Judgment :- 1. Second Appeal 1021 is by the 1st defendant in O.S. No. 1081 of the Principal Munsiff's Court, Trivandrum, and Second Appeal 1022 is by the same person who was the 4th defendant in O.S. No. 187 of 1965 of the same Munsiff's court. The two suits, O.S No. 187 of 1965 and O.S. No. 1081 of 1966, were suits for redumption of parts of the property scheduled as A schedule property in O.S. 1081 of 1966 which was a suit for redumption of the B schedule item in the plaint which is only a part of the property described in the A schedule therein. The other suit, O.S. 187 of 1965, was for redumption of another part of the A schedule property in O.S. 1081. The property in O.S. 187 of 1965 was in the possession of the first defendant in that suit. The 4th defendant therein, the appellant in S.A.1022, was only a proforma party in that suit. The suits were tried together and preliminary decrees for redumption of the properties in the two suits were passed in the cases. Appeals were taken and it was con tended before the appellate court that by virtue of S.4A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 after its amendment by Act 35 of 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the mortgagees will have to be deemed tenants and so were entitled to fixity of tenure and that therefore the suits should have been dismissed. The appellate court dealt with the matter in the last paragraph of its judgment and the relevant part of that paragraph reads thus: "A commission was taken out to ascertain the nature of the property. From the report and the evidence tendered by the commissioner when examined in court, it is clear that the plot is in the heart of the Trivandrum City very near the Cotton Hill High School. It is in the heart of the Trivandrum City. It is now well settled that properties within the Municipal and Corporation areas, which are not agricultural, are not affected by Act 1/64 as amended up to date. It would also seem that this gets the exemption under S.3 of the Act 1/64 as it is clearly the house site with the appurtenant land. Ext. P1 makes it clear that there are houses in the property. It would also seem that this gets the exemption under S.3 of the Act 1/64 as it is clearly the house site with the appurtenant land. Ext. P1 makes it clear that there are houses in the property. There were 2 or 3 structurers and the well. The only trees then available in the 45 cents of land were 2 coconut trees, 5 jack trees, 2 mango trees and 2 tamarind trees. Considering the whole of the document and the attendant circumstances it is clear that this is not. an agricultural land. Therefore, Act 1/64 cannot apply." 2. The main contention raised by counsel on behalf of the appellant is that it is unnecessary that the land should be agricultural land in order that the Act may apply to the land. Even for getting the protection of Art.31-A of the Constitution, it was submitted that only two conditions need be satisfied. (1) that the legislation must be a measure of agrarian reform, and (2), that it must relate to an estate as defined in Art.31-A. Before we proceed to deal with this aspect we shall extract S.4A as well as the exemption section, S.3(1) (ii) on which reliance was placed by the plaintiffs-respondents in support of the contention that the Act would not apply to the cases. "4A. Certain mortgagees and lessees of mortgagees to be deemed tenants. "4A. Certain mortgagees and lessees of mortgagees to be deemed tenants. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of court, a mortgagee with possession of land, other than land principally planted with rubber, coffee, tea or cardamom, or the lessee of a mortgagee of such land shall be deemed to be a tenant if (a) the mortgagee or lessee was holding the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than fifty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969; or (b) the mortgagee or lessee has constructed a building for his own residence in the land comprised in the mortgage and he was occupying such building for such purpose for a continuous period of not less than twenty years immediately preceding such commencement: Provided that a mortgagee or lessee falling under this clause shall not be deemed to be a tenant, if he, or, where he is a member of a family, such family was holding any other land exceeding two acres in extent on the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1968, in the Gazette; or (c) the land comprised in the mortgage was waste land at the time of mortgage or land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949, would have applied if that Act had been in force at the time of mortgage, and (i) the mortgagee or lessee was holding such land for a continuous period of not less than thirty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969; and (ii) the mortgagee or lessee has effected substantial improvements on such land before such commencement. Explanation I For the purposes of this sub-section, in computing the period of continuous possession or occupation by a lessee, the period during which the mortgagee was in possession or occupation, as the case may be, shall also be taken into account. Explanation II. -In computing the period of fifty years referred to in clause (a) or the period of thirty years referred to in clause (c), the period during which the predecessor-in-interest or