Judgement BAHARUL ISLAM, J.:- This appeal by the plaintiffs is from the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Manipur, in O. Suit No. 12 of 1965. The suit was for declaration that plaintiff No. 1 was the adopted son of late Iboyaima Singh and for partition by metes and bounds of the properties mentioned in the schedules to the plaint. 2. The facts of the plaintiffs case may be briefly stated thus: One Ningthemjao Singh was the predecessor-in-interest of the parties to the suit. He died in or about 1955, leaving behind him 3 heirs; two sons, (1) Ibobi Singh (defendant No. 2) and (2) Iboyaima Singh and (3) his widow, Keinyatombi Devi (plaintiff No. 2) as his heirs. About 12 years ago Iboyaima Singh and his wife Rani Devi (defendant No. 1) adopted Priyokumar Singh (plaintiff No. 1) who was the son of Ibobi Singh (defendant No. 2) as their son. Admittedly, the parties are Manipuri Hindus. According to the plaintiffs, the adoption was according to the Hindu Law. Iboyaima Singh died in the last part of 1961, leaving behind him his adopted son, plaintiff No. 1, his widow, Rani Devi (defendant No. 1) and his step-mother (plaintiff No. 2) as his sole heirs, and the properties mentioned in schedules "A", "C", "D," and "E,". After the death of Iboyaima Singh the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were in common enjoyment and possession of the properties. The defendant No. 1 however, made an application for grant of a Succession Certificate in the Court of the District Judge, Manipur, in respect of a sum of Rs. 10,838/- mentioned in schedule "E." The Succession Certificate case, at the relevant time, was pending in the Court of the Additional District Judge. In the original petition for Succession Certificate, defendant No. 1 cited plaintiff No. 1 as her adopted son, but by an application, the application for Succession Certificate was amended deleting the citation of plaintiff No. 1 as the adopted son. Defendant No. 3 claimed the truck mentioned in Schedule "C" claiming that he had purchased it from defendant No. 1. 3. As defendant No. 1, by her amendment of the petition for Succession Certificate denied plaintiff No. 1 to be the adopted son and refused the plaintiffs their shares in the suit properties, they were compelled to file the present suit for the reliefs mentioned above. 4. 3. As defendant No. 1, by her amendment of the petition for Succession Certificate denied plaintiff No. 1 to be the adopted son and refused the plaintiffs their shares in the suit properties, they were compelled to file the present suit for the reliefs mentioned above. 4. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement and contested the suit. She has denied the plaintiffs allegations that plaintiff No. 1 was the adopted son of Iboyaima Singh. She has admitted that the properties mentioned in Schedule "A," "C," "D" and "E" were the properties left by her husband, Iboyaima Singh. She has also admitted that Iboyaima Singh died in the last part of 1961, but she claims that she was his only heir, and has denied that the plaintiffs are heirs of late Iboyaima Singh. 5. Defendant No. 2 by a separate written statement has supported the claim of the plaintiffs. 6. The learned Subordinate Judge framed a large number of issues of which issues Nos. 4 and 5 are material for the purpose of this appeal and may be reproduced: "4. Was the plaintiff No. 1 adopted by late Iboyaima Singh during the latters lifetime. 5. Are the plaintiff No. 1, the defendant No. 1 and plaintiff 2 heirs of late Iboyaima Singh?" After trial, the learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in respect of the "B" schedule property in favour of plaintiff No. 2 and defendants Nos. 1 and 2, but dismissed the plaintiffs claim that plaintiff No. 1 was the adopted son of Iboyaima, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove adoption failing to prove one of the essential ingredients of adoption, namely, "giving and taking." Hence this appeal. 7. The alleged adoption having taken place before 1956, admittedly the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, does not apply to the present case. Shri N. Ibotombi Singh, learned Advocate General, Manipur, appearing for the appellants, submits that "giving and taking" are not essential ingredients of a valid adoption; alternatively he submits that the plaintiffs have proved "giving and taking." Admittedly, there is no deed of adoption in this case. Shri T. Bhubon Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that according to Manipuri customs adoption can be done only by a registered deed. In support of his submission he relies on para 33 of Chapter V of a printed booklet styled "Manipuri Customs." 