JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This special appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17th of September, 1975 of a learned Singh Judge, allowing the writ petition of the respondent No. 1, filed against the order retiring him from service. The circumstances giving rise to this petition are these : Swami Saran Saxena, the petitioner, was appointed as a temporary Judicial Officer by the Government of Uttar Pradesh by an order dated November 23, 1964. The petitioner's services were terminated by the State Government in December, 1962. Consequent upon his representation, the termination order was withdrawn on January 16, 1963. He thereafter joined the service and resumed his duties. But this could not last, long, as his services were again terminated by the State Government by an order dated May 18, 1966. Thereupon he challenged the order in this court by a writ petition. It was dismissed by a learned Single Judge, but on appeal the judgment was reversed and this order of termination was quashed. Holding that the order of termination amounted to the petitioner's removal, this court found that having been passed without complying with Article 311, it could not be sustained. He was then again reinstated on October 28, 1969. Before he could be confirmed, the State Government served the petitioner with an order dated September 20. 1974, retiring him compulsorily from service. By the writ petition, giving rise to this appeal, the aforesaid order was challenged by the petitioner on a number of grounds inter alia that Regulation 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations, having not authorised the State Government to retire a temporary Government servant, the impugned order is in excess of the authority and thus being without jurisdiction is liable to be quashed. The order dated September 20, 1974 by which the petitioner's services were terminated runs as under : "In exercise of the powers mentioned in Note I to Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations and all powers enabling in that behalf, the Governor, on being satisfied that it is not in public interest to retain Swami Saran Saxena, temporary Judicial Officer, Kanpur, in service, is pleased to require the said Swami Saran Saxena to retire from service with immediate effect and that he would be paid one month's pay in lieu of notice." 2. Before dealing with the points involved in this case, we wish to mention that Judicial Officers were previously under the control of the State Government, but by the notification issued on September 30, 1967 the control has been taken over by the High Court. As a result thereof the State Government now has to act in matters of dismissal, removal, termination and revision in consultation with the High Court. 3. Reverting to the grounds of challenge, the main question is whether the petitioner, a temporary Government servant, who did not hold substantive appointment, could be retired by the Government in exercise of power conferred by Article 465-A or Article 465 of the Civi1 Service Regulations. Regulations 465 and 465-A, as adopted and applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, have been amended and substituted by a Notification No. Samanya 3-1932 X.915-73 dated November 1, 1973. Admittedly, the Petitioner is governed by the amended regulations, we would, therefore, prefer to quote the aforesaid Articles for the convenience of reference : "465 (1). A retiring pension is granted to Government servant who is permitted to retire after completing qualifying service for 25 years or on attaining the age of 50 years. (2) A retiring pension is also granted a Government servant who is required by Government to retire after attaining the age of 50 years. Note- (1) Government may at any time, without assigning any reason, require any Government servant to retire on three month's notice or pay in lieu of the whole or part thereof, after he has attained the age of 50 years, and no claim to special compensation on this account shall be entertained. Such decision shall be taken by the Government in the Ad ministrative Department if it appears to it to be in the public interest. In the case of pay being given in lieu of the whole or part of such notice, the said period shall stand added to the Government servant's qualifying service for the purposes of calculating the pension and the death-cum-retirement gratuity due to him and for no other purpose. Note. (2) The Inspector General of Pace, Uttar Pradesh, may exercise the power vested in the Government in respect of compulsory retirement of Constables and Head Constables subject to the condition laid down in Note 1. Note. Note. (2) The Inspector General of Pace, Uttar Pradesh, may exercise the power vested in the Government in respect of compulsory retirement of Constables and Head Constables subject to the condition laid down in Note 1. Note. (2-A) Government may delegate its power under Note 1 to any officer or authority not lower than the authority by which he Government servant concerned was appointed. Where the power is so delegated, Government may, from time to time, issue executive instructions indicating guiding principles in that behalf, but nothing contained in Note 1 or in this Note shall be construed to require any recital, in the order, of such decision having been taken in the public interest or to require the publication of such instructions. Note. (3) A Government servant who has elected to retire under this Article and has given necessary information to that effect to the competent, authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his election subsequently except with the specific approval of the authority competent to fill the appointment and unless his request for withdrawal is made within the intended date of his retirement. Note. (4) A continuos temporary or officiating service under the Government, followed with interruption by confirmation in the same or any other post, other than temporary or officiating service, in a non-pensionable establishment or service in a work-charged establishment or service in a post paid from contingencies, shall be taken into account in computing qualifying service for the purposes of this Article. 