Sambasiva Rao, J.- The questions raised in these two writ petitions are of some importance to the detenus under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act who are also convicted prisoners undergoing imprisonment. The first question is whether the period of detention can be set off against the sentence of imprisonment. The other point is whether accused persons, who are undergoing terms of imprisonment, are entitled to remissions even for the period when they were in jail as undertrial prisoners before conviction. 2. The questions above-mentioned arise thus: The two petitioners were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad in S.C. Nos. 106 of 1970 and 6 of 1971 under more than one count and were sentenced to undergo varying periods of imprisonment. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently and since the maximum sentence is four year, they have to undergo imprisonment for four years. Criminal A. No. 301 of 1972 preferred by them to this Court against their convictions and sentences was dismissed. The 1st petitioner had been detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act even earlier. He alleged that the first information report in the conspiracy case was filed on 18th December, 1969. Some of the accused were arrested on 19th December, 1969 and were produced before the Magistrate who remanded them to judicial custody. Though the petitioner in the first writ petition has been under detention and thus available at the disposal of the police, he was produced before the Magistrate in connection with the case only on 18th April, 1970. Therefore, his contention is that it was for no fault of his he was not produced before the Magistrate before 18th April, 1970 though the first information report had been registered on 18th December, 1969 and some of the arrested accused were produced on 19th December, 1969. He, therefore, seeks a direction to the respondents, who are the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Superintendent, Central Prison, Hyderabad, to treat the period from 19th December, 1969 to 18th April, 1970 as the remand period and to act accordingly. 3. The facts in the second writ petition are slightly different. The petitioner was granted bail in Criminal A. No. 301 of 1972 before this Court and was released in accordance with the order on 29th April, 1972. He was, however, taken under detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act on 26th June, 1975. 3. The facts in the second writ petition are slightly different. The petitioner was granted bail in Criminal A. No. 301 of 1972 before this Court and was released in accordance with the order on 29th April, 1972. He was, however, taken under detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act on 26th June, 1975. This Court dismissed his criminal appeal on 28th November, 1975 confirming the trial Court’s conviction and sentence against him. Despite this confirmation of the sentence by the appellate Court, he was continued in detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act till 30th December, 1975 on which date he was served with a revocation order. Had he been free he would have surrendered no the police even en28th November, 1975 when the High Court delivered its judgment confirming his sentence. Without revoking the order of detention till 30th December, 1975 the respondents prevented him from undergoing the punishment which the Courts imposed on him. He, therefore, seeks a direction to the respondents to treat the period from 26th June, 1975 to 28th November, 1975 as remand period and the period from 29th November, 1975 to 30th December, 1975 as the period during which he suffered imprisonment as per the conviction. It is in that writ petition that remissions are claimed even in respect of the remand period. The contention in this behalf is that section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for set off of the remand period against the sentence of imprisonment. The jail rules provide for remission for good conduct etc., in the period of sentence of imprisonment or conviction. Since the remand period is equated by section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, with the period of sentence of imprisonment, remission should be allowed even for that period. 4. The respondents oppose granting of both these reliefs. In the first writ petition there is some dispute in regard to the actual period during which he was in remand. While the petitioner stated that he was under remand from 13th April, 1970 to 9th April, 1972 in the counteraffidavit it is asserted that the period was from 13th April, 1970 to 25th April, 1972. This difference need not detain us for long because if any relief is granted by us,, the concerned authorities will have to work out the period as per the records. 5. This difference need not detain us for long because if any relief is granted by us,, the concerned authorities will have to work out the period as per the records. 5. Now taking up the first claim made by the detenus to treat the period of detention under the Maintenance of internal Security Act as part of the remand detention, it is now the law as laid down by section 428, Criminal Procedure Code that the remand period, that is to say, the period of detention of an accused person during the investigation, inquiry and trial of his case and before the date of the conviction therein, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction, and that the liability of such convicted person to undergo imprisonment on the said conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. Section 428, Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, is clear on ‘his point. The Supreme Court has applied the benefit of section 428, even to persons who have been convicted before the coming into force of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and whose sentence was still running at the date when the new Code came into force. Vide B.P. Andre v. Superintendent Central Jail1, Hardev Singh v. State of Punjab2 and Surej Bhan v. Om Prakash3. This Court in Jayanthi Dharma Teja v. State of Andhra Pradesh4, extended the principle of sections 428, Criminal Procedure Code to, pre-conviction detention of the accused in foreign jails if the detention was in respect of the case in which he is ultimately convicted and. sentenced. Thus there is no doubt as to the right of the prisoner to claim set off of the remand period against the period of conviction. 