TYAGI (Actg.) C.J.—These 27 special appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated December 22, 1975 whereby the learned Judge has held that the proceedings commenced under Chapter-IIIB of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (herein after referred to as the old law) for the determination of the ceiling and the surplus area of the land holders shall even after the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (Act No. 11 of 1973) (hereinafter called the new Law) came into force, be governed by the old Law and the new Law shall have no effect on such proceedings. Having felt aggrieved by this finding the land-holders have preferred these appeals. 2. In order to resolve the controversies raised in these appeals it will be relevant to give a short history of various laws enacted by the legislature from time to time for the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings. For the first time, the law was made in the State of Rajasthan by enacting the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1960, (Act No 4 of 1960) which introduced in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 Chapter III-B. This amending Act got the assent of the President on March 12, 1960. This Chapter came into force on December 15, 1963 vide notification No.F.6(12) Rev. B/60, dated 25th November, 1963 published by the Government in the Rajasthan Gazette, Extraordinary, Part IV(A) of December 1, 1963. Thus the law relating to ceiling on holdings was incorporated in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The Government while exercising its power under section 257 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act named rules known as the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Government Rules, 1963. The Government by issuing a notification No.F.6(120) Rev.B/60 (ii) fixed 1.4.1965 as a notified date This Amending Act of 1960 was however challenged in this Court and the petitioners obtained interim orders directing the Government to stay the implementation of the ceiling law. Looking to the number of the petitions filed before this Court, the Government thought it proper not to implement the ceiling law till the clouds cast by the petitioners by preferring writ petitions and obtaining the stay orders had melted away The writ petitions were di«missed by this Court and thereafter a new notified date was fixed as 1 4.66 vide notification No F6(9) Rev.B/64 dated the February 11, 1966. The law fixed 30 standard acres of land as the ceiling area. Directions were issued vide the said notification that declaration in accordance with rule 9 of the then Ceiling Rules should be filed within six months from the notified date. These directions of the Government were, however, not carried out by the large number of the land holders and therefore a fresh notification was issued on 7.6.68 by the State Government directing all the Collectors for acquiring land from the landholders who had land in their possession in excess of 90 standard acres. Meanwhile certain amendments were brought, in Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The effect of the amendments so brought by the legislature was that it maintained the celling area to the extent of 30 standard acres but recognised certain transfers effected after 1958 which could not be recognised under the unamended law. The law was again amended in 1970 and a section 30(j) was deleted with effect from 18.8.70. The Parliament in order to avoid litigation between the State and the land holders placed, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution but that Act of the Parliament was challenged before the Supreme Court. That Act was, however, held to be valid by the Supreme Court. It is averred by the State that under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, 33171 cases were decided in accordance with the provisions of that Chapter upto 31.12.1972 prior to the commencement of the new Law i.e. the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceilings on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973. After the new law came into force as many as 8494 cases were initiated under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and they were also decided during the period commencing from 1 1 1973 to 30-6 1976 An area measuring 2,95,812 acres was declared as a surplus area upto 31.12.1972. The possession of the surplus land except the land covered by 166 cases, according to the affidavit of the office in-charge was taken possession of by the State government and distributed among the landless tenants. 3. On 1-1-1973 the Governor issued an Ordinance called the Rajasthan imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan Ordinance No. 1 of 1973). The possession of the surplus land except the land covered by 166 cases, according to the affidavit of the office in-charge was taken possession of by the State government and distributed among the landless tenants. 3. On 1-1-1973 the Governor issued an Ordinance called the Rajasthan imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan Ordinance No. 1 of 1973). By this Ordinance the old law relating to ceiling contained in Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was repealed except so far as it related to the second proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 and in sub-sec. (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance. This Ordinance prescribed entirely a new scale of ceiling area. It was published on January 1, 1973 in the Rajasthan Gazette, Extraordinary, Part-IV (Kha) dated January 1, 1973. 