Judgment 1. IN this application for appropriate writs under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-company is challenging an order of reference issued by the Government of West Bengal on 20 February 1970, in exercise of powers conferred by S. 10 of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), and the order of the Tribunal, dated 28 July 1971, whereby the preliminary objection of the petitioner-company regarding the validity of the said order of reference and the maintainability of the same was rejected by the Tribunal. 2. THE facts of this case, so far as relevant for the purpose of the decision herein, are as follows: The petitioner-company carries on, amongst others, the business of manufacture and sale of steel products and for that purpose have steel plants in different parts in India. At all material times respondent 4 was employed as a skilled worker, grade I, attached to section mill (despatch) of the petitioner-company. There were certain incidents which took place on 20, 30 and 31 December 1967, respectively in which respondent 4 is alleged to have been involved. Accordingly on 4 January 1968, a charge sheet was issued against respondent 4 containing charges under cls. 29 (ii) and 29 (vi) of the standing orders. Respondent 4 replied to the charge sheet and thereafter an enquiry was held by an enquiry committee. Pursuant to that enquiry on 20 July 1968, an order of punishment was passed whereby there was stoppage of the increment of respondent 4 for three years with effect from 1 January 1969, with cumulative effect. Thereafter it appears that by a letter, dated 26 July 1968, this matter was taken up by the employees' union, being respondent 3 herein, before the Deputy Labour commissioner, Government of West Bengal. Pursuant thereto a conciliation proceeding took place over the purported dispute raised by the respondent-union as aforesaid. The admitted position is that the petitioner-company, through its representative, appeared before the Conciliation Officer and participated therein but did not agree to reconsider their decision regarding respondent 4. It is claimed by respondents 3 and 4 that thereafter a letter was written by the respondent-union on 25 August 1968, to the petitioner, challenging the action of the petitioner. This is exhibit A before the Tribunal. It is claimed by respondents 3 and 4 that thereafter a letter was written by the respondent-union on 25 August 1968, to the petitioner, challenging the action of the petitioner. This is exhibit A before the Tribunal. I should point out that the genuineness of this letter was very much disputed by the petitioner-company before the tribunal and before me. Be that as it may, it appears that under these circumstances the order of reference was passed on 20 February 1970, whereby the Government of West Bengal referred the dispute to the Ninth industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The issue referred to was whether the stoppage of increment of respondent 4 for three years with cumulative effect was justified and what relief, if any, he was entitled to. The company and the union filed their respective written statements before the Tribunal. Thereafter the petitioner-company filed a petition for hearing on the preliminary issue. The Tribunal took up this petition for hearing on the preliminary question and heard the evidence of the parties both oral and documentary. The only contention which was raised before the Tribunal as and by way of preliminary objection was to the effect that neither the workmen concerned nor the union on record or anybody else on behalf of him, did make any demand of justice at the bipartite level and, therefore, the subject-matter of the said reference could not be an industrial dispute under the said Act. The tribunal, after considering the evidence on this point came to the conclusion that such demand was made to the petitioner-company by the workmen of the petitioner-company before the order of reference was made, which was rejected by the management. Accordingly, by an order, dated 10 July 1970, the Tribunal rejected the preliminary objection of the petitioner-company and fixed 9 August 1971, for hearing of the case on merits. Being aggrieved by the said order of reference, dated 20 February 1970, and the decision of the Tribunal, dated 20 July 1970, this writ petition was moved whereupon a rule nisi was issued by this Court on 18 November 1971. This Court also stayed all further proceedings pending the disposal of the rule. 3. SRI N. C. Chakrabarti, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised three fold contentions before me. This Court also stayed all further proceedings pending the disposal of the rule. 3. SRI N. C. Chakrabarti, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised three fold contentions before me. He submitted, on the basis of the decision in sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. v. industrial Tribunal, Gujarat [A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 529], that the dispute referred to for adjudication in the order of reference by the Government was not raised before the employer before the order of reference was made. The only demand which was raised in this connexion was by the letter, dated 26 July 