to issue a prerogative writ. On the other hand, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners have urged that there being infraction of a legal right by the employers' non-fulfilment of the conditions under sec. 25-F of the Act and, at any rate, the remedy under the Act being not convenient and efficacious, and the High Court having admitted the petitions for hearing and issued the rule, recourse to exhaustion of the remedies under the Act should not be insisted upon in the present case. 4. THE principle is well settled that the Courts will not interfere by an extra ordinary remedy where complete satisfaction can be had by an action. Regarding issue of mandamus, the law has been summed up in Halsbury's Laws of England, IIIrd Edition, Volume II, at page 107, para-200, in these words : "The Court will, as a general rule and in exercise of its discretion, refuse an order of manadmus when there is an alternative specific remedy at law, which is not less convenient, beneficial and effective". The rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ is granted is, however, a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. In a case where the petitioner complains of violation of the fundamental right, or, where the act complained of is without the authority of law; where the alternative remedy is authorised by law which is ultra vires; where the act complained of is without jurisdicition; where some mandatory provision of the Constitution has been violated, or where the alternative remedy is not adequate, a writ is issued inspite of the fact that the aggrieved party has had other legal remedy. The question which, therefore, falls for our consideration is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the instant, the Act affords to the petitioners an adequate remedy and that brings us to the relevant provisions of the Act. Obviously, within none of the other exceptions the case at hand falls. The Act, as its title and indeed its whole tenor disclose, was enacted for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes appearing in the Act, "Industrial Dispute" is defined in section 2(k) of the Act. It says : "2(k). "Industrial Dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person" (emphasis supplied by us). Section 2-A extends the definition of "Industrial Dispute" in Section 2(k) : "2-A. Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that other workman or any union of workmen is a party to the dispute." 5. THE result of insertion of sec.2-A is that an individual workman himself can raise an industrial dispute regarding his discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of his services and it will be competent for the authorities under the Act to deal with such dispute of the workman as an 'Industrial Dispute' even though there is no espousal by his fellow workmen or any union composed of them. 6. 6. FOR the settlement of such disputes the appropriate Government, as provided by Sec. 7-A of the Act, may by a notification in the official Gazette constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals relating to any matter whether specified in the IInd Schedule or in the IIIrd Schedule of the Act and the counsel for the Railway Administration contends that the Government has established such Tribunals. Now, the IIIrd Schedule mentions the matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals and Item 10 thereof relates to retrenchment of workman. The Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, by an amendment in sec. 10 of the Act, provides that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the IIIrd Schedule, and is not likely to affect more than 100 workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under Clause (c). Section 10 provides that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by an order in writing refer the dispute to Tribunal or Labour Court irrespective of the fact that any other proceeding including conciliation proceedings under the Act have commenced. Sec. 4(k) of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is another provision which authorises the State Govt. to make a reference. The words 'at any time' used in section 10(1) do not admit of any period of limitation in making an order of reference. Article 137 of the New Limitation Act is equally inapplicable to proceedings under the Act. The Act confers upon the workmen in any industry certain special rights under Ch. V-A. Reconstruction of wage structure and awarding various fringe benefits are matters de hors the contract, but an industrial adjudicator can award the benefits arising out of these additional rights to the workmen. Likewise, the payment of compensation u/Ss. 25F, 25FF and 25FFF is a statutory right of the workmen where services are terminated in consequence of a retrenchment or transfer or closure of industrial undertaking. Section 33C is in the nature of an executing provision prescribing the manner in which dues from an employer can be recovered by the workman. Likewise, the payment of compensation u/Ss. 25F, 25FF and 25FFF is a statutory right of the workmen where services are terminated in consequence of a retrenchment or transfer or closure of industrial undertaking. Section 33C is in the nature of an executing provision prescribing the manner in which dues from an employer can be recovered by the workman. In our opinion, once the Act provides a complete machinery for obtaining relief in respect of