JUDGMENT The Rule Nisi herein was directed against the Corporation of Calcutta and its various officers and departments and on the State of West Bengal in connection with the assessment of the cold storage and the factory building of which the petitioner no. 1 at all material time, had been and is still now a lessee. Under the terms thereof the petitioner no. 1 is liable to pay the Corporation rates and taxes. 2. The premises in question is no, 13B, Mirza Galib Street formerly known as Free School Street, Calcutta. Originally the premises belonged to Bangasri Cotton Mills of Sukhchar in Sodepur in the district of 24-Parganas On 30th August, 1948 the said Bangasri Cotton Mills Ltd. by a registered Indenture of Leave demised the said premises measuring about 17 cottahs in favour of the petitioner no. 1 for a period of 51 years with an option for renewal thereof for another 51 years and with a further option to purchase the said demised premises within first 21 years of the said lease. The recital in the said lease provided that the petitioner no. 1 desired to have the said lease for the purpose of carrying on its ice making and cold storage business after erection of necessary buildings on the said demised land at a cost of not less than Rs. 50,000/-. 3. By registered deed of conveyance dated 3rd August, 1955 one Prodyut Kumar Chowdhury purchased the said premises from the said Bangasri Cotton Mills Ltd. The Indenture of lease provided that the petitioner company would pay all rates, taxes, charges, duties, burdens, assessments, outgoings and impositions whatsoever, which would be payable during the continuance of the said lease in respect of the said plots of land or any part thereof either by the owner or by the occupier. There was another Indenture of lease dated 16th December, 1948 in respect of another adjoining plot of land which was numbered as 13C, Mirza Galib Street, formerly Free School Street, Calcutta and the same was also purchased by the said Prodyut Kumar Chowdhury by registered deed of conveyance dated 3rd August, 1955. 4. The petitioners' case is that the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was brought into force on 1st May, 1952. 4. The petitioners' case is that the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was brought into force on 1st May, 1952. Prior to the coming into force of the said Act of 1951 the quarterly rates and taxes in respect of the said demised plot of land was determined at about Rs. 150/- for each share and the same was in force at the commencement of the said Act as on 1st May, 1952. The petitioners put up a building in the said premises at a cost of much in excess of Rs. 50,000/- and as at 30th, June 1951 the said buildings on the said leasehold land stood at the value of Rs. 2,04,423-9-9. The monthly rent payable for and in respect of the said leases was and has been always Rs 288/- per month and the same was payable to the lessors and/or its assigns. 5. The petitioners' further case is that ever since the enforcement of the said Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951, the said factor premises has never been lawfully assessed and, determined and the consolidated rates and taxes relating thereto have not been fixed according to and in terms of the provisions of the said Act. It is also stated that the demands have always been made arbitrarily and de hors the statute. The petitioners never sub-let any portion of the said buildings in any manner. The entire buildings have been and are still being exclusively used by the petitioner company as manufacturer of ice and preserver of foodstaffs and edibles in its said cold storage. Upto the first quarter of 1956-57 the consolidated rate charged in respect of the said premises together with the said buildings thereon for both owner's share and occupier's share of taxes had been to the extent of Rs. 276-8-6 for each share on an annual valuation assessed and determined at Rs. 9,822/-. 6. In 1959 the value of the said buildings was to the extent of a sum of Rs.3,63,521.39 as shown in the balance sheet of the company. Since then there has been no addition in respect to the said buildings. 276-8-6 for each share on an annual valuation assessed and determined at Rs. 9,822/-. 6. In 1959 the value of the said buildings was to the extent of a sum of Rs.3,63,521.39 as shown in the balance sheet of the company. Since then there has been no addition in respect to the said buildings. The petitioners now state that the Corporation of Calcutta in breach of the mandatory provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act and without giving notice under section 180 of the said Act and without adjudication of the objection raised by the petitioner under section 182 thereof had been assessing the rates as will appear from the following chart : Assessment Qrtly, tax Quarterly tax Annual Valu Prevailing owner's Occupier's ation ass shares shares essed Assessment 303-12-0 303-12-0 Rs.10,800/- from 2nd Qtr. 1956 to 1959 From 2nd Qtr. 539.33P 539.33P Rs.18,360/- 1959 to 1966 (1st Qr. of 66) From 2nd Qtr. 1,401.98P 1,401.98P Rs.33,480/- 1966 to 1970 7. The petitioners now state that there has neither been any general revaluation in accordance with section 172(2A) of the said Act and in any event in order to be effective such revaluation must be invariably followed up by notice under section 178 of the said Act. Such notice has not been served on the petitioners. The petitioners' contentions are that for making a fresh general valuation the conditions precedent to the exercise of such power have not been followed and accordingly there has been no enhancement of the annual value nor any fresh valuation has been made within that meaning of section 172 of the said Act. Neither any notice has been served nor any hearing has been given to the petitioner company in any manner or form whatsoever in accordance with the statute. 8. The petitioners have paid the Corporation rates and taxes at the rate of Rs. 276-8-6 upto the first quarter of 1972-73. 9. The petitioners' grievance in this application, inter alia, is that by notice dated 11th June, 1959, the assessor under section 180 purported to assess the said premises at Rs 34,400/- with effect from 2nd quarter of 1959-60 until a fresh valuation would be made. 276-8-6 upto the first quarter of 1972-73. 9. The petitioners' grievance in this application, inter alia, is that by notice dated 11th June, 1959, the assessor under section 180 purported to assess the said premises at Rs 34,400/- with effect from 2nd quarter of 1959-60 until a fresh valuation would be made. In doing so, the annual valuation of the said premises was made on the basis of and according to the estimated yearly rental value thereof although the said buildings standing thereon at no point of time had been let out to and/or are neither lettable to in terms of the covenants and stipulations of the said leases. 10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that the provisions of section 168(1) are controlled by and/or are subservient to and or are otherwise regulated by the provision of sub-section (3) of section 168 of the said Act. This is a case of a factory building and as such the same would be governed by sub-section (3) because the building is not a lettable building and the lettable value thereof cannot be easily estimated. Learned counsel further contends that the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 168 also indicate and support counsel's contention that in a premises like this sub-section (3) thereof would be applicable. Section 168 provides as follows : "168(1) For the purpose of assessment to the consolidated rate the annual value of any land or building shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which the land or building might at the time of assessment be reasonably expected to let from year to year, less, in the case of a building, an allowance of ten percent for the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command such gross rent: Provided that in respect of any land or building the standard rent of which has been fixed under section 9 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, the annual value thereof shall not exceed the annual amount of the standard rent so fixed. (2) If the gross annual rent of any land not ordinarily let cannot be easily estimated, the gross annual rent of the land for the purpose of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be five per cent of the estimated present value of the land. (2) If the gross annual rent of any land not ordinarily let cannot be easily estimated, the gross annual rent of the land for the purpose of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be five per cent of the estimated present value of the land. (3) If the gross annual rent of a building not ordinarily let cannot be easily estimated, the gross annual rent of the building for the purpose of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be five per cent. of the value of the building obtained by adding the estimated cost of erecting the building at the time of assessment less a reasonable amount to be deducted on account of depreciation, if any, to the estimated present market value of the land valued with the building as part of the same premises, (4) The provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be subject to the following provisos, namely : (i) in the case of a building used as a public cinema house or theatre or other similar place of public resort, recreation or amusement, (ii) in calculating the value of any land or building, the value of any plant or machinery excepting those enumerated in Schedule X on such land or in such building shall be excluded, but all fixtures including lifts and electric and other fittings which add to the convenience of the building shall be valued, subject in the case of a lift to such deduction from the valuation, as may be prescribed by rules made by the Corporation, on account of the cost of repairs to maintenance of, and attendance on, such lift; (iii) the annual value of a bustee *** *** *** It would appear from the above that in respect of cinema houses it, was inevitable that such difficulty would be faced with and as such special provision has been made for such cinema houses. 