4. On February 23, 1973 a bill was introduced in the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly to replace the said Ordinance. This bill was published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary on February 23, 1973. In this Ordinance certain transfers made by the land holders even after the date mentioned under the old law, were recognised as valid transfers and given effect to for computing the ceiling area. It altogether changed the scheme for computing the ceiling area and instead of 30 standard acres prescribed as a ceiling area under the old law, it adopted a new scheme for determining the limits of the ceiling area. The State legislature replaced the Ordinance by enacting the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act (Act No. II of 1973) and it was published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary on March 29, 1973. This Act was given effect from 1-1-1973. The repealing sec. 40 of this Act repealed the old law as well as the Ordinance. In sub-sec. (3) of sec. 40 the Legislature made it clear that notwithstanding the repeal of the said Ordinance under sub-sec. (2) anything done or any action taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under this Act and sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General clauses Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) shall apply to such repeal and re-enactment. (2) anything done or any action taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under this Act and sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General clauses Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) shall apply to such repeal and re-enactment. By way of abundant precaution under the heading declaration sec 41 was introduced in the new Act whereby it was declared by the legislature that the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. 5 The cases of the appellants for the fixation of ceiling and declaring the surplus land were however pending before the S.D.O. concerned when the new Law came into force. In some of the cases after the new Law was promulgated various officers issued notices to the appellants under the provisions of the new Law and the Rules made thereunder, but later on these notices were withdrawn and the authorities proceeded to determine the ceiling area of the appellants under the old law presumably under the directions issued by the Board of Revenue that old ceiling cases initiated under the old law shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 even though that Chapter stood repealed by virtue of sec. 40 of the new Act. The appellants having felt aggrieved by the action by the S.D.Os. who for the purpose of the new Law were appointed as authorised officers, preferred writ petitions in this Court challenging the actions of the S.D.Os. inter alia on the ground that the S.D.Os. had no jurisdiction to proceed with the cases of the petitioners under the provisions of the old Law and prayed that notices issued by the S.D.Os. being without jurisdiction be quashed and the respond-ents be ordered not to proceed against the petitioners for the determination of their ceiling area under the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The prayer relating to the declaration of Chapter III-B as ultra vires the provisions of articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution had, however, not been pressed before us because of the emergency as Articles 14 and 19 stand suspended. The prayer relating to the declaration of Chapter III-B as ultra vires the provisions of articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution had, however, not been pressed before us because of the emergency as Articles 14 and 19 stand suspended. It is in this background that these appeals have come up before us for disposal. These appeals were heard by a division bench but looking to the importance of the questions raised herein they were referred for disposal to this special Bench of five Judges. 6. Mr. Hastimal with his usual ability and clarity argued the appeal on behalf of the appellant in civil special appeal No. 8 of 1976 with great force and the counsel appearing on behalf of other appellants adopted the argument of Mr. Hasti Mal except in the case of Mr. C.K. Garg who addressed the Court on a very limited question which shall be dealt with when we take up that question for consideration. Mr. M.B.L. Bhargava wanted to intervene and he was permitted to address the Court. He supported the claims of the appellants. Learned Advocate Genera) assisted by Dr. S.K. Tewari, has very ably supported the stand taken by the State. It will be convenient to mention the questions broadly raised by learned counsel for the parties for our decision and they are as follows :— (1) Mr. Hastimal has at the very outset urged that in view of sec. 40 of the new Law Chapter-IIIB stands totally repealed with effect from 1.1.1973 and therefore with the coming into force of 1973 Act the provisions of Chapter III-B stand completely obliterated from the statute book and therefore the provisions of the old Law cannot be made available for determining the ceiling of the surplus area of the appellants. In reply, it is contended by learned Advocate General that the rights and the liabilities accrued and incurred under sec. 30E of the old Law are saved by the operation of sec. 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act and, therefore, to that extent rights and liabilities accrued or arisen under the old Law are to be preserved and, the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act will govern the cases of the appellants. (2) Mr. Hastimal next argued that the intention of the legislature is clearly manifested by secs. 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act and, therefore, to that extent rights and liabilities accrued or arisen under the old Law are to be preserved and, the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act will govern the cases of the appellants. (2) Mr. Hastimal next argued that the intention of the legislature is clearly manifested by secs. 3, 9, 15 (2) and 19 of the new Law to show that no other law except the one contained in the new Act shall govern the proceedings relating to the computation of ceiling area of the land-holders in Rajasthan and, therefore, in view of the provisions contained in the aforesaid secs. the application of the old Act to the cases initiated before the new Act came into force, is totally ruled out. The learned Advocate General on the other hand urged that the correct reading of secs. 3. 