Ram Autar v. Nathoo Ram — 1976 DIGILAW 330 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmed, Member. - These are two review petitions (Nos. 930 of 1973-74 and 27 of 1974-75) which, although pertaining to the same case, are directed against two different order of two different members. Review petition no. 930 of 1973-74 is against the order dated 3.4.1974 passed by Sri R.N. Azad, a former member of the Board by which he summarily rejected revision no. 611 (z) of 1973-74 filed by Ram Autar, Petitioner, and did not consider it even fit for admission. The other petitioner no. 27(z) of 1974-75 seeks to review my own order dated 13.12.1974 by which revision no. 621 of 1973-74 (Ram Autar v. Nathu Ram etc. was dismissed by me on the basis of the recommended of the learned Additional Commissioner, Allahabad, and after hearing the parties at great length. This order has since been reported in 1975 R.D. at page 43. 2. The case giving rise to those petitions has had a very long and chequered history and its salient facts may be concisely set forth in order to provided the necessary background for the proper appreciation of issues raised during the course of the hearing of review petition no. 27(z) of 1974-75.On 12.10.1971. Nathu Ram gave an application that Land Management committee of jalpur district farrukhabad had executed some lease in an illegal and irregular manner. The Collector, Farrukhabad, cancelled these leases by his order dated 23.1.1973 in a case under section 198 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act Ram Autar and others filed a revision before the Additional filed a revision before the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad, against this order. The Commissioner heard the parties and having come to the conclusion that the revision had no force made a reference to the Board that the revision be rejected. Finally, this recommendation came up before me in the form of a reference and on 13.12.74. I accepted the reference, dismissed the revision filed by Ram Autar and others and upheld the order of collector Farrukhubad dated 23.1.1973. It is this order which is now sought to be reviewed in petition no 27 of 1974-75 3. As regard review petition no. 930 of 1973-74, the learned counsel for the petitioner had prayed that it should be referred to a bench for hearing. On 30.7.1975. I ordered that review petition no. It is this order which is now sought to be reviewed in petition no 27 of 1974-75 3. As regard review petition no. 930 of 1973-74, the learned counsel for the petitioner had prayed that it should be referred to a bench for hearing. On 30.7.1975. I ordered that review petition no. 27 (z) of 1974-75 will be heard and decided first and if its outcome showed that a reversal of the order of my learned predecessor Sri. R.N. Azad was necessary, the review Petition no. 930 of 1973-74 would be referred to a Bench because I could not possibly sit in judgment over the order of a brother member. 4. In Pursuance of this order, Review petition no. 27(z) of 1974-75 has had to be taken up first for the hearing and disposal. 5. Learned counsels for the parties argued their respective view points at considerable length and I do not consider it necessary to reproduce all such arguments as some of them are quite immaterial for the purpose of this review petition. However, the important points which have emerged from these arguments and on which I consider it necessary that a finding should be recorded are given below: (i) What is the scope of a revision ? (ii) what is the scope of a review petition ? (iii) Whether it is possible for this court to declare any provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act (or rules framed thereunder) as invalid or ultra vires ? (iv) Whether issue of a fresh notice is needed when 'suo moto' action is taken or deemed to be taken by the Collector ? (v) Whether the provision of the Gaon Samaj Manual are only directory and procedural or mandatory in nature ? (vi) If a rule framed under the rule making authority in any statute militates against any of the substantive provisions of the enactment itself, which one should prevail the relevant section of the Act or the offending rule ? (v) Whether the provision of the Gaon Samaj Manual are only directory and procedural or mandatory in nature ? (vi) If a rule framed under the rule making authority in any statute militates against any of the substantive provisions of the enactment itself, which one should prevail the relevant section of the Act or the offending rule ? (vii) In case any act provides that particular powers will be exercised in a particular manner to be prescribed, but no such procedure has been subsequently laid down, then whet procedure should be adopted by the authorities on whom the responsibility of complying with the provisions of law reset; and (vii)Finally what errors, mistakes, omissions or irregularities, if any, are apparent from the record of this case which can warrant any interference at the stage of review ? 6. The question of the scope of revision was first raised by the learned counsel for the opposite parties when he opened his arguments in reply to the learned counsel for the petitioner. He maintained that the 'impugned order' 1975 R.D. page 43 was already much more detailed, and exhaustive, than was required. According to him, a revision should have confined itself only to the question of jurisdiction or any material irregularity or illegality in any suit or proceedings in which no appeal lay or where an appeal lay but had not been preferred. This is the sum and substance of section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act which correspondents, almost word for word, to section 115 of the code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel contended that the board had taken into account all aspects of the matter, and had even gone the extent of looking into acts of the case in order to ensure that no injustice was done, when it decided this revision reference by its order dated 13.12.1974 which is now sought to be reviewed. On this point, the learned counsel concluded by saying that correctness of the impugned order itself was a very good ground why any review of that order should not be considered at all. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, argued that the position as stated by the learned counsel for the other party was not in keeping with the latest pronouncement of the supreme court on the subject. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, argued that the position as stated by the learned counsel for the other party was not in keeping with the latest pronouncement of the supreme court on the subject. He relied on a number of Supreme Court rulings but the one which deserves to be carefully born in mind is the case of Shankar v. Krishna A.I.R. 1970 (S.C.) page 1 in which their lordships of the supreme court have made the following significant observation:- "The right of appeal is one of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the court below. Two things which are required to constitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the relation to constitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the relation of superior and inferior court and the power on the part of the former to review decision of the latter. When the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure Code circumstances the limits of that jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the statue; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense". 8. Viewed in the light of those observations, the impugned order dated 13.12.1974. cannot be said to suffer from any defect if points of facts, raised in the course of revision/reference whose judgment is now being sought to be reviewed through this review position. 