11. Learned counsel has referred to a red post card dated 29th March, 1963 in which the annual value of the said premises together with the buildings thereon was suo motu assessed and determined at Rs. 18,360/- as against the valuation of Rs.32,400/- as contained in the said purported notice dated 11th June, 1959 and that it would show the lack of proper application of mind in arriving at the said valuation of Rs.32,400/-. 18,360/- as against the valuation of Rs.32,400/- as contained in the said purported notice dated 11th June, 1959 and that it would show the lack of proper application of mind in arriving at the said valuation of Rs.32,400/-. It is contended that the fact that the said red card as aforesaid containing the said valuation had been sent to the petitioners would clearly go to prove that there had not been any final valuation in respect of the said premises under the Provisions of section 182 of the Act. The objections recorded by the petitioners were never heard or decided before the final order regarding valuation is made. 12. Learned counsel contends that the Corporation has no power under the said Act to make fresh valuation until the expiry of the specified period under section 172 of the said Act save and except according to the provisions of section 179 and/or section 180 thereof. No such contingencies had happened as contemplated under sections 179 and 180 in the present case and as such to make a fresh valuation within the specified period would be acting without jurisdiction. 13. Learned counsel next contends that by notice dated 12th June, 1965 the respondent no. 1 purported to enhance the annual valuation of the said premises to the extent of Rs.52.380/- with effect from 2nd quarter of 1965-66. It has been stated in the said special notice that the said enhancement was in respect of the revaluation of the said premises on the yearly rental value less statutory allowances for repairs for substantial improvements or alterations made to the said buildings. The petitioners sent an objection by its letter dated 12th July, 1965. Since then no notice of hearing under section 182 has been issued nor any hearing has taken place nor any final order been made, and if made, the same must have been more exparte and without jurisdiction. 14. The petitioners sent an objection by its letter dated 12th July, 1965. Since then no notice of hearing under section 182 has been issued nor any hearing has taken place nor any final order been made, and if made, the same must have been more exparte and without jurisdiction. 14. Learned counsel contends that the petitioners, at all material time, made it clear that under no circumstances before the respondent Corporation the petitioner company was and still would be agreeable to pay the taxes of both the shares of owner and occupier on previous rate pending adjudication of the said objection filed by the petitioner company as would appear from the petitioner's letter dated 19th March 1968 but instead of such offer being made the respondent had been sending the petitioners with demand notices and has been threatening with distress warrant and/or instituting suits against the petitioner no. 1. 15. The petitioners state that the Corporation has purported to make the first assessment of the premises herein with effect from second quarter of 1956-57 under the Calcutta Municipal Act (Act XXXIII of 1951) inasmuch as the said Act came into force in 1952 but the assessment as existed under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 continued to be in force under this Act by virtue of the deeming provision as is contained in section 172 of the Calcutta Municipal Act until a fresh valuation would be made under the Act of 1951 after expiry of period of 6 years. In other words, before the second quarter 1956-57 no fresh valuation could he effected in respect of the said premises. The petitioners' case is that by a purported special notice under section 180 dated 12th June, 1965 the Corporation gave notice that the said premises have been assessed at an annual value of Rs.52,380/- with effect from second quarter 1965-66. In accordance with the instruction contained in the said notice the petitioners filed its objection to such valuation but the said objection has not yet been adjudicated or determined and accordingly the Corporation is bound to accept payment of the rates and taxes from the petitioner company on the previous valuation, that is at the rate of Rs. 276/8/6 quarterly for each share. 276/8/6 quarterly for each share. The petitioners further contend that incompliance with the provisions of section 207 the petitioner has regularly paid to the Corporation from the second quarter 1956-57 upto first quarter 1972-73 at the aforesaid rate to the extent of a total sum of Rs. 37,811.47. According to the petitioners the entire sum payable by way of rates and taxes in respect of the said premises has been paid less the sum of Rs. 5972.52 ,calculated at the said rate of Rs. 276/8/6 quarterly for each share. The petitioners have annexed to the petition a schedule of payment made by the petitioners to the Corporation of Calcutta in respect of such taxes for the said premises showing that the total amount to be paid was Rs. 37,712.5 from 23rd March 1957 upto 28th March 1969. 16. It would appear from the said annexure being Ext. "L" to the petition that the statement made hereinabove to the effect that the amount payable and paid for such quarterly taxes was to the extent of Rs. 276/8/6 for each share could not be a correct statement because on the petitioners own showing the petitioners have also made payment at the rate of Rs.539.33 per quarter for each share on the valuation which was enhanced to Rs. 18,360/-. This appears to be the admitted position. I shall deal with the same hereinafter more in detail after considering the argument put forward on behalf of the respondents. 17. The petitioners further contend that since 1959 there has been no addition or alteration to the said building; Furthermore, the said building has never been let out and cannot be let out having regard to the terms of the said leases. Accordingly, to determine the annual value of the said building for the purpose of assessment to the consolidated rate the Corporation could not apply rental basis but it was incumbent upon the Corporation to determine the annual value on the basis of the valuation of the building in terms of section 168(3) for the purpose of assessment under section 168 (1). 18. The petitioners further contend that since 1957 no engineer, surveyor or valuer had ever made any valuation report of the said premises or as to the cost of the said building for the purpose of section 168 (3). 18. The petitioners further contend that since 1957 no engineer, surveyor or valuer had ever made any valuation report of the said premises or as to the cost of the said building for the purpose of section 168 (3). The rates purported to have been fixed from time to time by the Corporation on an arbitrary basis and without having any regard to the provisions of section] 68 and section 182 of the said Act and without complying with the procedure laid down in chapter II of the said Act. 19. In or about May 1972 the Assessor to the respondent Corporation deputed two assessment engineers and inspectors and directed them to make valuation report of the said building. The said engineer and/or inspector made assessment report on the basis of cost of construction as on the date of the assessment. According to the petitioners such assessment by the said engineers were not in accordance with any law as the construction was made in 1951 and not in 1972 and as such the valuation made by them was not binding on the petitioners. The petitioners contend that the valuation of the said land must be assessed and determined within the meaning of section 168(1) of the Act at a valuation of Rs. 3520/- on the basis of the monthly rent of Rs. 285/- per month which is payable by the petitioners to the lessor in terms of the said leases. The petitioners have also relied on the audited balance sheet of the company for the purpose of valuation of the said building from second quarter 1956-57 onwards. 