JUDGMENT B. D. Singh, J. This application in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') is directed against the order of the lower appellate court dated 13.12.75 restraining the petitioner from interfering in the function of the plaintiff-opposite party, as an acting headmaster of M.P. High School, Sasaram, and also restraining him from functioning as acting headmaster of the said school till the question of seniority is decided in Title suit no. 499 of 1975, instituted by the opposite party in the court of 1st, Munsif, Sasaram. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved in the application it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. As indicated above, the plaintiff-opposite party instituted the said title suit for declaration that he was senior to the defendant-petitioner and that the letter of the District Education Officer (hereinafter referred to as 'the D. E. O.') was not binding on him (the plaintiff), and for permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from Interfering with the function of the plaintiff as the acting headmaster of the said school. On 27.10.75 one Kuber Nath, who was the headmaster of the school, had informed the Sub-divisional Education Officer that he was going to retire on 4.11.75 and sought his instruction as to whom he should hand over charge on his retirement. He forwarded that letter to the D. E. O. According to the petitioner, on 30.10.75 the D.E.O. passed an order while he was at Arrah that the petitioner was senior and, therefore, he should be put in charge. A copy of the said letter of the D.E.O. was taken by one of the teachers of the school, who had gone to Arrah, and he delivered it to Kuber Nath on 1.11.75 at 7 P.M. On that date the managing committee of the school passed a resolution to the effect that since Kuber Singh was retiring on 4.11.75, he would hand Over charge to the person directed by the Board or D.E.O. if no clear direction was received, then in that case, if necessary, an extraordinary meeting of the managing committee would be called on 4.11.75 to consider the matter. In the said meeting, among others, Kuber Nath was also present-vide Annexure 2'. In the said meeting, among others, Kuber Nath was also present-vide Annexure 2'. However, on 3.11.75, Kuber Nath handed over formal charge to the plaintiff-opposite party under Annexure 3', the relevant portion of which reads thus :- "Vide order of the Secretary M. P. Singh School, Sasaram, District Rohtas, dated 3rd Nov. 1975, after noon, I handed over the charge of the school to Shri Shivadhin Prasad Srivastava an Assistant Teacher of the School. The detail charge will follow : Sd. Shivadhin Pd. Sd. Kuber Singh, 3.11.75 Srivastava, 3.11.75 Retiring Headmaster Acting Headmaster M.P. High School, Sasaram M.P. High school, Sasaram (Rohtas) (Rohtas) On 4.11.75 Kuber Nath, as it appears, had received a letter written by D.E.O. as contained in Annexure 1' at 12.30 P.M. and therefore he handed over charge to the petitioner, as contained in Annexure 4', the relevant portion of which reads thus: **viuh lsok fuo`fr ds dkj.k dfri; vifjgk;Z dkj.k bl fnŒ 3-11-75 dks fo|ky; dk izHkkj Hkh flok/khu izlkn dks ns fn;k FkkA bl chp esus tks izHkkj nsus ds lEcU/k es foHkkx es fy[kk FkkA bl lEcU/k es foHkkxh; funs’k vkt fnukad 4-11-75 dks 12%30 cts fnu es esjs lkeus j[kk x;kA vr% voj&izeaMy f’k{kk inkf/kdkjh] lklkjke nf{k.kh ds Kki la[;k 838 fnŒ 4-11-75 ds vkyks es mDr fn;s izHkkj dks jn~n djrs gq, foHkkxh; vkns’kkuqlkj vkt fnukad 4-11-85 ¼lsok fuo`fr dh frfFk½ dks vijkg es fo|ky; dk fof/kor izHkkj Jh uUn dqekj dks lkSaikA gŒ&uUndqekj izlkn gŒ&dqcsjukFk 4-11-75 4-11-75 gŒ izHkkj ysus okys O;fDr dk gŒ izHkkj nsus okys O;fDr dk** 3. According to the case of the opposite party, Kuber Nath, on his retirement on 3.11.75, had already handed over charge to him and, therefore, he had become functus officio and as such he could not have handed over charge again to the petitioner, since, he (Plaintiff) was acting headmaster of the school, and the petitioner was interfering in day to day function of the acting headmaster, The further case of the opposite party was that he being the seniormost teacher was entitled to become the acting headmaster. Therefore, he had filed the suit and sought injunction against the petitioner. 4. The trial court, however, after considering prima facie case of the parties, ordered: "I find no merit in the injunction petition against the defendand and so it is rejected. Therefore, he had filed the suit and sought injunction against the petitioner. 