9. It was, again, the learned counsel for the opposite party who raised the question of the scope of review and maintained that such scope was extremely limited. He argued that no review could lie or be entertained on the ground that any material irregularity had taken place in the disposal of a reference or revision. He cited a large number of cases, both of several High Court and of Supreme Court in support of his contention. He argued that no review could lie or be entertained on the ground that any material irregularity had taken place in the disposal of a reference or revision. He cited a large number of cases, both of several High Court and of Supreme Court in support of his contention. He argued that the scope of review was so limited that no court of appellate or revisional jurisdiction could look into the facts of the case and had to confine itself to the conditions laid down in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He maintained that section 341 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act has made C.P.C. applicable to the enactment (Act 1 of 1951). He, therefore, urged that a review could be entertained only on the following grounds:- (a) When the petitioner has been able to discover new and important matter or evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not with in his knowledge or could not be produced at a time when the decree was passed or order was made against him; (b)When such decree or order suffered from some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; and (c) When there was any other sufficient reason justifying such a review. He concluded his arguments on this point by referring to what he maintained was the leading supreme court case on the subject. Tungbhandra industries v. Government of A.P. A.I.R. 1964 (S.C.) 1973 which it had been held was real though it might not always be capable of exposition between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which erroneous decision and a decision which should be vitiated by an 'error apparent'. A review is by no mean an appeal in disguise where by an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for a patent error, 'where, without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say that there is a substantial point of law which stares one is the face and, there could reasonably be no two opinion entertained about it'. According to their Lordships of the supreme 'error apparent' on the face of the record warranting any interference in review. 10. According to their Lordships of the supreme 'error apparent' on the face of the record warranting any interference in review. 10. learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out in reply that the aforementioned argument suffered from a great fallacy in so far as the reviews under the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act were not to be governed by the provision of order XLXII Rule 1 C.P.C. but according to rule 339 (1) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R Rules. 1952, (as amended from time to time). He relied on a number of cases for this proposition to dwell upon them because the scope of review by the Board of Revenue has been discussed in detail in the Board's Full Bench case of Bharuddin v. Gaon Sabha 1976 R.D. 53 and I can do no better than to reproduce para 39 of the judgment in this case in which legal position of review under the C.P.C. and reviews under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act by the Board of revenue has been considered in sufficient detail:- " According to the learned counsel for the petitioner reviews are provided by rule 339(1) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules. This rule derives its authority from section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act which reads as follows:- "273. The Board on its own motion or on the application of the parties to the case may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by it self or by a single member." However, Section 114 of the C.P.C. which provides for review has been expressly excluded from the provisions of C.P.C. which do not apply to suits or proceedings under this Act in accordance with the second schedule of the U.P. Tenancy Act and once the applicability of section 114 of the C.P.C. will also not be considered as being applicable to the applications for review filed under the U.P.Z.A.and L.R. Act. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner the powers of the board to review its own orders are neither governed by rule 339 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act or section 114 of the C.P.C. or order XLVII Rule 1, C.P.C., but these powers are enjoyed by the Board in accordance with the settled principles of law that every court has inherent jurisdiction, apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. This power is based on a legal maxim which is to the effect that no party shall suffer because of any fault of the court. Relying on a large number of cases, especially Sriniwasa Prasad Singh 1968 A.L.J. 1257 and the case of Srimati Laxmini v. Deputy Director of consolidation U.P. 1966 R.D. 419 the learned counsel has argued that the Board enjoyed vested powers which were not in any way confined, or restricted by the provisions of either of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act or the U.P. Tenancy Act or even the C.P.C. According to him this view of the Allahabad High Court has been confirmed in a large number of cases like the Sub-divisional officer Mirzapur v. Raja Sriniwasa Prasad Singh A.I.R. 1966 (S.C.) page 53 and several other cases reported in A.I.R. 1970 (S.C.) page 1909 and 1963 A.L.J. page 601." 11. The board has thud accepted that the scope of review is fairly wide and review can be granted in all case in which the feels that its pronouncement, unless reviewed, can result in defeating the ends of justice or in laying down an erroneous law which would be allowed by its subordinate courts. I would be like to indicate here why this distinction has been made by the provisions of Act 1 of 1951 between the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure and the rules governing reviews under the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act when section 341 of the Act makes almost the entire C.P.C. applicable to suit and proceedings under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The reason is not far to seek. The code of civil procedure is meant basically and essentially for the use courts which have a purely civil jurisdiction which have a purely civil jurisdiction. The board of Revenue, on the other hand has two wings-judicial and administrative or executive. The order of subordinate revenue authorities come up before the board either in appeal or revision. These orders can be of three types-judicial quasi-judicial and purely administrative. It is the purely judicial orders which are to be governed wholly by provisions of the C.P.C. this, however is not the case with quasi judicial and executive orders. The order of subordinate revenue authorities come up before the board either in appeal or revision. These orders can be of three types-judicial quasi-judicial and purely administrative. It is the purely judicial orders which are to be governed wholly by provisions of the C.P.C. this, however is not the case with quasi judicial and executive orders. If the provisions of C.P.C. were to be applied to quasi-judicial and executive orders also the speedy implementation of land laws would be virtually impossible and the very purpose of the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act would be frustrated. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the order sought to be reviewed by initiating arguments on the next point i.e. whether it is possible for this court to declare any provision of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act as invalid or ultra vires. According to him, the Board was fully competent to declare any section or rule of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R Act/Rules void or ultra vires and he quoted some cases in support of this proposition, but these cases being clearly distinguishable from the instant review need not be discussed here because this matter has also been discussed at length in the Board's Full Bench case Bahar Uddin v. Gaon Sabha, 1976 R.D. 53, supra. The relevant portion of the judgment in this case deserve verbtaim reproduction:- "We may next take up whether the Board has any power to hold any rules void or ultra vires. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case Aman v. Shiv Abhar 1966 R.D. 367 in which their Lordships of the High Court have held that 'it is the duty of the civil court to scrutinise the validity of each law challenged before it and if the law does not appear to be validity farmed to declare it ultra vires and not to give effect to it. Their Lordships went on to observe that the court below also held that the appeared to be beyond the power but unfortunately it remarked that it had no jurisdiction to declare the rule invalid. As against this pronouncement of the Allahabad High Court we have before us two case-one of the supreme court which have dealt which this issue. The first is the case of Venkataramana and co. As against this pronouncement of the Allahabad High Court we have before us two case-one of the supreme court which have dealt which this issue. The first is the case of Venkataramana and co. v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1966 (S.C.) 1089 in which their Lordships of the Supreme court observed as follows : If a statute imposes a liability and creates an effective machinery for deciding questions of law and fact arising in regard to that liability, it may, by necessary implication, bar the maintainability of a civil suit in respect of the said liability. A statute may also confer exclusive jurisdiction on the authorities constituting the said machinery to decided finally a jurisdictional fact thereby excluding by necessary implication the jurisdiction of a civil court in that regard. But an authority created by a statute cannot question the vires of that statute or any of the provisions there of which were under its function. It must act under the act and not outside it.' The case decided by the Allahabad High Court R.B. Narain Singh Sugar Mills Ltd. Lhaksar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P. Lucknow, A.L.J. 1968 1046 subsequent to the case of Aman Singh v. Shiv Adhari referred to above, clearly lays down that it is not open to an authority created under the statute to pronounce upon the vires of that statue. The views of judges of Allahabad High Court appear to be in conflict and therefore we have no hesitation in following the Supreme Court case in which it has been clearly stated that an authority created by a statute has to cannot challenge of question the vires of the statute itself." 13. It is, therefore, not for this court to decided whether any particular section of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act or rules made thereunder is valid and intra vires or not because the board is a body created by the statute and being a statutory body it has to function with in the frame work of rules and laws enacted by the same legislature which enacted by the same legislature which empower the board of revenue to function as a statutory body. Thus, the learned counsel for petitioner's objection that the validity of some rules under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act or U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (U.P. Act No. XXVI of 1947) some of which find place in the Gaon Samaj manual (a compendium of the relevant rules and G. Os. etc. Under the enactment mentioned above) cannot be sustained. 14. It has now to be seen whether issue of a notice is necessary in proceedings under section 198 of the U.P.Z.A an L.R. Act when it is proposed to take 'suo moto' action. According to the mandatory. He referred to Webster's Dictionary Volume III page 2936 regarding the meaning of the words 'suo' and 'moto' or motu. It is needless to dwell on the dictionary meaning of this word because the generally accepted sense in which the term 'suo moto' as used in Act and enactments is 'of his own accord' or on his own motion. 'Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that when an authority proposes to act or initiate action 'suo moto', a second notice is invariably necessary indicating that 'suo moto' action is being taken. The learned counsel relied on a number of rulings in support of this proposition. It would be necessary to consider some of these cases in order to ascertain if learned counsel's contention is correct. The first case referred to by him is the case of J.S. Saloja v. Chief Settlement Commissioner. A.I.R. 1971 (S.C.) 448. This case is clearly distinguished from the facts is clearly distinguished from the facts involved in the instant case. In Saloja's case their Lorships of the Supreme Court held that 'suo moto' power of revision cannot be exercised without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause. It is important to bear in mind that this case referred to the exercise of 'suo moto' powers in revision whereas in the instant case we are concerned with the exercise of suo moto powers by the trail court viz. The collector himself. This is also the position in the case of Chhango Lal v. Deputy Director of consolidation 1972 R.D 43 in which his Lordship of the Allahabad high Court has held that D.D.C cannot exercise his powers in revision suo moto without giving a second notice to the petitioner of grounds on which he wanted to exercise his 'suo moto' powers. This is also the position in the case of Chhango Lal v. Deputy Director of consolidation 1972 R.D 43 in which his Lordship of the Allahabad high Court has held that D.D.C cannot exercise his powers in revision suo moto without giving a second notice to the petitioner of grounds on which he wanted to exercise his 'suo moto' powers. Thus in almost all cases all the cited by the learned counsel two significant and noteworthy points emerge so far as the exercise of 'suo moto' powers is concerned. Firstly no court in revision or appeal can exercise 'suo moto' powers without giving a second notice to the party concerned; and secondly, a fresh notice would be mandatory in case in which the exercise of 'suo moto' powers by any court of original or appellate jurisdiction would result in taking such action by the court which was not known to the parties, or this action was based on material which was not in the knowledge of the party or parties concerned. Thus, for instance, if the Tahsildar issued a noticed calling upon trespassers on Gaon Samaj land to show cause why they should not be evidence therefrom and after he had passed an order directing the ejectment of the trespassers, the aggrieved party went up in revision before a superior court, such court had to confine itself to the question of eviction alone and could not, in the exercise of its suo moto powers, direct that damages should also be recovered from the trespassers for the period they were in illegal possession of Gaon Samaj land. Such action would be fully within the competence and jurisdiction of the superior court (e.g. Collection) but then the collection cannot take this action in the exercise of his 'suo moto' powers without issuing a second notice calling upon the trespassers to show cause why they should not merely be evicted but also mad to pay damages for the period of unlawful occupation and for the loss suffered by the Goan Samaj as a result of this trespass. Once this important distinction is borne in mind it would be clear that there was nothing to prevent a collector from taking 'suo moto' action in the instant revision because the facts and circumstances on the basis of which the lease were proposed to be cancelled were already mentioned in the original notice and a second notice was not called for because, firstly, the collector was acting in his capacity as a trial court (and not as a court of revision or appeal) and secondly, that the original notice contained all the ingredients on which action was proposed to be taken as also the consequence which would follow if the collector was satisfied that the action mentioned in the notice should be taken. In other words, the petitioner were given due notice of the fact that the lease executed in their names were irregular and liable to be cancelled and they should, therefore, show cause as to why lease should not be cancelled. If the collector had, in the exercise of his suo moto powers, taken action other than that mentioned in the show cause notice given initially, he would have certainly been acting in a manner which offended the principles of natural justice and it could have been justifiably argued that a second notice was necessary. In fact, in such a case a second would be mandatory and imperative. Since this is not the position in the instant case, I regret I cannot agree with the contention of the learned counsel or the petitioners that issue of a fresh show cause notice was necessary just because action was being taken by the collector 'suo moto'. 