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1976 DIGILAW 325 (RAJ)

Rajasthan Udyog v. State of Rajasthan

1976-10-05

M.L.SHRIMAL, V.P.TYAGI

body1976
Judgment Shrimal, J.-This special appeal is directed against the old D/-23-7-1974 of the learned single Judge of this Court, whereby he dismissed the writ Petition No. 389 of 1974 wherein the validity of the order dated March 13, 1973 issued by the State Government under Section 4 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act No. XXIV of 1953) was challenged and it was also prayed that the Land Acquisition Officer (Sub-divisional Officer). Bharatpur be prohibited from taking further action in the matter. 2. By a notification dated March 13, 1973 the respondent No. 1, the State of Rajasthan under Section 4 (1) of the Act No. XXIV of 1953 proclaimed that the lands specified in the schedule attached to the said notification were needed or likely to be needed for public purpose, that is, for General Engineering Works, Bharatpur. The notification further stated that under Section 4 (1) of the Act No. XXIV of 1953 the Government was pleased to authorise the Tehsildar, Bharatpur, to discharge the functions envisaged by Section 4 (1) and submit a report under Section 4 (4) of the Act No. XXIV of 1953. The respondent No. 3, Land Acquisition Officer (Sub-divisional Officer), Bharatpur, issued a notice-Annex. 1, under Section 4 (5) (1) of the Act No. XXIV of 1953 on April 30, 1973. The appellant filed objections-Annex. 2, dated May 22, 1973. The respondent No. 3 fixed July 20, 1973 for recording the evidence, but owing to general strike of the clerical staff , the case was adjourned to August 31, 1973. On this date the petitioner-appellant filed an application for determining certain preliminary objections challenging the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 3 to make the enquiry. The Land Acquisition Officer, (Sub-divisional Officer), Bharatpur, refused to consider the objections piecemeal. Instead he decided to dispose of the preliminary objections along with others at the time of submitting a report to the State Government. Being aggrieved by that, the appellant moved this Court to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He challenged the Notification issued under Section 4 (1) of Act No. XXIV of 1953 on the grounds: (a) that the State Government failed to apply its mind to the facts of this case before issuing a Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. He challenged the Notification issued under Section 4 (1) of Act No. XXIV of 1953 on the grounds: (a) that the State Government failed to apply its mind to the facts of this case before issuing a Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Although Section 4 as amended had made a significant departure from the old phraseology and has purposefully substituted the word ‘consider’ in place of the word ‘appear’, yet in the impugned order dated March 13, 1973 issued under Section 4 (1) the State Government used the word ‘appear’ and thus the notification is bad in law; (b) that the purpose of acquisition has not been particularised and is wholly vague; (c) that the provisions of Section 38 (2) of the Act were not complied with; (d) that the land was being acquired for Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd., but in the notification dated March 13, 1973, it has been mentioned that it was being acquired for public purpose, that is, for General Engineering Works, Bharatpur which is not a Company in itself , (e) that the provisions of Chapter VII were not complied with; and (f) that Rule 32 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Rules, 1956 was not complied with. 3. The State Government and the respondent No. 6, the Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd., contested each and every ground raised by the petitioner. 4. Thelearned single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide his order dated July 23, 1973; hence this special appeal. 5. Thelearned Counsel, Mr. Mukatbeharilal Bhargava, appearing for the appellant, has challenged the order of the learned single Judge on a number of grounds, which will be dealt with at seriatim. 6. Thefirst contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that Act No. XXIV of 1953 was amended by Act No. XXII of 1966 whereby the present Section 4 was substituted. The effect of the amendment was that before issuing the order dated March 13, 1973, it became necessary and obligatory for the Rajas-than State to consider whether it was necessary or expedient to acquire the and, but in the impugned order published under Section 4 (1) of the Act No. XXIV of 1953 the State Government of Rajasthan has used. the word: (sic) “appear” in contradistinction to the word “consider”. the word: (sic) “appear” in contradistinction to the word “consider”. This shows that the Government did not apply its mind for determining whether it was necessary or not to acquire the land in dispute belonging to the Rajasthan Udyog, It was also urged that the learned single Judge failed to appreciate the crucial importance implicit to the amendment of Section 4. 