JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal by the defendants against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Jaipur City dated November 27, 1975. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to this second appeal may briefly be stated. The plaintiff-respondents Raghunathdas and Suraimal instituted a suit against Bhonrilal on March 20, 1968 in the Court of Munsiff, Jaipur City, (West), for eviction from the shop fully described in paragraph No. 1 of the plaint. The plaintiffs also claimed arrears of rent and mesne profits amounting to Rs. 71/- at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month for the period from December 21, 1967 to March 18, 1968. It was alleged in the plaint that Bhonrilal took the shop on rent at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month from Madan Gopal and executed a rent note in his favour on June 23, 1944. After the death of Madan Gopal his heirs Surajnarain etc. sold the shop to the plaintiffs on December 21, 1967 by registered sale-deed dated January 3, 1968. Bhonrilal was informed orally about the said sale of the shop and from December 21, 1967, Bhonrilal became tenant of the plaintiffs. On January 10, 1968, the plaintiffs sent a registered notice to Bhonrilal terminating the tenancy. This notice was served upon Bhonrilal on January 13, 1968. When Bhonrilal did not vacate the shop in spite of notice, the plaintiffs brought the suit, as stated above, and sought eviction of Bhonrilal, on the ground of personal necessity. 3. Bhonrilal contested the suit. He filed written statement on July 18, 1968. He admitted that the suit shop was owned by Madan Gopal and it was let out to him on the monthly rent of Rs. 25/-. He denied having executed any rent note on June 23, 1944. He also denied that the heirs of deceased Madan Gopal had sold the shop to the plaintiffs. In the alternative, it was pleaded that even if any such sale-deed was executed in favour of the plaintiffs, it was a sham and fictitious transaction. He also denied that the plaintiffs required the suit shop reasonably and bonafide for their personal use. It was further alleged that since he got standard rent of the suit fixed from the Court and since he was not agreeable to increase the rent of the shop the plaintiffs have brought this suit on wrong facts. He also denied that the plaintiffs required the suit shop reasonably and bonafide for their personal use. It was further alleged that since he got standard rent of the suit fixed from the Court and since he was not agreeable to increase the rent of the shop the plaintiffs have brought this suit on wrong facts. He denied having received notice to quit on January 13, 1968. He alleged that since he carried on business in the suit shop in the name of Messrs Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal, a partnership firm and since this shop was let out for the use of the partnership business, all the partners of the firm of Messrs Rameshwar Lal Bhonrilal were necessary parties of the said firm were impleaded as defendants, the suit was not maintainable. Some more pleas were raised, but it is not necessary to mention them here. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial Court on September 2, 1968:- "1. Whether the defendant on 23-6-44 executed a rent note at Rs. 25/- p.m. and signed it ? P. 2. Whether Surjanarain, heir of the deceased Madan Gopal, sold the shop in dispute under a sale-deed executed on 21-2-67 and registered on 3-1-68 to the plaintiff and oral information of the same was given to the defendant ? P.3. Whether the plaintiffs require the shop in dispute reasonably and bonafide for the business ? P. 4. Whether the plaintiffs give a registered notice to the defendant on 10-1-68 and that notice is valid ? P. 5. Whether the sale the disputed shop is invalid because of the reasons mentioned in para 9 of the additional pleas of the written statement ? D 6. Relief."5. Bhonrilal thereafter moved an application for grant of permission to amend his written statement. The application was allowed and Bhonri Lal filed amended written statement on August 26, 1969. There more pleas were added in the amended written statement; firstly, that the suit was barred by limitation; secondly, that the rent note dated June 23, 1944 was inadmissible in evidence; and thirdly, that since the shop in dispute was gifted in favour of Thakurji Shri Gopalji, the heirs of Madan Gopal had no right to sell the suit shop in favour of the plaintiffs. On the basis of the amended written statement, the following additional issues were struck on October 4, 1969, -On March 20, 1970 the Court struck our issues Nos. 3 and 5 of the September 2, 1968. Bhonrilal again moved an application for amendment of the written statement. This application too was allowed and the amended written statement was filed by him on April 16, 1970. Bhonrilal, thereafter expired. His daughter Mst Mangi Bai was impleaded as a legal representative of deceased Bhonrilal. Mst Mangi Bai filed written statement on November 12, 1970 wherein she pleaded, inter alia, that Bhonrilal had, in his life time, executed a registered Will on April 17, 1953 in favour of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore (the appellants) and by virtue of that Will, Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore were in possession of the shop in dispute as owners. It was also pleaded that although this fact was within the knowledge of the counsel for the plaintiffs still Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore were not made parties to the suit. It was further alleged that