15. The learned counsel for the opposite party has made one or two additional and even more weighty points in this regard. He has maintained that the question of exercise of suo moto power is entirely a new point which was taken up fist only when the case came up for hearing before the Board. When the initial notice was given to the petitioners they never raised the plea in their objection to the notice that the collector could not proceed in this matter 'suo moto'. Again, when an appeal was filed before the Additional commissioner, this point was taken up as one of the grounds of appeal. When the initial notice was given to the petitioners they never raised the plea in their objection to the notice that the collector could not proceed in this matter 'suo moto'. Again, when an appeal was filed before the Additional commissioner, this point was taken up as one of the grounds of appeal. Later, when the appeal was converted into a revision, this point was not raised by the petitioners and finally, when the revision was taken up by the learned Additional commissioner, no objection was raised on the point of exercise 'suo moto' power. In order words, according into the learned counsel, the petitioners knowingly and deliberately waived their right to be given a fresh notice when 'suo moto' action was taken or deemed to be taken by the collector and did not claim it till a very late stage when it could not have been claimed at all. 16. This view of the learned counsel finds supports from the observations of our country's eminent jurist, Jagdish swarup, according to whom 'A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, but obviously an objection to jurisdiction cannot be waived, for consent cannot give a court jurisdiction where there is none.' In the instant case the Collector's jurisdiction is not being challenged and hence this intentional relinquishment of a right, if any, must be taken as a waiver which deprives the opposite parties to claim the right of a second notice either at the stage of revision or review (14) . (14)Jagdish Swarup : Legislation and Interpretation p. 315. 17. This view is further borne out by the legal maxim 'consensus Tollit Errorem' which means 'the acquiescence of a party who might take advantage of an error obviates its affect (15) . According to Broom 'on the maxim under consideration depends also the important doctrine of waiver, that is, the passing by of a thing; a doctrine which is of wide application both in the sense of pleading and in those practical proceedings which are to be observed in the progress of a cause from the first issuing of the writ to the ultimate signing of judgment and execution (16) . Broom further elucidated this point by saying' when applied to the proceedings in an action, waiver may be defined to be the doing something after an irregularity committed and with a knowledge of such irregularity, where the irregularity might have been corrected before the act was done; and it is essential to distinguish a proceeding which is merely irregular from one which is completely defective and void. In the latter case the proceeding is a nullity, which cannot be waived by any laches or subsequent proceedings of the opposite party. Where, however, an irregularity has been committed and where the opposite party knows of the irregularity, it is fixed rule observed by all the courts in this country, that he should come in the first instance to avail himself of it, and not allowed the other party to proceed to incur expense. "It is not reasonable afterwards to allow the party to complain of the irregularity, of which, if he had availed himself in the first instance, all that expense would have been rendered unnecessary; and, therefore, if a party, after any such irregularity has taken place, consents to a proceeding which by insisting on the irregularity, he might have prevented, he waives all exceptions to the irregularity. This is a doctrine longs established and well known, and extends so far that a person may be materially affected in a subsequent criminal prosecution by proceedings to the irregularity of which he has, by his silence, waived objection" (17) . This is a doctrine longs established and well known, and extends so far that a person may be materially affected in a subsequent criminal prosecution by proceedings to the irregularity of which he has, by his silence, waived objection" (17) . He concludes his observations on this legal maxim by stating : It may appear in some measure superfluous to add that the consent which cures error in legal proceedings, may be implied as well as expressed for instance-when, at the trial of a case, a proposal was made by the Judge in the presence of the counsel on both sides, who made no objection, that the jury should assess the damages contingently with leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for the amount found by the jury, it was held that both parties were bound by the proposal; and that the plaintiff's counsel was not, therefore, at liberty to move for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, for qui tacit consentire ridetur, the silence of counsel implied their assent to the course adopted by the judge, and 'a man who does not speak when he ought shall not be heard when he desires to speak" (18) . (15) Selection of Legal Maxims by Broom, 7th Edn. P. 109. (16) Selection of Legal Maxims by Broom, 7th Edn. P. 110. (17) Legal Maxims by Broom, 7th Edn. P. 111 supra. (18) Legal Maxims by Broom, 7th Edn. p. 112, supra. 18. I fully agree with the learned counsel for the opposite party as also with the eminent and leading jurists, cited above, and find myself quite unable to subscribe to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the collector should have given a second notice if he was acting in a 'suo moto' manner. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next proceeded to assail the impugned order by maintaining that the provisions of the Goan Samaj Manual are only directory and procedural in nature and are not mandatory. In fact according to him, such of the paras of this manual as are at variance with the substantive provisions of the law itself deserve to be struck down outright. In may order dated 13.12.1974, I referred to 1960 R.D. page 171 but, according to the learned counsel, this ruling is itself incorrect and deserves to be overruled. 20. In fact according to him, such of the paras of this manual as are at variance with the substantive provisions of the law itself deserve to be struck down outright. In may order dated 13.12.1974, I referred to 1960 R.D. page 171 but, according to the learned counsel, this ruling is itself incorrect and deserves to be overruled. 20. In order to decide this point, it will be necessary to ascertain as to what is 'delegated legislation' and what is 'subordinate legislation.' The eminent jurist of our country, Jagdish Swarup (19) , has given a very lucid exposition of this aspect of the interpretation of statutes. Defining 'delegated legislation' he has distinguished it from 'subordinate legislation.' According to him, legislation is either supreme or subordinate. The former is that which proceeds from sovereign and supreme power of the state and which is, therefore, incapable of being repealed, annulled or controverted by any other legislative authority. Subordinate legislation' is that which proceeds from any authority other than the sovereign power and is, therefore, dependant for its continued existence and validity on some supreme or superior authority. He has further proceeded to categorise 'delegated legislation' under two main heads - firstly rules, regulations and bye laws under the statute which provided that they shall have the same effect as it enacted there-under; and secondly, rules and regulations made under the statute which do not provide in so many word that they shall have the effect as it enacted there-under. The Gaon Samaj Manual is a sort of handbook which is a compilation of (a) relevant selections of the U.P.Z.Z and L.R. Act or the panchayat Raj Act; (b) rules made under these Acts which have the same effects as if they had been enacted by the legislature and (c) G. Os.and B. Os. issued by the Government or the BOard of Revenue in the exercise of authority vested in them by the state or the board the legislature or the enacting authority in respect of instructions and directions regarding the manner in which substantive Acts and Rules are to be complied with. So far as the rules made under the rule making power of the Government are concerned, they have the same force as that of the law itself under which they were framed. As regards the G. Os. and B. Os. So far as the rules made under the rule making power of the Government are concerned, they have the same force as that of the law itself under which they were framed. As regards the G. Os. and B. Os. issued by the Government and board, from time to time, to regulate the implementation of the substantive Acts, and rules they came within the category of 'subordinate legislation' which do not have the force of law in the strict sense of the word but they are as good and effective as the rules framed under the Act because they are 'ancillary and subserve the purpose of the enactment.' Jagdish Swarup, however, makes it clear that unless these G. Os. and B. Os. subserve the purpose of enactment and do not go against the provisions of the statue, they should be deemed to be, for the purpose of carrying out the essential policy which the legislature has laid down in the statute itself and which therefore, inspite of being procedural and directory are in effect mandatory in nature. These views are not only in keeping with the basis in principles of jurisprudence, but also follow the observations contained and Maxwell's 'Interpretations of Statue' and Salmond's jurisprudence' as well as the cases laid down by eminent Indian jurists like Jagdish Swarup (20) and G.P. Singh (21) . Thus, there might be difference of opinion regarding the view in the case of Bhaggi Lal etc. v. Land Management Committee 1960 R.D. 171 in which a Member of the Board held that the compliance with rule contained in Gaon Samaj Manual was mandatory yet as the view of the leading jurists would show that the logic behind this important decision is thoroughly sound. In view of these facts, I have absolutely no hesitation in holding that my finding that the provisions of Gaon Samaj Manual should be strictly observed in the allotment of land and grant of pattas is in no way incorrect. (19) Legislation and Interpretation 666. (20) Legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup. (21) Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh. 21. Before proceeding further it might be worth while to examine what has been called by Salmond as the 'Law of procedure.' According to this law, 'the law of procedure' may be defined as that branch of the law which governs the process of litigation. (20) Legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup. (21) Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh. 21. Before proceeding further it might be worth while to examine what has been called by Salmond as the 'Law of procedure.' According to this law, 'the law of procedure' may be defined as that branch of the law which governs the process of litigation. It is the law of actions-jus quod ad actiones pertinent using the term action in a wide sense to include all legal; proceedings, civil or criminal. All the residue is substantive law and relates, not to the process of litigation, but to its purposes and subject-matter. Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks; procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates the conduct and relations of courts and litigant in respect of the litigation it self; the former determine their conduct and relations in respect of the matter litigated' (23) . This is equally true about revenue law, with which in the instant case, we are concerned. The question would then be which procedural laws are mandatory ? For this, it would be necessary once again to fall back on Jagdish Swarup who has given a very Lucid ex-position of the mandatory and directory nature of laws and rules. 'There is a distinction well recognised between a statute that is imperative and that which is merely directory. The scope and object of a statue are the only guides in determining where its provisions are directory or imperative. In the absence of an express provision, the intention of the legislature is to be ascertained by weighing the consequence of holding a statue to be directory or imperative. No universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of court to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. No universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of court to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. Lord penzance (sic) said in Howard v. Bodioton, "I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject matter, consider the importance of the provision that has disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decided whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory," In considering whether a statute is imperative a balance may be struck between the inconvenience of rigidly adhering to and inconvenience of sometimes departing from its terms. Thus the construction of mandatory words as directory and directory words as mandatory should not lightly be adopted. It will always be pursuaded that the legislature intends to use the words in their usual and natural meaning. It is only where a meaning leads to absurdity or great inconvenience leas or for some other reason as clearly contrary to the obvious intention of the legislature, that the words which are ordinarily mandatory in their nature, will be construed as directly or vice versa.' Thus some rules are vital and go to the root of the mater, they cannot be broken; others are only directory and a breach of them can be overlooked provided there is substantial compliance with the rules. The intention of the legislature should be construed as mandatory, if the aim and object of the statute would be clearly defeated if the direction to do a thing in a particular manner is not strictly observed. A provision of law is not mandatory unless non-compliance with it is made penal. Statutes are not directory when to put them in that category would result in serious impairment of the public or private interests that they are intended to protect' (24) . A provision of law is not mandatory unless non-compliance with it is made penal. Statutes are not directory when to put them in that category would result in serious impairment of the public or private interests that they are intended to protect' (24) . Thereafter he goes on to observe 'To determine whether a contravention of a particular provision of a statue makes the proceeding, held in such contravention, a nullity or whether such contravention operates only as an irregularity is at all times difficult. No hard and fast line can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity. The question has to be determined having regard to the nature, scope and object of the particular provision which has been violated. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity but the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is a nullity is to see whether the parties can waive the objection; if they can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity if they cannot it is a nullity. The ultimate test seems to be whether the particular statute or the particular provision in that statute is based on grounds of public policy or whether it was intended only for the benefit of a particular person or a class of persons. If it is based on grounds of public policy, it is obligatory and cannot be waived and a contravention of such a provision must be a nullity. On the other hand if it is not based on grounds of public policy but is intended only for the benefit of an individual person or a class of person, than it is only directory and can be waived because every one has a right to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule, made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual and a contravention of such a provision will amount only to an irregularity' (25) . Judged by this yardstick ; the relevant rules pertaining to allotment of G.S. land are clearly mandatory in nature. Judged by this yardstick ; the relevant rules pertaining to allotment of G.S. land are clearly mandatory in nature. Because (a) other provision (like section 122-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and rule 115-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rule which though enacted much later were given retrospective effect) and the general scheme of the enactment clearly points to this conclusion; (b) these rules are based on ground of public and their breach is not merely an irregularity but a nullity and (c) no-compliance of these rule is penal and in cases of irregular allotments pattas grated to the lessees are liable to be cancelled and the lessees are liable to ejectment. It is significant to note that according to J. Swarup (P. 314 supra) it is not merely statute which can be mandatory or directory but also rules framed thereunder. 'These rules are vital and go to the very root of the matter.' He has also observed that they cannot be broken. This would make it abundantly clear that the rules which were not complied by the L.M.C. were of this nature and their branch cannot be overlooked and must entail a penal consequence. (23) Salmond on Jurisprudence by P.J. Fizerald (12th Edn.) pp. 461-62. (24) Legislation and interpretation by Jagdish Swarup, J. pp. 312, 314. (25) Legislation and interpretation by Jagdish Swaprup p. 314, 315. 22. In arriving at this conclusion I am further fortified by another salutory principle mentioned by Jagdish swarup. No court of present day Indian can be oblivious of the fact that ours is an age of population explosion and terrific land hunger. Land grab has, therefore, become the order of the day. It is for this reason that while 10% of the total land of village was remarked for the creation of fuel and fodder reserves when the Z.A. and L.R. Act came into effect, subsequently this area is nil. Jagdish Swarup has, therefore aptly observed that no labour legislation, no social legislation and no economic legislation can be considered by a court without applying the principles of social justice in interpreting the provisions of these laws. A piece of social legislation which is conceived to give effect to the socio-economic objects is not to be narrowly considered. Social justice is an objective which is embodied and enshrined in our constitution. 23. Maxwell has expressed the same in this 'Interpretation of Statutes'. A piece of social legislation which is conceived to give effect to the socio-economic objects is not to be narrowly considered. Social justice is an objective which is embodied and enshrined in our constitution. 23. Maxwell has expressed the same in this 'Interpretation of Statutes'. writhing under the head construction ut res magis valeat quam who have observed. 'If the choice is narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about the effective result. Where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating and that alternatives is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction confusion into the working of the system' (26) . In accordance with these principles, Maxwell goes on, 'the court should avoid interpretations which would leave any part of the provision to be interpreted without effect, will not narrow enactment designed for a particular aim or objective. Again, referring to "Historical setting, he has quoted Sri George Jessel. 'The court is not to be oblivous of the history of law and legislation. Although the court is not at liberty to construe an Act of parliament by the motives which influenced the Legislature, yet when the history of law and legislature, yet when the history of law and legislation tells the court and prior judgments tell the present court, what the object of the legislature was, the court is to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairly to carry out that object and no other, an to read the section with a view to finding out what it means and not with a view to extending it to something that was not intended. In the interpretation, of statutes the interpreter may call to his aid all those external or historical facts which are necessary for comprehension of the subject-matter (27) . (26) Maxwell 12th Edn. by Langan p. 45. (27) Maxwell 12th Edn. by Langan p. 47 and 48. 24. These aids to interpretation leave no room for doubt that these rules, G. Os., B. Os. (26) Maxwell 12th Edn. by Langan p. 45. (27) Maxwell 12th Edn. by Langan p. 47 and 48. 24. These aids to interpretation leave no room for doubt that these rules, G. Os., B. Os. etc., assailed by the learned counsel as being 'contrary to the provisions of the main Act (i.e. Act 1 of 1951)' are actually designed to help the authorities to implement the enactment in its letter and spirit. However a court may approach a particular problem, it cannot ignore the fact that all our legislation is aimed at bringing about social justice (28) . All that one can add to this cardinal principal is that agrarian and tenancy legislation is an integral part of the economic legislation and the foregoing observations will apply as much to social and labour legislation as to economic and agrarian legislation for a common objective viz. Bringing about social and economic justice in the country. (28) Jagdish Swarup's 'Legislation and Interpretation'. 25. In view of the above observations, it would be hardly necessary to dwell at any length on the next point viz. If a rule framed under the rule making authority given in any statute militates against any of the substantive provisions of the enactment itself, which one should prevail; the relevant section of the Act or the offending rule. The answer is obvious. Any rule whether of 'delegated' or 'subordinate' legislation which goes against the subordinate' legislation which goes against the substantive provisions of the statute has got to be struck down. A perusal of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules, 1952. and various G.Os. and notification of the government or the Board, some of which are incorporated in the Gaon Samaj Manual, are not only in the fullest conformity with the rules of natural justice but also aim at streamlining the system by which the main objective of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is to be implemented in the field. These rules and the various paragraphs, of the manual fully subserve the purpose of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and neither do they go against the provisions of the Act nor are they in any manner at variance with the spirit of the enactment itself. They are mere ancillaries for the purpose of carrying on the essential policy which the legislature has laid down in the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Acts, 1951. 