JUDGMENT M. P. Saxena, J. 1. THIS is a defendant's revision under section 115, CPC against the judgment and order dated 17- 12-75 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur. 2. BRIEFLY stated the facts giving rise to this revision application are that the plaintiff opposite party filed a suit in the court of the Munsif, Gorakhpur for ejectment of the defendant-revisionist from the premises in suit and for the recovery of arrears of rent. During the pendency of the suit the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, came into force and the suit was transferred to the Small Cause Court on 27-2-1973. On 7-4-1973 the parties appeared before that Court and 16-5-1973 was fixed for final hearing. Under the amended Order 15, Rule 5, CPC the defendant was required to deposit the entire arrears of rent and damages admitted by him by the first hearing after the said amendment. The defendant failed to do so, and on 9-8-73 the plaintiff moved an application, 30 -C, for striking off his defence. 25-8-73 was fixed for its disposal. Ultimately it was taken up on 2-11-1973 when the written statement was struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC and 18- 12-73 and thereafter 29-1-74 were fixed for hearing of the case. On the latter date the defendant applied for time to deposit rent. He was allowed to do so by 9-2-1974. Again he failed to deposit the rent and moved an application 32(C) for further extension of time. It was rejected on 9-2-74 and 21-3-74 was fixed for hearing. On 21-3-74 and 29-3-74 there was no Presiding Officer of the Court and the suit was taken up on 2-5-74 for ex- parte hearing. On this date the defendant remained absent. The plaintiff examined one witness and the suit was decreed ex-parte. On 6-5-1974 the defendant moved an application purporting to be under Order IX Rule 13, CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree (38-C)' on the ground that when the case was called out he went to call his learned counsel but by the time he returned the suit was decreed exparte. He filed an affidavit also to support his contention. The plaintiff opposed it (vide 48-C) alleging that the defendant had not turned up on that date. The trial court dismissed it by the following order :- "Heard parties' counsel and perused the affidavits. He filed an affidavit also to support his contention. The plaintiff opposed it (vide 48-C) alleging that the defendant had not turned up on that date. The trial court dismissed it by the following order :- "Heard parties' counsel and perused the affidavits. The defence of the appellant was struck off on 2-11-1973 in the suit and then the suit was proceeded with exparte and exparte decree was passed. In this view of the matter the application for setting aside the exparte decree is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed." The defendant preferred a revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act and the learned lower Revisional Court rejected it by observing ;- "Failure to deposit such rent was visited by a penal consequence, namely, the court was given a discretion either to refuse to entertain any defence or as the case may be, strike off the defence... ......I do not think the .defendant could be permitted to take part in further proceedings after his defence was struck off. Strictly speaking, it was not an exparte decree. The mere fact that the court wrote that the suit was decreed exparte in the judgment is immaterial. Even if it was an exparte decree I do not think an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was maintainable." At another place he observed :- "When the defence is struck off the defendant is debarred from setting up his case. He cannot prove his case even bv cross-examining the plaintiff and his witnesses." As both the learned lower courts were of opinion that the application under order IX Rule 13 CPC was legally not maintainable, they did not go into the merit of the question whether sufficient ground for setting aside the exparte decree was made out or not. 3. THE defendant has now come up in revision to this Court. 4. THE first point for consideration is whether the application under Order IX rule 13 CPC was maintainable. For this purpose it is necessary to enquire whether the decree passed by the trial court on 2-5-74 was under rule 2 or rule 3 of Order 17 CPC. 3. THE defendant has now come up in revision to this Court. 4. THE first point for consideration is whether the application under Order IX rule 13 CPC was maintainable. For this purpose it is necessary to enquire whether the decree passed by the trial court on 2-5-74 was under rule 2 or rule 3 of Order 17 CPC. It is needless to say that after amendment of these rules by this Court they have become mutually exclusive and if a case falls under rule 2 it will not be open to the court to proceed under rule 3, Munna Lal v. Jai Prakash, 1968 AWR 860. The learned counsel for the opposite party has relied on the following explanation to amended rule 2 : "No party shall be deemed to have failed to appear if he is either present or represented in court by agent or pleader though engaged only for the purposes of making an application." It is argued that according to the defendant himself he had come to court and had also engaged a counsel. Therefore, he should be deemed not to have failed to appear. There is no force in this contention because the circumstances in which the order was passed will have to be examined and the order passed will have to be interpreted to find out whether the order in law and substance is one under Or. 17 rule 3 or under Or. 17 rule 2 read with Order 9. In the instant case the suit was adjourned on 21-3-1974 and 29-3-74 as there was no Presiding Officer of the Court and 2-5-1974 was fixed for final hearing. On this date the defendant did not put in his appearance in court as will be evident from the order sheet. He appears to have remained outside the court room and gone away to call his counsel when the case was called. By the time he returned the suit was decided. His learned counsel did