465-A. For officers mentioned in Article 349-A the rule for the grant of retiring pension is as follows : (1) An officer is entitled, on his resignation being accepted, to a retiring pension after completing qualifying service of not less than 25 years, or on attaining the age of 50 years. (2) A retiring pension is also granted to an officer who is required by Government to retire after attaining the age of 50 years. Note. (1) Government may at any time, without assigning any reason, require any officer to retire on three months' notice or pay in lieu of the whole or part thereof after he has attained the age of 50 years, and no claim to special compensation on this account shall be entertained. Such decision shall be taken by the Government in the Administrative Department, if it appears to it to be in the public interest. Such decision shall be taken by the Government in the Administrative Department, if it appears to it to be in the public interest. In the case of pay being given in lieu of the whole or part of such notice, the said period shall stand added to the officer's qualifying service for the purposes of calculating the pension and the death-cum-retirement gratuity due to him and for no other purpose. Note. (2) Deleted; Note. (2)(A) Government may delegate its power under Note 1 to any officer or authority not lower than the authority by which the officer concerned was appointed. Where the power is so delegated, Government may from time to time issue executive instructions indicating guiding principles in that behalf, but Nothing contained in Note 1 or in this Note shall he construed to require any recital, in the order, of such decision haying been taken in the public interest to require the publication of such instruction. Note. (3) An officer who has elected to retire under this Article and has given necessary information to that effect to the competent authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his election subsequently except with the specific approval of the authority competent to fill the appointment and unless his request for withdrawal is made within the intended date of his retirement. Note. (4) A continuous temporary or officiating service under the Govern. meat followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or any other post, other than temporary or officiating service in a non-pensionable establishment or service in a work-charged establishment or service in a post paid from contingencies, shall be taken into account in computing qualifying service for purposes of this Article." 4. These regulations were issued by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The opening sentence of Regulation 465-A, extracted above, shows that it applies to officers mentioned in Article 349-A. Article 349-A applies in its turn, to those officers who are appointed substantively to the services and posts specified in Article 349-A. In the services and posts listed in Article 349-A appears the entry. `The Provincial Civil. Service-Executive and Judicial'. But since the petitioner does not belong to the Provincial-Executive or Judicial service, he could not be proceeded with under Article 465-A, being holding the permanent post. `The Provincial Civil. Service-Executive and Judicial'. But since the petitioner does not belong to the Provincial-Executive or Judicial service, he could not be proceeded with under Article 465-A, being holding the permanent post. As it is common case of the parties that he was a temporary judicial officer, this Article 465-A could not be pressed into service by the State Government for retiring him. 5. The question however is whether the State Government can be permitted to justify the impugned order under Article 465. This Article, as would he seen, does not limit its application to any class of officers whereas 465-A expressly makes it applicable to officers mentioned in Art de 349-A. The determining factor, however, for retirement of Government servants under both the Articles is public interest. Not only both these Articles have the same object in view, namely, to weed out the undesirable officers whose continuance in public service is not in public interest, but the nature of powers under the two Articles is alike and not different. The mere fact that Article 465-A apples to officer with higher duties and responsibilities, and Article 465 deals with lower state of officials, whose duties are comparatively of lesser importance, does not mean that the consideration which arises in assessing public interest under Article 465-A is distinct from that arising under Article 465. As said above action hnder poth the articles has to sub-serve the public interest, hence we do not find any difficulty in permitting the state counsel to justify the order under Article 465. In fact the learned Single Judge had also permitted him to do so. A similar controversy came up for consideration before a Division Bench of which one of us (Hon. R. B. Misra, J.) was a member in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Bhagwan Saran Saxena, 1971 A.L.J. 911. The Bench found that:- "On comparing Articles 465 and 465-A of Civil Service Regulations it becomes clear that there is close resemblance between the provisions of Note 1 to Article 465 and Note 1 to Article 465-A. In each case the Government decides to retire an officer on the ground that such a step is the public interest. The Bench found that:- "On comparing Articles 465 and 465-A of Civil Service Regulations it becomes clear that there is close resemblance between the provisions of Note 1 to Article 465 and Note 1 to Article 465-A. In each case the Government decides to retire an officer on the ground that such a step is the public interest. If the Government came to the decision that it was not in public interest to let the petitioners continue in service it made little difference whether the officer's case is covered by Article 349-A or not. There is, therefore, no difficulty in treating the decision as one under Article 465." 6. Reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in N. B. Sarpara v. Elphiston Spinning and Weaving Mills, 1971 (1) S.C.C. 337 in which it said that "if the exercise of a power can be traced to a legitimate source, the fact that the same was purported to have been exercised under a different power does not vitiate the exercise of the power in question. This is a well settled proposition of law................" 7. Hence we find that the mere mention of wrong provision being immaterial, there is no difficulty in treating the decision as one under Article 465. 8. The main submission of Sri S. C. Budhwar, appearing for the State was that since Note 1 to Article 465 of the Civil\Service Regulations, 1973 lays down that Government can at any time without assigning any reason, require any Government servant to retire on three month's notice or pay in lieu of the whole or part thereof, the State Government had ample authority to retire the respondent No. 1 as well. He further submitted that the power of compulsory retirement, being a fact of superannuation, its exercise could not be restricted to only those Government - servants who are entitled to pension. 