JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - This is an appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant by which he challenged the determination by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Allahabad, of the correct dates of birth of respondents Nos. 5 to 8 who were the workmen of the appellant company. 2. Clause (LL) of the Standing Orders which relates to the determination of the age of retirement of the workmen reads thus : "(1) A workman may be retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation which shall be 58 years. (2) The Provident Fund Records of the factory specifying the workman's age should, to begin with, be taken as the reliable record of the age of a workman for purposes of retirement. (3) This record of age will stand modified as may be warranted by the following : (a) date of birth as given in the School Leaving Certificate or the High School Certificate. (b) date of birth as certified by a Municipal Board. Cantonment Board. a Notified Area or a Town Area Committee. (c) An Insurance Policy taken before November 1, 1960. (d) Junior High School (VIII Class) Certificate (to be applicable in the case of future entrants only). Provided that (i) where the date, month and the year of birth of a workman are recorded in Provident Fund Records, the date of birth as given in the Provident Fund records shall be taken as final; (ii) Where only the month and year of birth are given. the date will be taken as the 1st of that month: and (iii) Where the Provident Fund record of the workman does not specify the date or month of birth. in that case, the 1st November of the year shall be deemed to be the date of retirement; (4) The management shall give at least one month's notice to a workman before retiring him and during this period, the workman shall have the right to represent to the Labour Commissioner, U. P. Kanpur. Such representation shall normally be disposed of within a period of six weeks of the date of receipt of representation from the workman and the orders passed by the Labour Commissioner. Such representation shall normally be disposed of within a period of six weeks of the date of receipt of representation from the workman and the orders passed by the Labour Commissioner. U. P. or, if he so directs, by the Additional Labour Commissioner or Joint Labour Commissioner or the Deputy Labour Commissioner (IR) regarding the question of age of the workman shall be final and shall not be questioned by any party before any Court. In case the Labour Commissioner. U. P. or the Additional Labour Commissioner or the Joint Labour Commissioner or the Deputy Labour Commissioner (IR); as the case may be, allows the representation, the employers shall reinstate the workman immediately on receipt of the said orders and also pay to him full wages for the period of involuntary employment. (5) In the event of a workman retiring during the off season, he shall be paid retaining allowance up to the date of retirement. N. B.- The factory and the union(s) concerned are free to settle the question of rectification of age by mutual negotiation. Notices were given by the appellant to the four respondents and some other workmen intimating to them that they would be retired according to the mentioned in the Provident Fund records relating to each of them. The four respondents made representations to the Labour Commissioner. U. P. The Labour Commissioner directed the Deputy Labour Commissioner to dispose of the representations. Before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, the four respondents produced copies of the birth registers from the Police Stations to show that the dates of birth mentioned in the Provident Fund records were not correct and also to establish their correct dates of birth. The Deputy Labour Commissioner accepted the entries in these birth registers and on their basis corrected the age of each of the four respondents. Against the order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court. The only argument of the appellant was that the entries in the birth registers of the Police Stations were not admissible and could not be looked into for determining the correct age of the workman concerned. The argument was based on clause (3) of the Standing Orders and was to the effect that the documents mentioned in clause (3) alone could be looked into and no other documents could be looked into for this purpose. The argument was based on clause (3) of the Standing Orders and was to the effect that the documents mentioned in clause (3) alone could be looked into and no other documents could be looked into for this purpose. The learned Single Judge did not accept this argument and dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appeal. 3. Before us, learned counsel relied upon the Judgment of Satish Chandra. J. in Civil Misc. Writ No. 2803 of 1969, M/s. Cawnpore Sugar Works Limited. Kanpur v. The Labour Commissioner. U.P., Kanpur decided on August 5, 1970 (All) in which the learned Judge held that only documents mentioned in Clause (3) could be utilised for amending the age mentioned in the Provident Fund records. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we regret our inability to concur with the view taken by the learned Judge. 4. Clause (2) of the Standing Order (LL) raises an initial presumption in favour of the age mentioned in the Provident Fund records. Clause (3) then provides that the age mentioned in the Provident Fund records will stand modified as warranted by the documents enumerated in that clause. This much is clear that if one of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a). (b). (c) and (d) of Clause (3) is produced. then that documents will override the Provident Function records and the age will stand modified according to the age mentioned in this document. The documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) have been given the status of conclusive evidence to rebut the initial presumption which has been placed on the workman's age mentioned in the Provident Fund records. The question then arises whether in any circumstances, it is permissible to rely upon some other evidence of age or not. We have no doubt that if one of the documents mentioned in sub-cls (a), (b), (c) and (d) is available, then that document will be conclusive evidence about the age of the workman concerned and that in such a situation, no other evidence of age will be admissible. We have no doubt that if one of the documents mentioned in sub-cls (a), (b), (c) and (d) is available, then that document will be conclusive evidence about the age of the workman concerned and that in such a situation, no other evidence of age will be admissible. If in a particular case, more than one of these documents is available and they give different dates of birth of the same workman, then, of course, it will be for the Labour Commissioner to decide which one of them is the most reliable and once he decides that the age will be determined according to the most reliable document. But what is to happen if none of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Clause (3) are available? Is the workmen in such cases completely precluded from challenging the age mentioned in the Provident Fund records and from producing any other evidence to establish his real and correct age ? 