JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner Ramdayal was convicted by the Additional Munsiff Magistrate, First Class Ajmer for an offence under Section 304A, I.P.C. and was sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo three months' simple imprisonment vide his judgement dated 20-1-1971. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the aforesaid judgement of the learned Additional Munsiff Magistrate to the Sessions Judge, Ajmer which was transferred to and heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer who, upheld the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal vide his judgment dated 22-6-1972. Aggrieved by this judgement, the petitioner has filed this revision. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor and have also gone through the record, of the case. 3. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the petitioner was driving the bus No, RJ2 - 2894 at about 12.00 noon and while coming from the side of Srinagar to Ajmer he knocked down a boy, who was crossing the road. One Rampal lodged the report at the Police Station, Alwar Gate-Ajmer on 11-2-1968 at about 12-30 p.m. with the allegation that the bus was being driven at the very fast speed. The driver did not sound the horn and the boy died at the spot. The prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses (three being eye-witnesses). The petitioner examined only one witness in his defence. After trial the learned Magistrate held the petitioner guilty of an offence under Section 304A I P.C. and convicted and sentenced him as mentioned above. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the prosecution has failed to establish that the petitioner was guilty of rash and negligent driving of the bus and the three alleged eye-witnesses could not, in the circumstances, be accepted to have seen the actual manner in which the accident took place. They were busy in playing cards and it seems as is natural that their attention was drawn after the collision had taken place. The boy was crossing the road from one hand to another and it was neither expected from the driver nor there is evidence to the effect that the driver had seen the boy while crossing the road earlier than the accident took place. The boy was crossing the road from one hand to another and it was neither expected from the driver nor there is evidence to the effect that the driver had seen the boy while crossing the road earlier than the accident took place. So as to fastness of the speed his contention is that there is neither definite evidence on this point nor the witnesses can be judged of the speed and therefore it cannot be said that the vehicle was at the very fast speed. From the statements of these witnesses it is clear that the throttling noise of the vehicle was heard by them much before the accident and therefore it can very well be expected that ''the boy must have also known that the bus was coming and he might have thought that he would cross the road in the meantime. Thus it appears that the error of judgment was on the part of the boy and the driver was not responsible for any negligent driving. The mere fact that the boy was knocked down does not by itself prove any culpable rashness and negligence on the part of the driver. The bus collided the boy when he was crossing the road and the left wheel of the bus came in the contact of the boy. Even according to the prosecution there was no head long collision and it would be, according to the defence, the boy collided with the bus near about the middle portion. According to him the high speed of a vehicle does not amount rash and negligent driving or not giving the horn of the bus by the driver does not prove any negligence of the bus driver. He has relied upon Tukaram Sitaram Gore v. State, AIR 1971 Bom 164 and State v. Hari Singh, AIR 1969 Raj. 86 . In support of his contention.His further contention is that if a pedestrian suddenly crosses a road without taking note of the approaching bus there is every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the driver becoming aware of it. The bus driver cannot save accident however slowly he may be driving and, therefore, he cannot be held to be negligent in such a case. The bus driver cannot save accident however slowly he may be driving and, therefore, he cannot be held to be negligent in such a case. In Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 221 it has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that if a bus driver, however, slowly he may be driving, may not be in a position to have the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the Bus Driver was negligent. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor has contended that the prosecution has proved that the petitioner was guilty of rash and negligent driving the bus in the city like Ajmer which is a very busy with traffic. The prosecution has examined three eye-witnesses namely, Rampal, Roop Chand and Kishan to prove that the bus was coming at a very fast speed and collided with the child who was crossing the road. The driver did not blow the horn and, therefore, in these circumstances it can be said that the driver was driving the bus rashly and negligently. 