predecessors-in-interest of the mortgagee or lessee was or were holding the property shall also be taken into account. Explanation III. Explanation II. -In computing the period of fifty years referred to in clause (a) or the period of thirty years referred to in clause (c), the period during which the predecessor-in-interest or predecessors-in-interest of the mortgagee or lessee was or were holding the property shall also be taken into account. Explanation III. For the purpose of clause (b), (i) "mortgagee" or "lessee" shall include a predecessor-in-interest of the mortgagee or lessee, as the case may be; (i) "building" includes a hut. Explanation IV- In computing the period of twenty years referred to in clause (be) occupation of the building by any member of the family of the mortgagee or lessee for residential purpose shall be deemed to be occupation by the mortgagee or lessee, as the case may be, for such purpose. Explanation V In calculating the extent of land held by a family for the purposes of clause (b), all the lands held individually by the members of the family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family. Explanation VI For the purposes of sub-clause (ii) of clause (c), (i) improvements made by the mortgagee shall be deemed to be improvements made by the lessee; (ii) "mortgagee" or "lessee" shall include a predecessor-in-interest of the mortgagee or lessee, as the case may be. Explanation VII For the purposes of clause (c), (i) improvements shall be deemed to be substantial improvements if the value thereof on the date of commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, is not less than twenty-five per cent of the market value of the land on that date; (ii) a land shall be deemed to be waste land notwithstanding the existence of scattered trees thereon. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to a lessee if the lease was granted on or after the commencement of this Act." "3. Explanations (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to (i) x x x x (ii) leases only of buildings, including a house, shop or warehouse, and the site thereof, with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto." 3. We shall first deal with the exemption provision in S.3(1)(ii) for, if the Act did not apply to the transaction, no further question would arise. We shall first deal with the exemption provision in S.3(1)(ii) for, if the Act did not apply to the transaction, no further question would arise. A reading of the provision relied on clearly indicates that the exemption will apply in cases where the lease referred to is that of the building alone. The building includes a house, shop or warehouse, but the lease must relate to a building and the site thereof with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto. A reading of the mortgage document indicates that it is a mortgage of land, of a building that is situate in a part of the land and of the well and the trees thereon as well as of other structures in the property. It is not possible to understand the mortgage as relating to a building with its site and land appurtenant thereto. We have, of course, assumed that in view of the deeming provision in S.4A when its conditions are satisfied the mortgage will have to be understood as a lease. Otherwise the exemption will not be attracted at all. 4. Turning now to S.4A the particular provision relied on is that in S.4A(1)(a), that the mortgagee was holding the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than fifty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. The Amendment Act came into force on 1-1-1970, and the mortgage was of the year 1048 M. E. The mortgagee has been in continuous possession from 1048 M.E. and he continued to be in possession till the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 and even after that. The terms of clause (a) of sub-s. (1) of S.4A have, therefore been satisfied and this aspect has not been disputed before us. The main point urged by counsel on behalf of the respondents was that the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1963 is not applicable to lands situate inside a corporation or municipality or even to what may be termed as 'urban land'. To put it in a positive manner the argument was that the Act must be construed as applicable only to agricultural land. To put it in a positive manner the argument was that the Act must be construed as applicable only to agricultural land. The Act has been included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and therefore is immune from challenge on the ground that it violated Art.14,19, 31 and 3I-A. Realising and accepting this position the argument was that the terms of the statute clearly indicated that the legislature intended to make the Act applicable only to agricultural lands and not lands within the city limits and within municipalities. Support was sought to be gained from the provisions of Chapter II regarding tenancies and the provisions in Chapter III pertaining to restriction on ownership, and possession of land in excess of ceiling area and disposal of excess lands as well as the provision in the statute regarding the methods by which fair rent should be determined. Reference was also made to the provision in the statute for converting one type of land into another for the purpose of determining its area It was, therefore, argued