20. The Corporation has purported to treat the rent of the said premises at the rate of Rs. 4850/- per month and has purported to arrive at the valuation of Rs.52,380/- by multiplying the rent by 12 times giving a deduction of 10% from the gross amount. According to the petitioners the Corporation has acted perversely and illegally in making such valuation. The Corporation has purported to put forward a claim on the said valuation and is trying to enforce the same even though the said objections filed by the petitioners have not yet been heard or determined. 21. According to the petitioners the Corporation has acted perversely and illegally in making such valuation. The Corporation has purported to put forward a claim on the said valuation and is trying to enforce the same even though the said objections filed by the petitioners have not yet been heard or determined. 21. Then again, the respondent Corporation through the Deputy Commissioner No.1 on or about 28th February, 1971 by an ex parte order in clear defiance of the provision of section 182 of the Act and in contravention and/or in violation of the rules of natural justice and without slightest knowledge to the petitioners suo motu recorded in the books of the Corporation a new valuation from the said second quarter 1966 fixing such valuation for the purpose of assessment of consolidated rate at a sum of Rs.33,430/-. The said order is absolutely bad, illegal find void and without jurisdiction. Even subsequent to February 29, 1971 no hearing had taken place in respect of the said objections filed under section 182 of the said Act pursuant to the said notice dated 12th June, 1965. 21. Lastly, the petitioners have set up an agreement whereby the Corporation agreed pending adjudication of the said objections of the petitioners to the effect that the company would pay Rs. 10,000/- on 8th April, 1976 and a sum of Rs 5000/- on an ad-hoc basis and the Corporation would accept the same. It is stated that in terms of the said agreement a cheque was issued by and on behalf of the petitioners for Rs. 10,000/- and the same was drawn in the name of the Collector who, accepted the same and put his endorsement on the reverse thereof for transmission by the Treasury for encashment. When the cheque reached the Law Department of the Corporation the Collector was advised not to accept the same and thereupon the same was returned. According to the petitioners the Collector has not come forward to deny the said agreement. It is now contended that by reason of the aforesaid the Corporation is bound by the said agreement and/or in accordance with the principles of promissory estoppel and/or by the principles analogous thereto. 23. Under those circumstances, the petitioners have obtained a Rule herein in order to get complete remedy in the matter of such wrongful and illegal assessment. 24. Mr. 23. Under those circumstances, the petitioners have obtained a Rule herein in order to get complete remedy in the matter of such wrongful and illegal assessment. 24. Mr. Dutt refers to paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Acting Collector to the Corporation of Calcutta where it has been stilted that the nature of the business of the petitioner company is such that it lets out spaces to the different constituents at the said premises. This statement has been verified as submission. Then again in paragraph 45(c) the Same deponent states on information based on the records that the business of the petitioner company is to let out spaces to different constituents at the said premises and that the company does not use the whole space for the purpose of preservation of its own food staffs or edibles. Mr. Dutt also contends from the said averment that the assessment have been made on the basis of alleged letting out of spaces to the different constituents and as such undoubtedly that cannot be the correct mode of assessment for the municipal tax of a cold storage and of a factory. 25. Reference is also made to paragraph 20 of the said affidavit-in-opposition filed by the said Acting Collector to the Corporation. There also it has been stated that the spaces at the said cold storage are let out by the said company to its various constituents and that is the business of the company. On that basis the petitioner's submission in the petition that the said premises had not been let out or that the same cannot be let out have been challenged. It is significant that the above averments again have been verified as based on information derived from the records which the deponent believed to be true. The same averments have been repeated as based on information in paragraph 28 of the said affidavit. Mr. Dutt contends that no documents whatsoever have been relied on by the said deponent to support his allegation as stated above nor has the deponent disclosed the source of his information Mr. Dutt contends that the deponent has failed to appreciate the fact that the said lease with the superior landlord contains provisions whereby the petitioner Company is not permitted to sub let and that fact has not been challenged by the Corporation. Dutt contends that the deponent has failed to appreciate the fact that the said lease with the superior landlord contains provisions whereby the petitioner Company is not permitted to sub let and that fact has not been challenged by the Corporation. It is also significant that even though the strenuous litigations had been going on with the said superior landlord yet even the said superior landlord did not think of making any allegation to the effect that the petitioner company has ever indulged in subletting any part of the premises. The strange part of it is that the Inspector of the respondent Corporation never visited the factory from 1959 onwards upto May 1972 and as such there were no factual material or data before the Corporation to arrive at any decision as to what should be the rate of tax and whether section 168 (1) or section 168 (3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act should be the proper section to be applied. 26. Reliance was placed on the case of (1) Corporation of Calcutta v. Messrs. India Exchange Ltd., reported in 69 CWN 237 where the Division Bench of this Court considered the question as to how the annual value of a building would be determined as a true gross annual rent under section 168 (1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act (XXXIII of 1951). At page 241 of the said Report the Division Bench observed that the gross annual rent should also be the gross a annual rent payable by the tenant less an amount towards payment for services and amenities. In that case the tenants were provided with a lift in the said building. The Division Bench held that the lifts are one of such services and amenities and that the electricians appertain to such services and amenities. It was further held that the sweepers and the disinfectants also appertain to such services and amenities. After taking into consideration all those facts the Division Bench gave a deduction to the extent of Rs. 225/- per month for the maintenance of the lifts as also Rs. 235/- per month as salary for the lift men and a further sum of Rs. 146-6-6 pies per month and Rs. 66-3-3 pies per month for the electricians and the assistant electrician and Rs. 267/- per month as pay and bonus for the sweepers and Rs. 130/- per month for purchasing disinfactants. 27. 235/- per month as salary for the lift men and a further sum of Rs. 146-6-6 pies per month and Rs. 66-3-3 pies per month for the electricians and the assistant electrician and Rs. 267/- per month as pay and bonus for the sweepers and Rs. 130/- per month for purchasing disinfactants. 27. From the above decision by the Division Bench it would seem to follow that in respect of a building with its cold storage arrangements and apparatus various deductions have got to be given in arriving at the annual value of a building. In sub-section (1) of section 168 an allowance to the extent of 10% for the cost of repairs and for other expenses necessary to maintain the building for the purpose of commanding such gross rent has only been allowed suggesting thereby that such a building is let out only as a building and without any amenities whatsoever. In sub-section (1) the letting value of the building along has been provided for the purpose of assessment to the consolidated rate but in case of a building with such equipment and machinery like those which are necessary for the purpose of making a cold storage different considerations are bound to apply and to meet such eventualities for the purpose of finding out the annual value or the gross annual rent the provisions of subsection (3) have to be applied. The expressions used in sub-section (3) is "if the gross annual rent of a building ..... .......................cannot be easily estimated". To avoid complications in the matter of making such estimation the legislature has provided for a simpler method by introducing a deeming clause in sub-section (3) of section 168. To solve such complications in the matter of making such estimation the legislature has thought fit to assess such building on the basis of 5% of the value of the building after making the calculation in accordance with the provision made thereunder. The mode of calculation in respect of such building has also been provided in the proviso contained in section 168 (4) (ii) of the Act. 28. Mr. Dutt next contends that in respect of a factory building the provisions of sub-section (3) and (4) (ii) would be applicable to arrive at the annual value thereof under section 168 (1) of the said Act. In this connection Mr. 28. Mr. Dutt next contends that in respect of a factory building the provisions of sub-section (3) and (4) (ii) would be applicable to arrive at the annual value thereof under section 168 (1) of the said Act. In this connection Mr. Dutt has relied on section 5, clauses (6) and (8) of the said Act where the expression "building" and "building of the warehouse class" have been defined. The same provides as follows : "(6) "Building" includes a house, outhouse, stable, privy, urinal, shed, hut, wall (other than a boundary wall not exceeding three metres in height) and any other such structures, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever, but does not include a hogla or other similar kind of temporary shed erected on ceremonial or festvie occasions". (8) "building of the warehouse class" means a building, the whole, or a substantial part of which, is used, or intended to be used, as a warehouse, factory, manufactory, brewery, or distillery, or for any similar purpose which is neither a domestic building, nor a public building as defined in this section, and includes a hut used or intended to be used for any of the purposes mentioned in this class". 29. To my mind, it would be worthwhile to refer to the previous enactment, viz.. The Calcutta Municipal Act (III of 1923) in respect of the Chapter on Taxation and the provisions for the imposition of consolidated rate. It would also be worthwhile to set out section 127 of the said Act of 1923 which is equivalent of section 168 of the Act of 1951 though the language has been differently worded. The said section 127 of the said previous enactment of 1923 is set out as follows : "Assessment of lands and buildings to the consolidated rate. 127. Annual value of land or buildings how to be ascertained.- For the purpose of assessing land and buildings to the consolidated rate, (a) the annual value of land, and the annual value of any building erected for letting purposes or ordinarily let, shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which the land or building might at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to let from year to year, less, in the case of a building, an allowance of ten per cent. for the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command such gross rent; and (b) the annual value of any building not erected for letting purposes and not ordinarily let shall be deemed to be five per cent. on the sum obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building, less a reasonable amount to be deducted on account of depreciation (if any), to the estimated present value of the land valued with the building as part of the same premises. Provided as follows :- (i) the annual value of a bustee shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which the land contained within it, excluding the lands which have been left vacant for the purposes of any bustee street prescribed in or under a standard plan approved by the Corporation under Chapter XXII, might reasonably be expected to let from year to year, plus the gross annual rent at which the huts erected thereon might reasonably be expected to let from year to year, after deducting therefrom the rent of the land and an allowance of ten percent for the cost of repairs and for all expenses necessary to maintain such huts in a state to command such gross rent; (ii) in calculating the value of any land or building under this section, the value of any machinery on such land or in such building shall be excluded, but all fixtures including lifts and electric and other fittings which add to the convenience of the building shall be valued, subject in the case of lift to such deduction from the valuation, as the Executive Officer may think proper, on account of the cost of repairs to, maintenance of, and attendance on, such lift ; (iii) if in the case of a building valued under clause (b), the annual value of which does not exceed five hundred rupees, any exceptional circumstances exist which render a valuation of five per cent. on the cost of erecting the building less depreciation, excessive, a lower percentage may be taken; (iv) When any building has been valued at a special percentage taken under proviso (iii), it may be re-valued at any time after the exceptional circumstances referred to in that proviso have ceased to exist. " 30. on the cost of erecting the building less depreciation, excessive, a lower percentage may be taken; (iv) When any building has been valued at a special percentage taken under proviso (iii), it may be re-valued at any time after the exceptional circumstances referred to in that proviso have ceased to exist. " 30. It would appear that the said section 127 provides for two classes of buildings for the purpose of assessment to tax viz. (a) building not erected for letting purposes or ordinarily let and (b) building not erected for letting purposes and not ordinarily let. In respect of such building erected for letting purposes or ordinarily let the annual value thereof would be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which such building might reasonably be expected to let from year to year at the time of assessment less an allowance of ten per cent; but in respect of any building not erected for letting purposes and not ordinarily let the annual value would be deemed to be five per cent on the sum obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building, less the deduction as provided thereunder. 31. It is to be borne in mind that The Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 is an Act to amend and consolidate the Municipal Law which existed by the enactment of 1923. By this Act the said Act of 1923 no doubt was repealed but the provisions of the old Act were incorporated in the new Act. Under those circumstances the provisions of the old Act of 1923 can be looked into for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the new Act. The object of the new Act is to reproduce the law as it stood before. The presumption is that the Parliament does not intend to alter the existing law. It follows therefore that the words of the two statutes would bear the same meaning and, accordingly, the earlier decisions on the earlier statutes would be a special guide and can be followed and applied in respect of the new provisions wherever, they would be applicable. The presumption is that the Parliament does not intend to alter the existing law. It follows therefore that the words of the two statutes would bear the same meaning and, accordingly, the earlier decisions on the earlier statutes would be a special guide and can be followed and applied in respect of the new provisions wherever, they would be applicable. It would be noticed that in the previous enactment the Taxation Chapter was put under Chapter X, of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923 but in the new Act of 1951 it is the Chapter XI Otherwise the main caption of the chapter and the heading immediately preceding section 127 of the old Act and section 168 of the new Act are the same in all respects. At page 21 of Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition it is provided as follows: "In the construction of a consolidated Act, the presumption that Parliament does not intend to alter the existing law applies with particular force. For the object of the Act was merely to 'reproduce the law as it stood before.' And there is a further, perhaps less persuasive, presumption that the words used in the consolidating Act bear the same meaning as that which they had at the time the enactments consolidated were passed." Under those circumstances, it is argued that the decision in' (2) Royal Asiatic Society v. Corporation of Calcutta, should be followed and the principles laid down therein should be applied in this case, more so, because in this matter there is a clause in the lease to the effect that the lessee is prohibited from sub-letting and in case of valuation of such a clause the lessee would incur forfeiture of the lease provides that the lessee must make the construction of a building by spending a sum not less than Rs.50,000/- and the lessee would have the option to purchase the premises as in Royal Asiatic case (supra). 32. It would appear that the language used in section 127 of the Act of 1923 creates no difficulty at all and on the basis of the said provisions the assessment could be made without any difficulty whatsoever. 32. It would appear that the language used in section 127 of the Act of 1923 creates no difficulty at all and on the basis of the said provisions the assessment could be made without any difficulty whatsoever. It would further appear that the language used in section 168 of the Act of 1951 is not so easy to understand as in the old Act although it would seem that the legislature in enacting section 168 of the Act of 1951 intended that the assessment of land and buildings to the consolidated rate should be substantially on the same principle, as before excepting that the broad classification of the said two classes of buildings for the purposes of assessment was to be withdrawn by the Act of 1951. Under the present section 168 the gross annual rent as provided under subsection (1) would be the basis of the assessment and incase the land or building is not ordinarily let or such gross annual rent cannot be easily estimated then by a legal fiction the gross annual rent has to be fixed with the help of the deeming clause as provided in sub-sections (2) and (3) by valuing the property at five per cent of the value of the building in the manner as provided under sub-sections (2) and (3). In case of subsection (3) the valuation of the land or building would be the basis under two circumstances, viz., that such land or building must not be such which are ordinarily let and the gross annual rent of such land or building cannot be easily estimated. It follows, therefore, that if the gross annual rent of such land or building though not ordinarily let can be easily estimated then such gross annual rent would be estimated by applying the method as provided in sub-section (1) and on the basis of such gross annual rent the annual value of such land or building would be arrived at and on that basis the consolidated rate would be assessed. In such event, even though the said lands or buildings are not ordinarily let yet the valuation would be on the basis of gross annual rent. In such event, even though the said lands or buildings are not ordinarily let yet the valuation would be on the basis of gross annual rent. It is only when such land or building which is not ordinarily let cannot be easily estimated then the legislature intended that the estimate of such gross annual rent would be on the basis of five per cent of the value of the building obtained in the manner as provided in subsection (3). Accordingly, it must be the intention of the legislature that the easier of the two methods has to be adopted. 33. That brings us to the question as to what is meant by the expressions "not ordinarily let" and "cannot be easily estimated" as used in sub-section (3) of Sec. 168 of the Act. The expression "not ordinarily let" finds place also in the old Act of 1923. In the old statue under section 127 the said expression has been used along with the expression "any building not erected for letting purposes", which would necessarily mean that until the building is let out or intended to be let out it will be taken to have been erected for his own use and occupation. The said expression would also signify that the nature and character of user of such buildings is such that in the usual and ordinary course it is not easily possible to estimate the gross annual rent even with the help of deeming clause as provided in sub• section (1). After taking into consideration all these factors it would seem that the factory building or a cold storage building would comply with the requirement as provided in sub-section (3) and the assessment thereof would be on the basis of five per cent value of the building which valuation would be arrived at as provided in sub-section (3) thereof. 34. To my mind, if the old Act had been in force, a building of the cold storage type with cold storage apparatus annexed to it would have clearly come within the meaning of sub-section (b) of section 127 of the Act of 1923. Under that sub-section it would have bean sufficient if the erection of the building was not for letting purposes and the character of the building was such that the same would not be ordinarily let as is understood in the common parlance. Under that sub-section it would have bean sufficient if the erection of the building was not for letting purposes and the character of the building was such that the same would not be ordinarily let as is understood in the common parlance. In such a case the premises would be valued at five per cent by land and building method as provided thereunder to arrive at the annual value of the building but unlike the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 168 of the present Act it need not be the gross annual rent or deemed to be so for the purpose of assessment thereof. The substantial difference which has been made in the present Act is in respect of the valuation arrived at by following the method as provided under sub-section (3) of section 168. What is to be arrived at is the gross annual rent of the building as provided under sub-section (1) because under any circumstances the annual value of any land or building must be on the basis of gross annual rent and that is why the expression "cannot be easily estimated" has been provided under sub-section (3). The legislature thought it fit that even by applying the statutory fiction it would not be always possible to arrive at the gross annual rent. By using the expression "easily" in' the expression "cannot be easily estimated" the legislature put a caution on the authority concerned not to strain itself unnecessarily in a matter where there would be difficulty in arriving. It the gross annual rental under Sub-section (1). Under such circumstances, provision of sub-section (3) has been enacted by providing easier method of valuation. It should not be the consideration of the authorities concerned as to which of the two provisions would fetch more taxes to the Corporation, but the consideration should be as to which of the two methods would be more easily applied in the facts and circumstances of each case. 35. The authority concerned in the case has misdirected itself by taking into consideration a fact to the effect that the floor space of the cold storage is let out to various constituents and, therefore, the building can be reasonably expected to let from year to year. This is clearly a wrong approach to the matter. 35. The authority concerned in the case has misdirected itself by taking into consideration a fact to the effect that the floor space of the cold storage is let out to various constituents and, therefore, the building can be reasonably expected to let from year to year. This is clearly a wrong approach to the matter. Assuming that the cold storage lets out the floor space instead of giving it on hire as a bailor, in such event, it is not the building as such or the part thereof which is let out but the letting out carries with it various other things, e.g., the cold storage apparatus, the maintenance thereof, the electricity charges, the establishment and several other things. The gross annual rent which is to be found out under sub-section (1) is in respect of the land and building as such only. If something else would be attached to it, such as, lifts or electric motor pump etc. the same would have to be taken into consideration separately along with the land and building and then the gross annual rent has to be arrived at to make the assessment on the annual value. The allowance of ten per cent for the purpose of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in the same state to command such gross rent would have to be deducted from the gross annual rent to arrive at the annual value of any land or building and on the basis of such annual value, the consolidated rate has to be assessed. It would seem clear that even though the valuation is made on the basis of the method as provided under sub-section (3) what is to be found out thereunder is only the gross annual rent by applying the statutory fiction; but to arrive at the annual value for the purpose of assessment the allowance as provided under sub-section (1) have to be deducted. 36. Then again, a further question which comes up for consideration is whether only ten per cent is the total allowance that is provided under sub-section (1); whether such allowance would cover both repairs and all other expenses of whether the said ten per cent. 36. Then again, a further question which comes up for consideration is whether only ten per cent is the total allowance that is provided under sub-section (1); whether such allowance would cover both repairs and all other expenses of whether the said ten per cent. would relate only to the cost of repairs but in respect of other expenses the same would have to be allowed after the same would be found necessary to maintain the building in such a state so as to command such gross rent. Take for instance, a case where an entire three storeyed big building is let out to a tenant. In such a case apart from the question of repairs the landlord usually would not have to incur any other expenses to keep the said property ill the same tenantable state as he would be liable to incur if the said premises are let out to different tenants occupying different parts of the premises. In such event, it might be necessary to keep caretakers, to provide for lifts, electricity motor pump for supplying water and sweepers, machine men and some such employees. For providing such amenities in the said premises the proportionate rent of each flat would necessarily be higher than what it would have fetched if no such amenities had been provided there. Under such circumstances, obviously. Where the character and nature of the building would be such as described above, the expenses involved in getting such proportionate higher rents would necessarily have to be taken into consideration in order that in future also the said respective portions might be let out to earn such higher gross annual rental. Accordingly, it would seem that the legislature intended that the ten per cent amount should relate to repairs only but in cases any other expenses would be involved if the some are to be found necessary to be incurred to maintain the building in the same state to command such gross rent then the same would have to be allowed and thereafter the annual value of the building would have to be arrived at for the purpose of assessment to consolidated rate. 37. Take for instance, a very simple case where two adjacent buildings with separate municipal numbers are let out to two different tenants and each such building consists of same number of flats. 37. Take for instance, a very simple case where two adjacent buildings with separate municipal numbers are let out to two different tenants and each such building consists of same number of flats. One of them is fully air-conditioned and the other is not. Under such circumstances the air-conditioned building would fetch more rent than the one which is not air-conditioned. If the gross rental alone, less the ten per cent amount is taken to be the annual value then the assessment to consolidated rate would differ. To this extent the air-conditioned premises would be assessed at a higher annual value and the other one would be assessed at a lower annual value. Under such circumstances, was it the intention of the legislature that the landlord should pay more taxes for the air-conditioned premises than the other which is not provided with such amenities. Would it not sound absurd if the assessment in respect of the same type of building would be differently made? 38. The additional rental that is being derived from the air-conditioned premises is because of the investment made by the landlord in providing the said air-conditioning plant, machinery and apparatus. The gross rental without deductions would contain therein the depreciation value, the cost of maintenance of the said air-conditioning apparatus, plant and machinery the cost of electricity, to be consumed to keep it in working condition the cost of labour and several other things to account for the difference in the gross rental. Is it the intention of the legislature that the gross annual rental as provided under sub-section (1) would mean the entire gross annual rent without the deductions as discussed above? To my mind, that was never the intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section (1) of section 168. In any event the decided cases on this point would not support such a view. 39. I have been supported by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of (1) Corporation of Calcutta v. India Exchange Ltd., reported in 69 CWN 237. In that case the Division Bench of this Court considered the question as to how the annual value of a building would be determined under sub-sections (1) of section 168 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (XXXIII of 1951). In that case the Division Bench of this Court considered the question as to how the annual value of a building would be determined under sub-sections (1) of section 168 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (XXXIII of 1951). That case came up to the Division Bench of this Court by way of an appeal against an order passed in an appeal under section 183 of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 by a Judge of the Small Causes Court at Calcutta. The principle decided in the said case would apply to the case before me and particularly the interpretation of sub-section (1) and (4) (ii) of section 168 are binding on this Court. There also on behalf of the Corporation it was submitted that the deduction of the ten per cent amount covered all deductions on account of expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command the gross rent. It is to be noticed that in that case the Division Bench did not proceed on the basis of clause (ii) of sub-section (4) of section 168 wherein the expenses for lift had been separately provided. The Division Bench has observed that the said clause (2) has no application because that is applicable if valuation has to be made under subsection (3) but in the case of sub-section (1) the said provision of clause (iv) of sub-section (4) would not apply. The case before the Division Bench was decided under sub-section (1) and on that basis the Division Bench at page 240 held as follows : "The question is how should the gross value under the English Act or the gross annual rent under section 168 (1) of the Act are to be found, that is, whether the gross value or the gross annual rent would represent the total sum paid by the tenants or the total sum paid by the tenants less an amount towards payment for the services and amenities provided by the landlord. The Court of appeal in Bell Property's case has held that the gross value should be taken to be the gross sum payable by the tenant less an amount towards payment for service and amenities. On similar principles, the gross annual rent should also mean the gross rent payable by the tenant less an amount towards payment for services and amenities. On similar principles, the gross annual rent should also mean the gross rent payable by the tenant less an amount towards payment for services and amenities. We hold, therefore, that before the annual value of the building can be determined the true gross annual rent should be determined and for determining the same, there should be a deduction from the gross rent a sum towards payment for the services and amenities provided for by the landlord on the facts and circumstances of this case. We have no doubt that lifts are one of such services and amenities". 40. Mr. Dutt next refers to section 177 of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 and contends that this section provides for giving a notice by the Commissioner to the owner or occupier of a building requiring them to furnish certain particulars regarding measurement, rent or the annual value of the land or building. It is contended that until such particulars are furnished and obtained by the Commissioner, the Commissioner would not be in a position to arrive at the gross annual rent, or for that purpose, the annual value of such land or building which is required under section 168 (1) for the purpose of assessment to the consolidated rate. That being the position, it is contended that the giving of notice by the Commissioner is not discretionary but the Commissioner would be bound to give such notice under section 177. It follows, therefore that the expression "may" in sub-section (1) must be read as "shall". 41. To my mind, Mr. Dutt's argument on this point cannot be accepted inasmuch as in this Chapter the legislature has been particularly careful to use the expressions "may" or "shall", as the case may be to signify its real intention. There is sufficient reason to use the expression "may" in sub-section (1) of section 177 inasmuch as the Commissioner might be in a position to ascertain the particulars required thereunder by employing its own Inspector but it is only when the same would not be adequate or faithful that the Commissioner might feel the necessity of giving a notice to require such particulars to be furnished. But once such a notice is given the owner or occupier shall be bound to comply with the same. The reading of the sub-section in the section as a whole would make that sense quite clear. But once such a notice is given the owner or occupier shall be bound to comply with the same. The reading of the sub-section in the section as a whole would make that sense quite clear. Moreover, it would seem that the expression "may" has been used to give a discretion to the Commissioner inasmuch as it may be possible for the Commissioner to ascertain the particulars of a premises by sending its own inspectors. By such process the allowable deductions to be given in respect of a property, if so required to be given, could be ascertained. 42. Mr. Dutt has argued that the Corporation has proceeded on the rental basis without any material before them and as such the entire assessment order was an order without jurisdiction and was a nullity. Mr. Mallick, on the other hand, has contended that in the present case the Corporation has acted within the scope of its authority. It was a question of fact that the Corporation has rightly or wrongly exercised its jurisdiction in deciding it and as such the Writ Court should not interfere with it. Mr. Dutt has contended that the previous orders for assessment have been passed in contravention of sections 172, 177 and 182 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and such orders accordingly have become bad, without jurisdiction and nullity. 43. Mr. Dutt has next argued, that if the order is nullity then delay was not a factor to be considered. Mr. Dutt has referred to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (3) Jabbalpore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and others, reported in AIR 1974 Cal. 309 where it has been held 'that the question of delay considerably loses its significance in case where the impugned' order is void and not merely voidable. In such a case there is no need for an order of the Court to set it aside, though it is sometimes convenient for the Court to declare it to be so. Mr. Mallick, on the other hand, points out that in the facts of that case a series of orders were sought to be challenged. The last of which was passed about a month before the application 'under Article 226 was made. Mr. Mallick, on the other hand, points out that in the facts of that case a series of orders were sought to be challenged. The last of which was passed about a month before the application 'under Article 226 was made. In that case the Division Bench observed at page 311 as follows :- "In a case of this nature when there is no delay in challenging the last of a series of orders the fact that the earlier orders were not challenged in time, should not ordinarily deprive a petitioner of its rights under article 226 of the Constitution". The observations relating to delay were made on the basis of such facts. Mr. Dutt contends that in this case the Corporation itself went into slumber for long 11 years by not disposing of the petition filed by the petitioner on 12th July, 1965. In paragraph 8(1) of the affidavit-in-opposition the Corporation has admitted the position that the same is still now pending. That being, the position the Corporation should not be allowed to take the point of delay in making this application. Mr. Mallick, on the other hand, points out that in this case the last order was passed on 28th March, 1963 and the previous orders were passed on 1st May, 1961, 12th March, 1959 and 15th November, 1955 and each one of them is an independent order and not orders passed serially. In the case of (4) M/s. Tilokchand Motichand and others v. H.B. Munshi Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay and another, reported in AIR 1970 SC 898 the majority view of the Supreme Court was that the petitioner could not take advantage of the Supreme Court decision after lapse of a number of years. It was no ground that he had no knowledge of the statute being struck down by the Supreme Court and for that reason the party concerned could not pursue its remedy since the law would presume that he knew the exact ground of unconstitutionality. Having set the machinery of law in motion he could not abandon it to resume it after a lapse of several years. The Supreme Court also considered that in that case there was no question of mistake of law entitling the petitioner to invoke the nullity of the article in the Limitation Act. Having set the machinery of law in motion he could not abandon it to resume it after a lapse of several years. The Supreme Court also considered that in that case there was no question of mistake of law entitling the petitioner to invoke the nullity of the article in the Limitation Act. At page 902 the Supreme Court observes : "The party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action for that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. In England a period of 6 months has been provided statutorily, but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where there is appearance of avoidable delay and this delay affects the merits of the claim, this Court will consider it and in a proper case hold the party disentitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction". 44. It is argued that when a prima facie case for investigation has to be made out in the writ petition, and the dismissal of the case is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court should not throw out a writ application and dismiss it in limini without laying down the law which is being misapplied by the authorities concerned. I should think that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, this petition should not be thrown out in limini - on the ground of delay in as much as important points concerning the public at large is involved in this case. 45. I should think that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, this petition should not be thrown out in limini - on the ground of delay in as much as important points concerning the public at large is involved in this case. 45. It is further contended that even if it be held that section 168 (1) will apply yet it is to be considered, (a) whether notice under section 177 has to be complied with; (b) whether it is true gross annual rent which is to be taken as the basis for the purpose of fixing the annual value under section 168 (1) ; (c) whether statutory rules of natural justice have been complied with or not; (d) whether the intermediate valuation under section 172(2) clause (c) was warranted by the taxing authority as stated in paragraphs 57, 58 and 59 of the petition and so on. The connected paragraph in the affidavit-in-opposition is paragraph 28 but nothing, stated in the said paragraph in the petition have been denied by the said paragraph 28 of the affidavit-in-opposition. It has been stated that since 1951 there has been no construction and after 1957 and prior to May 1972 there had not been any physical inspection of the premises. This averment also has not been denied in paragraph 23 of the affidavit-in-opposition. It has been stated that since 1951 there has been no construction and after 1957 and prior to May 1972 there had not been any physical inspection of the premises. This averment also has not been denied in paragraph 23 of the affidavit-in-opposition. The further questions to be considered are, (e) whether such intermediate valuation, as in paragraph 8(f) and paragraph 8(g) of the affidavit-in-opposition, stood lapsed with the expiry of the first statutory general valuation on the expiry of four quarters of 1961-62 in view of section 172(4) read with section 172(2) of the Act ; (f) whether the purported general valuation dated 1st May, 1961 as mentioned in paragraph 8(h) of the affidavit-in-opposition could be kept alive for the purpose of tax beyond the statutory period of time and whether the scheme of the Act permits of such a procedure; (g) whether under the scheme of the Act it is permissible to keep the hearing and the determination of the petition to valuation pending sine die; (h) in view of the contradictions between paragraph 8(h) and paragraph 25 of the affidavit-in-opposition whether the purported general revaluation as mentioned in paragraph 8(h) of the affidavit-in-opposition can be sustained; and (i) whether a fresh hearing is called for in view of the written promise given by the Corporation as contained in annexure "C" to the petition being the letter dated October 24th, 1975. 46. As stated hereinabove the Corporation proceeds on the basis that the petitioner has been letting out spaces which means letting out part of the premises and on that basis the Corporation asserts that this is not such a premises which are not ordinarily let. In other words, it is such a premises which are ordinarily let and as such the gross annual rent can be ascertained by applying the statutory fiction. 47. In my opinion, this argument is not sound and must be rejected. When a cold storage space is allowed to be used by the owner to the customers, the space is not let out. Under the West Bengal Cold Storage (Licensing and Regulation) Act, 1966, the expression 'cold' storage' has been defined to mean an enclosed chamber insulated in the prescribed manner and mechanically cooled by refrigeration machinery to provide refrigerated condition to things stored therein but does not include refrigerated cabinets and chilling plants having capacity of less than 28.3168 cubic metres. Under the West Bengal Cold Storage (Licensing and Regulation) Act, 1966, the expression 'cold' storage' has been defined to mean an enclosed chamber insulated in the prescribed manner and mechanically cooled by refrigeration machinery to provide refrigerated condition to things stored therein but does not include refrigerated cabinets and chilling plants having capacity of less than 28.3168 cubic metres. It would appear from the said Act that the relationship becomes that of a hirer and a licensee and the said expression "hirer" and "licensee" have been defined in the said Act. The expression 'hirer' has been defined to mean a person who hires on payment of the prescribed charges, space in a cold storage for storing agricultural produce and enters into a" contract or agreement with the licensee for the purpose. In respect of storing such produce the licensee is obliged to issue the cold storage receipt in the prescribed form and the same is transferable by endorsement and delivery and the same would entitle any lawful holder thereof to receive the agricultural produce specified in that, as if he were the original hirer. These are the special characteristics of a cold storage as defined under the said Act and the same are entirely different from the concept of letting out the premises. A rent receipt is never granted in respect of a cold storage and the cold storage receipt unlike a receipt is negotiable and passes from hand to hand. I have already observed that there is no allegation to sub-letting of any part of the premises in the affidavit-in-opposition herein nor has the superior landlord ever made any such allegation in course of the litigation which are going on from time to time with him. I have further observed that under the terms of the lease with the superior landlord the petitioner has been prohibited from letting out any part of the premises and if the petitioner would commit breach thereof, the lease would be liable to be forfeited on that ground. 48. To my mind, the expression "not ordinarily let" has to be given a commercial meaning when applied in relation to a factory and if such a meaning is given to the said expression no violence would be done to the statute being the said Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. 48. To my mind, the expression "not ordinarily let" has to be given a commercial meaning when applied in relation to a factory and if such a meaning is given to the said expression no violence would be done to the statute being the said Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. The expressions 'building' and 'building of the warehouse class' have been separately defined and the definition of 'building' and the 'building of the warehouse class' includes be within it a factory; and a factory of the cold storage type cannot considered as a premises which are ordinarily let. Accordingly, it must be held that the expression 'not ordinarily let' must be interpreted to apply to a factory and it must further be held that in the facts and circumstances of this case, its rent cannot be easily estimated. In this case as already mentioned when the special assessment notice was served on the petitioner under section 180 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 by its letter dated 12th June, 1965 making an assessment at Rs.52,380/- as the annual value of the said premises from second quarter 1965-66 the petitioner filed objection thereto but uptill no hearing has taken place in respect of such objection. If that be the position since the Corporation has failed to prove how such assessment had taken place, all assessments made subsequent thereto must be held to be provisional because the same would be dependent on the said objection case filed in respect of the special notice dated 12th June, 1965. Moreover the Corporation has failed miserably to explain how the valuation was enhanced to Rs.18,360/- and tax assessed at the rate of Rs. 539.33 per quarter for each share although the said prior objection case is still pending. To my mind, the Corporation cannot take advantage of its own laches in not disposing of the said objection case and by keeping the same pending till date. It would seem that the respondent Corporation had been acting in the arbitrary-manner without complying with the provisions of the statute in respect of making assessment from time to time since such objection as aforesaid had been filed. It is difficult to appreciate how the sum of Rs.4850/- per month was arrived at as the monthly rental of the said premises without any inspection by the inspectors or assessors of the Corporation of Calcutta since May, 1972. It is difficult to appreciate how the sum of Rs.4850/- per month was arrived at as the monthly rental of the said premises without any inspection by the inspectors or assessors of the Corporation of Calcutta since May, 1972. It is also difficult to appreciate how the assessment could be final from the second quarter, 1966 and the annual value be arrived at a sum of Rs.33,430/- on 28th February, 1971 although no hearing took place till date in respect of the objection filed pursuant to the said notice dated 12th June, 1965. 49. That being the position, the petitioner is entitled to relief. In the facts and circumstances of this case the question of delay is immaterial because the Corporation of Calcutta is likewise guilty of gross delay in disposing of this objection matter which was filed pursuant to notice dated 12th June, 1965. Furthermore, I do not think that in the facts and circumstances of this case the Court would be justified in dismissing this application on the ground of suppression of material 'facts and not to go into the said question after the matter has been heard in details for several days. The matter is of public importance inasmuch as the principle that is being followed by the Corporation of Calcutta so long is not the correct principle/and the Corporation is required to act in accordance with law and as indicated hereinabove. 50. Mr. Mallick appearing on behalf of the Corporation of Calcutta has referred to the-provisions of sections 183(1) and 183(3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. Mr. Mallick contends that the alternative remedy as provided thereunder should be pursued instead of allowing the petitioner to come before this Court in this manner. Mr. Dutt contends that the matter involves the interpretation of the Constitution of India which the Small Causes Court is not competent to entertain. Substantial questions are involved in this matter and the same affects the citizens of India in general. Even assuming the matter had been initiated before the Small Causes Court the same would have been, in any event, needed to be got transferred to this Court because the Small Causes Court would not have power to interpret the statute. The matter is of first impression and relates to taxation. Even assuming the matter had been initiated before the Small Causes Court the same would have been, in any event, needed to be got transferred to this Court because the Small Causes Court would not have power to interpret the statute. The matter is of first impression and relates to taxation. The matter involves question as to now the industrial premises is to be valued for the purpose of assessment of the annual value. In this writ petition the petitioner has asked for mandamus for hearing the pending objection according to law. Such remedy was not available before the Small Causes Court. Moreover, this is not a matter where an assessment has not been correctly arrived at. It is a matter involving the question as to whether the Corporation had been exercising its jurisdiction properly or not in the matter of assessment of a business premises of the type of a cold storage. That being the position, in my opinion, the question of pursuing the alternative remedy in this case does not arise. If the taxing authority has exceeded its jurisdiction then the alternative remedy as provided can not be insisted upon to be pursued by the tax-payer. In such a case the petition under article 226 of the Constitution would be entertained notwithstanding the existence of such alternative remedy. 51. That being the position, the Rule herein must be made absolute and the Corporation is required to act in accordance with law by giving a hearing in respect of the objection filed pursuant to the special notice under section 180 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 dated 12th June, 1965. In respect of the said objection matter the Corporation of Calcutta has to proceed under section 168(3) in respect of the petitioner company and to arrive at. the animal value after giving necessary deductions regarding the cost of maintenance of the said plant, machinery and implements and the cost of maintenance of the said cold storage in accordance with law. This will not entitle the petitioner to ask for re-opening of assessment for any period which is prior to the period mentioned in the notice dated 12th June, 1965. This will not entitle the petitioner to ask for re-opening of assessment for any period which is prior to the period mentioned in the notice dated 12th June, 1965. The Corporation is directed to give credit to the petitioner in respect of all amounts already paid since the period subsequent to the period covered by the said notice dated 12th June, 1965 in making such assessment and to realise the excess amount, if any, so to be found due or to .refund, if any amount in excess of the amount due has been recovered. Let the necessary writs issue. In the facts, and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.