any improper order passed by the industrial employer, an aggrieved workman cannot be permitted to abandon resort to that machinery and invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 when he has an adequate remedy available to him by way of refierence of the dispute by the appropriate Government to the Tribunal or the Court. In support of this contention counsel for the Railway Administration has invited our attention to the opinion handed down by the Supreme Court in Nanhoo Mal v. Hira Mal, 1975 AWC 671 and in Premier Automobiles v. K. S. Wadke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 . The former was a case in which by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the validity of the procedure adopted by the District Magistrate for holding election to the office of the President of the Municipal Board was challenged upon the allegation that it did not conform to the provisions of Rule 6 of the U. P. Municipalities (Conduct of Election of Presidents and Election Petitions) Order, 1964. Because section 43-B of the U. P. Municipalities Act sets out a complete procedure dealing with the case where the election- of the President is questioned, Alagiriswami, J., speaking for the Court, observed at page 674 of 1975 AWC :- "The Act provides only for one remedy, that remedy being an election petition to be presented after the election is over and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate stage......... once the legal effect above set forth of the provision of law which we are concerned with is taken into account, there is no room for the High Courts to interfere in exercise of their power under Article 226 of the Constitution." 7. IN the Premier Automobile's case (supra), the dispute being in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Act, the remedy in the civil court was held barred. IN the Premier Automobile's case (supra), the dispute being in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Act, the remedy in the civil court was held barred. There the plaintiffs based their claim on the memorandum of settlement dated 31st December, 1966, which on being acted upon had become a condition of service not only of the members of the Sabha or Union but also of others who were not its members. Their assertion was that the other settlement dated 9th January, 1971, arrived at between the Company and the Association Union under section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was not binding on those workmen who were not its members. They attacked the second agreement as having been arrived at without following the mandatory requirements of section 9-A of the Act. Their Lordships ruled that a collective agreement entered into between the Comany and the Sabha or the Union in December, 1966, created a right in favour of the members of the Union only under Sec. 18(1) of the Act and not under the general law of contract and the Company having terminated that agreement, the suit was in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Act. Laying down the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute, it was, inter alia, stated : (1) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (2) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (3) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act, such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. 8. (3) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act, such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. 8. THE Supreme Court founded the judgment on the authority of Wolverhampton New Waterworks Company v. Hawkesford (known as the Wolverhampton New), 141 E. R. 486 where W.illes, J. expounded the principle of law by the following celebrated observations : "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. One is, where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy, and the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy : there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The present case falls within this latter class, if any liability at all exists. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." Further, the Court referred with approval to several decisions of the House of Lords and out of those Barraclough v. Brown and Co., (1897) AC 615 and Pasmore v. Oswald Twistle Urban District Council, (1898) AC 387 may have apposite application here : In Barraclough v. Brown and Co. (supra) Lord Herschcll in construing section 56 of an Old English Harbours and Docks Act of 1847 using the language- "or the undertakers may, if they think fit, recover such expenses from the owner of such boat, barge or vessel in a court of summary jurisdiction" observed at page 622 as follows : "The right and the remedy are given uno flatu and the one cannot be dissociated from the other. By these words, the Legislature has, in my opinion, committed to the summary court exclusive jurisdiction, not merely to assess the amount of expense to be repaid to the undertaker, but to determine by whom the amount is payable ; and has, therefore, by plain implication indicated that no other court has any authority to entertain or decide these matters." The principle was further illustrated by Lord Halsbury L. C. in Pasmore v. Oswald, Twistle Urban District Council (supra) at pp. 394-95 in these terms : "The obligation which is created by this statute is an obligation which is created by the statute and by the statute alone. It is nothing to the purpose to