6. But that is not the problem posed before us. The petitioners seek to treat the period of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act as remand period as in the first case and to treat that detention period as period of sentence as in the second case. Is this claim warranted and tenable under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code? The petitioners do not rest their claim on any other provision of law. Is this claim warranted and tenable under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code? The petitioners do not rest their claim on any other provision of law. So, the point we have to consider is whether the period of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act can be set off against the term of imprisonment under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code. The language of the section does not afford any support to this claim of the petitioners; on the other hand, it is against them. It is true the word “detention” is used in section 428 and it is on this word the edifice of the argument of the petitioners has been built. Since the section says that the period of detention undergone by the prisoner during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case shall be set off against the term of imprisonment, the petitioners contend that they have been kept under detention and therefore are entitled to the set off. This argument ignores very many crucial words, phrases and clauses of the section. It is useful to read the section in its entirety which is as follows: “Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment: — Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any-undergone by him daring the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set of? against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.” 7. It is manifest that ‘the period of detention’ contemplated in section 428 is clearly and unambiguously in respect of the case in which he is finally convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The expressions ‘same case’ and ‘such conviction’ occurring in the section bring out the intention of the Parliament very clearly. The period of detention, in order to come within the scope of section 428, should be during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, that is to say, conviction in the case in connection with which he has been detained during investigation, inquiry or trial. The period of detention, in order to come within the scope of section 428, should be during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, that is to say, conviction in the case in connection with which he has been detained during investigation, inquiry or trial. Though the word “detention” is of wider amplitude, there cannot be any doubt that it is used in section 428 only with reference to the detention in connection with the case in which he is finally convicted. If the detention of the person or his imprisonment is in connection with some other case or charge, or for that matter under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, it does not come within; the purview of section 428. I is also the natural and logical meaning of the section. The Parliament clearly intended that when a person is convited in a particular case, his pre-trial imprisonment or remand detention should also be reckoned and set-off against the total period of imprisonment imposed on him in that case. That is because of the obvious reason that in connection with that case the accused person has in fact suffered imprisonment. Evidently the law-makers though that be it the imprisonment before conviction or after it, it is immaterial, since the accused person has undergone the totality of the period of imprisonment which is ultimately awarded to him. To say that the period of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act should also be reckoned as part of the period of detention during the investigation, enquiry,or trial or part of the sentence awarded on conviction would be clear violation of the language of section 428 and would be repugnant to its wording, spirit and intendment. 8. It is also clearly established that preventive and punitive fields are not co-extensive but are different from each other. Detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act is preventive and does not arise on conviction, it is only to prevent a particular person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the State or to the Society. It is not hased on proved facts but mainly on suspicion and probabilities. A sentence of imprisonment imposed on a convicted person is different. It is not hased on proved facts but mainly on suspicion and probabilities. A sentence of imprisonment imposed on a convicted person is different. That sentence is imposed on him by a Court of law after examining the entire evidence and coming to the conclusion that the guilt of the accused person has been made out beyond reasonable doubt. It is thus patent that the preventive detention and punitive imprisonment are totally different. That is pointed out by the Supreme Court in Borjahn v. State of West Bengal1 and Ihdradeo v. State of West Bengal2. In the first case after stating the distinction between the two, the Supreme Court held that the circumstance that a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code also could have been launched against a. detenu is not a valid ground for saying that it precludes the authority from acting under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. In Indradeo v. State of West Bengal2, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court at page 1065: "The respective fields of operation of the law providing for trial and punishment for the commission of offences and of the Act are not co-extensive. One is meant to punish for past offences while the other is designed to prevent the person concerned from future mischief irrespective of his liability to be punished in a Court of law on the basis of the same acts. Their operation is not alternative, the detenu is liable to be tried not invalidating his detention. " 9. So, this undoubted feature of preventive detention being of altogether different nature from punitive detention also supports the view we have taken. 