Order: This criminal revision case is against the order of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Usilampatty, dismissing the petition in C.M.P.No. 270 of 1974 in so far as the respondent herein. is concerned. 2. One Venkitachalam, petitioner herein, as trustee of Sri Alagarsamy Madam, Allinagaram village, Periakulam Taluk, and in. pursuance of the certificate issued to him by the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Administration) Department, Madurai, under section 101 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, has filed the said C.M.P. No. 270 of 1974 in the Court of Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Usilampatty, for directing the respondents 1 to 10 to deliver the temple properties mentioned in the schedule attached to the petition. The first respondent is reported to have expired. Except the 6th respondent, the other respondents have filed petition stating that they have no objection for the petition being allowed. The 6th respondent alone has filed a counter stating that he is a bond fide tenant having derived tenancy lawfully from the previous trustees and that his claim to remain in possession is made in all good faith. He would further contend that he is a tenant from the year 1953 onwards as per the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and that he cannot be ordered to be evicted except under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. 3. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, after giving through the evidence adduced in this case, held that the claim of the 6th respondent to be in possession on his own account is in good faith and dismissed the petition as against the 6th respondent. 4. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner has preferred this criminal revision case, contending that the lower Court, has erred in holding that the respondent is in possession of the property under a valid lease agreement entered into between the 6th respondent (respondent) and the previous lawful trusts and that he is now in possession as a tenant by holding over. 5. The questions that arise for consideration are whether the respondent is a tenant by holding-over or a trespasser and. whether section 101 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act is applicable to the facts of the present Case. 6. Out of ten respondents, in the trial Court itself the first respondent was reported to have expired. 5. The questions that arise for consideration are whether the respondent is a tenant by holding-over or a trespasser and. whether section 101 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act is applicable to the facts of the present Case. 6. Out of ten respondents, in the trial Court itself the first respondent was reported to have expired. Respondents 2 to 5 and 7 to 10 stated that they have no objection for ordering delivery of the prorerties to the petitioner. The respondent (6th respondent before the trial Magistrate) claims to be a bond fide tenant having derived tenancy lawfully from the previous trustees and therefore his claim to remain in possession of the suit property is in. all good faith. Mr. C.F. Louis appearing for the petitioner would strenuously contend, that the learned Magistrate has erred in observing that the respondent (6th respondent) is in possession as tenant by holding over According to him, the claim made by the respondent is not a bona fide one and he is a trespasser. The respondent in support of his contention has filed on his side two documents namely (1) a registered notice dated 22nd August, 1971 signed on behalf of the petitioner to him and (2) a copy of the reply notice dated 16th September, 1971 sent by the counsel of this respondent to the counsel of the petitioner. The property in dispute is in respect of a rice mill building with the superstructures situated in door No. 46 ward No 8, Nehruji Street, Allinagaram in Periakulam Taluk, as set out in schedule B to the petition filed by the petitioner. It is seen from the registered notice dated 22nd, August, 1971 sent to respondent by the petitioner’s counsel that the respondent has to execute a fresh lease agreement to the petitioner regarding the lease of the property in question and the respondent should pay the arrears of rent to the petitioner. The respondent by his reply dated 16th September, 1971, has slated that he does not dispute that the petitioner is a trustee of the temple, on the validity of the order passed appointing him as trustee. Further he has stated in clear terms that he is prepared to attorn to the present trustee, namely the petitioner as his landlord and ready to execute a fresh lease deed in respect of the property in question. Further he has stated in clear terms that he is prepared to attorn to the present trustee, namely the petitioner as his landlord and ready to execute a fresh lease deed in respect of the property in question. Therefore it is not disputed by the petitioner that the respondent is a tenant of the properties belonging to the said Sri Alagarsamy Madam and the respondent is in possession of the suit properties on obtaining a lease deed from the previous lawful trusteee. As the learned Magistrate has observed that it is not shown that the lease granted by the previous trustee-in-office is either unlawful or illegal, the respondent has therefore to be held in possession of the property under a valid lease agreement entered into between him and the previous lawful trustee which lease was for a period till 19th February, 1973 and he still continues to be in possession of the property. 