8. Shri T. Bhubon Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that according to Manipuri customs adoption can be done only by a registered deed. In support of his submission he relies on para 33 of Chapter V of a printed booklet styled "Manipuri Customs." 8. "Manipuri customs" is the codification of the customs in Manipur by a Codification Committee. Paras 27 and 33 of Chapter V which deal with adoption may be reproduced: "27. The following ceremonies are necessary for adoption - Sagei Chakkhangba with Homa or without it or Datta Homa. Along with the above the ceremony of giving and taking in adoption of the boy is necessary. x x x x x x x x 33. Apart from the customary rituals of giving and taking, Sagei Chakkhangba or Datta Homa, the factum of adoption must be in writing and registered." 9. The following are essential ingredients of a valid adoption under the Hindu Law:- (i) Capacity to take in adoption. Subject to the provision of any law for the time being in force, every male Hindu, who is of sound mind, and has attained the age of discretion, even though he may be a minor, may lawfully take a son in adoption, provided he has no son, grand-son, or great-grand-son natural or adopted, living at the time of adoption. (ii) Capacity to give in adoption. The only persons who can lawfully give a boy in adoption are his father and his mother. (iii) Capacity to be adopted. A male Hindu belonging to the same caste as his adopting father may be taken or given in adoption. (iv) There must be a physical act of giving and receiving of the child to be adopted with intent to transfer the boy from the family of the natural father to the family of the adoptive father. (See Mullas Hindu Law - 13th Edition - Sections 450, 474, 480 and 488). 10. In the instant case, there is no controversy that Iboyaima had the capacity to adopt; that Ibobi Singh natural father of plaintiff No. 1, had the capacity to give in adoption; and that plaintiff No. 1 had the capacity to be given and taken in adoption. The only controversy, is on the ceremony of adoption. 11. 10. In the instant case, there is no controversy that Iboyaima had the capacity to adopt; that Ibobi Singh natural father of plaintiff No. 1, had the capacity to give in adoption; and that plaintiff No. 1 had the capacity to be given and taken in adoption. The only controversy, is on the ceremony of adoption. 11. The purpose of the ceremony of adoption is to give publicity to the factum of adoption and as such the ceremony of giving and taking has assumed importance and become an essential ingredient of a valid adoption. In the case of Lakshman Singh Kothari v. Smt. Rup Kanwar, reported in, AIR 1961 SC 1378 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed: "Under the Hindu Law, whether among the regenerate caste or among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the corporal giving and receiving in adoption is to secure due publicity. To achieve this object it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it." 12. The submission of learned Advocate General, therefore that giving and taking is not an essential ingredient of a valid adoption is untenable. 13. Let us now examine the contention of learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that a registered deed is essential for a valid adoption. Registration itself is notice of a certain transaction and is for the purpose of publicity of the transaction embodied in the document. The fact that the Hindu Law enjoins that giving and taking must be ceremoniously done to give due publicity negatives the contention that a registered deed is additionally essential for adoption. 14. The booklet, "Manipuri Customs," does not ex facie show in which year the customs were codified and under what authority. The fact that the Hindu Law enjoins that giving and taking must be ceremoniously done to give due publicity negatives the contention that a registered deed is additionally essential for adoption. 14. The booklet, "Manipuri Customs," does not ex facie show in which year the customs were codified and under what authority. In a few decisions of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Manipur ( AIR 1956 Manipur 18 and AIR 1964 Manipur 14 ) noticed some provisions of this booklet, though no judicial pronouncement has been made as to its legal value. It is not necessary for our purpose either to make any pronouncement on its legal value. We shall assume its validity and then examine paras 27 and 33 (supra). 15. Para 27 provides that for adoption giving and taking is necessary; it also provides for Sagei Chakkhangba with or without Homa or Datta Homa. It has been agreed by counsel at the Bar that in Manipur Homa or Datta Homa is not necessary. In its place there must be Sagei Chakkhangba (a clan feast). In the instant case admittedly, the plaintiffs performed no Homa or Datta Homa. But the plaintiffs claim that Sagei Chakkhangba was given. Para 27 therefore is not in conflict with the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in, AIR 1961 SC 1378 . (supra). It correctly records a custom of Manipur. 16. What remains to be considered is whether the factum of adoption has to be done by a registered deed as required by para 33 (supra). Customs, in order to be valid, inter alia, must not conflict with the law of the land. 17. Manipur was integrated with the then Dominion of India on the 15th October 1949. In exercise of the powers conferred by Ss.3 and 4 of the Extra - Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (46 of 1947) (now known as Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947) the Central Government issued the Manipur (Administration) Order 1949, Paragraph 5 of this order provided that all laws in force in Manipur or any part thereof immediately before the commencement of that order shall continue in force until repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority. This provision saved the Manipur Laws and Acts. On the passing of the Constitution of India, Manipur became a Part "C" State. This provision saved the Manipur Laws and Acts. On the passing of the Constitution of India, Manipur became a Part "C" State. The Acts and Ordinances specified in the Schedule to the Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949 (59 of 1949), with certain exceptions, were extended to Manipur by the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 (30 of 1950) (now known as the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950) which came into force on the 16th day of April 1950. This Act gives power to the Central Government to extend to Manipur or any part thereof, any enactment which is in force in a State. It is under this provision that a number of Acts in force in different States have been extended to Manipur by the Central Government (see preface to the Manipur Code Part I). The Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949, came into force on Ist January 1950. One of the Acts specified in the schedule to the Merged States (Laws) Act 1949 is the Indian Registration Act, 1908. In other words, the Indian Registration Act, came into force in Manipur on April 16, 1950, under the provision of Part C (Laws) Act, 1950. The Indian Registration Act, therefore, with effect from that date, became the Law of Manipur and any State Law of Manipur, or any customs even having the force of law in Manipur, if it conflicts with any provision of the Indian Registration Act, shall cease to have any effect in the State of Manipur. The relevant provision of the Indian Registration Act (S.17 thereof) does not enjoin that for adoption by a Hindu a registered deed is necessary. As such, assuming that para 33 of Chapter V of Manipuri Customs" had the force of law, it ceases to have any legal, effect after the coming into force of the Registration Act. We, therefore, hold that in Manipur a registered deed is not essential for the purpose of adoption and to that extent para 33 of "Manipuri Customs" records no validly extant custom. We, further, hold that for a valid adoption in Manipur, no registered deed is necessary; nor the factum of adoption need be in writing. 18. Let us now proceed to examine whether the plaintiffs have been able to prove the ceremony of giving and taking. The evidence on this point is the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. 18. Let us now proceed to examine whether the plaintiffs have been able to prove the ceremony of giving and taking. The evidence on this point is the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. P. W. 1 Madhu Singh deposes that he knew Iboyaima Singh and Ibobi Singh, the natural father of plaintiff No. 1. Iboyaima Singh was the younger brother of Ibobi Singh. He deposes that plaintiff No. 1 was adopted since his birth by Iboyaima Singh. Before the birth, he deposes, Iboyaima requested his brother, Ibobi, that if a male child was born to him, he would adopt that child as his son. Ibobi agreed. On the date of the birth of plaintiff No. 1, Iboyaima adopted him as his son. On the 6th day of the