say that there were other statutes which created similar obligations, because all those statutes are repealed; you must take your stand upon the statute in question, and the statute which creates the obligation is the statute to which one must look to see if there is a specified remedy contained in it. There is a specified remedy contained in it which is an application to the proper Government Department." Applying the principles aforementioned to the facts of the instant, it is clear that what the petitioners complained is the violation by the industrial employer of the mandatory requirements of Sec. 25-F of the Act. Sec. 25-F postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for effecting a valid retrenchment, namely, (a) one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons retrenchment or wages in lieu of such notice; (b) payment of compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every complete year of continuous service or in part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner; Rule 76 and Form F of the Centrat Rules of 1957. The parties are at variance on the point whether or not the termination amounts to 'reternchment' within the meaning of Sec. 2 (oo) of the Act. The parties are at variance on the point whether or not the termination amounts to 'reternchment' within the meaning of Sec. 2 (oo) of the Act. On the authority of the decision in Hari Psasad Shukla v. A. D. Divelker, 1957 (1) Labour Law Journal 243, the petitioners contend that they were retrenched without complying with the conditions laid down in Sec. 25-F of the Act. They were not thus enforcing a common law right or a right flowing from contract between them and the Railway Administration. The common law right of an individual employer to discharge or dismiss his workman or what is popularly known, 'right of hire and fire', has been subjected to statutory restrictions contained in section 11-A and section 25-F of the Act. The source of their right is the Act and where, therefore, the Act has created an obligation and has evolved a machinery to enforce its performance in a specified manner and also the Act lays down the manner of recovery of money in Sec. 33-C, we take it that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. 9. THERE is one more point and that has a bearing on the question, whether the Act affords an adequate remedy to an aggrieved workman. In industrial matters the Court is entitled and it is bound to modify contractual rights and obligations on consideration of equity and in the larger interest of the community, such as promotion of industrial peace and security of employment of workmen, while a court of law proceeds on the footing that no power exists in the court to make contract for people and the parties must make their own contracts. Industrial adjudication does not mean adjudication according to the law of master and servant. Unlike a court of law, an Industrial Tribunal may create new obligations or modify contracts in the interest of industrial peace and to prevent unfair practice or victimisation of the labour. As observed by Gajendragadkar, J. in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Labour Appellate Tribunal, (1963) 1 Lab. L. J. 436 at p. 444, "the concept of social justice has now become an integral part of industrial law and it would be idle for any party to suggest that industrial adjudication can or should ignore claims of social justice in dealing with industrial disputes". L. J. 436 at p. 444, "the concept of social justice has now become an integral part of industrial law and it would be idle for any party to suggest that industrial adjudication can or should ignore claims of social justice in dealing with industrial disputes". And it was in this background that the Supreme Court in a number of cases refused the relief of reinstatement even though the termination of service by the employer was improper, and instead awarded compensation in lieu of retrenchment-see Sham Nagar Jute Factory v. Their Workmen, (1964) 1 Lab. L. J. 634, Assam Oil Company Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1960) 1 Lab. LJ. 587, Hindustan Steels v. A. K. Roy, (1970) 1 Lab. L. J. 228 and Burmah Shell Oil Storage v. Their Workmen, (1970) 1 Lab. L. J. 363. A court of law has to work under the limitations of law and cannot adjudicate an industrial matter on the concept of social justice alone. A Court of law cannot ordinarily grant reinstatement or award compensation in lieu thereof, but the jurisdiction of the industrial adjudication to grant such reliefs is no longer in doubt. These considerations we cannot ignore in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a right which has been created by the Act. 10. COUNSEL for the Workmen in their endeavour to take their case out of the ambit of the above principles of law have advanced a two-fold contention : First, that the remedy provided under the Act is no remedy in the eye of law; reference to the Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the industrial dispute depends upon the exercise of the power by the Government u/S. 10(1). Second a reference under Sec. 10(1) can be made only upon an application made by the parties about the industrial dispute whether jointly or separately as provided by Sec. 10 (2). On the first point, a similar contention was raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles and it was repelled, with the observations that "reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of Govt. On the first point, a similar contention was raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles and it was repelled, with the observations that "reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of Govt. under Sec. 10(1) is so common that it is difficult to call the remedy a misnomer or insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of enforcement of the right or liability created under the Act............Persons wishing the enjoyment of such rights and wanting its enforcement must rest content to secure the remedy provided by the Act. The possibility that the Government may not ultimately refer an industrial dispute under Sec. 10 on the ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard". If the refusal is not sustainable in law, appropriate writ may be issued by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction against the Government. The second branch of the agrument is also of little avail. Sec. 10 (1) of the Act confers a power upon the appropriate Govt. to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to Boards, Courts or Tribunals where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. Sec. 10 (2) makes it obligatory upon the Government to make reference of an industrial dispute if the parties to the dispute apply in the prescribed form. In other words, in the event of the parties applying for reference of industrial disputes, the discretion of the Government whether to refer or not is divested, as in a case falling under this sub-section the Govt. like sub-section (1) has not to form its opinion .with respect to the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute or of expediency of making a reference. The requirement of making an application in the prescribed form, namely, in Form A, is mandatory for a valid reference u/S. 10 (2) of the Act but a reference made by the appropriate Government u/S. 10 (1) would not be vitiated merely on the ground that an application by one of the parties in Form A was not made. A fortiori there is no need of an application much less in Form A when the Government makes a reference under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act. 11. A fortiori there is no need of an application much less in Form A when the Government makes a reference under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act. 11. COUNSEL for the petitioners have cited various decisions of the High Courts in support of their contention that the remedy under the Act does not bar the relief under Article 226. In Duryo-dhan Naik v. Union of India, 1969 Lab. I. C. 1282 the Orissa High Court in a case of railway employee contending that the termination of his service amounted to retrenchement negatived the plea of the Railway Administration that the Act provides an adequate remedy. In Sonu Kumar Chatterji v. Distt. S.T. Engineer, 1970 Lab. I.C. 629 a Division Bench of the Patna High Court had taken the view that a worker retrenched in breach of Sec. 25-F could directly invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court for quashing the order of retrenchment and for the relief of reinstatement under Art. 226 even without raising an industrial dispute. In taking this view the Bench felt themselves fortified by a decision of the Bombay High Court in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Bombay, (1957) 1 Lab. L.J. 55 where the High Court directed the Hospital authorities by a writ of mandamus to reinstate the workmen even though the Union had filed a writ petition directly against the retrenchment of the workman without raising an industrial dispute. The decision of the Bombay High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, 1960 (1) L.L. J. 251. But in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case neither before the High Court nor before the Supreme Court objection to the maintainability of the writ petition was raised. N. Sundramony v. State Bank of India, (1974) Indian Factories and Labour Reports, Volume 29 page 186 was a similar case in which the Madras High Court relying upon the decision in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra) quashed the termination order of workman holding that the order was in contravention of Sec. 25-F of the Act. To the same effect are the observations of the Patna High Court in Basant Lal v. D.M. Engineer, 1975 S. L. W. R. 499. In an unreported decision in Sp. To the same effect are the observations of the Patna High Court in Basant Lal v. D.M. Engineer, 1975 S. L. W. R. 499. In an unreported decision in Sp. Appeal No. 108 of 1968 Becha Ram v. Union of India, decided on 14th April, 1970 (Alld.) this Court, taking the view that for a reference u/s. 10 (2) the employer and the employee should jointly or separately apply to the appropriate Government and as the remedy depends upon the will of the employer, it is no remedy, negatived the contention of the Railway Administration based on the plea of alternative remedy. 