6. It may be said that out of these three witnesses Kishan PW 5 has admitted that he was playing cards and therefore he did not see the accident. However, he had seen it after the accident had taken place. PW I Rampal and PW 2 Roop Chand have stated that they were sitting in such a condition that they could see the accident and they had seen that the bus was coming with a fast speed and collided with the child. The bus could stop after crossing 28 after colliding with the child. The main ground relied upon by the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge was that the bus was running at the fast speed so that it could be stopped after 28 from the place of collision and secondly the bus driver did not blow the horn. 7. It may be said that the witness Rampal deposed that the vehicle was at the speed of about 40 to 50 miles per hour, he however, admitted that he did not state this fact in the First Information Report. In his statement Roop Chand PW 2 has deposed that he cannot definitely say as to what was the speed of the vehicle but it was coming at the fast speed. In his statement Roop Chand PW 2 has deposed that he cannot definitely say as to what was the speed of the vehicle but it was coming at the fast speed. It may be said that the question of determining the speed is vague one for a layman. Therefore it cannot be said that as to what actually was the speed of the vehicle when it collided with the boy. On the other hand, from the statement of the PW 1 Rampal it is clear that he heard the throttling noise of the vehicle and after this noise the deceased started crossing the road. He has further deposed that the boy was not running while crossing the road but in his statement before the Police in Ex. D. 1 at portion `A' to `B' he has deposed that the boy was running while he was crossing the road towards the washerman's shop. PW 2 has deposed in his statement before the police that he and others were playing cards in front of the house of the owner of Nawal Kishore Press while in his statement before the Court he deposed that they were playing cards infront of the shop of a washerman. In his statement before the Police marked `C' to `D' he has deposed that the boy was crossing the road and was going towards the shop of a washerman from the side they were playing cards. From these and some other contradictions it cannot definitely be said that these witnesses who have alleged themselves to have seen the occurrence from the very beginning have actually seen the accident after it had taken place. It rather seems that the attention of these witnesses was attracted after the accident had taken place as generally happen in road accident cases. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nageshwar Sh. Krishna Ghobe v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 165 that in cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses who would be in a position to affirm positively the sequence of vital events during the few moments immediately preceding the actual accident from which its true cause can be ascertained. Krishna Ghobe v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 165 that in cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses who would be in a position to affirm positively the sequence of vital events during the few moments immediately preceding the actual accident from which its true cause can be ascertained. When accidents take place on the road, people using the road or who may happen to be in close vicinity would normally be busy in their own pre-occupations and in the normal course their attention would be attracted only by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. It is only then that they would look towards the direction of the noise and see that had happened. It is seldom and it is only a matter of co-incidence that a person may already be looking in the direction of the accident and may for that reason be in a position to see and later describe the sequence of events in which the accident occurred. At times it may also happen that after casualty witnessing the occurrence those persons may feel disclined to take any further interest in the matter, whatever be the reason for this disinclination. If, however, they do feel interested in going to the spot in their curiosity to know some thing more; then what they may happen to see there, would lead them to form some opinion or impression as to what in all likelihood must have led to the accident. Evidence of such persons therefore requires close scrutiny for finding out what they actually saw and what may be the result of their imaginative inference. Apart from the eye-witnesses the only person who can be considered to be truly capable of satisfactorily explaining as to the circumstances leading to accidents like the present is the driver himself or in certain circumstances to some extent the persons who is injured. In the present case the boy, who died in the accident is obviously not available for giving evidence Rampal PW 1 and two others were playing cards and in fact their attention was drawn after the accident had taken place. Therefore, their evidence as to the sequence of the accident cannot much be relied upon. It is admitted that the boy collided with the bus when he was crossing the road. Therefore, their evidence as to the sequence of the accident cannot much be relied upon. It is admitted that the boy collided with the bus when he was crossing the road. From the basis of the statement given by the PW 1 it also transpires that he was crossing while running. Simply because there had been a loss of life, the Court should not be-prejudiced to infer that there must have been rash and act on the part of the driver this is no consideration for the Court. The prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the driver failed in his duty to take precaution as a man of prudence should have taken in the circumstances of the case. As the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of rash and negligent driving the bus it is not safe to convict him for an offence under Section 304-A I.P.C. and in these circumstances, the conviction passed by the learned Magistrate and affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer cannot be upheld. 8. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer, dated 22-6-1972 is set aside and the petitioner is acquitted of the charge for an offence under Section 304-A I.P.C. *******