that the Act furnished internal evidence, from which it is clear, that the Act applied only to agricultural land. If we look at the whole of the statute, it is clear that the Act applies at least in some respects to land situate within the corporations or municipalities. We have only to read S.4A, S.106, and the provisions relating to kudikidappukars to understand that the wording on a plain reading of atleast certain of the sections indicated that the provisions were applicable not merely to agricultural lands. In these circumstances it will be difficult, if not impossible, to construe the Act as a whole as applicable only to lands which are agricultural in nature. This is particularly so as far as the applicability of S.4A of the Act is concerned. The expression 'land' therein must normally take in all land irrespective of where it is situate and for what purpose it is used and irrespective of its nature. 5. But counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance on certain decisions of this Court as well as decision of the Supreme Court for the proposition that any measure introducing agrarian reforms as envisaged by Art.31-A of the Constitution should necessarily be understood as relating only to agricultural land. 5. But counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance on certain decisions of this Court as well as decision of the Supreme Court for the proposition that any measure introducing agrarian reforms as envisaged by Art.31-A of the Constitution should necessarily be understood as relating only to agricultural land. We may preface this part of the discussion by stating an accepted proposition repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme Court that to get the protection of Art.31-A of the Constitution the legislative measure must relate to agrarian reforms. This point has not been questioned before us and we proceed on the basis that the legislation to fall within the four corners of Art.31-A must relate to agrarian reforms. It is equally well-settled that to gain the protection of Art.31-A, the agrarian reform, must relate to or deal with an'estate' as denned in Art.31-A. We shall now extract Art.31-A of the Constitution. "31-A- Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc. It is equally well-settled that to gain the protection of Art.31-A, the agrarian reform, must relate to or deal with an'estate' as denned in Art.31-A. We shall now extract Art.31-A of the Constitution. "31-A- Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Art.13, no law providing for (a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights; or (b) the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property; or (c) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations; or (d) the extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing agents, secretaries and treasurers, managing directors, directors or managers of corporations, or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof; or (e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges, any of the rights conferred by Art.14, Art.19 or Art.31: Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent: Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. (2) In this Article, (a) the expression "estate" shall in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include (i) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the State of Madras and Kerala, any janmam right; (ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement; (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans; (b) the expression" rights," in relation to estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue." Clause (2) (a) states what is an'estate'. There are three sub-clauses to Clause (2) (a). Counsel placed great reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Narayanan Nair's case, 1970 KLT. 659, for the proposition that agrarian reforms to fall within Art.31-A must relate only to estates that satisfied sub-clause (iii) of Clause (2) (a) of Art.31-A of the Constitution. The judgment therein referred to the proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court that legislation to fall within Art.31-A must necessarily relate to agrarian reform and observed: "a restriction not apparent from its plain language. The court held that the protection of the article was available only for the purpose of agrarian reform." The judgment then proceeded to consider "what exactly did the Supreme Court mean by the expression, "agrarian reform"? and towards the end of Para.13 it came to the following conclusion by referring to sub-clause (iii) of clause (2) (a) of Art.31-A: "This, it seems, to us provides the key to the true scope and intendment of the article, to what the Supreme Court meant (and what Parliament subsequently accepted) by the expression, "agrarian reform" when, despite the very wide definition of the word, "estate" in the article, it said that clause (1) (a) thereof was not intended to protect all land reforms but only agrarian reforms. As we have said, sub-clause (iii) of clause (2) (a) of the article embodies the essential definition of the word "estate" within the meaning of the article. As we have said, sub-clause (iii) of clause (2) (a) of the article embodies the essential definition of the word "estate" within the meaning of the article. We can think of no reason why the