1968, addressed by the union to the Deputy Labour commissioner. Accordingly no such demand being made directly before the employer concerned there was not and could not be any industrial dispute which could be referred to for adjudication under S. 10 of the said Act. Regarding the finding of the Tribunal on this point Sri Chakrabarti made various submissions regarding the authenticity and the genuineness of the letter, dated 25 August 1968, claimed to have been written by the union to the petitioner-company challenging the action of the petitioner-company in passing the order of punishment. In this connexion he referred to the evidence of the company's witness and respondent 4 and submitted before me that the evidence of the petitioner-company's witness should have been accepted by the Tribunal and that Tribunal should have held that no such letter was addressed by them. 4. IT was next submitted by Sri Chakrabarti that in this case the conciliation meeting was held on 12 and 23 August 1968, respectively and the order of reference was passed on 20 February 1970. In this connexion he drew my attention to Ss. 12 (5) and 12 (6) of the said Act and submitted that the report of the conciliation Officer was to be submitted within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings and accordingly the report must have been submitted by 26 August 1968. Accordingly there was a delay of about eighteen months before the order of reference was made on 20 February 1970. Accordingly he submitted that it was a stale dispute and no order of reference could be passed on the basis of the same. Accordingly there was a delay of about eighteen months before the order of reference was made on 20 February 1970. Accordingly he submitted that it was a stale dispute and no order of reference could be passed on the basis of the same. It was lastly submitted by Sri Chakrabarti that in the present case the conciliation proceeding was not valid inasmuch as the same could not be validly initiated by the conciliation Officer under S. 12 (1) of the said act. According to him such conciliation proceedings could be initiated by Conciliation officer only if an industrial dispute existed. Inasmuch as by that time no such demand was made before the employer, no industrial dispute could exist. Therefore, the conciliation proceeding was bad and illegal and the report made in this respect was bad and illegal. Accordingly, he submitted that the order of reference, which was passed on the basis of such report, was also bad. 5. SRI Gupta, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondents 3 and 4, disputed the correctness of the submissions of sri Chakrabarti. Regarding the first submission of Sri Chakrabarti, Sri Gupta referred to the letter, dated 25 August 1968, written by the union to the petitioner-company challenging the action taken by the petitioner-company and which was marked as exhibit A in the proceeding before Tribunal. He also contended that in this connexion the Tribunal did not rely solely on the said letter, dated 25 August 1968, but also on the fact that a conciliation proceeding was held and also that there was a verbal representation to the petitioner-company objecting to the action taken by them. Regarding the second submission of sri Chakrabarti it was submitted by Sri Gupta that the petitioner-company cannot be allowed to take any such point because no such point was raised before the Tribunal or taken in this petition. In any event he submitted that there was no delay in this matter and it cannot be said that the dispute referred to was a stale one. Regarding the third submission of sri Chakrabarti, it was similarly submitted by sri Gupta, that no such point was either raised before the Tribunal or taken in this petition and accordingly the petitioner should not be allowed to agitate the same at this stage. Regarding the third submission of sri Chakrabarti, it was similarly submitted by sri Gupta, that no such point was either raised before the Tribunal or taken in this petition and accordingly the petitioner should not be allowed to agitate the same at this stage. In any event he submitted that the petitioner having participated in the conciliation proceedings cannot be allowed to challenge the same or the report. It was further submitted that the appropriate Government was entitled to make a reference under s. 10 of the said Act irrespective of any report under S. 12, Accordingly this order of reference cannot be challenged even if the conciliation proceeding held or the report submitted was not proper or legal. 6. SO far as the first submission of Sri Chakrabarti is concerned it is now a settled law that if no demand was made to the employer directly before an order of reference is made, then such a reference in respect of such dispute is not competent. In the case of sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. [A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 529] (vide supra), the demand which was preferred with the management was in respect of retrenchment compensation and not reinstatement. It was held that since no dispute about reinstatement was raised before the management, it was clear that the state Government was not competent to refer a question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by Tribunal. In this connexion it was observed as follows : "If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen and workmen and workmen. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute." Accordingly if the order of reference before us had been made only on the basis of and only on receipt of the union's letter, dated 26 July 1968, there would be a great deal of force in the contention of Sri Chakrabarti. However, in the facts of the case before me I am unable to hold that the order of reference was passed merely on the basis of the said letter. However, in the facts of the case before me I am unable to hold that the order of reference was passed merely on the basis of the said letter. Firstly, it is to be remembered that in this particular case before the Tribunal the letter alleged to have been written by the union to the director-in-charge, dated 25 August 1968, was strongly relied upon by the workmen. By the said letter the validity of the action taken by the management was challenged by union and the management was called upon to set aside the order of punishment. It was made clear that if no action was taken on the said letter, dispute will be filed in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The admitted position is that if the said letter was in fact sent then it complied with the requirements as laid down in the Supreme Court case. Accordingly the genuineness of this letter was strongly challenged on behalf of the company. However, the Tribunal had chosen to accept the contention of the workmen in this regard and accept this letter to be genuine. Similar challenge was made by Sri Chakrabarti before me. However, it should be remembered that this Court in this writ jurisdiction is not entitled to correct this finding of fact by the Tribunal, This Court is entitled to set aside an order in the case of an error of law and not an error of fact. There was some evidence before the Tribunal on the question whether this document was genuine or not the Tribunal has chosen to accept the case of the workmen and hold that the said letter was genuine and that the same was sent to the company. The Tribunal was entitled to come to such conclusion on the basis of the evidence before it. If any error was committed by the tribunal it was an error of fact and not an error of law and this Court in its constitutional writ jurisdiction cannot correct the same. I should, however, make it clear that i am not of the view that any error of fact was committed by the Tribunal. I am only making it clear that this Court cannot interfere with such findings of fact. I should, however, make it clear that i am not of the view that any error of fact was committed by the Tribunal. I am only making it clear that this Court cannot interfere with such findings of fact. It would have been a different case if the Tribunal had come to such conclusion without any evidence as that would have amounted to error of law. There was some evidence on record and if on the basis of the same the Tribunal came to a particular conclusion, this Court cannot correct the same. It is a finding of fact and this Court cannot reassess or reappraise the evidence adduced before the tribunal to come to a different conclusion. This Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot act as a Court of appeal. Accordingly I hold that the decision of the Tribunal to this effect cannot be challenged before me in this proceeding. That should be the end of this matter so far as the first contention of Sri Chakrabarti is concerned. However, I should point out that as rightly pointed out by Sri Gupta, the decision of the Tribunal was not based only on the letter, dated 25 August 1968. The admitted position is that there was a conciliation proceeding before the order of reference was passed, and that the petitioner-company participated therein and rejected the claim of the petitioner. This itself shows that, if not otherwise, an industrial dispute has arisen as a result of the same when this claim was reiterated on behalf of the workmen and rejected by the petitioner-company in the conciliation proceeding. In this connexion reference may be made to the case of Good Year India, Ltd., jaipur v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur [A.I.R. 1969 Raj. 95], to which Sri Chakrabarti's attention was drawn by me. A similar point was raised therein when the case of sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. (vide supra), was relied upon. It was pointed out by the Court that the employee's service was terminated by the management on 16 December 1966, and that immediately thereafter he moved an application before the Conciliation officer challenging the termination of the service and requesting for reinstatement. The management opposed his reinstatement. Accordingly it was held that it cannot be said that no industrial dispute had been raised by the employee concerned with the management. The same is the position here. The management opposed his reinstatement. Accordingly it was held that it cannot be said that no industrial dispute had been raised by the employee concerned with the management. The same is the position here. A letter was addressed to the Deputy Labour Commissioner on 26 July 1968, (being exhibit 