26. They are mere ancillaries for the purpose of carrying on the essential policy which the legislature has laid down in the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Acts, 1951. 26. I may in the same stride, take up the next question. In case any Act provided that particular powers will be exercised in a particular manner to be prescribed but no such procedure has been subsequently laid down, then what procedure should be adopted by the authorities on whom the responsibility for complying with the provisions of law rest? Now according to Venkataramya's Law Lexicon (volume II) the word 'prescribed' by the rules made by the Government. In case anything which is not prescribed by the rules is provided for by the government agency prescribe by the authority to regulate the procedure under the substantive act it will have the same force as the rule prescribed by the statute itself. A careful perusal of the rules made under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act as well as of the rules under the Panchayat Raj Act (which have been made applicable to the procedure to be adopted in implementing the act) would go to show the rules pertaining to the powers, duties and functions of L.M.Cs. have been given in the Gaon samaj Manual and it cannot, therefore, be said that no rules are prescribed for carrying out the various provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. So far as the manner in which the inquiry is to be conducted by the collector or S.D.O. under section 198 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. act, these rules are quite elaborate. Rule 170-B to Rules 176 of the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Rules, amended from time to time, lay down very detailed and exhaustive procedure under which the land is to be allotted and they inquiry is to be conducted by the collector/Assistant collector-in-charge of the sub-division. In fact rules are so comprehensive and so detailed that there is hardly any allotment which does not suffer from one shortcoming or the other as a result of non-compliance of these rules. In fact rules are so comprehensive and so detailed that there is hardly any allotment which does not suffer from one shortcoming or the other as a result of non-compliance of these rules. The contention of the learned counsel that the rules do not provide any manner in which the collector has to conduct an inquiry for the purpose of cancelled of a lease in accordance with the provision of section 198 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act is, therefore, absolutely untenable and hardly warranted by any stretch of logic or language. 27. According to the learned counsel for the O.P. there is still another reason why the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner should not be accepted. He has argued, and I entirely agree with him, that according to the rules it is the satisfaction of the collector which is of the essence in order to decided whether a lease should be cancelled or not. As held in the case of Bahar Uddin v. G.S. 1976 R.D. p. 53 (supra). the satisfaction is of two types 'subjective' and 'objective'. For the purpose of subjective satisfaction even a hardly cryptic order will serve the purpose. The full bench of the Board has, therefore, held in this case it is only when objective satisfaction is require and when an order is to be passed as a result of this satisfaction and is liable to judicial scrutiny, that both parties have to be heard and a proper order is to be written as required by the rules governing judicial or quasi-judicial orders. Section 198 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act does not envisage that as as result of this objective satisfaction a detailed judgment should be written as contemplated by order 41 Rule 31 code of civil procedure. However since even a quasi-judicial order has to be passed on objective satisfaction the order must fulfil the basis requirements of the principles of natural justice viz. Both the parties should be heard and it should be made clear as to why and on what basis that particular order is being passed. However since even a quasi-judicial order has to be passed on objective satisfaction the order must fulfil the basis requirements of the principles of natural justice viz. Both the parties should be heard and it should be made clear as to why and on what basis that particular order is being passed. The order of the collector dated 23-1-1973 cancelling the lease is a fairly well reasoned and well argued order and there is nothing in that order which cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny and hence I am fully satisfied that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner in his regard has hardly any force. 28. The last question what mistake omissions or irregularities, if any, are apparent from the record of this case which can warrant any interference at the stage of review has already been dealt with in the earlier paragraphs of this order in which the scopes of revision and review have been discussed in considerable detail. It would be futile to repeat those arguments. However, one fact is abundantly clear. No amount or mistakes, omissions or irregularities will vitiate an order sought to be reviewed unless those errors, omission of irregularities are such that they may result in gross miscarriage of justice or in defeating the end of justice. The rules of justice can be manifold and, as observed earlier, just as there as there are basic natural and fundamental principles of justice there are also social, economic, agrarian and socio-economic laws as long as the social, economic and agrarian principles do not offend the natural rules of justice, it would be highly improper to strike down an order just because it suffers from petty omissions or minor irregularities. Even in appeals, section 99 C.P.C. lays down that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties o causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the court. Whatever be the minor defects or irregularities pointed out b y the learned counsel for the petitioner, the proceedings cannot be regarded as vitiated because they do not affect either the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. Whatever be the minor defects or irregularities pointed out b y the learned counsel for the petitioner, the proceedings cannot be regarded as vitiated because they do not affect either the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. In the course of arguments, the learned counsel has, no doubt, drawn my attention to some such petty irregularities and these will certainly be rectified in the instant review petition but to argue that the entire order sought to be reviewed should be drastically altered so that it has, virtually, the effect of reversing the previous order due to insignificant mistakes will be against all canons of justice, equity and fair party. 29. In the end learned counsel for the petitioner argued that according to Appendix III of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules the period of limitation mentioned against serial no. 24-A is six months. According to him, as a result of land laws Amendment Act, 1974, section 198(4) relates to applications for setting aside the order of the L.M.C. or suo moto action by the S.D.O. in this regard. A close study of the original Act and the rules and the amended Act and the rules would show that this anomaly has cropped up because section 198 has been amended with the result that what was formerly section 198(2) has now become section 198(3). According to him, therefore the l imitation for suo moto action is also six months only as mentioned against serial no. 24-A of Appendix III of the Z.A. and L.R. Act. This, however, does not mean that the period of limitation is to be read only against serial no. 24-A. The limitation mentioned against item no. 24 should also be read in this connection. According to this serial, Period of limitation for application for setting aside the orders of the L.M.C. about allotment of land is six months from the date of the order of the L.M.C. and for S.D.O. for setting aside an order of the Goan Sabha about allotment of land is three years from the date when collector/S.D.O. first knew of the irregular allotment of land. In my opinion is a mistake due to an inadvertent oversight which has cropped up on account of the fact that the rules under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act have not been amended along with the substantive action by the U.P. Land Laws Amendment Act of 1974. In spite of this inadvertent omission, the intent of the legislature is quit clear the limitation for suo moto action under section 198 which was only one year previously has now been raised to three years. It is a well-settled principle of law that whenever such ambiguities arise leading to the interpretation of laws in more than one sense it is the intent of the legislature which is to be seen in order to arrive at any reasonable and sensible conclusion. Land-grabbing having become the order of the day, the legislature increased the period of limitation for 'suo moto' action from six months to one year and has now raised it to three years. It is, thus, manifest that the legislature wants that unlawful trespass on Goan Samaj land must be curbed, as also the grant of illegal leases, and it was for this purpose that the period of limitation for 'suo moto' action was enhanced from one year to three years and it is not at all in keeping with the spirit of the Act that the period of limitation having been enhanced to one years should now be reduced to six months only. Hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings are time-barred is thus without any force and cannot be regarded as a reasonable ground for reversing the previous order. 30. Before concluding I would like to refer to those mistake and omissions which are apparent on the face of the record and which either merit rectification or some clear specification and unambiguous orders. Firstly, paragraph no. 13 of the order sought to be reviewed has been serially re-numbered as 13' twice. This is a clerical error and after the first para no. 13, the subsequent paras should be renumbered as 14, 15, 16 and 17 respectively. 31. There is one more point which seem tom have escaped my attention at the time of passing my order dated 13.12.1974. A perusal of he file shows that on 24.6.74 a member of the board, who has since retired. 13, the subsequent paras should be renumbered as 14, 15, 16 and 17 respectively. 31. There is one more point which seem tom have escaped my attention at the time of passing my order dated 13.12.1974. A perusal of he file shows that on 24.6.74 a member of the board, who has since retired. Passed by the additional commissioner dated 15.2.73 appointing a receive and asking the collector to suggest the name of suitable person who could act as receiver within 15 days. He further directed by this order dated 24.6.74 that status quo be maintained till the disposal of the revision and also ordered issue of notices to the parties. While deciding revision on 13.12.74, I should have passed a specific order that the order of learned member dated 24.6.74 had become infructuous as a result of the decision of the revision and stood automatically vacated. This was a patent omission on my part and since it was inadvertent, it is now clarified that this order of the learned member dated 24.6.74 has become infructuous because the revision itself has been decided and all interlocutory orders regarding stay of proceedings or appointment of receiver, or deposit of security etc. Passed during the time when the review or the revision were pending in the various courts also became infructuous and stood recalled. The sum of Rs. 2000/- deposited by the O.P. in compliance of my order dated 21.2.1975 will be refunded to them forthwith. According the following will be added as para 189' in my order dated 13.12.1974. "18. with the disposal of this revision all interlocutory orders passed during its pendency will automatically stand vacated. 19. In the circumstances of the case no orders are passed regarding costs." The concluding para of the said order being serial number 18 will, thereafter be numbered as para 19 as above. 32. This brings me to the other review petition no. 930 of 1973-74 by which the order of one of my predecessors (Sri R.N. Azad) dated 4.3.1974 was sought to be reviewed. This review petitioner was moved because the revision had not been admitted by Sri. Azad, who summarily dismissed it on 4.3.1974. On 24.6.1974 Sri. 32. This brings me to the other review petition no. 930 of 1973-74 by which the order of one of my predecessors (Sri R.N. Azad) dated 4.3.1974 was sought to be reviewed. This review petitioner was moved because the revision had not been admitted by Sri. Azad, who summarily dismissed it on 4.3.1974. On 24.6.1974 Sri. Saiyid Hussain, another Member of the Board, since retired, seems to have set aside this order inadvertently by passing an order which had the effect or admitting the revision and thus reversing the revision and thus reversing the order of Sri Azad dated 4.3.1974. Actually, when this review petition was moved against the order of sri azad dated 4.3.1974, sri S. Husain instead of reversing Sri Azad's order should have admitted it and then referred it to a division bench of two members it to a division bench of two members which alone was competent to set aside Sri Azad's order. In the present circumstance, however, the review petition no. 930 and the action which should have been taken in consequence there of is of academic interest only. The petitioner had sought to review Sri Azad's order who had not considered this revision even fit for admission. However, another member inadvertently set aside, this order without appreciating that he was not competent to do so and matter should have been referred to a bench but the main object of the petitioners has been achieved. They wanted the revision to be admitted and it was duly admitted. What is more, it has since been heard and considered on merits at great length with the result that the revision petition no. 930 has also become infructuous and ineffective. 33. In the result the review petition no. 27 of 1974-75 seeking review of the order dated 13.12.1974 is partly allowed and partly dismissed. It s allowed to the extent shown in paras 30 and 31 of this order which need not be reproduced and is dismissed in all other respects. Review petition no. 930, seeking review of Sri Azad's order dated 4.3.74 is here by dismissed as being infructuous and ineffectual. It s allowed to the extent shown in paras 30 and 31 of this order which need not be reproduced and is dismissed in all other respects. Review petition no. 930, seeking review of Sri Azad's order dated 4.3.74 is here by dismissed as being infructuous and ineffectual. The learned counsel for the petitioner's argument that this petition should be referred to a Bench because order of a single member can be reversed, altered or modified only by a bench of not less than two members, has hardly any force, because the petitioner's purpose has been duly served and the revision has not only been admitted but fully and finally decide. This should end the controversy once and for all. 34. These proceeding have been going on far a very long time and it is, therefore, considered proper that the amount of Rs. 2000/- deposited as security by the petitioners should be refunded to them forth with and the entire file should be sent to the trial court for suitable action according to law without any further delay. 35. This appears to be a fit case in which the petitioners should bear the costs throughout but in view of the interesting points of law involved, the costs will be easy.