16 a. With respect, we may say that when a reference is made by the appropriate Govt. u/Sec. 10(1), it would not be bad on the ground that an application by one of the parties was not made. We have already discussed this aspect of the matter in the foregoing and we need not repeat the same here. Form A prescribed by the Rules is not required when the Government makes a reference under Sec. 10(1) of the Act. That being apart, in view of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles Case (supra) and the observation made in Nanhoo Mal's case, "where the statute prescribes for one remedy, there is no room for the High Court to interfere in exercise of their power under Sec. 226 of the Constitution", we hold and decide that these cases are with respect no longer good law. 12. COUNSEL for the petitioners have further invited our attention to some decisions where the relief under Art. 226 was given to the petitioner inspite of an alternative remedy being available to him-see State of West Bengal v. North Adjai Coal Company Limited, 1971(1) S.C.C. 309 and Lala Hirday Narain v. I.T.O. Bareilly, 1970 (2) S.C.C. 352 . But in our view, these cases do not substantially assist the petitioners. Whether relief under Art. 226 can be granted when alternative remedy is available is a matter of discretion; it by no means follows that any kind of principle is established. The principle, however, is that extraordinary remedy should not take the place of ordinary remedy (per Hidayatullah, C.J. in Trilok Chand v. H. B. Munshi, 1969 (2) S.C.R. 824 at page 830). The principle, however, is that extraordinary remedy should not take the place of ordinary remedy (per Hidayatullah, C.J. in Trilok Chand v. H. B. Munshi, 1969 (2) S.C.R. 824 at page 830). Further, reliance has been placed by counsel for the petitioners upon single Judge decision of this Court in Kali Charan v. The Workshop Electrical Engineer, 1973 Labour and Industrial Cases 172 in support of his alternate submission that the dispute about the legality of the order of retrenchment being not an 'industrial dispute' within Sec. 10 of the Act, it would not be referable to Boards, Courts or Tribunals under Ch. Ill of the Act. In the holding of the learned single Judge : "Payment of retrenchment compensation u/S. 25-F is not a matter which falls in the exclusive jurisdiction of an Industrial Court, Board or Tribunal. The said provision is contained in Chapter V-A of the Act, which does not deal with disputes which are referable to the Board, Court or Tribunal under Ch. Ill but is concerned with entirely different matters.' With respect, we confess our inability to subscribe to that view. The words "employment or non-employment" found in Sec. 2 (k) are of the widest amplitude and have been put in juxta-position to make the definition of 'Industrial Dispute' comprehensive. "Employment or non-employment" constitutes, the other two classes of Industrial disputes being those 'connected with the terms of employment' and 'the conditions of labour'. In Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bombay and others, AIR 1949 FC 111 these words were paraphrased : "Any dispute which has connection with the workmen being put in or out of service or employment". Sec. 2-A of the Act specifically deems a dispute between the employer and an individual workman "connected with or arising out of retrenchment" as an industrial dispute. An order made by an industrial employer without complying with the requirements of Sec. 25-F will be a case of unlawful termination of service to entitle the workman to reinstatement and full wages for the period he has been kept out of employment. Under Sec. 10(1) the appropriate Government may refer, "an existence of apprehended, dispute", for adjudication to the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be. Chapter V-A confers certain special rights upon the workman. Under Sec. 10(1) the appropriate Government may refer, "an existence of apprehended, dispute", for adjudication to the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be. Chapter V-A confers certain special rights upon the workman. But since there arises non-employment by reason of termination of the employment by the employer, it would be a matter requiring the settlement between the workman and the employer. Being thus an industrial dispute under Sec. 2 (k) read with Sec. 2-A, it will be within the jurisdiction of the appropriate Government to refer such a dispute to the Tribunal/Labour Court to determine whether the termination was justified. Sec. 25-F was never intended to be taken alone and in isolation from Ch. Ill of the Act. Viewed in that light, we are of the opinion that Sec. 10 read with Sections 2(k) and 2-A of the Act is wide enough to authorise the appropriate Government to refer a dispute raised for re-employment of a retrenched workman to industrial adjudication. 13. FOR the discussion in the foregoing, we are, therefore, of the opinion that since the right sought to be enforced by the petitioners is a right created under the Act, the remedy for its enforcement is by way of raising an industrial dispute which the appropriate Government has the power to refer under Sec. 10(1) of the Act to the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be. Allowing thus, full force and effect to be given to the provisions of the Act, we restrain ourselves from granting relief in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. ACCORDINGLY, we allow Special Appeal No. 29 of 1975 and dismiss Special Appeal No. 58of 1975 and, vacating the finding on the plea of retrenchment taken by the petitioners and leaving the said question to be decided on merits by the Industrial Adjudication, we dismiss Writ Petitions Nos. 114 of 1973 and 683 of 1974. In the circumstances, costs in both the cases shall be borne by the parties. Sp. A. No. 29/1975 allowed. K.J.C. Sp. A. No. 58/1975 dismissed.