2 before the tribunal), complaining about the action taken by the petitioner in stopping the increment of respondent 4 for three years with cumulative effect and the Conciliation Officer was called upon to intervene in the matter "for redressal. " pursuant thereto a conciliation proceeding was held and the petitioner-company appeared and participated therein but they did not accede to such request. In this context reference may be made to the evidence of the company's witness before the Tribunal. Therefore, an industrial dispute did arise before the order of reference was made. There is another aspect of this matter. There was some evidence before the Tribunal that before the order of reference was passed, the union went to the petitioner-company's director-in-charge to represent the case of respondent 4 but that the director concerned refused to entertain the case and rejected the representation. 7. FOR the aforesaid reasons I must hold that a demand, which was the subject-matter of the order of reference, was in fact made by and/or on behalf of the workmen concerned to the petitioner-company before the order of reference was made. Accordingly I reject the first contention of the petitioner and I uphold the validity of the decision of the Tribunal on this point, 8. REGARDING the second submission of Sri Chakrabarti, on the point that the dispute referred to was a stale one, at the outset I must point out that no such point was taken before the Tribunal nor was the same raised in the writ petition. Under these circumstances no such point can be allowed to be taken at this stage. Merely because there is a gap of one and half years before the order of reference was passed, it cannot be held that the dispute was a stale one. No material was produced before the tribunal in support of the same and there is no averment in the petition in support of the same. This is not purely a question of law but a question of fact; at least a mixed question of fact and law. No material was produced before the tribunal in support of the same and there is no averment in the petition in support of the same. This is not purely a question of law but a question of fact; at least a mixed question of fact and law. Further as a result of the petitioner not having taken such point specifically, the respondents did not have any opportunities to offer any explanation for such alleged delay. There cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the time for making an order of reference. This must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. No fact has been alleged and no such point was taken. Accordingly I reject this contention of sri Chakrabarti. The last contention of Sri Chakrabarti was regarding the validity of the conciliation proceeding. No such point was taken before the Tribunal nor was it raised in the writ petition. Under these circumstances for similar reasons I must hold that the order of reference cannot be challenged on this ground. In any event the contention of Sri Chakrabarti must be held to be misconceived. The Conciliation officer can take up a matter not only when there is an industrial dispute but also when such dispute is apprehended. In the present case even if it is assumed that no industrial dispute existed at the relevant time because it was not till then taken up with the employers, still the Conciliation Officer was entitled to hold such conciliation proceedings in the facts of the case having regard to the fact that under S. 12 (1) he can hold such proceedings even if no industrial dispute existed but was merely apprehended on that date. Accordingly in this particular case if after the receipt of the union's letter, dated 26 July 1968, conciliation proceedings were held by the Conciliation officer then the same cannot be challenged as illegal. 9. IN this context I should point out that such conciliation proceeding and report of the conciliation Officer have not been challenged in this rule which is directed only against the government's order and the Tribunal's order. I should also point out that the petitioner-company appeared before the Conciliation officer and participated therein. Accordingly it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the conciliation proceeding or any report made thereon at this stage in this writ petition. 10. I should also point out that the petitioner-company appeared before the Conciliation officer and participated therein. Accordingly it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the conciliation proceeding or any report made thereon at this stage in this writ petition. 10. IT should also be pointed out that the state Government has the power to make an order of reference under S. 10 of the said Act irrespective of any report of the Conciliation officer. Further the order of reference does not state that same was being made on the basis of any such report. Accordingly the order of reference cannot be challenged to be invalid merely because there may be a report under S. 12 which may be invalid or not. For the aforesaid reasons I reject this contention of Sri Chakrabarti. 11. ALL the contentions raised in support of the rule fail. Accordingly I dismiss the application and discharge the rule. All interim orders are vacated. No order as to cost.