not appear before the Court at all. He did not even do any thing to represent the defendant. In these circumstances the suit was rightly decided exparte. This view finds support from the case of Rattan Chand v. Brij Bhushan, 1968 AWR 658 and the Full Bench decision in M. S. Khalsa v. Chiranji Lal, 1976 AWC 23 . The application was clearly maintainable under Or. IX rule 13 CPC. In these circumstances the suit was rightly decided exparte. This view finds support from the case of Rattan Chand v. Brij Bhushan, 1968 AWR 658 and the Full Bench decision in M. S. Khalsa v. Chiranji Lal, 1976 AWC 23 . The application was clearly maintainable under Or. IX rule 13 CPC. The learned counsel for the opposite party has further argued that as the suit was decreed after striking off the defence no application under IX Rule 13 CPC lay. It has also no force because in the case of Abdul Aziz v. Raj Chhabra, AIR 1968 Allahabad 119 it has been held that if a suit proceeds exparte after written statement is struck off Or. IX Rule 13 CPC applies. 5. IT may now be considered as to what is the effect of striking off the defence. Whether the defendant is completely precluded from participating in the proceedings or he can still cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses and show that on the basis of his own evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree. Before going into the merit of this question it may be stated that it was a suit for ejectment and for the recovery of rent etc. As held in the case of Moran Mar Basselious Catholic v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 the plaintiff in an ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of his own title. This can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is on him irrespective of whether the defendant has proved his case or not. A mere destruction of the defendant's title in the absence of establishment of his own title carries the plaintiff nowhere. This view was followed in Chaki Charia Audilak Shamamma v. Atanakuru Ramarao, 1972 (2) Andhra Weekly Reports 346 in which it was held that in a suit for ejectment the plaintiff has to prove his title. IT is not for the defendant to prove defect of his title. 6. This view was followed in Chaki Charia Audilak Shamamma v. Atanakuru Ramarao, 1972 (2) Andhra Weekly Reports 346 in which it was held that in a suit for ejectment the plaintiff has to prove his title. IT is not for the defendant to prove defect of his title. 6. IN Paradise Industries Corporation v. K. P. Products, AIR 1976 SC 309 the effect of striking off the defence has been considered and their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down "Even when a defence is struck off the defendant is entitled to appear, cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses and submit that even on the basis of the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff a decree can not be passed against him, whereas if it is ordered in accordance with Section 11(4) that he shall not be entitled to appear in or defend the suit except with the leave of the Court he is placed at a greater disadvantage. The said case was under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (1947). It makes it clear that even after the defence is struck off the defendant is entitled to appear, cross-examine the plaintiff's 8 witnesses and show that even on the basis of the evidence adduced by him, he is not entitled to a decree. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotab, AIR 1955 SC 425 in which it has been held that:- "A Code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is 'procedure' something designed to facilitate justice and further it ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should, therefore, be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.............But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle." In the instant case it is true that the written statement of the defendant was struck off. It simply meant that he was not entitled to press his pleas and might not even be entitled to adduce evidence but that could not prevent him from cross-examining the plaintiff and his witnesses and from showing that on the basis of material on the record the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree. The striking off the defence does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff's suit should automatically stand decreed. The learned lower courts were, therefore, wrong in holding that the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was not maintainable or the defendant was not entitled to participate in the proceedings after his written statement was struck off. In view of the aforesaid finding it is necessary to consider whether sufficient cause was made out by the defendant for setting aside the exparte decree. Whatever may have been his previous conduct, the hard fact remains that on 6-5-1974 he moved an application supported by an affidavit alleging that he had come to court on 2-5-1974 and had gone to call his counsel when the suit was taken up in his absence and decreed exparte. A counter affidavit was no doubt filed by the plaintiff denying that the defendant had appeared on that date but in the circumstances of this case the defendant's affidavit carries more weight than the plaintiff's affidavit. There is no reason why the defendant would have remained absent and allowed the suit to be decreed exparte to his own detriment. If he was interested in delaying disposal of the suit he would not have moved the application for setting aside the decree only four days after. I am, therefore, in judgment that sufficient cause for setting aside the exparte decree is made out. The orders passed by the trial court and the lower revisional Court are vacated. The application under Order IX rule 13 CPC is allowed and the exparte decree dated 2-5-1974 is set aside on payment of Rs. 25/- as costs to the plaintiff opposite party. The defendant will be entitled to participate in the proceedings from the stage at which they were on 2-5-1974. Ordered accordingly.