qualifications in sub-clause (iii) of clause (2) (a) of the article should not apply to the lands described in the earlier part of the clause, and we think that, so far as land reforms are concerned, the protection of the article extends only to land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto including sites of buildings occupied by cultivators, agricultural labourers and village artisans, namely, by persons having an intimate connection with agriculture. In other words, only to what we shall hereafter refer to as agricultural lands." What has been found by the Court in the judgment is not that the Act as framed did not take in non-agricultural land, but that the Act would have the protection of Art.31-A if it related to agricultural land. The judgment did not say that the Act did not take within its ambit non-agricultural land and that if it did it was invalid. This aspect we consider is most important for it appears to us that the true ambit of the Full Bench decision with very great respect has not been noticed by atleast three decisions of this Court, one of them being another Full Bench decision. A reading of Para.20 and 21 will make it clear that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Narayanan Nair's case did not hold that the Act was not applicable to non-agricultural land or that if it applied the Act was invalid. We shall extract Para.20 and 21. "20. Some of the impugned provisions, it is pointed out, are on their wording wide enough to apply To non-agricultural land and such application, it is urged, being unrelated to agrarian reform, cannot have the protection of Art.31A. That being so, the impugned provisions must pass the test of Art.14,19 and 31 in their application to non-agricultural land and must submit itself to such a test even at the instance of a person who holds only agricultural land. If it fails, then, it must be struck down in entirety. That being so, the impugned provisions must pass the test of Art.14,19 and 31 in their application to non-agricultural land and must submit itself to such a test even at the instance of a person who holds only agricultural land. If it fails, then, it must be struck down in entirety. This contention is illustrative of the argument, "bad in part, bad in whole" we have already noticed, and we see no reason why, if that be necessary, the operation of a provision should not, despite the width of its language, be confined to agricultural lands. Supposing two separate statutes were framed in similar terms, one applicable to agricultural land, the other, to non-agricultural land. Would the one be struck down because the other was bad? Supposing there are separate sets of similar provisions in the same statute, the one set applicable to agricultural land the other to non-agricultural land. Would the one set be struck down because the other was bad unless it cannot stand without the other or unless it is manifest that it was not intended to stand by itself? Why should the position be different because both agricultural and non-agricultural lands are dealt with by the same provision? So long as the field is severable, why should not a provision be allowed to operate in the unforbidden portion of the field and barred only from the forbidden portion? 21. For the aforesaid reasons, we shall consider the impugned provisions only in their application to agricultural land as we have said, these petitions are not concerned with non-agricultural land, at any rate, not directly. We wish to make it clear that we are expressing no opinion whatsoever about their validity or otherwise in their application to non-agricultural land." The decision has proceeded on the basis that even if the Act was applicable to non-agricultural lands the provision or the expression 'land' in the statute had a severable applicability in the field. We must also remember that the question that arose before the Court was about the validity of the statute. It was contended that the Act did not have the protection of Art.31-A as it related not merely to agricultural land but also to non-agricultural land. In all the cases dealt with by the judgment the subject matter was agricultural land and it was held that the statute was valid as regards those lands. It was contended that the Act did not have the protection of Art.31-A as it related not merely to agricultural land but also to non-agricultural land. In all the cases dealt with by the judgment the subject matter was agricultural land and it was held that the statute was valid as regards those lands. What is more important is that the Full Bench specifically left the question open in Para.21, which we have extracted, by saying that "we are expressing no opinion whatsoever about their validity or otherwise in their application to non-agricultural land". It necessarily implies that the court understood the Act as applicable or as possibly applicable to non-agricultural lands as well. Notwithstanding this clear expression, if we may say so with respect the judgment has been applied in Damodaran v. Parameswara Panicker,1971 KLT. 484, another Full Bench decision of this Court as if it is an authority for the proposition that the Act applied only to agricultural lands. We shall extract the relevant passage: "The Full Bench also held that the provisions of the Land Reforms Act applied only to agricultural lands, lands