they being necessary parties, the suit was not maintainable. One more new point was raised by Mst. Mangi Bai. She alleged that Nathulal, who was 'mukhtiyar-am" of Madan Gopal had served a notice to Bhonrilal terminating the tenancy and since no suit was filed thereafter for a period of 16 years the suit was barred by time on account of adverse possession from the date of the notice to quit. The plaintiffs thereafter sought permission to amend their plaint and impleaded Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore as legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal. The amendment was allowed and Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore were impleaded as legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal, besides Mst. Mangi Bai. All the three legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal filed separate written statement. Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore, in their written statements, denied Bhonrilal to be the tenant of Madan Gopal. They also denied that Bhonrilal took the shop on rent from Madan Gopal vide rent note date January 23, 1944. According to them, Bhonrilal never remained in possession of the suit. They denied that they got the shop under the will executed by Bhonrilal. They pleaded ownership by adverse possession. They also denied the receipt of notice terminating the tenant prior to the date the suit. Some more pleas were raised in the written statements filed by Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore, but they need not be mentioned. 6. They denied that they got the shop under the will executed by Bhonrilal. They pleaded ownership by adverse possession. They also denied the receipt of notice terminating the tenant prior to the date the suit. Some more pleas were raised in the written statements filed by Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore, but they need not be mentioned. 6. On February 3, 1971, the following issues were added to the issues already framed on October 4, 1969, - "(4) Whether no tenancy right devolved on the legal representatives of Bhonrilal, defendants 1/1 to 1/3 ? If so, what is its effect on the suit. (5) Whether deceased Bhonrilal executed a Will in favour of defendant 1/3 with regard to the shop in dispute and, therefore, the defendant is his legal representative ?" It further appears that on November 19, 1971, issue No. 1 dated October 4, 1969 was amended. The amended issue No. 1 read as under, - On January 15, 1972, the following issues were framed, -1. Whether the market value of the disputed shop is Rs. 20,000/- and, therefore, this Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit ? D.2. Whether defendant Rameshwar is in possession of the disputed shop as owner for more than 12 years and, therefore, the suit is not within limitation ? D.3. Whether the suit is liable to be summarily rejected under order 7 R. 11 C.P.C. ?4. Whether the sons of defendant 1/2 and 1/3 are necessary parties to the suit ? If so, what is the effect on the suit ? D. 5. Whether the suit should have been filed for declaration and possession and if so, what is its effect on the suit ? D. 6. Whether Bhonrilal deceased was never in possession of the disputed shop and Rameshwar was in possession of the shop as Karta of the Joint Hindu Undivided Family as owner ? D.Again on April 13, 1972 two more issues were added to the issues framed on January 15, 1972, - 7. "Whether the suit is not maintainable because of the reasons mentioned in para 5 of the additional pleas of the written statement of Nawalkishore ? D. 8. Whether deceased Bhonrilal did not execute any Will with regard to the disputed shop and what is its effect on the suit ? D".7. "Whether the suit is not maintainable because of the reasons mentioned in para 5 of the additional pleas of the written statement of Nawalkishore ? D. 8. Whether deceased Bhonrilal did not execute any Will with regard to the disputed shop and what is its effect on the suit ? D".7. Trial Court decided issue No. 2 dated October 4, 1969 vide its order dated April 8, 1970, and held that the rent note dated June 23, 1944 being unregistered, was inadmissible in evidence. The trial Court further decided vide its order dated September 10, 1971 that Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore has intermeddled with the possession of the shop in dispute on behalf of the deceased Bhonrilal and as such they are the legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal. 8. On consideration of the evidence led by the parties, the trial Court recorded the following findings - (1) Bhonrilal took the suit shop on monthly rent of Rs. 25/- from Madan Gopal. (2) The heirs of Madan Gopal sold the shop to the plaintiffs and Bhonrilal was informed of the same. (3) The plaintiffs required the suit shop reasonably and bonafide for their business of "Kiryana". (4) A registered notice was sent by the plaintiffs to Bhonrilal on January 10, 1968 and that notice was valid. (5) Mst. Mangi Bai was not entitled to take a stand inconsistent with the stand taken by Bhonrilal. (6) No tenancy right devolved on the legal representative of bhonrilal as they became statutory tenants after the termination of tenancy. (7) The suit for eviction was maintainable. (8) The defendants Rameshwar and Nawalkishore were not in possession of the shop under the will. (9) The suit for eviction was properly valued. (10) The suit was not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. (11) That sons of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore are not necessary parties to the suit. 9. On the basis of the above findings, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid decree, two separate appeals were preferred before the District Judge, Jaipur City. one by Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore and another by Mst. Mangi Bai. The learned District Judge decided the question of reasonable and bonafide necessity and also the question of comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiffs. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid decree, two separate appeals were preferred before the District Judge, Jaipur City. one by Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore and another by Mst. Mangi Bai. The learned District Judge decided the question of reasonable and bonafide necessity and also the question of comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiffs. In the appeal filed before the learned Additional District Judge by the present appellants, the following points were urged, - "1. That defendants 1/2 and 1/3 (appellants) were not the legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal, and therefore, could not have been substituted, as no cause of action arose against them. 2. That the defendants 1/2 and 1/3 (appellants) were in possession of the shop in dispute as owners in their own right and could not be a party to the suit for eviction. 3. That the defendants 1/2 and 1/3 (appellants) were in possession for more than 12 years and asserted they are hostile against the whole words and as such their title has repened by adverse possession."In another appeal filed on behalf of Mst. Mangi Bai, two points were urged; firstly, that no notice of eviction was even served on Bhonrilal and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed; and secondly, that the suit was not within limitation against Bhonrilal under Act 67 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which corresponds to Article 139 of the old Limitation Act of 1908. 10. The learned District Judge, on the basis of the statement of Rameshwarlal who admitted execution of the will by Bhonrilal in favour of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore, came to the conclusion that even though the shop in dispute was not bequeathed in favour of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore but still as they received part of the estate left by Bhonrilal under the Will, they would in law represent the estate of the deceased Bhonrilal. The learned District Judge further held that as Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore were intermeddling with the estate of Bhonrilal, they were rightly held to be the legal representatives deceased Bhonrilal. While dealing with points Nos. 2 and 3 argued on behalf of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore, the learned District Judge disbelieved the statement of Rameshwarlal D.W. 1, Hanumandas D.W. 2, Goverdhanlal D.W. 3 the Siva Sharan D.W-4/1. He placed reliance on Exs. While dealing with points Nos. 2 and 3 argued on behalf of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore, the learned District Judge disbelieved the statement of Rameshwarlal D.W. 1, Hanumandas D.W. 2, Goverdhanlal D.W. 3 the Siva Sharan D.W-4/1. He placed reliance on Exs. 18, 19 and various written statements filed by Bhonrilal and came to the conclusion that the appellants Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore were not the owners. Dealing with the question on adverse possession, the learned District Judge observed as follows:- "So far as the question of adverse possession of the shop in dispute of defendants 1/2 and 1/3 is concerned, there is practically no material on record. They being the legal representatives of Bhonrilal, who was the tenant, can never be considered to be in adverse possession of the shop in dispute. No evidence has been led by them to show as to when they in their own right entered into wrongful possession of the shop. On the contrary, on the statement of Siyasatan D.W 4/1 who is the real brother of these defendants, it can be said that Bhonrilal used to sit on the shop and because of his failing eye sight Rameshwar started sitting on the shop. The shop as per the statements of Rameshwar (D.W.1) after the year 1955 has been registered under the Weekly Holidays Act. The names of the employers and of the servants are mentioned therein. The best evidence could have been the record from the official files to show that Rameshwar alone or along with Nawalkishore was the employee and Bhonrilal was not the employer. No such record has been filed on behalf of the defendants and contrary to this is certified copy of Form 1 Statement under section 4, Part 1. (Ex. 55/D.W. 1) has been filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, Rameshwar denied that this form was filled in by him, or that he signed. There were also certified copies of F. 15 Notice of Weekly Holidays. They appear to have been signed also by the Inspector under the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act. They are, therefore, certified copies of public documents and are admissible into evidence. The establishment is Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal. It can, therefore be easily said that the defendants 1/3 and 1/2 have failed to prove that they were in adverse possession of the shop in depute. 11. They are, therefore, certified copies of public documents and are admissible into evidence. The establishment is Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal. It can, therefore be easily said that the defendants 1/3 and 1/2 have failed to prove that they were in adverse possession of the shop in depute. 