9. Sri S.N. Kacker, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, urged that it is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the intent, a legislation ` should be read as a whole and that words and phrases are not to be taken an isolated and detached from the context, but are to be read together and construed in the light of its object and purpose. Reading these regulations as a whole, he contended that it would be found that Civil Service Regulations is a comprehensive code defining the conditions under which salaries, leave pension and other allowances were to be earned, and that it has no concern with the question of compulsory retirement. According to him since these regulations, are meant for calculating pensions and do not confer independent power of retirement, it is not possible to so all out any power from Note 1. In this background he urged that the word `any' used in Note means only those who are covered by the substantive provisions of Article 465. In the alternative, he contended that as clauses (1) and (2) of this Article deal with those persons, who are entitled to pension action under the Note, can only be taken against them and not others. 10. This takes us to the question as to the true affect and scope of the provisions contained in Note 1 to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations. In order to understand this aspect of the case, it may be noted that the legal position of a Government servant is one of status and not of contract. The terms of his service are governed by statute and statutory rules. Article 809 of the Constitution provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Acts of the appropriate legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. The proviso to Article 309 further makes it clear that it would be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and prescribing the conditions of service of persons respectively appointed to services and posts under the Union or the State. This Article 309 has to be read subject to Articles 310 and 311, and Article 310 is subject to Article 311. Article 311 (2) reads thus : "311 (2). This Article 309 has to be read subject to Articles 310 and 311, and Article 310 is subject to Article 311. Article 311 (2) reads thus : "311 (2). No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunely of being heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry : Provided that this clause shall not apply - (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recovered by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry." The safeguard provided by Article 311 (2) as said in Gurdas Singh Sidhur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1585 is subject to two exceptions viz (1) when a permanent Government servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which is reasonably fixed (2) where a public servant is compulsorily retired under the Rules which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provides reasonably long period of qualified service after which compulsory retirement could be valid. The validity of the Rules providing for compulsory retirement made in some of the States was challenged in the Supreme Court without success. 11. The case to which reference may be made in this respect is reported in Shyam Lal v. State of Utter Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 369. In this case the Supreme Court found that compulsory retirement does not amount to dismissal or removal and, therefore does not attract that provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and, therefore, is not repugnant to that Article. 12. In this case the Supreme Court found that compulsory retirement does not amount to dismissal or removal and, therefore does not attract that provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and, therefore, is not repugnant to that Article. 12. A compulsory retirement as said in the case of Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 40 is not taking any penal action, but it is in substance and in effect an order of termination of service. An order of compulsory retirement is really passed after taking into consideration the rights of the Government servant on the one hand and the interest of the public which ordinarily coincides with the interest of Government on the other. An order of compulsory retirement does not deprive a Government servant of benefits earned till the age of his retirement. By this order the process of superannuation is only expedited. S. R. Das, C. J., delivering the judgment in Parshottam Lal Dingera v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 has observed : - "that likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tenamount to the infliction of punishment and does not attract Article 311 (2), as has also been held by this court in Shyam Lal v. State of U. P., A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 369. In either of the two above mentioned cases, the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequence of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52...............". Hence it follows that an order of compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service can be legitimately made by a State Government. The only restriction made on the power of compulsory retirement of a Government servant is that the period for which an order can be passed should not be unreasonably short. As said above an order of compulsory retirement for all purposes curtails the terms of employment and results in termination of service of an incumbent. 13. A person appointed temporarily does not acquire any right to the post hence his services can be terminated without assigning any reasons. As said above an order of compulsory retirement for all purposes curtails the terms of employment and results in termination of service of an incumbent. 13. A person appointed temporarily does not acquire any right to the post hence his services can be terminated without assigning any reasons. In fact as said by a Division Bench of this court in D. M. Varanasi v. Materu Ram, 1975 (2) S.D.R. 606 the services of a temporary Government servant can be terminated even for a fault, whether fault indicates inefficiency, unsatisfactory work, misconduct or negligence. In fact in such a case motive is immaterial, hence if an order of termination is based on over all assessment of service record and then it is found that a Government servant is not fit to be continued in service, the order of termination would be perfectly justified. 