JUDGMENT K.N. SINGH, J. 1. THESE are five petitions which raise common questions of law. I consider it proper to dispose these petitions by a common order. 2. ALL the petitioners, except Rajendra Prasad Srivastava, were employed in the Diesel Locomotive Works, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the D.L.W.) a public undertaking run and administered by the Railway Administration. Rajendra Prasad Srivastava, petitioner (Writ Petition No. 8273 of 1974) was employed as a clerk in the North Eastern Railway at Gorakhpur. The Disciplinary Authority as defined under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, issued orders removing all the petitioners from service in exercise of its powers under rule 14 (ii) of the said rules. Separate orders in case of each of the petitioners were passed in May, 1974. The allegation against the petitioners was that they took leading part in the Railway strike held in May 1974. The Disciplinary Authority removed them from service without framing any charges or holding any enquiry or giving any opportunity to them. The petitioners filed appeal against their removal but the appellate authority upheld the order of the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed the order removing the petitioners from service. Aggrieved the petitioners filed these petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of their removal from service. 3. SRI G. C. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the impugned orders of removal were passed in violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as petitioners were not given any opportunity to explain their conduct or to make their submissions with regard to the quantum of punishment, before the impugned orders were issued removing the petitioners from service. SRI Lalji Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent Railway urged that the impugned orders of removal were passed under special circumstances under Rule 14 (ii) and it was not necessary to afford any opportunity to the petitioners. 4. RULE 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, is in the following terms: "14. Special procedure in certain cases notwithstanding anything contained in RULE 9 to 13. 4. RULE 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, is in the following terms: "14. Special procedure in certain cases notwithstanding anything contained in RULE 9 to 13. (i) Where any penalty is imposed on a railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge or (ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; or (iii) Where the President is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules: the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit provided that the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule." Rules 9 to 13 lay down procedure for framing charges, holding enquiry and for awarding punishment against a railway servant who may be found guilty of any misconduct or misbehaviour. The procedure laid down in the Rules ensure a reasonable opportunity of defence to the delinquent railway servant which is in consonance with the constitutional protection guaranteed to a person holding civil post under the State, viz., Article 311 of the Constitution. Rule 14, however, contains special provision for awarding penalty to a railway servant without complying with the procedure laid down in Rules 9 to 13. The special power as conferred by Rule 14 can be exercised in three contingencies. Firstly, if a railway servant is convicted on a criminal charge, the disciplinary authority may impose penalty on him without following procedure or holding enquiry in accordance with rules 9 to 13. Secondly, if the disciplinary authority is satisfied for the reasons recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable due to presence of exceptional circumstances, to hold enquiry in the manner provided in rules 9 to 13, penalty may be awarded to the railway servant without holding any enquiry was contemplated by rules 9 to 13. Secondly, if the disciplinary authority is satisfied for the reasons recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable due to presence of exceptional circumstances, to hold enquiry in the manner provided in rules 9 to 13, penalty may be awarded to the railway servant without holding any enquiry was contemplated by rules 9 to 13. Lastly rule 14 empowers the President to award any penalty to a railway servant without holding any enquiry, if he is satisfied that in the interest of security of the State, it would not be expedient to hold any enquiry. A railway servant may be removed without holding any enquiry only on the existence of either of these three contingencies. Clause (i) contemplates awarding penalty on the basis of conviction by a court. Clause (ii) envisages dispensation of enquiry on the ground that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry. Clause (iii) empowers the President to award penalty in the interest of the security of State. Before power is exercised under any of the three clauses of rule 14, the competent authority is required to consider the circumstances of each case, and if under the service rules consultation with the Union Public Service Commission is necessary, then the Commission must be consulted before orders are made in either of the three cases. The rule confers extraordinary powers on the authorities to remove a railway servant from service without holding any enquiry or giving any opportunity of defence. 5. THERE is no dispute that in the instant case consultation with the Union Public Service Commission was not necessary. The question then arises as to whether the disciplinary authority while considering the circumstances of the case is required to comply with the rules of natural justice, so as to afford opportunity to the railway servant. In Bhola Nath v. Union of India 1975(1) Service Law Reporter 277., Thakar, J. or Gujarat High Court, while interpreting rule 14 (ii) hold that though while exercising powers under rule 14 (ii) there is no necessity for holding any elaborate enquiry as contemplated by rules 9 to 13, the disciplinary authority is bound to afford opportunity to the railway servant in relation to the punishment which the authority may propose to award against him. In the absence of any opportunity the order awarding punishment would be in violation of principles of natural justice. In the absence of any opportunity the order awarding punishment would be in violation of principles of natural justice. The view of Thakar, J. was upheld by a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Letters Patent Appeal but the judgment is not available. The view taken by Gujarat High Court was not accepted by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Chief Mechanical Engineer E. Railway v/s. Jyoti Prasad Benerjee 1975(2) Service Law Reporter 437. The Calcutta High Court referred to the proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and compared the same with rule 14, thereafter the Bench held that proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as well as Rule 14 by necessary implication excluded application of the principles of natural justice. The Bench held that even though the orders may affect the tenure of service of a Government servant, it could not be said that their right to service was affected, because under the proviso to Article 311(2) no person holding civil post under the Union Government or State Government has any legal right to hold office as the right to hold office or continuance in service is always subject to the pleasure of the President or the Governor. 