held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto including sites of buildings occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans, viz., by persons having intimate connection with agriculture." The decision proceeds on the basis that S.4A, the validity of which was questioned in the case, was applicable both to agricultural and non-agricultural lands and it is for that very reason that it applied to non-agricultural land as well, that it was struck down, as the majority took the view that the applicability of the section was not severable and could not be upheld in so far as it related to non-agricultural land. This decision will not be of any help to the respondents in these cases for two reasons. The assumption made in the case that in the earlier Full Bench decision in Narayanan Nair's case, it was held that the Act applied on its wording only to agricultural land does not seem to be correct. Further, the very decision (1971 KLT. 484) indicates that the court proceeded on the basis that the wording of S.4A clearly indicated that the provisions therein applied to agricultural as well as non-agricultural lands. This decision cannot be of any help, therefore, for understanding the section as applicable only to agricultural land. Further, the very decision (1971 KLT. 484) indicates that the court proceeded on the basis that the wording of S.4A clearly indicated that the provisions therein applied to agricultural as well as non-agricultural lands. This decision cannot be of any help, therefore, for understanding the section as applicable only to agricultural land. The view taken in Damodaran's case, 1971 KLT.484, is also expressed in Sankaran Nambissan v, Sarvothama Rao, 1972 KLT. 891. Categorically the judgment stated: "Thus, it is clear that Act 1 of 1964, being a measure of agrarian reform, could apply only to agricultural land in the sense of Art.31-A(2)(a) (iii) of the Constitution." 6. The same is the view taken in the decision in Madhavan Thampi v. Padmavathi,1974 KLT. 310. We shall extract the relevant passage. "In support of his contention that the Act does not apply to non-agricultural lands he relied on me Full Bench decision of this Court in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT. 659) and Sankaran Nambissan v. Sarvothama Rao (1972 KLT. 891). Reference is also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Malankara Rubber and Produce Co v State of Kerala 1972 KLT. 411. In these cases it was held that Act 1 of 1964 being a measure of agrarian reform would apply to agricultural land in the sense of Art.31-A (2) (a) (iii) of the Constitution." The Supreme Court in Malankara Rubber and Produce Company's case (1972 KLT. 411) summed up the conclusions of the High Court in Narayanan Nair's case in the following manner: 'T The Act as a whole was a measure of agrarian reform. It had to be read as applicable to agricultural land alone by the doctrine of severable application. It got protection of Art.31-A though portions failed for want of that protection and could be challenged under Art.14,19 and 31 of the Constitution. 2. According to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court and one of his colleagues agrarian reform may be wide enough to include ameliorative measures for agriculturists unrelated to rights in the land but in the context of Art.31-A it could only cover measures affecting rights in estates. According to the third learned judge the scope of agrarian reform was much wider and the objective of such reform justified the enactment and protected it under Art.31-A." 7. We do not think that the passage will support the respondents. According to the third learned judge the scope of agrarian reform was much wider and the objective of such reform justified the enactment and protected it under Art.31-A." 7. We do not think that the passage will support the respondents. What the Supreme Court has stated, if we may say so, with respect is the correct summary of the decision. Paras 20 and 21 of of the judgment in Narayanan Nair's case, which we have extracted show that the court proceeded on the basis that the Act would be taken to have severable applications and it was valid as regards agricultural lands and as the cases before the counts were all concerned with agricultural lands, the validity was upheld. From the analysis we have made of the pronouncements of this Court it appears to us that no decision of this Court has analysed the provision of the statute in S.4A of the Act excepting the decision in 1971 KLT. 484, to find out whether that section applied to non-agricultural lands as well The court held therein that the section was applicable to non-agricultural lands. There is no pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the matter. If we accept the reasoning of the decision in 1971 KLT. 484, it is clear that S 4A, as it stood then and as it stands now, takes in not only agricultural, but non-agricultural lands as well. The reasoning in the decision is in accordance with the wording of the section. 