10. It follows from the above that the period of detention of a person under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act cannot be set off under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, against the period of sentence awarded to him on conviction. In fact, this is the view taken by two Benches of this Court in W.P. No. 494 of 1976 dated 9th February, 1976 (Chennakesava Reddy, J. and Madhusrdan Rao J.), and W.P. No. 925 of 1976 dated 9th March, 1976 (Sambasiva Rao, J. and Jayachandra Reddy, J.), though there is no elaborate reasoning therein. 11. In fact, this is the view taken by two Benches of this Court in W.P. No. 494 of 1976 dated 9th February, 1976 (Chennakesava Reddy, J. and Madhusrdan Rao J.), and W.P. No. 925 of 1976 dated 9th March, 1976 (Sambasiva Rao, J. and Jayachandra Reddy, J.), though there is no elaborate reasoning therein. 11. There is some force in the contention of the petitioners that they would have surrendered immediately on the charge-sheet being filed as in the first case or on the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence as in the second case, had they not been detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act and thus prevented from doing so. They say that considerations of justice should allow the setting off. In individual cases this may work hardship. But for that reason the law cannot be construed wrongly when the language of the material provision viz., section428 is clear, categorical and unambiguous. We can only hope that the Government and the police authorities would hereafter avoid such delays in revoking the orders of detention or in producing the charged persons before Courts, when the accused persons are in the custody of the Government. 12. The petitioners also relied on section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, and invoked our inherent powers to give them the relief. Their contention was that they were unjustly prevented from surrendering themselves to the Court or to the police by virtue of their preventive detention and so the ends of justice require that the periods of detention should be set off against their periods of sentence. This argument cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that there is a specific provision in section 428 of the Code providing for set off. It is only in the absence of a clear provision, inherent powers can be exercised. 13. Now coming to the question of remission, the plea of the petitioners is that for remand detention also remission should be given under prison rules as it is given for the actual period of sentence. This was opposed by the learned Public Prosecutor saying that remand period is different from the sentence or punishment and consequently no remission is envisaged or permissible in respect of the remand period. The Hyderabad Prison Rules or the Rules made by the Madras Government are practically analogous. This was opposed by the learned Public Prosecutor saying that remand period is different from the sentence or punishment and consequently no remission is envisaged or permissible in respect of the remand period. The Hyderabad Prison Rules or the Rules made by the Madras Government are practically analogous. The Prisons Act of 1894 defines "Criminal Prisoner" in section 3 (2) as "any prisoner duly committed to custody under the writ, warrant or order of any Court or authority exercising criminal jurisdiction, or by order of a Court-martial"."Convicted criminal prisoner", according to section 3 (3) means "any criminal prisoner under sentence of a Court or Court-martial and includes a person detained in prison under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 or under the Prisoners Act, 1871.“Section 3 (5) defines ‘‘remission system” as “the rule for the time being inforce regulating the award of marks to, and the consequent shortening of sentence of, prisoners in jails”. Chapter XX of the Madras Prison and Reformatory Manual deals with the remission system. It contains Rules made under section 59 (5) of the Prisons Act to regulate the shortening of sentences by the grant of remissions. Rule 310 (b) defines “sentence” as, “a sentence as finally fixed on appeal, revision or ‘Otherwise, and includes an aggregate of more sentences than one and an order of committal to prison in default of furnishing security to keep the peace or be of good behaviour.” 14. We are not here concerned with the nature of remissions that are available to the present petitioners. What we have to decide is the principle as to whether the remission system could be applied to the remand period as well. An accused person, who undergoes imprisonment during the remand period before conviction, is certainly a “criminal prisoner” though during that time he was not undergoing any sentence. But, the noteworthy feature is that section 428,Criminal Procedere Code clearly ordains that the remand detention shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused [person on conviction. The section further clarifies that the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. In other words, the statute equates the undertrial detention or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction. The section further clarifies that the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. In other words, the statute equates the undertrial detention or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction. The provision, in so many words, treats the remand detention as part of the period of imprisonment after conviction. If remissions are given for imprisonment after conviction, there is no plausible or understandable reason why it should be denied to the remand period when the statute equates both of them. It is unthinkable that the Parliament has any mental reservations while making section 428. It, therefore, follows that ‘whatever is applicable to the imprisonment on conviction in the matter of remission is also applicable to the undertrial or remand detention. We, therefore, hold that all the remissions that are available or permissible to the two petitioners in regard to imprisonment on conviction are available to them even in respect of the remand period. We, therefore, direct the respondents and the concerned jail authorities to workout these remissions and give the benefit to the Petitioners. 15. The above would show that the petitioners succeed partly. While they cannot claim that the period of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act should be set off against the sentence imposed on conviction, they are eligible to the remissions which are permissible to them under the rules, in respect of the remand detention also. To this extent the writ petitions are allowed and in other respects they are dismissed. Advocate’s fee Rs.250 in each