7. Mr. Louis would contend that the respondent is only a trespasser, but not a tenant holding over. In support of his contention,he would rely upon the ruling, Salay Md. Sait v. J.M.S. Charity1. This ruling relates to the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 defining the scope of section 2 (2) of the Act. After going through the above decision I am of the view that the principles laid down under this ruling cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case which stand entirely on different footing. The second one relied upon by the learned counsel is a decision in M.A. Irani v. M.E. Mistry2. In this case, the Supreme Court while dealing with section 4 (B) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (LXVII of 1948) has held that if a tenant after the termination of a lease is in possession without the consent of the landlord, he is a tenant by sufferance and is not entitled to the protection under section 4 (B) and that it is only where a tenant will continue in possession with the consent of the landlord that he may be called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The Supreme Court has further observed that a tenancy is a matter of privity of parties and where the landlord never gave consent to hold over the tenant is only a trespasser. The Supreme Court has further observed that a tenancy is a matter of privity of parties and where the landlord never gave consent to hold over the tenant is only a trespasser. I am afraid how far this ruling would be helpful to the petitioner as to the facts of the present case. But in fact, if we apply the principles laid down in this case, it would be helpful only to the respondent. As I have already narrated, the petitioner himself has admitted in his legal notice that the respondent was in possession of the property on the strength of the lease agreement entered into between him and the previous trustee and the present trustee expressed his willingness to allow him to continue in possession provided the respondent was prepared to execute a fresh lease deed in his favour. The respondent had also expressed his willingness to attorn the tendency in favour of the petitioner. Therefore the respondent has to be held to have been in possession of the property with the consent of the landlord. After having consented the respondent to be in possession of the property, the present contention of the petitioner that he is a trespasser is uncomprehensible. The learned Magistrate in my view has rightly relied on the observation made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a judgment reported in Danamurthy v. Balayya3, which is to the effect that the Magistrate while dealing with the petition under section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 (corresponding to section 101 of the present Act) must be satisfied either that the person resisting the possession of the lawful trustee derived bis title from either a dismissed trustee-office-holder, or other person not entitled in good faith or that he had no shadow of the claim which could be regarded as bona fide and that before any decision could be taken with reference to the body of the section, the Magistrate is required to satisfy himself as to the nature of the claim of the petitioner. 8. Section 101 of the present Act (Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowements Act) under the heading "putting trustee Or Executive Officer in direct possession" deals with the power of Magistrate in giving delivery of possession of the properties. The delivery of posssession under this section could be directed against three categories of persons. 8. Section 101 of the present Act (Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowements Act) under the heading "putting trustee Or Executive Officer in direct possession" deals with the power of Magistrate in giving delivery of possession of the properties. The delivery of posssession under this section could be directed against three categories of persons. The first consists of trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from his office meaning thereby disqualified to hold or continue to be in possession, second consists of persons who are otherwise not entitled to be in possession and the third category consists of any person claiming or deriving a title from such trustee, officer-holder or servant, not being a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person not being such trustee, office-holder or servant. Therefore if the resistence or prevention is made in good faith to be in possession, it will not come or fall within the scope of three categories of persons mentioned in section 101 of the Act. Ananthanarayanan, O.C.J., in a case in Ponnusamy v. Nallamuthu1, has observed regarding the scope and applicabiliy of section 101 of the Act as follows: "As will be seen from a glance of section 101, it is not every person who may be in possession of the properties of a religious endowment, against whom a proceeding can be taken under this provision of law. On the contrary, the provision is explicitly restricted to a person in possession who is a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution or one who has been dismissed or suspended from such office, or any person claiming or deriving title from such trustee, officeholder or servant. This is a positive limitation. Not merely this. There is also a negative limitation, in that a person who could claim in good faith to be in possession on his own account, or on account of some person not being such a trustee, office-holder or servant, is definitely excluded." Vide also the decision in Rangasamy Chetty v. P.N. Perumal2. 9. Therefore the question is whether the person claiming the possession if the property is in lawful possession of the said property in good faith. From the above discussion, I have no hesitation to hold, that the respondent’s claim is a bona fide one made in good faith. 9. Therefore the question is whether the person claiming the possession if the property is in lawful possession of the said property in good faith. From the above discussion, I have no hesitation to hold, that the respondent’s claim is a bona fide one made in good faith. In view of my foregoing discussion, I do no: find any error in the order of the learned Magistrate and hence the same is confirmed. This criminal revision case is dismissed.