8. The limitation which the Full Bench decision in Narayanan Nair's case attached to the expression 'estate' by appending to it the qualifications prescribed in sub-clause (iii) of S (2)(a) of Art.31-A can no longer be considered to be the correct view in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in three decisions. We shall first refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company's case, AIR. 1972 S.C. 2301=1972 KLT. 377. We shall extract Para.15 of that judgment. "15. It will be noticed that what the section vests in the Government is not only agricultural lands but all lands situated in the Kannan Devan Hills village in the Devicolam taluk of the Kottayam district. It extinguishes the rights of the lessees and other persons and vests the lands in the State subject to some exceptions which are contained in subsections (2) and (3) of S.3. It extinguishes the rights of the lessees and other persons and vests the lands in the State subject to some exceptions which are contained in subsections (2) and (3) of S.3. Sub-section (2) exempts plantations. Sub-section (3 ) does not have any bearing on the problem before us." The judgment then proceeded to consider whether the land in question was janmam land or not for the purpose of sub-clause (i) of clause (2) (a) of Art.31-A and after it was found that it was janmam land proceeded in Para.59 to pose the question: "If the lands acquired by the impugned Act are an estate, is the impugned Act a law for effecting agrarian reforms?" It is thus clear that once it is found that the land in question is an estate the only further question for gaining the protection of Art.31-A is whether the measure was for promotion of agrarian reforms. The matter is concluded by the judgment in Balmadies Plantations' case, AIR. 1972 S.C. 2240. "15. Argument has also been advanced on behalf of the petitioner-appellants that so far as the forest areas in the janmam lands in question are concerned, they do not constitute estate unless they are held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, as contemplated by Cl. (2) (a) (iii) of Art.31-A of the Constitution. This contention, in our opinion, is devoid of force. (2) (a) (iii) of Art.31-A of the Constitution. This contention, in our opinion, is devoid of force. Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of Art.31-A reads as under: (2) In this article, (a) the expression "estate" shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include (i) any jagir, in am or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala, any janmam right; (ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement; (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans;" Janmam lands are covered by Clause (2) (a) (i) of Art.31-A. Forest area, which is part of such janmam land would like the remaining janmam lands, constitute an estate, and it would not be necessary in such a case to show that the forest land is held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto. All lands which are part of janmam estate of a janmi in the States of Madras and Kerala would constitute estate as mentioned in Cl. (2) (a) (i) of Art.31-A of the Constitution. As janman lands fall under Cl. (2) (a) (i), it is not essential to show that the requirements of Clause (2) (a) (iii) too are satisfied for such lands and it would make no difference whether forests are a part of the janmam lands." This decision has been referred to by the Supreme Court in a later decision in Government of Kerala v. G. R. Silk Mfg. (Wvg) Co., AIR. 1973 SC. 2734, and the matter is discussed in the judgment in Para.17. In the light of these decisions we have to understand the sub-clauses of clause (2) (a) of Art.31A as separate and distinct provisions and if any one of these is satisfied the land would be an estate within the meaning of clause (2) (a) of Art.31-A. No contention has been raised before us that the land would not fall under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (2) (a) of Art.31 A. 9. It is impossible to give to the language of S.4A a limited meaning and find that its terms would apply only to agricultural land. We have, therefore, to hold that S.4A of the Act applies to the land in question notwithstanding the fact that it is situate in an important part, almost in the heart, of the city of Trivandrum, and may not reasonably be expected to be used for agricultural purposes now or in the near future by any reasonable person. To read the Act, particularly S.4A as limited in its ambit and application to agricultural land alone is not possible. The Act having been included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, what is the effect of making the Act applicable to non-agricultural land, and whether such application would take the Act outside the purview of Art.31A and whether the provision can be understood as a measure for promoting agrarian reforms we need not and cannot consider for deciding its validity. The Act having been included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution is free from attack on the ground that it violated Art.14,19, 31 and 31A. The person in possession of the property in O.S. 187 of 1965, the first defendant, has not appealed from the decree for redemption of the property scheduled to that plaint. So that decree against the first defendant cannot be altered. 10. In the light of the above we allow S.A.1021 of 1973 and dismiss S.A.1022 of 1973. But we hold that the finding entered by the appellate court in O.S. 187 of 1965 (which gave rise to S.A.1022 of 1973) will not be binding on the appellant in S.A.1022, the 4th defendant in O.S. 187. We direct the parties to be or their respective cost throughout.