birth of plaintiff No. 1, Swasti Puja was performed by Iboyaima Singh. He further deposes that there was also a Sagei Chakkhangba and that he himself attended the Swasti Puja. He further deposes that plaintiff No. 1 was brought up by Iboyaima Singh at the latters home. P. W. 5 Ibobi Singh is the natural father of the boy. He corroborates the evidence of P. W. 1 in toto. P. W. 2, who is a Sagei relation of the plaintiffs as well as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 also corroborates the evidence of P. W.s. 1 and 5. P. W. 4 is Kulabidhu Singh. He is also a Sagei relation of the parties. He is also their neighbour. He too supports the plaintiffs case in full. He further deposes that Iboyaima adopted plaintiff No. 1 as he and his wife Rani Devi had no child, although they had been married for seven years. P. W. 3 Jugeswar Sarma deposes that he acted as the Porohit in the Swasti Puja of Priyokumar Singh. He deposes that Iboyaima performed all the religious functions of P. W. 5. He further deposes that in that Swasti Puja, Iboyaima told him that he had adopted the child as his son and that the child was son of his brother, Ibobi Singh. We do not have any reason to disbelieve the evidence of the above witnesses. P. Ws. 2 and 3 are common Sagei relations of the parties; P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were all disinterested witnesses. Nothing has been brought out in cross-examination to render their evidence incredible. We do not have any reason to disbelieve the evidence of the above witnesses. P. Ws. 2 and 3 are common Sagei relations of the parties; P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were all disinterested witnesses. Nothing has been brought out in cross-examination to render their evidence incredible. We, therefore, hold that the Swasti Puja of plaintiff No. 1 and the Sagei Chakkhangba on the date of the Annaprasanna (Chaumba) were performed by Iboyaima. The learned trial Judge also has found that these ceremonies were performed by Iboyaima. Had the child not been adopted by Iboyaima, the latter would have no reason to perform the Swasti Puja of the child and to give the Sagei Chakkangba on the above occasion. 19. The learned trial Judge has found that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the giving and taking of the child. What law requires is that for valid adoption the child must be transferred from the family of the natural father to the family of the adoptive father; but the mode of transfer depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the adoption took place on the date of the birth of the child itself. It may not always the possible bodily to transfer a child on the day of its birth from the home of his natural father to the home of his adoptive father. It is enough, in our opinion, for all intents and purposes, if there is a transfer of sonhood of the adopted boy from the natural father to the adoptive father. That the sonhood of plaintiff No. 1 was, in fact, transferred from Ibobi to Iboyaima can be inferred from the following circumstances: (i) the plaintiff No. 1 was brought up in the family of Iboyaima, (ii) that when Iboyaima was lying seriously ill and ultimately expired in the Dibrugarh Medical College Hospital, it was plaintiff No. 1, who attended him there. P. W. 5 has deposed that "plaintiff No. 1 was taken and brought up by Iboyaima Singh and he was residing with Iboyaima and Rani Devi." P. W. 6 (plaintiff No. 2) also deposed that "he was brought at the house of Iboyaima Singh." Defendant No. 1 (D. W. 6) simply denies adoption, but she has not denied the plaintiffs evidence referred to above that plaintiff No. 1 was brought up by Iboyaima Singh at his home. Defendant No. 1 has admitted that when her husband Iboyaima died at Dibrugarh while taking treatment. Plaintiff No. 1 was with him. (iii) There is a third piece of circumstantial evidence furnished by Exts. A/1 and A/3. Exts. A/1 and A/3 are pattas in which the name of plaintiff No. 1 has been recorded along with the names of defendant No. 1 and plaintiff No. 2. In Exts. A/1 and A/3 - plaintiff No. 1 has been shown as the son of Iboyaima. 20. The D. Ws. give only negative evidence. D. W. 1 Tomba Singh, claims to be a Sagei relation of the parties. He deposes that he does not know that there was adoption of any son by Iboyaima. In cross-examination, he has gone so far to say that he does not know plaintiff No. 1 at all. This evidence is a complete lie. D. W. 1 being an elderly Sagei relation could not have any reason not to know plaintiff No. 1, adopted or not. The evidence of P. W. 2 is to the effect that he does not know of any adoption. 21. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 refers to Exts. B/1, B/2 and B/3. Ext. B/1 is an L. P. School certificate of plaintiff No. 1. In that certificate the name of Ibobi Singh has been recorded as the father of plaintiff No. 1. Nobody denies that Ibobi was the father of the boy, albeit natural. There is nothing to show that if a boy is adopted, the name of the adoptive father only has to be shown in School records. In fact, an adoptive father is not the father of an adopted son. He is the father only by fiction of law for certain purposes. Ext B/3 is a copy of a form of an application for admission into the M. E. School filled up by a teacher of the School. In that application the natural fathers name has been recorded as the father of the boy. On the basis of Exts. B/3. Ext. B/2 was issued. Ext. B/2 is identical with Ext. B/1. D. W. 5, a teacher of the M. E. School says that he filled up Ext. B/3 on his own, and not at the instance of either Ibobi or Iboyaima. Exts. B/1 and B/3 do not prove that plaintiff No. 1 was not adopted by Iboyaima Singh. 22. B/3. Ext. B/2 was issued. Ext. B/2 is identical with Ext. B/1. D. W. 5, a teacher of the M. E. School says that he filled up Ext. B/3 on his own, and not at the instance of either Ibobi or Iboyaima. Exts. B/1 and B/3 do not prove that plaintiff No. 1 was not adopted by Iboyaima Singh. 22. Another submission of Shri T. Bhubon Singh is that there was no reason for the alleged adoptive parents to adopt a son as they were yet young enough to have a son. That may be so, but the law does not enjoin that a person who has no possibility of having a son only can adopt. On the contrary, a male Hindu of discretion including a minor, may adopt. That apart, an explanation of the adoption is available. The explanation is that Iboyaima and defendant No. 1 did not have children, though they had been married for 7 years. 23. In the result, we hold that plaintiff No. 1 was physically transferred from the home of his natural father, Ibobi, to the home of Iboyaima, and that there was giving and taking as required by law. We further hold that plaintiff No. 1 was validly adopted by Iboyaima Singh, deceased, as his son and that he is entitled to a share in the properties left by Iboyaima Singh. 24. The next question for our consideration is what will be the shares of plaintiff No. 1 and of plaintiff No. 2. Admittedly, Iboyaima died in 1961. So, the devolution of his property on his death will be governed by the Hindu Succession Act. 1956. S.8 of the Hindu Succession Act provides: "8. 24. The next question for our consideration is what will be the shares of plaintiff No. 1 and of plaintiff No. 2. Admittedly, Iboyaima died in 1961. So, the devolution of his property on his death will be governed by the Hindu Succession Act. 1956. S.8 of the Hindu Succession Act provides: "8. The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this chapter:- (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the schedule; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of Class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the schedule; (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased." In other words, the heirs of class I exclude the heirs mentioned in the other following classes and the heirs mentioned in class II exclude the heirs mentioned among agnates and the cognates. 25. In the instant case, plaintiff No. 1 is the son, and respondent No. 1 is the widow of the deceased, Iboyaima. They will inherit in equal shares, their names appearing among class I heirs. Plaintiff No. 2 is Iboyaimas fathers widow. Her name appears among class II heirs. So she is excluded by the class I heirs. The result is that the property left by Iboyaima will be inherited in equal shares by plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 and plaintiff No. 2 will not have any share. 26. This suit is for partition by metes and bounds as well as for a declaration that the plaintiff No. 1 was the adopted son of late Iboyaima Singh. As the suit is for partition, a preliminary decree has to be passed. We direct that the learned Subordinate Judge will pass a preliminary decree in respect of the properties mentioned in schedules "A", "B", "C" "D" and "E" in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. 27. The appeal of appellant No. 1 Priyokumar Singh is allowed. The appeal of appellant No. 2 Keinyatombi Devi is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs. PATHAK J. :- I agree. Appeal partly allowed.