5. It is a matter of common knowledge that a vast majority of the workmen in the factories come from the village areas and will not be able to produce any one of the documents rationed in sub-cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Cl. (3). It surely was not the intention of the Standing Order that this vast majority of workmen should be bound by the statement of age contained in the Provident Fund Records and should be barred from establishing their correct age for purposes of retirement. It is this class of workmen which at the time of employment is usually unable to give his correct age and in respect of whom it can very well be imagined that the age mentioned in the Provident Fund records was not intended to be final. If this age mentioned in the Provident Fund Records can only be challenged by producing one of the documents mentioned in sub-cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Clause (3), then this vast majority of the workmen whose correct ages have not been recorded in the Provident Fund Records will not be able to get their ages corrected. There is nothing in the Standing Order (LL) to indicate that no evidence other than that mentioned in Clause (3) will be admissible for the purpose of correction of the age. There is nothing in the Standing Order (LL) to indicate that no evidence other than that mentioned in Clause (3) will be admissible for the purpose of correction of the age. Clause (3) gives the documents mentioned therein the status of conclusive evidence, but neither this clause nor any other clause of this Standing Order says that no other evidence can be entertained or looked into. There is no doubt that if any of these documents which have been given the status of conclusive evidence is available, then from the very fact that this document is conclusive evidence, no other evidence will be permissible. But if none of these documents which have been given the status of conclusive evidence is available, then we can see no reason why other evidence cannot be adduced to establish the correct age of the workman concerned. Clause (LL) (4) of the Standing Order merely provides that on receiving the notice of retirement from the management, the workman shall have a right to make a representation to the Labour Commissioner. It does not say that he will be entitled to make a representation only on the basis of one or more of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) (c) and (d) of Clause (3). Therefore on a reading of the Standing Order and upon a consideration of its object and effect, we have come to the conclusion that. (1) There is a presumption in favour of the age of the workman concerned mentioned in the Provident Fund records but this presumption is rebuttable. (2) The presumption mentioned above shall stand rebutted by the production of one or more of the documents enumerated in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Clause (3) and these documents are conclusive evidence of the age of the workman concerned. (3) If more than one of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) are produced and there is difference in the age given in them, then it is for the Labour Commissioner to decide which of these documents is the most reliable and that document will have the status of conclusive evidence. (3) If more than one of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) are produced and there is difference in the age given in them, then it is for the Labour Commissioner to decide which of these documents is the most reliable and that document will have the status of conclusive evidence. (4) If none of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) are available, then it is permissible for the workman concerned to produce any evidence of his age and in that event it will be for the Labour Commissioner to decide whether the evidence is relevant, whether it relates to the workman concerned and what is its probative value and whether it is sufficient to rebut the initial presumption in favour of the entry in the Provident Fund Records. 6. Some argument was raised on the basis of the three provisos set out under Clause (3) of the Standing Order. In our opinion, these three provisos only relate to the determination of the actual date of birth which should be deemed to be contained in the Provident Fund records and to which the initial presumption attachis. These provisos have no repercussion on the decision of the question whether any evidence other than the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a). (b), (c) and (d) can or cannot be entertained and relied upon by the Labour Commissioner in determining the correct age of the workman concerned. 7. Coming now to the facts of the present case, admittedly, none of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Clause (3) of the Standing Order were available in the case of any of the four respondents. They all produced entries from the birth registers maintained at the Police Station. In the view that we have taken, the Deputy Labour Commissioner was entitled to entertain this evidence and to determine the correct ages of the workman concerned on the basis of the this evidence if it was found relevant, reliable and sufficient to rebut the initial presumption. The Deputy Labour Commissioner has held that these entries were of the same type as the documents mentioned in sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) of the Standing Order and, therefore, on the basis of these documents, he corrected the ages of the four workmen concerned in this appeal. The Deputy Labour Commissioner has held that these entries were of the same type as the documents mentioned in sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) of the Standing Order and, therefore, on the basis of these documents, he corrected the ages of the four workmen concerned in this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that in the interpretation that we have given we should remand that case to the Deputy Labour Commissioner to consider all the evidence that was before him and to decide the matter afresh. We are unable to accede to this request. Three of the workmen concerned have retired and the fourth will retire in June 1978. That apart, the appellant did not as stated in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, impugned the validity of the order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner on any other ground except that the documents produced by the workmen were not admissible for the determination of the age. There is no ground taken in the writ petition that even if the evidence produced by the four workmen was admissible, it was not sufficient to rebut the initial presumption, nor is there any complaint in the writ petition that the Deputy Labour Commissioner has not weighed or considered the probative value of the evidence produced by the workmen. 8. In these circumstances, since we have come to the conclusion that the evidence produced by the workmen was admissible, the appeal must fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.