6. ON a close analysis of the two judgments, I find it difficult to agree with the view of the Calcutta High Court. No doubt it is correct to hold that by necessary implication, the application of principles of natural justice are excluded if the President of the Governor exercise powers under Proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, but that is not so in the case of exercise of power under rule 14. The proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 14 are not identical, instead there is a significant difference in the two provisions. While Rule 14 lays down that the 'disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case the proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution do not contain any such provision. The use of the expression 'may consider the circumstances of the case' imply that the authority while exercising powers under rule 14 must consider the circumstances of the case in an objective manner. The expression 'consider' indicates that the Disciplinary Authority is not permitted to act on its subjective satisfaction. The use of the expression 'may consider the circumstances of the case' imply that the authority while exercising powers under rule 14 must consider the circumstances of the case in an objective manner. The expression 'consider' indicates that the Disciplinary Authority is not permitted to act on its subjective satisfaction. Since the Disciplinary Authority is required to consider the circumstances of the case, it would not be reasonable to hold that the rules of natural justice are excluded by necessary implication. Rules of natural justice are attracted to a case where a statutory authority is required to consider the circumstances of the case before exercising its power affecting right of a citizen. A permanent Government servant has a right to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation and his tenure of service cannot be curtailed except by means of an order issued in accordance, and in compliance of the procedure requirements of statutory rules of service and Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Whenever the Disciplinary Authority terminates the services of a Railway servant under Rule 14, it undoubtedly affects him adversely and his legal right to continue in service is taken away. In this situation, in the absence of any statutory provision the principles of natural justice are attracted and if the power is exercised in violation of those rules, the exercise of power would be rendered void. (See: State of Orissa v. Bina Pani) 1967(15) F.L.R. 299= (1950-67) 3 S.C.L.J. 1574=A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1259. In Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v/s. T. R. Challappan A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2218., validity of an order removing a railway servant under Rule 14(1) was considered by the Supreme Court. In construing the expression 'the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such order thereon as it deems fit', the Supreme Court observed "The word 'consider' merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the Disciplinary Authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words the term 'consider' postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person." The Supreme Court further made observations "The statutory provision referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoying that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair play. The disciplinary authority has the undoubted power after hearing the delinquent employee and considering the circumstances of the case to inflict any major penalty on the delinquent employee without any further departmental enquiry if the authority is of the opinion that the employee has been guilty of a serious offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, it is not desirable or conductive in the interests of administration to retain such a person in service." 7. THE above observations even though made while considering validity of an order issued under Rule 14 (i), would equally apply to any order issue under any of the three clauses of Rule 14. The Supreme Court has declared that the principles of natural justice would apply as the Disciplinary Authority is required to consider the circumstances of the case before making orders which he may deem fit. In this view of the matter the view taken by the Calcutta High Court does not lay down correct law. There is no dispute that none of the petitioners were afforded any opportunity whatsoever by the Disciplinary Authority before removing them from service under Rule 14. 8. SINCE the order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice the impugned orders of removal are rendered void. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that clause (ii) of Rule 14 requires the Disciplinary Authority to award penalty 'for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry in the manner provided in these rules', therefore recording of reasons is a condition precedent for the exercise of power. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that clause (ii) of Rule 14 requires the Disciplinary Authority to award penalty 'for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry in the manner provided in these rules', therefore recording of reasons is a condition precedent for the exercise of power. In the instant case since the Disciplinary Authority did not record any reasons in writing as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry in accordance with the rules the order of removal is liable to be quashed on this ground also. There is no doubt that the impugned orders do not contain any reasons but the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Railway Administration states that the requisite reasons were recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and the same are present in the Railway files. The question then arises as to whether recording of reasons and keeping the same on the file would meet the requirement of law. On this question again there is divergence of opinion. The Calcutta High Court in the case of the Chief Mechanical Engineer v. Jyoti Prasad (supra) held that the order as communicated to the Railway servant need not be speaking order as the requirement of law is that the reasons are recorded and kept on file. The contention of the railway employees that in the absence of reasons it would be difficult for them to file appeal as contemplated by Rule 18, the High Court observed that the railway servant may ask for the reasons and thereafter he may file appeal. With great respect to the learned Judges I find no rationable for this view. Rule 14(ii) which requires the Disciplinary Authority to record reasons in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry in the manner provided by these rules, laws down a statutory principle. The nature of power conferred on the Disciplinary Authority is drastic as it takes away the right of a railway servant to defend himself in the manner provided by the rules, therefore Rule 14 (ii) enquiries that the Disciplinary Authority while exercising the exceptional power must record reasons disclosing the circumstances which may make it clear that the holding of enquiry was reasonably not practicable. This lays down a safeguard against the arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. This lays down a safeguard against the arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. The reasons so recorded are liable to be examined in appeal as the rules contemplate appeal against the order passed under rule 14. An aggrieved railway servant may approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and in the absence of any reasons it would be difficult for the petitioner and this Court to appreciate the grounds which may have persuaded the Disciplinary Authority to adopt this unusual course. The purpose of recording reasons would be defeated if the reasons so recorded are not communicated to the Railway servant against which the order is passed, and the same are kept on file. The opinion that the reasons recorded must be communicated to the Railway servant, consequently the order of removal issued under Rule 14 (ii) must be a speaking order. In Bholanath Khanna v. Union of India (supra), a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court held that failure to pass and communicate a speaking order to the Railway servant would amount to deprivation of statutory right of appeal and as such it is open to the Railway servant to contend that the order was passed in non-compliance with the statutory rules The view expressed by the learnt Single Judge was upheld in Letters Patent Appeal. I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court on this question. In the circumstances I am of the opinion that the impugned orders of removal are vitiated on this ground also. In the result I allow the petitions and quash the impugned orders of removal they are entitled to continue in service and to their costs of the petitions.