JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a reference made by Sri S.M. Hasan, Addl. Commissioner, Faizabad Division, recommending that the revision against the order of Judicial Officer, Amethi, dated January 29, 1970 in suit No. 89 under Section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act may be dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for parties and have gone through up in revision against this order. 3. During the pendency of the reference in this court revisionist No. 10 Ramayan Singh died on July 30, 1975 and the application for substitution of his heirs was filed on September 23, 1975. Further the C.P. No. 1 Smt. Kaushilay Devi also died and an application for substitution of her heir was moved on January 21, 1976. The counsel for the O.P. did not file any objection to these substitution application. He however, argued that the second substitution was not maintainable as no date of death has been given. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the O.P. referred to High Court Rules. Subsequently however, he conceded that the High Court Rules are not applicable to the Board of Revenue and he has withdrawn his objection to the substitution. The substitution applications have therefore, been allowed. 4. The facts giving the rise to this reference may be briefly stated here. The O.P. Nos. 1 to 4 Ram Narain, Ram Sunder, Ram Surat and Smt. Kaushilya Devi had instituted a suit for declaration of their Bhumidhari rights in the land in suit. During the pendency of the suit defendant No. 13 Raj Pat Singh defendant No. 22 Srimati Kalpa and defendant No. 23 Mahabir Singh died on different dates. The plaintiff moved the substitution applications for Smt. Kalpa and Mahabir Singh. However, in the case of Rajpat Singh, the defendants had taken the plea that the substitution application was time-barred and the suit may be abated. The plaintiffs had on the other hand moved an application for setting aside abatement giving the ground that as Rajpat Singh was the r/o another village the plaintiffs could not know the date of his death earlier. The trial court by its impugned order dated January 29, 1970 set aside the abatement and ordered substitution of the heirs of Rajpat Singh deceased. The remaining defendants have now come the record. 5. The trial court by its impugned order dated January 29, 1970 set aside the abatement and ordered substitution of the heirs of Rajpat Singh deceased. The remaining defendants have now come the record. 5. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that the application for setting aside the abatement was itself time-barred and the learned Addl. Commissioner has erred in holding that it was within limitation. He has further contended that the ground for setting aside the abatement was wrong and frivolous and the plaintiff has not come with clean hands. The learned counsel has also contended that the ground pleaded by the plaintiff that he was ignorant of the death is false and moreover ignorance is no ground for setting aside abatement especially when this ground was mala fide. 6. The learned counsel for the O.P. has contended that condoning delay in making application for substitution of legal representative of a deceased party is a matter of judicial discretion for the trial court and revision against such an order is not maintainable. He has referred to Misri Lal v. Gaon Sabha, 1971 R.D. 76 in which a learned Member of this Court has held that where a trial court condones delay in making application for substitution of legal representatives of deceased defendants this is a matter of exercise of judicial discretion by the Court and a revision against, this order is not maintainable. The learned counsel has further referred to Janki v. Soney Lal, 1972 R.D. 397 in which another learned Member has observed as follows:- "Under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, the delay must be explained to the satisfaction of the court. It is quite possible that the same reasoning if advanced before different courts on the question of delay, may appeal to one court and not to the other and it is for this reason that while considering application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act it is the court before whom the application is presented who has to express his satisfaction by granting the prayer. The statute does not lay down that the court, so satisfied, must also record reasons for its satisfaction. The statute does not lay down that the court, so satisfied, must also record reasons for its satisfaction. It is, therefore, not open to a court sitting in revision go into the merits of the reasons advanced." The learned counsel has further referred to Toori v. Sheo Baran, 1973 R.D. 453 in which another learned Member of this Court has observed as follows:- "The next question which is to be considered is as to whether or not the Court exercised its jurisdiction properly in condoning the delay. The order passed by the Trial Court in condoning the delay is based on appreciation of facts which appreciation cannot be subjected to any scrutiny in revision. The Court has also the requisite jurisdiction to condone delay. In view of it there has been no error in the exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the Trial Court when it condoned the delay and allowed the substitution application moved by Sheo Baran." 7. I am entirely in agreement with the views expressed by my learned colleagues in the above decisions. Condoning of delay under Section 5 Limitation Act is entirely a matter of judicial discretion for the Court concerned. It cannot be said that a Court concerned. It cannot be said that a Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it or has exercised such jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity in deciding the question one way or the other. Such an order therefore, cannot be interfered with in revision. 8. I accordingly accept the reference made by the learned Addl. Commissioner and dismiss the revision against the impugned order of the trial court.