11. The learned District Judge then turned to the appeal filed by Mst. Mangi Bai. After thorough discussion of the evidences, the learned District Judge decided both the points raised on behalf of Mst. Mangi Bai against her and dismissed both the appeals. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the landlord District Judge, Mst. Mangi Bai as well as Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore preferred two separate second Appeals before this Court. The appeal filed by Mst. Mangi Bai was dismissed by this Court in limine. See S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 78 of 1976 - Mangi Bai v. Raghunath, Suraj Mal, Rameshwar and Nawalkishore - decided on April 29, 1976. 12. Arguing the appeal preferred by Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore, Mr. M.B.L. Bhargava, the learned Advocate urged the following points before me : (1) That the appellants have been in their own right for more than 12 years and eviction suit against them is not maintainable. (2) That the appellants cannot be held to be the legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal, specially when they had pleaded an independent title in themselves. (3) That Nathulal, as "Mukhtiar-aam" of Madan Gopal has served notice Ex. A. 2 to Bhonrilal on September 2, 1954 terminating the tenancy. Since no suit for eviction was filed for more than 12 years after the said notice, the suit is barred by limitation under Article 139 of the Limitation Act of 1908 or Article 67 of the Limitation Act of 1963. (4) That the Courts below erroneously held that notice terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served upon Bhonrilal. In absence of service of notice to quit, the suit is liable to be dismissed. (5) That the plea on the footing that the appellants were in possession as trespassers was wholly inconsistent with the case of tenancy set up in the plaint. In absence of service of notice to quit, the suit is liable to be dismissed. (5) That the plea on the footing that the appellants were in possession as trespassers was wholly inconsistent with the case of tenancy set up in the plaint. That Courts below committed grave error in converting a suit of rent and eviction into a suit against trespassers, and more so, because the Munsiff has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain a suit in respect of the property of the value of more than Rs. 5,000/-. 13. I first take up the first point urged by Mr. M.B.L. Bhargava. 14. The following pedegree table, which is no longer in dispute, will show the relationship between the deceased Bhonrilal and the appellants:- 15. It may be stated at the outset that no title deed whatsoever in respect of the suit shop showing the appellants to be the owners of the shop has been produced on behalf of the appellants. The appellants claim title on the basis of adverse possession. There is, however, no reliable evidence on record to show as to when the appellants in their own right, entered into wrongful possession of the suit shop. From the various written statements filed by deceased Bhonrilal, it is apparent that he never denied letting out of the suit shop to him by Madan Gopal. Thus, according to Bhonrilal, the suit shop admittedly belonged to Madan Gopal. There is again no doubt that the suit shop was sold by the heirs of Madan Gopal duly registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. Again, Bhonrilal in his written statement, clearly mentioned that he carried on business in the suit shop in the name of Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal a partnership firm. He, however, did not disclose the name of the partners in his written statement but he alleged that the suit was not maintainable unless all the partners are made parties to the suit. There is, on the record, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. signed by Bhonrilal and presented in the Court on March 20, 1970. In this application Bhonrilal admitted that Rameshwarlal was one of his partners. Rameshwarlal as D.W. 1 admitted that after 1953, there was no dispute between him and Bhonrilal. There is, on the record, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. signed by Bhonrilal and presented in the Court on March 20, 1970. In this application Bhonrilal admitted that Rameshwarlal was one of his partners. Rameshwarlal as D.W. 1 admitted that after 1953, there was no dispute between him and Bhonrilal. He further admitted that Bhonrilal had gifted some property to his mother and bequeathed some property to him and his brother Nawalkishore and that after 1953, Bhonrilal used to treat him as his son. According to his statement, Bhonrilal had common him after 1963. He also admitted that on that date of the suit there was no ill-will or enmity between him and Bhonrilal. In view of the above admitted facts, it does not stand to reason why Bhonrilal against the interest of his relatives consistently admitted Madan Gopal to be the owner of the suit shop and himself to be the tenancy of the suit shop at the monthly rent of Rs. 25/-. He also admitted having been irregular in payment of rent at the agreed rate. Not only that, he also stated in his written statement, that he had earlier filed a suit for fixation of standard rent in respect of the suit shop against Madan Gopal. 