4. The trial court, however, after considering prima facie case of the parties, ordered: "I find no merit in the injunction petition against the defendand and so it is rejected. The ad interim injunction order passed earlier against the defendant is hereby vacated." Aggrieved by the said order the opposite party preferred a miscellaneous appeal, which was disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge, who, as mentioned earlier, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the trial court and granted injuction against the petitioner. 5. Mr. J.C. Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has raised the following points for consideration by this Court. (i) Kuber Nath was to retire on 4.11.75 and not on 3.11.75. Therefore, handing over charge on 3.11.75 was not valid nor it conferred any right on the opposite party. According to him, the charge, which was handed over by Kuber Nath to the petitioner on 4.11.75 under Annexure 4' was a valid one. (ii) The finding of the appellate court that the opposite party was the acting headmaster was based on no evidence. (iii) The opposite party had no legal right to enforce and, therefore, he had no legal right to obtain injunction under order 39 Rule 2 of the Code. (iv) Under section 49 of the Bihar Secondary Education Board ordinance, 1975, (herein after referred to as 'the Ordinance') the civil court had no jurisdiction to pass an injunction order. 6. In my opinion, the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner mainly depend upon the finding of prima facie case of the petitioner on the interpretation of Annexures 3 and 4 and on interpretation of those two annexures the appellate court came to the conclusion that Kuber Nath had already handed over charge to the opposite party on 3.11.75 under Annexure 3 and, therefore, he had become functus officio on 4.11.75 when he had handed over charge to the petitioner (vide Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the appellate court Judgment). It is true that a different view may be taken on the interpretation of those annexures by this Court, but sitting in revision it is not possible to interfere with the impugned order. Reference may be made to Mahavaja of Cochin V. Madhva Menon, A.I.R. 1942 Mad. It is true that a different view may be taken on the interpretation of those annexures by this Court, but sitting in revision it is not possible to interfere with the impugned order. Reference may be made to Mahavaja of Cochin V. Madhva Menon, A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 413 (2) where it was observed that where the courts below had taken n view of the effect of the instrument which certainly could not be deemed to be unreasonable, although it was perhaps, not the only view which might be taken and there was no error relating to jurisdiction, there was no ground for interference. A similar view was taken in the case of Balram Das Agrawal V. Kedar Nath, A.I.R. 1958 All 659 where N.U. Beg and M.L. Chaturvedi, JJ. held that where the question before the lower court was one relating to the interpretation of a document, no revision would lie because the matter was perfectly within jurisdiction of the Court to put any interpretation it thought reasonable and therefore did not raise any question of jurisdiction. Reference may also be made to Hindustan Aeronautic V. Ajit Prasad, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 76 in paragraph 5 whereof at page 77 it was observed : "In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law, but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Cede, See the decisions of this court in Pandurang Dhoni V. Maruti Hari Jadhav (1966) I SCR 102 = (A.I.R. 1966 SC 153) and D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. (2) Ltd., New Delhi V. Sarup Singh, (1970) 2 SCR 368 = ( AIR 1971 SC 2324 )." 7. (2) Ltd., New Delhi V. Sarup Singh, (1970) 2 SCR 368 = ( AIR 1971 SC 2324 )." 7. For these reasons I do not find any material to interfere with the finding of the appellate court nor do I wish to dilate upon the merits of the case of the parties. As mentioned earlier, the suit is still pending for consideration before the trial court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, as mentioned earlier, has also contended that the suit itself was barred in view of the provisions contained in Section 49 of the Ordinance, which reads thus: "No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this ordinance required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the District Control Committee or the Board." In my opinion, since none of the provisions has provided remedy with regard to inter se seniority among the teachers, expressly providing that such decision of seniority would be final, nor the counsel for the petitioner has been able to place any such provisions under the Ordinance, the suit, which is mainly based on seniority, could not be barred because of the above provisions. 9. In the result, there is no merit in the application, which is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.