JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This petition is directed against the order of the Director, postal services, Uttar Pradesh dated 4-9-1975 retiring the petitioner prematurely from service by giving him three months' salary in lieu of period of notice. 2. The petitioner was employed as Inspector, Post Offices in the Postal Department of Union of India. On a certain complaint of misconduct against the petitioner a preliminary enquiry was held and witnesses were examined. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Agra Division, issued a charge sheet to the petitioner, containing a number of charges of misconduct and failure to perform duty. The petitioner was required to submit his explanation to those charges. On 2-9-1975 petitioner made application for inspection of documents mentioned in the Charge-sheet. The Senior Superintendent of Post Offices rejected the petitioner's application on 5-9-1975. On that very day the Director of postal services, Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of his powers under Clause (b) of Proviso to Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 48 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, issued orders retiring the petitioner from service. Aggrieved the petitioner filed this petition challenging the validity of the said order. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment without giving any opportunity of defence as contemplated by Art. 311 of the Constitution. Learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents urged that the impugned order is a simple order of compulsory retirement, it does not cast any stigma to the petitioner. The order was not passed as a measure of punishment. He further urged that since the order has been issued in unexceptional form, this court cannot go behind the order to ascertain its true nature. Rule 41(1) of the Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 confers absolute power on the appointing authority to retire a Government servant in public interest on his completing 30 years of qualifying service. The nature of the power conferred on the appointing authority is the same as conferred on the appropriate authority under Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. Rule 41(1) of the Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 confers absolute power on the appointing authority to retire a Government servant in public interest on his completing 30 years of qualifying service. The nature of the power conferred on the appointing authority is the same as conferred on the appropriate authority under Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. Normally, if an order of compulsory retirements is passed by the appointing authority retiring a Government servant in public interest and if the order does not contain any words to cast stigma on the Government servant, such an order cannot be treated to be an order of punishment, but where a facts and circumstances, placed before the Court show that in a substance the order is founded on misconduct, it is open to the court to examine the attending facts and circumstances to ascertain the true nature of the order. It is well settled that the form of the order of termination of service or compulsory retirement is not conclusive of its true nature. Many a time, the form may be merely comouflage of an order of dismissal for misconduct. It is open to the court to go behind the form to ascertain the true character of the order. The Supreme Court consistently affirmed this view in S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680; State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1089. State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Misra, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1011 and Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192. The respondents contention that the court could not go behind the order to ascertain its true character is untenable. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents then urged that if the appointing authority bona fide forms opinion that a Government servant should not be retained in service in public interest, the order cannot be challenged on the ground that the order was passed by way of punishment. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40 . In J.N. Sinha's case the order of compulsory retirement was not challenged on the ground that even though the order, issued in unexceptionable form but in substance it was in order of punishment. Since the order was not challenged on this ground the Supreme Court had no occasion to deal with this question. In J.N. Sinha's case the order of compulsory retirement was not challenged on the ground that even though the order, issued in unexceptionable form but in substance it was in order of punishment. Since the order was not challenged on this ground the Supreme Court had no occasion to deal with this question. J.N. Sinha's case is authority for the proposition that in the case of compulsory retirement Court cannot go behind the order. The nature of power to terminate the services of a temporary Government servant under the service Rules is the same as conferred on the appropriate authority under Fundamental Rule 56 or Rule 48 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules. In both the cases, power is exercised without assigning any reasons to terminate the services of any reasons to terminate the services of any Government servant. The Supreme Court has consistently held that in a case where servant of a temporary Government servant are terminated by a simply order of termination, it is open to the court to examine the true nature. The same principle would apply in adjudging the validity of an order of compulsory retirement. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. P.S. Johari, 1976 A.W.C. 223. A Division Bench of this Court held that it is permissible for the court to see whether the order of compulsory retirement is founded or based on misconduct and inefficiency and has in effect been passed by way of punishment. This can be done only by going behind the order. 5. Now the question arises as to whether in the instant case the impugned order was passed by way of punishment. As already noted it was permissible to the appointing authority to retire the petitioner under Rule 48 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, without assigning any reason or giving any opportunity to the petitioner. But the circumstances which proceded to the issue of the order are necessary to be considered. There is no dispute that there were allegations of misconduct against the petitioner to the effect that he had acted dishonestly in certain matters and he manipulated records, and failed to discharge his duties in accordance with the rules. But the circumstances which proceded to the issue of the order are necessary to be considered. There is no dispute that there were allegations of misconduct against the petitioner to the effect that he had acted dishonestly in certain matters and he manipulated records, and failed to discharge his duties in accordance with the rules. After a fact finding enquiry, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him for awarding major punishment and with this and in view he was served with a memo of charges on 27-8-4975 calling upon him to submit his defence. This is clear from the averments contained in paragraphs 10 of the affidavit of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices. Admittedly disciplinary proceedings were not dropped, instead the petitioner was asked to submit his reply before he could be allowed to inspect the documents which were sought to be relied upon against the petitioner during the enquiry. In the background of these set of facts I find no legitimate ground to accept the respondents contention that the compulsory retirement of the petitioner from service was not founded on the disciplinary proceedings taken against him. On the admitted facts, it is legitimate to infer that the charges of his honesty and inefficiency against the petitioner were the foundation for the issue of the impugned order. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment. Since the petitioner was not given. any opportunity of defence the impugned order is rendered illegal. 6. In the result I allow the petition with costs and quash the impugned order dated 9-9-1975. The petitioner is entitled to continue in service and I direct the respondents to treat the petitioner in service