JUDGMENT H.N. Kapoor, J. This is a defendants appeal directed against the appellate judgment of the Third Addl. District Judge, Etah dated February 11, 1975 in Civil Appeal No. 151 of 1972 confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court (Munsif, Kasganj) in original suit No. 259 of 1968 by which the plaintiff's suit was decreed. The plaintiff had brought the suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking offerings or Dakshina from the Jajmans mentioned in the Bahis specified at the foot of the plaint and also from interfering with the taking of offering and Dakshina from those Jajmans by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that he was the owner of Vritti Jajmani and in possession of the Jajmani Bahis which were transferred to him by means of a sale deed dated October 17, 1967 executed by Smt. Lilawati wife of Ram Prasad. These Bahis originally belonged to Ram Kishan against whom Ram Prasad had obtained a decree in suit No. 464 of 1956 for a sum of Rs. 1,000/. In execution of that decree, he got the Bahis attached and sold in auction and he had himself purchased the same for a sum of Rs. 700/. It was claimed that Vritti Jajmani right too was sold in the auction sale. Ram Prasad made a gift of the Bahis of Vritti Jajmani along with other property to his wife Smt. Lilawati. The extract of register of the decree in suit No. 464 of 1956 is Ext. 1. The attachment order is Ext. 2. The report of the Amin about execution of the sale of Bahis is Ext. 4. The plaintiff claimed that after the transfer deed executed in his favour by Smt. Lilawati he was taking offerings or Dakshina from the Jajmans mentioned in the Bahis but the defendants started interfering with his right to take offerings and hence the suit. Defendant No. 1 was Sri Kishan who filed a separate written statement stating that he was unnecessarily made a party and that had nothing to do with the Vritti Jajmani. According to him the original Bahis were in possession of the other members of the family, who received them in partition. Defendants Nos. Defendant No. 1 was Sri Kishan who filed a separate written statement stating that he was unnecessarily made a party and that had nothing to do with the Vritti Jajmani. According to him the original Bahis were in possession of the other members of the family, who received them in partition. Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 filed separate written statement in which they claimed that they belonged to the family of Sri Kishan and that they had ancestral right to receive offerings from the Jajmans mentioned in the Bahis in suit. They also alleged that the original Bahis came to the share of Siaram father of defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and after him, defendants Nos. 2 to 4 alone were realising offerings at Soron from the Jajmans. According to them, no valid right to realise Vritti Jajmani passed to the plaintiff on the basis of the auction sale of the Bahis. On the pleadings of the parties several issues were framed by the trial court which were decided in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's suit was decreed. The lower appellate court also concurred with the findings of the trial court. It arrived at the conclusion that the Vritti Jajmani Bahis belonged to Sri Krishna and were sold in execution of the decree to Ram Prasad and were purchased by him. It also held that the Bahis could have been sold in execution of the decree. It further found that there was a valid gift deed in respect of the Bahis with these findings the appeal was dismissed. The main point that arises for decision in this case is as to what was the effect of the auction sale of the Vritti Jajmani Bahis and whether any right called as Vritti Jajmani right passed to the auction purchaser. There is no dispute that the Bahis were sold in execution of the decree in suit No. 464 of 1956 and were purchased by Ram Prasad. It is true that the defendants failed to produce the alleged original Bahis in their possession. Even if it is assumed that no other Bahis were in existence, could Ram Prasad claim the Vritti Jajmani right on the basis of the transfer of the Bahis only. It is true that the defendants failed to produce the alleged original Bahis in their possession. Even if it is assumed that no other Bahis were in existence, could Ram Prasad claim the Vritti Jajmani right on the basis of the transfer of the Bahis only. The lower appellate Court has placed reliance on the case of Sidhnath and others v. Prem Club 1972 A.L.J. 127, and Smt. Sarda Kunwar v. Gajanand A.I.R. 1942 All. 320. In both these cases it was held that Vritti Jajmani is a right in the property as distinguished from Man Brity. It is heritable and in some cases even transferable and therefore, legally enforceable. In the case of Sidhnath v. Prem Club 1972 A.L.J. 127, it was held that these rights were extinguished when the Ghat had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. In the case of Smt. Sarda Kunwar v. Gajanand A.I.R. 1942 All. 320. It was held that the legal heir of the Ganga Putra or Panda could bring a suit for declaration of Vritti Jajmani right and also for possession of Vritti Jajmani Bahis which passed into the hands of anothetr person. All that can be said on the basis of these authorities is that the right of Vritti Jajmani is a right in property under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and is heritable and under certain circumstances transferable. But the question which arises for consideration is whether this right can be attached and auctioned in execution of decree. Under clause (f) of the proviso to Section 60, C.P.C. 'any right of personal service' is not liable to attachment or sale in execution of a decree'. In the case of Durga Prasad v. Shambhu XVII (1919) A.L.J. 842, a Division Bench of this Court held that office of Maha Brahman or a Brit Acharji is exempt from attachment of sale in execution of a decree under the provisions of Section 60, C.P.C. The learned Judges had relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Rajaram v. Ganesh (1899) I.I.R. 23 Bom. 131. 131. In this Bombay case Ranade, J. had held that in the case of Vritti a private alienation is not absolutely prohibited but its compulsory alienation by way of sale in execution of decree is prohibited as opposed to Hindu law and public policy and also as against the provisions of Section 266(old C.P.C.) (now Section 60, C.P.C.). The same matter was dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in an earlier case of Gopinath v. Jhandu (IV) 1907 A.L.J. 712. It was held that there may be auction sale of Vritti Jajmani Bahis in execution proceedings but the right of the judgment debtor to his Vritti Jajmani could not be transferred on the basis of mere transfer of the Bahis. In the case of Ganpai Prasad v. Kashmiri Bank Ltd., Faizabad A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 444, a Division Bench of the Chief Court held as follows: 'As regards the right to receive offerings from pilgrims we have no doubt that such a right is merely a right of personal service, which cannot be the subject of attachment and sale. This right of Ganga Putra or Ghatia to receive offerings from pilgrims is similar to the right of a shebait or pujari to receive offerings at a Hindu Shrine or the right of a Mahabrahman to get alms and offerings on the death of any person'. The learned judges drew distinction that this right to receive offerings was different from other rights which a Ganga Putra may have such as: (a) right to ownership of the land on which chaukis are placed (b)............ (c) right to the occupation of the particular spot........ (d) right to ownership of the wooden platform called the Chauki. All these rights are transferable. To this we may add that the Bhis themselves are transferable as was held in the case of Gopinath v. Jhandu (supra). In the case of Balmagund and others v. Tularam and others A.I.R. 1928 All. 721, a Division Bench of this Court held that when emoluments are attached to priestly office in the sense that that person has to perform Sewa Puja, the same cannot be transferred to a person not competent to perform the worship either by private sale or by sale in execution of a decree. The learned Judges further observed: 'We are unable to discover any justification for holding that such a right is not transferable. The learned Judges further observed: 'We are unable to discover any justification for holding that such a right is not transferable. Such a right was held to be transferable under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act A similar view was taken in the case of Nand Kumar Dutt v. Ganesh Das A.I.R. 1936 All. 131. In the present case there can be no doubt that Vritti Jajmani is a right of personal service. In the case of Beni Madho Pragwal v. Hira Lal 43 I.L.R. All. 20. 55 in connection with ceremonial bathing at the confluence of the rivers at Allahabad, right of Vritti Jajmani was described as a right to receive offering from pilgrims for whom service is rendered according to the custom by offering prayers. The learned Judges further observed: 'It may be that a pilgrim has greater faith in the due performance of all necessary ceremonies, and therefore in the religious benefit derivable from the ceremonial bathing, if he knows that it has been performed under the guidance and with the help of the prayers and ministrations of the representative of the priest with whom his family has been in the habit of dealing Similar was the case of Vritti Jajmani at Soron which is also a bathing place at the river Ganges. In fact, in the plaint itself it was alleged that the interference was with the rights of the plaintiff of rendering service and realising charities the Jajmani coming to Soron for taking a Holy dip in the river Ganges. I have, therefore, no doubt that such a right could not have been transferred by auction sale in execution of a decree. When Rama Shanker himself could not have acquired such rights, he obviously could neither have gifted the same nor Smt. Lilawati could have transferred them by means of a sale deed in her turn. Learned counsel for the respondent next argued that the defendants themselves have not been able to prove that they had any such Viritti Jajmani right left in respect of the Jajmani mentioned in the Bahis. He has drawn my attention to the fact that the lower Courts have drawn an adverse inference against defendants Nos. 2 to 4 on account of nonproduction of the alleged original Bahis. He has drawn my attention to the fact that the lower Courts have drawn an adverse inference against defendants Nos. 2 to 4 on account of nonproduction of the alleged original Bahis. He has argued that even in the written statement of the defendants, partition was alleged and the lower appellate court has held that it was not open to the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 to allege that there was no partition in the family and they continued to have right of Vritti Jajmani. In fact, according to the pleadings in the written statements, the right of Vritti Jajmani had passed to the father of defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and not to defendant No. 1 that is Sri Krishna. For the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to record a definite finding whether the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 have any joint or exclusive right of Vritti Jajmani in respect of the Jajmans mentioned in the Bahis. Moreover, Sri Krishna is dead. It is sufficient to hold that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he had acquired any such right on the Bahis of the auction sale or the subsequent gift deed and the sale deed. The plaintiff's suit fails because he has not been able to establish his claim. 6. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decrees of the lower courts are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. Both the parties shall however, bear their own costs, throughout.