6, 9, 15 (2) and 19 of the new Act will reveal that the legislature never intended to apply the new Law to the old cases where the rights and liabilities have accrued or incurred under secs. 30E(1) and (2) of the old Act. 7. We propose to deal with these arguments one by one. 8, It will be relevant to reproduce sec. 40 of the new Act around which the entire argument of the appellants revolves viz that Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act having been repealed by the new Act, shall stand completely obliterated f<om the statute book and it shall be taken as if it had never existed in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Sec. 40 reads as under : — "40 Repeal and savings—(1) Except as provided in second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 and in sub-section (2) of section 15 of this Act, the provisions of clause 6A of section 5 and Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) are hereby repealed except in the Rajasthan Canal Project area wherein such provisions shall stand repealed on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area. (2) The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan Ordinance 1 of 1973) is hereby repealed. (2) The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan Ordinance 1 of 1973) is hereby repealed. (3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Ordinance under sub-section (2), anything done or any action taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under this Act and section 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) shall apply to such repeal and re-enactment." 9. A cursory look on the provisions of this repealing sec shows that except as provided in second proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 and sub sec. (2) of sec. 15 all the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Tenancy Act, 1955 which governed the determination of the ceiling area under the old law, stand repealed. 10. Upto the year 1936 the general trend of the courts in India was that section 6 of the General Glauses Act would apply only to those cases where a previous law has been simply repealed but there was no fresh legislation to take its place. In the words of Sulaiman C. J. in (Firm) Danmal Parshotam Dass vs. (Firm) Babu Ram Chhote Lal (1),— "Where an old law has been merely repealed then the repeal would not affect any previous right acquired nor would it even affect a suit instituted subsequently in respect of a right previously so acquired But where there is a new law which not only repeals the old law, but is substituted in place of the old Act, section 6(e) of the Act is not applicable." 11. Placing reliance on these observations in the Allahabad case (1) Mr Hasti Mal strenuously urged before us that in the present case the old law was not only repealed by the new Act but it has been replaced by a fresh enactment and, therefore, when the Act itself does not save the rights accrued or liabilities incurred under the old law, no resort can be taken to the provisions of the old law to determine the case instituted under the old law. 12. Mr. 12. Mr. Hastimal in this connection placed reliance on the Supreme Court authorities in State of Punjab vs. Mohandir Singh Pratap Singh (2), Indira Sohanlal vs. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi (3), The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. vs. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni (4), State of Orrisa (in both the Appeals) vs. M/s. M.A. Tulloch and Co. (5), Kalawati Devi Harlalka vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (6), Qudrathulla vs. Municipal Board Bareilly (7), Qudrat Ullah vs. Municipal Board, Bareilly (8). He also cited a Bombay decision in Union of India vs. Dr. Maqsood Ahmed (9). 13. Mr Advocate General on the other hand submitted that there is lot of difference between the right created under a statute and the right acquired, and similarly a liability created and the liability incurred. Under the provisions of the old Act if the liability has been incurred by the appellants and a corresponding right has accrued to the State by virtue of the statutory provisions, namely, the provisions of sec. 30E (1) and (2) of the old law then sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act is attracted and it saves that right even though there has been a repeal of the old Act and followed by a re-enactment. In this connection reliance was placed by the learned Advocate General on various English authorities reported in Free Lanmka Insurance Co; Ltd; vs. Ranasinghe (10), R. Fisher (11), James Gardher vs. Edward A. Lucas (12), In re Athlumney vs. Ex Parte Wilson (13), Abbott vs. The Minister for Lands (l4) and Director of Public Works vs. Ho Po Sang (15). Besides these English authorities learned Advocate General quoted various observations from the Supreme Court cases reported in Moti Ram vs. Suraj Bhan (16), Kesgaven Madhava Menon vs. The State of Bombay (17), K.M.C. Lakshmarier and Sons vs. Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras (18) and the Income-tax Officer, Alleppey vs. M.C. Poonoose (19) and also tried to explain the authorities of the Supreme Court cited in his favour by Mr. Hasti Mal. According to the learned Advocate General the authorities of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mt. Hastimal do not support his case but strengthen the plea advanced by the State. Hasti Mal. According to the learned Advocate General the authorities of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mt. Hastimal do not support his case but strengthen the plea advanced by the State. 14 Before dealing with these authorities as cited by learned counsel for the parties, it will be relevant to look into the provisions of the old Act under which the State government claims that certain rights accrued to the State government and a corresponding liability was incurred by the appellants. In view of section 30-E(2) of the old Act it is argued that the provisions of clauses (c) and (e) of sub section (1) of section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act which provides that if any law is repealed then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not effect any privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege obligation, liability, fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid is attracted. The provisions of section 30E (1) and (2) have been relied upon by the State government to show that after the old Law was enacted by the legislature and section 30E in Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, was introduced therein an obligation was cast on the land holders not to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. Sub-section (2) of section 30E provides that every person, who, on such date (in this case the date is 1-4-66) is in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by acquisition under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1), shall, within six months of such date or within three months of the acquisition, as the case may be, make a report of such possession or acquisition to, and shall surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate. (1), shall, within six months of such date or within three months of the acquisition, as the case may be, make a report of such possession or acquisition to, and shall surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate. This provision according to the learned Advocate General positively creates a vested right in the State to take away the land held by the landholder in excess to his ceiling area and casts a positive obligation on the land holder not to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. According to Dr. Singhvi these two sub-sections or section 30E of the old Act create a complete right in favour of the State and a liability is incurred by the land-holder to part with the excess land. In this connection reference has been made to certain entries to be made by the land holder while making declarations under rule 9 of the 1963 Rules. On the basis of those entries, it is vehemently urged by Dr. Singhvi that the land-holder while making declaration under rule 9 knew it fully well that he was in possession of lands which were in excess of the ceiling area prescribed by the law and, therefore, a liability was incurred by him not to retain such land and he was under a statutory obligation to part with it as soon as a time prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 30E expires. Dr. Singhvi also urged that the right accrued in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 30E are not inchoate rights and, therefore, the application of sec. 6 (c) and (e) cannot be avoided. 15. The stress has been laid by Mr. Hastimal on the scheme of section 30E which, in his opinion, is not capable of any other interpretation except that sub-section (5) when read with sub-section (3) and (4) clearly manifests the intention that the land held in excess shall vest in the State government only when such land has been either surrendered by the land-holder under sub-section (2) of section 30E or the landholder after he was declared a trespasser under sub-section (4) was ejected therefrom. It is only in these circumstances that the surplus land so determined under the old Law shall vest in the State government, and therefore, State government cannot claim any vested right in such surplus land unless it came to the State. According to Mr. Hasti Mal any rights claimed by the State under section 30E(2) are only inchoate rights which are not saved by section 6(c) and (e) of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act. 16. It will be relevant to reproduce here the section 30E of the old Law :— "30 E—Maximum land that can be held and restriction on future acquisitions :— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall as from a date notified by the State Government in this behalf— (a) continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or (b) acquire, by purchase, gift, mortgage, assignment, lease, surrender or otherwise or by devolution or bequest, any land so as to effect an increase in the extent of his holding over the ceiling area applicable to him; Provided that different dates may be so notifled for different areas of the State. (2) Every person, who, on such date, is in possession of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by acquisition under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall, within six months of such date or within three months of acquisition, as the case may be, make a report of such possession or acquisition to, and shall surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of, the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate. Provided that if any person holding or acquir ing land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him holds land in more than one Tehsil he shall have the option to choose which of the lands held by him in different Tehsils should be surrendered so as to leave with him the land upto the ceiling area applicable to him; Provided further that the option afforded by the foregoing provision shall be subject to the limitation that, where the person surrendering excess land under this sub-section holds lands, of which some are encumbered and some are not encumbered, the unencumbered lands, shall so far as may be, be surrendered in preference to encumbered lands. (3) Any person failing intentionally to make a report or to surrender land as required by subsection (2) shall, on conviction, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (4) Without prejudice and in addition such conviction and fine the person retaining possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him shall be deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from such excess land and To pay penalty in accordance with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 183; Provided that the lands, from which a person shall be so ejected shall, as far as may be, be unencumbered lands. (5) All lands coming to the State Government be surrender under sub-section (2) or by ejectment under sub-section (4) shall vest in it free from all encumbrances. (6) Nothing contained in this section shall operate as against the transferor to the extent his transfers are recognised under section 30 DD." 17. A close scrutiny of the provisions of section 30E will show that after the dafe notified by the