14. The discussion made above shows that the services of a permanent Government servant can be terminated by compulsory retirement and similarly service of temporary Government servant can also be brought to an end by an order of termination. As the service of a temporary Government servant can be terminated we do not find any difficulty in holding, on principle, that he can also be compulsorily retired, as stated above all order of compulsory retirement for all practical purposes is an order of termination of service. Therefore, when Government is entitled to terminate services of a temporary Government servant it can retire him as well. The consequence, in case of a compulsory retirement of a temporary Government servant, would be the same as in case of simple termination. It is, however, a different thing that if a legislature prohibits such a course to be adopted in that event the services of a temporary Government servant may not be brought to an end by compulsory retirement. 15. In the instant case we find that Note 1 to Article 465, in exercise of which, the service of respondent No. 1 were terminated has been framed by the State Government in exercise of its power under Art. 309 of the Constitution. Art. 309 of the Constitution entitles a State legislature to frame rules regarding the conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. Art. 309 of the Constitution entitles a State legislature to frame rules regarding the conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The term `conditions of service' is of wide amplitude and would, therefore, bring within its ambit any rule regarding compulsory retirement as well. 16. Sri S. N. Kacker, counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, however, submitted that Note 1 to Article 465 does not confer any power on the State Government to make an order of compulsory retirement. He urged that Article 465 is essentially meant for calculating pension and its payment, it does not confer power independently of retirement of a Government servant. We have given our consideration to this argument but find ourselves unable to accept it as sound. Note 1 to Art. 465 in clear terms confers power on the State Government to retire any Government servant on three months notice without assigning any reasons. There is nothing in this note which could justifiably be taken into account for restricting its applicability. It is true that as emphasised by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the Civil Service Regulations are essentially intended to define the conditions under which pension is earned by service in the civil department and in what manner it is calculated, but that by itself would not be sufficient to curtail the meaning of the Note 1, in our opinion is wide enough to be interpreted as conferring power of compulsory retirement on the State Government. While interpreting these rules as emphasised above, we must not forget that they have been made by the State legislature in exercise of power under Article 309 of the Constitution which entitles it to lay down conditions of service. Hence even if it is correct that most of the provisions of the Civil Service Regulations deal with the question of payment of pension and its calculation, it does not appeal to us that the scope of Note 1 to Article 465 be confined to the narrow limits mentioned above. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 that Note to Article 465 and 465-A does not confer any power on the Government to retire a Government servant. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 that Note to Article 465 and 465-A does not confer any power on the Government to retire a Government servant. In Shyam Lals case as well the action of retirement against shyam Lal was taken under Not 1 to Article 465-A and the Supreme Court found after discussing the law that such an action could be taken under aforesaid Note. Similarly in Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1487 as well the order of compulsory retirement was passed under Note 1 to Rule 244 (2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules. Ray C.J., found that the action taken by the State Government was justified under the aforesaid rule. In this case the Supreme Court has also dealt with the scope of a note appended to a rule and has said dealing with the same. "The Notes are promulgated with the rules in exercise of legislative power. The Notes are made contemporaneously with the rules. The function of the Notes is to provide procedure and to control discreet on. The real purpose of the Notes is that when rules are silent the note will fill up gaps." 17. In the instant case the note is an integral part of the Rule. It is so having been incorporated by the rule making authority. It would thus not be proper for us to construe the rule without giving due effect to the note. Hence we find that as Note to Article 465 confers right on a Government to retire any Government servant on three month's notice or pay in lieu of the whole or part thereof, after he has attained the age of 50 years, the action taken by the Government under the aforesaid note cannot be challenged on the ground that it has no authority to do so under this Note. 18. Linked with the above the next submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent was that both the Articles viz. Article 465 as well as 465-A confer power on the State Government to retire a Government servant prematurely on his attaining the age of 50 years only if the Government servant is entitled to pension. 18. Linked with the above the next submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent was that both the Articles viz. Article 465 as well as 465-A confer power on the State Government to retire a Government servant prematurely on his attaining the age of 50 years only if the Government servant is entitled to pension. In other words, he urged that the powers under these articles cannot be exercised by the Government to retire a Government servant who is not entitled for pension. Inasmuch as the grant of retiring pension is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations. 