16. I have carefully gone through the statement of D.W. 1 Rameshwarlal. He has no doubt stated that he has been in exclusive possession of the suit shop since 1947, but a reading of his entire statement leaves no doubt that he is a liar of the first order. He denied even the signatures of Bhonrilal on the written statement filed in the Court by Bhonrilal as his signature on the "vakalatnama" dated May 3, 1968 filed in the Court. The lower appellate Court rightly disbelieved his testimony. The other oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants, relating to his ownership to the suit shop, is equally unreliable and rightly disbelieved by the lower appellate Court. Sivasaran D.W. 4/1 could not, probably suppress the truth. In his cross-examination, he admitted that Rameshwarlal commenced sitting on the suit shop from the year 1968 and that too on account of failing eye sight became weak. In other words according to him, Rameshwarlal came in occupation of the suit shop in 1968 and that too on account of failing eye sight and ill-health of Bhonrilal. In his cross-examination, he admitted that Rameshwarlal commenced sitting on the suit shop from the year 1968 and that too on account of failing eye sight became weak. In other words according to him, Rameshwarlal came in occupation of the suit shop in 1968 and that too on account of failing eye sight and ill-health of Bhonrilal. As already pointed out above, Bhonrilal never disowned the title of Madan Gopal. He, in his written statement asserted that in the suit shop, business was carried on in the name of Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal, a partnership firm. He also admitted in his application dated March 20, 1976, that Rameshwarlal was one of the partners of the firm Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal. That suggests that Rameshwarlal, if at all, was in occupation of the suit shop, he was in occupation constructively on account of his being a partner in the firm Messrs Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal. If so, it cannot be said that Rameshwarlal was in occupation of the suit shop, in his own right, as owner. 17. According to Bhonrilal, the suit shop was let out by Madan Gopal for carrying on the partnership business of Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal. If that is so, Bhonrilal would be deemed to have taken the suit shop on rent on behalf of the firm, Messrs Rameshwarlal Bhonrilal would be deemed to be the tenants of the suit shop I, therefore, find no substance in the contention of Mr. Bhargava that the appellants were the owners of the suit shop and they have been in possession of the suit shop in their own right for more than 12 years. 18. Coming to the net point, it is urged by Mr. Bhargava the appellants cannot be treated as legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal specially when they had pleaded an independent title in respect of the suit shop. Section (11) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides inter alia, that a "legal representative" Means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased. In the present case, D.W. 1 Rameshwarlal has admitted in his statement that a part of the estate of Bhonrilal was bequeathed by Bhonrilal in his favour and in favour of his brother Nawalkishore. It is further not in dispute that the suit shop was not included in the Will made in favour of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore. In the present case, D.W. 1 Rameshwarlal has admitted in his statement that a part of the estate of Bhonrilal was bequeathed by Bhonrilal in his favour and in favour of his brother Nawalkishore. It is further not in dispute that the suit shop was not included in the Will made in favour of Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore. As a matter of fact, the suit shop could not have been included in the said Will as the suit shop according to Bhonrilal belonged to Madan Gopal. 19. It has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court Andhra Bank Ltd. v. R. Sriniwasan and others, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 232, that a legatee, who obtains only a part of the estate of the deceased under a Will, represents his estate and therefore he is a legal representative under Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore have admittedly under the Will, part of the estate of the deceased Bhonrilal. They are, therefore, legal representatives of the deceased Bhonrilal under Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. That apart, the trial Court, vide its order dated September 10, 1971, held that since Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore intermeddled with the estate of deceased Bhonrilal, they are legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal. In pursuance of this order, Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore were added as defendants as legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal besides Mst. Mangi Bai. This decision of the trial Court cannot be reversed in appeal on the ground that Rameshwarlal and Nawalkishore were not the legal representatives of Bhonrilal. I am supported in my view by the decision in Balabi v. Ganesh Shanker Pandit and another, ILR 27 Bombay 162, Maiyajan Bibi and another v. Abdul Shek, AIR 1939 Calcutta 498, C. Subramania Iyer and others v. Muthu Vaithilinga Mudaliar and others, AIR 1919 Madras 971, Malook Dass v. Sahib Ram, AIR 1964 Punjab 532. In all the above authorities, it has been laid down that the order of the trial Court deciding as to who is the legal representative of the deceased party is final and cannot be called in question in appeal. 21. Mr. Bhargava has placed reliance on Ramprasad v. Jammaprasad, AIR 1952 Madhya Bharat 153, Mst. Naro v. Harbans Lal, AIR 1962 Punjab 457, Natesa Sastrigal and another v. Alamelu Achi, AIR 1950 Madras 541, and V. Rm. 21. Mr. Bhargava has placed reliance on Ramprasad v. Jammaprasad, AIR 1952 Madhya Bharat 153, Mst. Naro v. Harbans Lal, AIR 1962 Punjab 457, Natesa Sastrigal and another v. Alamelu Achi, AIR 1950 Madras 541, and V. Rm. A.S. Chockali Chettiar v. A.Sp.S.K.R. Karuppangam Chettiar and others, AIR 1948 Madras 386. In the cases relied on by Mr. Bhargava, it has been laid down that a trespasser or a person who claims title in himself adversely to the estate of the deceased, cannot be said to intermeddle with the estate of the deceased within the meaning of Section 2(11) C.P.C. He, therefore, cannot be treated as legal representative of the deceased. Assuming that these authorities lay down current view, they are of no consequence to the appellants as admittedly they are legatees at least of the portion of the estate left by deceased Bhonrilal and were therefore rightly held to be the legal representatives of the deceased Bhonrilal under Section 2(11) C.P.C. 22. I now pass on to consider point Nos. 3 and 4 urged by Mr. Bhargava. They relate to the question of limitation and the question as to due service of notice to quit on Bhonrilal. Both these points were pleaded and agitated by the appellants before the trial Court but they were not urged on behalf of the appellant before the lower appellate Court. The appellants before the lower appellate Court confined their arguments to three points which have been quoted above in extenso. There is no indication in any part of the judgment under appeal that the objections relating to the suit being barred by time and non-service of the notice to quit on Bhonrilal which are the subject-matter of point Nos. 3 and 4, were also taken and pressed on behalf of the appellants before the lower appellate Court. That being the situation. I do not think that these objections can now be allowed to be raised in this second appeal. See Adwairya Prasad and others v. Balbeo Dass and others, AIR 1941 PC 166, and Krishnapasuba Rao Kundunpur v. Dattatraya Kishanji Karani, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1024. 23. I may recall here that point Nos. 3 and 4 were agitated before the lower appellate Court on behalf of Mst. Mangi Bai who filed a separate appeal before the lower appellate Court. 23. I may recall here that point Nos. 3 and 4 were agitated before the lower appellate Court on behalf of Mst. Mangi Bai who filed a separate appeal before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court after full discussion rejected objections, and dismissed the appeal filed by Mst. Mangi Bai. She then preferred a second appeal before this Court against the decision of the lower appellate Court rejecting these objections and that appeal, as pointed out above, was summarily dismissed by order of this Court dated April 29, 1976. He decision of the lower appellate Court on these two points, therefore became final. It is binding not only on Mst. Mangi Bai but also against the appellants, for Mst Mangi Bai and the appellants were impleaded defendants as legal representatives of deceased Bhonrilal bonafide and three existed no collusion between the plaintiffs and Mst. Mangi Bai. Mst. Mangi Bai contested the suit as vigorously as the appellants. There is ample authority in support of the proportion that a decree passed in a suit brought bonafide against one of the legal representatives is, in the absence of fraud or collusion, binding on all the other legal representatives. This is another aspect of the case which debars the appellants from urging point Nos. 3 and 4 in this appeal. 24. On merits, I agree with the findings given by the lower appellate Court on point Nos. 3 and 4. 25. That brings me to the last point urged by Mr. Bhargava. In view of my findings on point Nos. 1 and 2, it cannot be said that the Courts below converted the suit for rent and eviction into a suit against trespassers. The plaintiffs were justified in bringing the suit for rent and eviction against Bhonrilal and the Munsiff, Jaipur City had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try that suit. The appellants were impleaded as defendants in the suit in their capacity of being legal representatives of deceased defendant Bhonrilal and Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C, Sub-rule (2) of rule 4 of order 22 C.P.C. says:- "Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant." This obviously means that on the death of a party, his legal representatives are impleaded merely in order that the suit might proceed and the decision be arrived at. It is the right and liabilities of the deceased defendant, which have to be considered and not those of the legal representatives themselves. All that the legal representatives can therefore do is to take up the suit at the stage at which it was left when the original defendant died and to continue it. It is not open to them to assert their individual right or hostile title to the suit. They cannot take up a plea contrary to the same taken up by the deceased defendant. In this view of the matter, the appellants, as legal representatives of the deceased Bhonrilal, were debarred from taking up any plea which was not taken up by Bhonrilal. In the present case, Bhonrilal did not plead adverse possession or that he was in possession of the suit shop as a trespasser. On the contrary, he admitted Madan Gopal to be the owner of the suit shop and himself to be the tenant of the shop. 26. In view of the above facts pleaded by the deceased Bhonrilal, I find substance in the point. 27. The result is that the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.Appeal dismissed. *******