7. In the present case no doubt the Impugned order under Section 4 has been issued in the phraseology as it existed in the unamended Section 4 and not in accordance with the phraseology of the amended section, but, nevertheless, it substantially complied with the requirement of Section 4. In our opinion, the mere use of the words contained in the unamended section in the order issued under Section 4, dated March 13, 1973, is not sufficient to invalidate the order. Simply because the (sic) has been used in the impugned order it cannot be said that the order is bad in law or that the State Government did not apply its mind before issuing the imagined order under Section 4 (1) of the Act No. XXIV of 1953. All that the section requires is that before issuing an order under Section 4 (1) the Government should be satisfied that the land is needed for the purpose mentioned in the Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that there was no material before the Government to base its order under Section 4 is without any foundation. It is not necessary to make a mention in the order made under Section 4 (3) and “published in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Section 45”, all the material which was available with the Government before issuing the order under Section 4 (1). Moreover, from the documents filed by the State Government with the application dated July 19, 1972 it appears that the Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd., submitted an application dated July 25, 1972, praying to the Government to hand over the land after acquiring 100 acres of land belonging to the Rajasthan Udyog lying adjacent to their unit, and the Collector, Bharatpur, after enquiring into the matter recommended for the acquisition of the land in dispute. The State Government after perusing the record issued the impugned order dated March 13, 1973. The State Government after perusing the record issued the impugned order dated March 13, 1973. In the totality of the circumstances there is no justification for the appellant to urge that the Government had not applied its mind before issuing the impugned order. We agree to the reasons advanced by the learned single Judge while disposing of this argument. 8. Thesecond submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the State Government erred in authorising the Tehsildar, Bharatpur, to perform the functions under Section 4 (1) of Act No. XXIV of 1953. The learned Counsel for the appellant tried to contend that since the acquisition of the land in this case was admittedly for the company, Section 38 of the Act No. XXIV of 1953 applied and the Slate Government could not have authorised the Tehsildar, Bharatpur, to perform the functions mentioned in the order dated March 13, 1973. We do not find any substance in this contention of the learned Counsel. Section 38 is only an enabling provision. It does not take away the power vested in the Slate Government under Section 4 (1) of Act No. XXIV of 1953. 9. The third contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the impugned order does not particularise the purpose for which the land was needed. jkT; ljdkj dks ;q izfrr ksq qrk S fd fuEu of .kZr LEky esa lkoZtfud iz;kstukFkZ vFkkZr tujy bUthfu;jhax 0D1Zds fy;s Hkqfe dh vko’;drk qS vEkok vko’;drk qksus dh laHkkouk qS A** 10. The purpose mentioned is too vague to give any idea to the person interested in the property for the purpose of preferring objections effectively under Section 5-A of the Act. The learned Counsel urged that Law makes a clear distinction between an acquisition for a public purpose in contradistinction to an acquisition for a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. In the case on hand it was not in dispute that no part of the compensation was to come out of the public revenue or from the local authority. On the other hand, the whole compensation was to be paid by the Company. In the case on hand it was not in dispute that no part of the compensation was to come out of the public revenue or from the local authority. On the other hand, the whole compensation was to be paid by the Company. Therefore, the notification dated March 13, 1973, published under Section 4 (1) of the Act, if it was to be valid in the circumstances, ought to have declared that the land WAS needed for the Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd. The impugned order purported to have been made under Section 4 (11 cannot be said to have been validly made and published, in the circumstances, because the order issued reads that the land was needed for public purposes, that is, for General Engineering Works: koZtfud iz;kstukFkZ vFkkZr tujy baftuh;jhax 0D1Z ds fy;s** The Company for which the land, in fact. in this case being acquired is the Hindustan DEVELOPMENT Corporation Ltd., which is a public limited concern. There is nothing in the order dated March 13, 1973, that the land was needed for the Company All that the impugned order reads is that the land was needed for public purpose. The public purpose mentioned therein was that the land was required for General Engineering Works. It is not impossible for the Government or the local authority to own an Engineering Works. From the impugned order it cannot necessarily be concluded that the land was needed for a company. The General Engineering Works can also be a factory owned and solely managed by the State Government or by a public authority. It was urged that when the State wants acquisition of land to be made for third party, it is its bounden duty to mention in the order under Section 4 (1) that the land was being acquired for a party named in the notification. In the absence of that, the impugned order must be adjudged as bad in law. The detinite averments were necessary to bring home the necessity of the public purpose to the objector and the appellant has been deprived of a valuable right to raise effective objections envisaged by Section 5-A of Act No XXIV of 1953. Reliance was placed on Gyan Devi vs. The State of Rajasthan, 1967 RLW 367. Shyam Behari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1965 SC 427 . 11. Reliance was placed on Gyan Devi vs. The State of Rajasthan, 1967 RLW 367. Shyam Behari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1965 SC 427 . 11. The learned Additional Advocate General urged that the effect of the amendment of Section 4 of Act No. XXIV of 1953 by Section 2 of the Rajasthan Act No XXII of 1966 is that the provision of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 is directory and its violation cannot annul the proceedings without proving prejudice to the affected party. He further urged that the General Engineering Works is a unit of the Hindusthan Development Corporation Ltd., and this fact was known to the petitioner-appellant. The appellant knew it very well that the land was being acquired for the company viz, the Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd. The appellant was not precluded from filing his objections, and detailed objections were filed by the appellant, which were considered by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 5-A of the Act No XXIV of 1953 and were disposed of according to law. 12. We have given a careful consideration to the rival contentions of the parties. Now we will read Section 4 as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act No. XXII of 1966 as well as the amended Section 4, as it was in force when the impugned order dated March 13. 1973 was passed. 13. Section 4 as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act No. XXII of 1066, reads as under:-“4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon. .(1) Whenever it appears to the Appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published In the Official Gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. .(1) Whenever it appears to the Appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published In the Official Gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. .(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf , and for his servants and workmen to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality, to dig or bore into the sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work, if any, proposed to be made thereon; to make such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches: and where, otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle;” Section 4, as it stood on the date of the issuance of the impugned notification viz, after the coming into force of Act No. XXII of 1966, reads as under:- .“4. Preliminary proceedings preceding intended acquisition .(1) Whenever the State Government considers it necessary or expedient to acquire land in any locality, needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose, it shall by an order published in accordance with the “provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 45, require any officer subordinate to it and generally or specially authorised in this behalf , to enter upon or into any land in such locality, accompanied by his servants and workmen, if any.- .(a) to survey and take levels of such land suitable for such purpose, .(b) to dig or bore into the sub-soil thereof , .(c) to set out the boundaries of such land and the intended line of the work, if any, proposed to be carried out thereon or therein, .(d) where otherwise the survey cannot be completed or the levels cannot be taken or the boundaries or the line cannot be set out, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle, .(e) tomark the levels taken or the boundaries or the intended line of work by placing marks and cutting trenches, .(f) to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether land is suitable for such public purpose, and of) to inquire into end ascertain the particulars of the persons interested in such land: .Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed Court or garden attached to a dwelling house (unless with the consent of the occupier there of without giving such occupier at least seven days’ notice in writing of his intention to do so. .(2) Acopy of the order made under Sub-section (1) shall also be endorsed to the Collector of the district in which such locality is situated with the direction to take suitable action upon receipt of the report under Sub-section (4). (3) The officer making an entry under Sub-section (1) shall, at the time of such entry, pay or tender payment for all necessary damages to be done to the land entered upon or into and, in case of dispute as to the sufficiency of the amount so paid or tendered he shall at once refer the dispute for the decision of the Collector, and such decision shall be final. (4) Such Officer shall send to the Collector a report on the result of the survey, as to the other operations described in or carried on under Sub-section (1), as to the enquiries made thereunder and as to the particular land in that locality which may be acquired for the public purpose. (5) The Collector shall, upon receipt of such report, cause to be given- .(i) to the head of the Government Department at whose instance the order under Sub-section (i) shall have been made and to all persons reported under Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) to be interested in the land proposed thereby to be acquired as being suitable for the public purpose, a notice in the prescribed form of the proposed acquisition, and .(ii) a public notice to the like effect at convenient places on or near about the land proposed to be acquired.” Section 4 of the Central Act No. 1 of 1894 is parimateria to Section 4 of the unamended Act No. XXIV of 1953. 14. Aclose reading of the above-mentioned sections reveals that prior to the Amendment of 1966, there was no provision in the old Act corresponding to Section 4 (5) of the new section substituted by Section 2 of Act No. XXII of 1906. The word ‘thereupon’ appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 4 in the old section has also been omitted in the new section. By adding Clause (g) in Sub-section (1) of Section 4 a duty has been cast upon the Authorised Officer to enquire into and ascertain the particulars of the person interested in the land intended to be acquired. The purpose of Sub-section (1) of the amended Section 4 is to give a notice to the owner of the land that the Authorised Officer along with his servants and workmen shall enter his premises for performing the functions mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 4. Indeed the functions are of exploratory character and an order passed under this sub-section discloses a tentative intention that the lands specified may be ultimately acquired after service of public notice in the manner provided in Section 4 (5). Prior to the issuance of the notice under Section 4 (5) the Authorised Officer making an entry under Sub-section (1) is required to submit a report to the Collector on the result of his survey and the enquiry made thereunder. Prior to the issuance of the notice under Section 4 (5) the Authorised Officer making an entry under Sub-section (1) is required to submit a report to the Collector on the result of his survey and the enquiry made thereunder. The purpose of such a report is to determine the suitability of the land for the purpose for which it is intended to be acquired. Thereafter, a notice under Sub-section (5) of Section 4 is required to be given to the persons mentioned in that sub-section. The purpose of such a notice is to afford an opportunity to the person interested in the land to be acquired to file objections under Section 5-A within 30 days of the service of the notice envisaged by Sub-section (5) of Section 4. Under the amended section it is the publication of the notice under Section 4 (5) which affords an opportunity to the owner of the land, to be acquired to file objections envisaged by Section 5-A and not the order issued and published under Section 4 (1). The effect of the amendment in Section 4 is that the limitation for filing objections which used to commence from the publication of the notification issued under the old Section 4(1) now commences from giving and publication of the notice under Section 4(5) of the Amended Section. The public purpose which was required to be particularised under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 is now required to he particularised in a notice to be given under Sub-section (5) of 5- in the prescribed form of the proposed acquisition. Thus the effect of the amendment in Section 4 of Act No. XXIV of 1953 is that the provisions of Section 4 (1) are directory and the provisions of Section 4 (5) are mandatory. Thus it can be safely said that the appellant cannot succeed on the ground of defect in the impugned notification issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 4, unless it is proved that the defect had the effect of causing prejudice to the case of the appellant. 15. The case: State of Mysore vs. Abdul Razak, AIR 1973 SC 2361 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is of no help to it. In that case Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act No. 1 of 1894 (Central Act) came up for interpretation. 15. The case: State of Mysore vs. Abdul Razak, AIR 1973 SC 2361 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is of no help to it. In that case Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act No. 1 of 1894 (Central Act) came up for interpretation. While interpreting that section, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:- “The publication of the notice in the locality is a mandatory requirement. It has an important purpose behind it. In the absence of such publication the interested persons may not be able to file their objections about the acquisition proceedings and they will be deprived of the right of representation provided under Section 5-A, which is very valuable right.” Section 4 of the Central Act is pan materia of the unamended Section 4 of Act No. XXIV of 1953. The required notice referred to in the aforesaid ruling is to be given and published in accordance with Sub-section (4) of Section 45 under sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Amended Section of Act No. XXIV of 1953 (Rajasthan Act). Section 4 (1) of the Amended Act No. XXIV of 1953 does not create a right in the interested persons to file objections. Such a right is created only after the issuance of notice under Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act No. XXIV of 1953. Thus, the scheme of the Rajasthan Act No. XXIV of 1953, as amended up to date being altogether different, the case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not improve the case of the appellant. This authority rather supports the contention of the respondents. The decision rendered in the case of Gyandevi vs. The State of Rajasthan, 1997 RLW 367 is of no avail to the appellant. It is totally distinguishable both on facts and law. 10. Inthe notification issued in that case it was mentioned that the land was being acquired for public purposes by the Government out of public revenue. Any person reading that notification could not have possibly imagined that the land was being acquired for the purposes of respondent No. 3 of that case viz. Gosewa Sangh, because the notification specifically mentioned that it was acquired out of’ public revenue’. Any person reading that notification could not have possibly imagined that the land was being acquired for the purposes of respondent No. 3 of that case viz. Gosewa Sangh, because the notification specifically mentioned that it was acquired out of’ public revenue’. On the peculiar facts of that case it was held as under:- “Reading Sections 4, 5-A and 6 together we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that where a State seeks to acquire the land of another under the Act, it must mention in the notifications both under Sections 4 and 6 whether it intends to do so for a company or otherwise and where it fails to mention to give this information and issues a notification which prima facie indicates as if it intends to acquire such land for its own purpose, though it really intends to do so for the purpose of a company, then such a notification would be bad in law and would lack the essential foundation for which acquisition under the Act could be undertaken.” 