19. Haling given our consideration to the above submission we find no substance in the same. The power of compulsory retirement of a Government servant is not dependent on eligibility to pension. As said by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 40.the Rules entitling a Government to retire a Government servant merely embodies one of the facts of the "pleasure doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution." On the mere fact that the Supreme Court found in cases of retirement of permanent Government servant, that since they do not lose the benefit of pension which they have earned, therefore, compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences, does not mean that payment of pension is a condition precedent for an order of retirement. An order of retirement being one of the facts of the pleasure doctrine has to be upheld on the ground that public interest requires chopping off the dead wood, inasmuch as it enables a Government to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who are not fit to be retained. Hence, in our opinion, the payment of pension being not a condition precedent. it is not possible to say that a Government servant not entitled to pension cannot be proceeded will by a State Government under Note 1 to Article 465. In the alternative the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent was that an action under Note 1 to Article 465 can be taken only against a permanent Government servant and not a temporary one. We find no merit in this submission. In the alternative the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent was that an action under Note 1 to Article 465 can be taken only against a permanent Government servant and not a temporary one. We find no merit in this submission. By an order of compulsory retirement, as said above, the services of a Government servant are terminated or brought to an end. Just as the power of compulsory retirement can be utilised as against a permanent Government servant it can also be utilised against a temporary Government servant. The language employed in Note 1 to Article 465 does not admit this interpretation urged by the learned counsel. The words used are `any Government servant'. The dictionary meaning of the word `any' is of any kind or sort whatever. Therefore the interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 on this note is not acceptable to us. 20. Apart from the above we do not find any good reason as to why an action of compulsory retirement cannot be taken against a temporary Government servant when such an action can be taken against a permanent Government servant. In fact services of a temporary Government servant can be terminated at any time and if the mode of compulsory retirement is only one of the ways of termination of service, that mode should be available to a Government as against a temporary servant as well. In fact a temporary Government servant, on being compulsorily retired instead of his services being terminated in ordinary way would stand to gain in as much as in that event he would be getting either three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof, whereas in the case of termination only one month's notice is contemplated. 21. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to subscribe to the opinion of the learned Single Judge that for taking action under Note 1 to Article 465 of the Civi1 Service Regulations a Government servant must hold the post substantively. 22. For these reasons in disagreement with this view taken by the learned Single Judge we find that the respondent No.1 could be retired compulsorily from service under Note 1 to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations. 23. 22. For these reasons in disagreement with this view taken by the learned Single Judge we find that the respondent No.1 could be retired compulsorily from service under Note 1 to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations. 23. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, however, urged that even if the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside on the point mentioned above, the same should be upheld on the alternative ground that the order of retirement being arbitrary, is liable to be set aside on that ground. The only point which was urged by the learned counsel in support of this argument was that the respondent No.1 having been allowed to cross the efficiency bar in June, 1973, on the ground that his work was outstanding and that his integrity was beyond doubt, the order of compulsory retirement passed immediately on 2nd of August. 1974 was arbitrary. The necessary allegations in this regard have been made by the respondent No. 1 in paragraph 21 of the writ petition but as this paragraph has been sworn on the basis of an information received from record, to which admittedly he could not have any access, the submission made in this paragraph is unworthy of reliance and no writ can be issued on the basis of allegations made in this paragraph. 24. Apart from the above Sri S. C. Budhwar, counsel appearing for the appellant produced the entire personal file of the respondent No. 1 before us. On perusal of the record we find that there was ample material before the State Government High Court which could justify the action of compulsory retirement against the respondent No. I. These materials in fact came into existence after the respondent No. 1 was permitted to cross efficiency bar in June, 1973. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the action taken against the respondent No. 1 was arbitrary or unjustified. It is settled law that the State Government has to look into the entire record of a Government servant before compulsorily retiring him. In the instant case we find from the counter affidavit that the entries given to the respondent No. 1 were such that action taken against him cannot be branded as arbitrary. It is settled law that the State Government has to look into the entire record of a Government servant before compulsorily retiring him. In the instant case we find from the counter affidavit that the entries given to the respondent No. 1 were such that action taken against him cannot be branded as arbitrary. We must not at the same time forget that whether or not the respondent No. l is retirement was in public interest is a matter for the State Government to consider. The court of law is not an appellate forum, where the correctness of an order of Government could be conversed on the ground of propriety. In fact the court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own view as to the wisdom of taking action of compulsory retirement. Hence we are unable to find that the impugned order of compulsory retirement passed against respondent No. 1 is liable to be quashed on this ground. 25. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs.