JUDGMENT Saxena, J. This is a revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the order dated December 13, 1975 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad. Briefly stated the facts are that the revisionist applied for allotment of an accommodation belonging to the opposite party. It was allotted in his favour. On January 18, 1975 the opposite party filed an appeal against it. December 1, 1975 was fixed for hearing of the appeal. On this date when the case was called on for hearing the revisionist, who was respondent in the appeal, went to call his learned counsel, who was busy in another court. He returned with his counsel after an hour and in the meantime the learned Second Additional District Judge took some additional evidence and allowed the appeal. The revisionist moved an application for setting aside the ex parte decision which was rejected by the Second Additional District Judge on the ground that the learned counsel for the applicant appears to have remained absent intentionally and no satisfactory ground for restoration was made out. He also observed that even if he had heard the appeal on merits, he would have allowed it. It is against this order that the allottee has come up in revision. The learned counsel for the opposite party has raised a preliminary objection that the revision is legally not maintainable because it does not arise out of 'original suit' as contemplated by Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The contention is not without substance because the case arose out of proceedings for allotment of a house. Rule 10 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Act) prescribes procedure for allotment. According to it, an application for allotment of building shall be made in form 'A'. After complying with other requirements the District Magistrate may under Section 16 of the Act require the landlord to let any building or part of a building which has fallen vacant. So in the instant case the proceedings arose on an application. Against that allotment the landlord filed an appeal which was allowed ex parte and then the present revisionist applied for setting aside the ex parte order but remained unsuccessful. So in the instant case the proceedings arose on an application. Against that allotment the landlord filed an appeal which was allowed ex parte and then the present revisionist applied for setting aside the ex parte order but remained unsuccessful. Therefore, the appeal as well as this revision have arisen not from a suit but from an application and in view of Section 115, C.P.C., as it stands amended by the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973, this revision is not maintainable. I am fortified in this view by the case of Hira Lal v. Ranjit Singh C.R. 1942 of 1975 decided by a Division Bench of this Court on April 8, 1976. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that if for any reason the revision is held to be not maintainable, it may be treated as an appeal. The learned counsel for the opposite party has objected to it also on the ground that Section 37 of the Act attaches finality to the orders passed by the District Judge and, as such, neither an appeal nor revision is maintainable against the order of the District Judge. The learned counsel for the revisionist is inclined to repel this objection on the ground that the preamble of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down: "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the courts of civil judicature it is hereby enacted as follows.............' His contention is that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure primarily apply to court of civil judicature. Section 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act 1887, prescribes the following classes of courts: 1. The Court of the District Judge, 2. The Court of the Additional District Judge, 3. The Court of the Civil Judge and 4. The Court of the Munsif. It is, therefore, contended that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to the aforesaid four classes of courts, all of which have got inherent right to restore a proceeding or to set aside an ex parte decree and an appeal lies against that order. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the case of Chatur Mohan and others vRam Bihar Dixit A.I.R. 1964 Alld. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the case of Chatur Mohan and others vRam Bihar Dixit A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 562, in which it has been held that if a special enactment authorises a court to exercise powers already vested in it, then the appeal will be regulated by the practice and procedure of the court. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Krishna Rao vWoman Rao I.L.R. 1963 M.P. 347, in which it was held that if powers are conferred on a District Judge, the latter is not a persona designata and even if his order is final, it does not exclude revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. I have given my anxious consideration to these cases and in my judgment in the peculiar nature of the provisions of the Act they do not advance his contention much further.. Section 37 of the Act states: " (1) No order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any court." The question which arises for consideration is whether the power of restoration is exercised under the Act or under inherent powers conferred by the Code. Rule 22 framed under Section 41 of the Act refers to powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which can be exercised by the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority. It says: "The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely (a) the power to dismiss an application or appeal for default and to restore it for sufficient cause; (b) the power to proceed ex parte, and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte; (c) ............... (d) ................ (e) ............... (f) The aforesaid makes it clear that it is by virtue of R. 22 that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority, or the Appellate Authority are given the powers as are vested in the civil court in respect of the matters enumerated therein. (d) ................ (e) ............... (f) The aforesaid makes it clear that it is by virtue of R. 22 that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority, or the Appellate Authority are given the powers as are vested in the civil court in respect of the matters enumerated therein. The necessity for conferring these powers arose because the District Magistrate and the Prescribed Authority are not vested with powers vested in the civil court under the Code. The District Judge is no doubt the appellate authority under the Act, but it was not contemplated that he should exercise the powers already vested in him. Therefore by means of Rule 22 certain powers vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure were vested in the appellate authority also otherwise there was no necessity to do so. While acting as anAppellate Authority the District Judge will be exercising powers vested in him by this rule. Therefore, for purposes of Section 37 the District Judge exercises the powers conferred by or under this Act. This conclusion is further warranted by the fact that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable in toto to the proceedings under this Act. Only certain powers given under the Code are vested in the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. One of these powers is the power to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte. In this connection Rule 32 has been enacted which lays down the procedure. It says that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority, or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, for sufficient cause: "(a) ................ (b) restore an application or an appeal referred to in clause (a) as well as an application for release of any building or part thereof or any land appurtenant to such building where such application or appeal has been dismissed for default of appearance of the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, or his counsel." It is, therefore, clear that the Act prescribes the procedure for moving an application for setting aside an ex parte order or for restoration. It vests power in the various authorities to dispose of such applications. They are to have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. It means that they will exercise these powers under this Act. It vests power in the various authorities to dispose of such applications. They are to have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. It means that they will exercise these powers under this Act. Since they will exercise the powers conferred by or under this Act finality is attached to their orders by S. 37 of the Act. In Kailash Chandra v. Distt. Judge, Bhopal A.I.E. 1963 M.P. 218, and V. K. Ouseph v. Mary A.I.R. 1969 Ker. 103, it has been held that if there is a specific provision in the statute making the determination of a certain question by the District Court final, no further remedy is available against it. But if there is no specific provision the supervisory powers of the High Court will exist. In the instant case I have already discussed that the supervisory powers of the High Court cannot be exercised by this Court because the proceedings do not arise out of original suit. Besides it, Section 37 attaches finality to the order. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Ram Swarup and others v. Shikar Chand and another A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 893, in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the jurisdiction of the civil courts to deal with civil causes can be excluded by the legislature by Special Acts which deal with special subjectmatters but the statutory provisions must expressly provide for such an exclusion or must necessarily or inevitably lead to that inference. In the instant case Section 37 specifically curtails rights of the Civil courts. Sections 18 and 22 contemplates appeals before the District Judge, only. For all these reasons I am in judgment that even an appeal is not maintainable and the revision cannot be converted into an appeal. Since no appeal or revision lies against the impugned order, it is not necessary to go into the sufficiency of cause for restoration. The revision is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of this case the parties will bear their own costs.