17. In the case on hand it has been specifically mentioned that the land was likely to be acquired for public purpose, viz, for the use of General Engineering Works. Thus, in the impugned notification the name of the unit of the company for which the land was being acquired has been mentioned. For the reasons already mentioned and the averments made in the writ petition, it is abundantly clear that the appellant knew that the General Engineering Works was and is a unit of the Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd., Sir R.N. Mukherjee Road, Calcutta. 18. The other case relied upon by the appellant is Shyam Behari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 427 . This case relates to a declaration made under Section 6 of the Central Land Acquisition Act whereas in the case on hand the appellant rushed to this Court even before his objections filed under Section 5-A were considered and decided. This case relates to a declaration made under Section 6 of the Central Land Acquisition Act whereas in the case on hand the appellant rushed to this Court even before his objections filed under Section 5-A were considered and decided. The other point of distinction is that in the declaration made and published under Section 6 in that case, though issued twice as notifications dated December 3, 1960 and April 19, 1971, there was nothing to show that the land was needed for a company whereas in the case on hand the name of the unit of the company for which the land was being acquired, was mentioned in the impugned notification issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act No. XXIV of 1953 as amended up to date. 19. Besides that, as already discussed in detail, the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act No. XXIV of 1953 and the notification under Section 6 of the Act, serve altogether different purposes. In the case on hand, though it is true that the General Engineering Works referred in the impugned order itself is not a Company for which the land was being acquired, but is a Unit of a joint stock company viz, the Hindustan Development Corporation. The appellant knew this fact very well as is borne out from the objections dated May 22, 1973 submitted by the appellant in response to the notice dated April 20, 1373. It was categorically admitted therein that the General Engineering Works, Bharatpur, was a Unit of Hindustan Development. Corporation Limited. Similar averments have been made in the writ petition itself , it cannot be said in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand that the appellant was put to a handicap in the matter of lodging objections, and, thereby, was prejudiced In para No. 6 of the above referred objections the appellant has mentioned “that General Engineering Works is not a company but a unit, the proprietor of which is the Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd., Registered Office-27, Sir K. N. Mukherjee Road, Calcutta. As such by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the appellant thought at the time of filing objections under Section 5-A that the land was intended to be acquired for a factory owned by the State Government or a local authority. As such by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the appellant thought at the time of filing objections under Section 5-A that the land was intended to be acquired for a factory owned by the State Government or a local authority. The purpose of an order under Section 4 (1) is to take preliminary proceedings preceding the intended acquisition with a view to finding after survey and taking levels and if necessary after digging and boring into the sub-soil. All this is done to ascertain the suitability of the land for which it was intended to be acquired. Indeed the order under Section 4(1) is of exploratory character and discloses the tentative intention that the lands specified may be ultimately acquired subject to the consideration of the objections of the interested parties. After discharging the functions, the Authorised Officer is required to make a report under Section 4(4) of the Act No. XXIV of 1953. After considering the said report a notice under Section 4 (5) is issued and published. On the publication of the notice the interested person is required to file an objection against the intended acquisition, within 30 days of the publication of such a notice. Every objector making an objection under Sub-section (1) of Section 5-A is given an opportunity of being heard. The officer concerned after hearing all such objections and after making such further enquiry as he deems necessary submits the case to the State Government for decision together with the record of the proceedings held by him and the report containing his recommendation on the objections and thereafter the State Government is required under Section 6 to give a firm declaration that the land with proper description and area is needed for a public purpose or for a company. It is not correct to say that the defect pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant regarding non-mention of the name Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd., in the impugned order dated March 13, 1973, made by the State Government was fatal to the proceedings or in any manner has prejudiced the case of the appellant. As already mentioned above, the appellant w