State government a land-holder can neither continue to hold nor retain possession in any capacity and under any tenure the land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. This provision of law undoubtedly creates a liability on the land-holder to part with a land which in the eye of law is surplus in his hands. This provision of law undoubtedly creates a liability on the land-holder to part with a land which in the eye of law is surplus in his hands. Subsection (2) also cast an unqualified obligation on the land-holder to part with the excess land within the period of six months and if he has acquired the land after the Act came into force then to surrender that land within three months from the date of the acquisition and to place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar. The penal consequences have been provided under sub-section (3). If any person failing intentionally to make report or surrender the land as required by subsection (2) shall on conviction be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/-. Sub-section (4) lays down that without prejudice and in addition to such conviction as mentioned in sub-section (3) if any person was found to retain possession of any land in excess of ceiling area then he will be deemed to be a trespasser and liable to ejectment from such excess land. It may be mentioned here that though under the definition of a trespasser as given in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the land-holder till the land is vested in the government under subsection (5) of section 30E may not come within the mischief of the term trespasser yet the legislature by a fiction of law as contained in sub-section (4) provided that he will be deemed to be a trespasser and he will be liable to ejectment treating him as a trespasser in his own land which has not till then vested in the State government. Sub section (5) deals with the vesting of the surplus area in the government and it says that all the lands coming to the State Govern-ment by surrender under sub section (2) or by ejectment under subsection (4) shall vest in it free from all encumbrances. The vesting clause no doubt makes it clear that till the land is factually surrendered or the land-holder has been actually ejected from such excess land treating him to be a trespasser under sub sec. (4) the land of the landholder shall not vest in the Government but sub-sec. (5) in our opinion is not very relevant to determine the rights of the State accrued under sub sec. (4) the land of the landholder shall not vest in the Government but sub-sec. (5) in our opinion is not very relevant to determine the rights of the State accrued under sub sec. (1) of sec 30E and the obligation cast on the land-holder to part with his surplus land under sub-sec. (2) of the said section. 18. In the light of these provisions of law we have now to examine whether the rights under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 30E claimed to have been created in favour of the State really accrued to the State and the obligation cast under subsection (2) of section 30E has been really incurred by the laud-holder. 19. A vested right as distinguished from the contingent right has a positive connotation and it is to be seen whether its enjoyment is presently conferred, or is postponed to some future date. In other words an interest is vested when there is an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present right of future enjoyment. In Sashi Kantha Acharjee vs. Promode Chandra Roy (20) the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in this connection observed as follows:— "An estate or interest is contingent if the right of enjoyment is made to depend upon some even or condition which may or may not happen on be performed, or if in the case of a gift to take effect in future, it cannot be ascertained in the meantime whether there will be any one to take the gift; in other words, an estate or interest is contingent when the light of enjoyment is to accrue, on an event which is dubious or uncertain And as regards certainty, the law does not regard as uncertain the event of a person attaining a given age or of the death of somebody beyond which his enjoyment is postponed, because if he lives long enough the event is sure to happen." 20. This authority lays down that if the interest does not depend upon some event or condition which may or may not happen or be performed then the interest or right is called the vested right meaning thereby that when there is an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present right of future enjoyment, then, such a right shall be deemed to have accrued to the person who claims that right. If this doctrine of present right of future enjoyment is applied to the case of the appellants then it becomes clear that in the case under the Ceiling Act the State government acquires in the surplus land from the date the Chapter III B was introduced in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 but the enjoyment thereof was to be postponed to some future date when all other statutory formalities necessary for the determination of the Ceiling area by the competent authority are over. 21. This very principle as laid down by the Calcutta High Court, has been accepted by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in Sree Chand Sowcar vs. T. Kasichetty (21) 22. In Venugopala Reddiar vs. Krishnaswami Reddiar alias Raja Chidambara Reddiar (22) a suit was instituted in 1932 in British India with respect to properties situate in British India and also in Burma, After the Burma was separated from India by the Constitution Act of 1937, a question was raised before the learned Judges of the Federal Court whether suit relating to the properties situated in Burma could he continued in British India even though Burma was separated from India. The learned Judges held that a right to continue a duly instituted suit is in the nature of a vested right and it cannot be taken away except by a clear indication of intention to that effect. In the absence of such a clear indication in the Constitution Act. a British Indian Court continues to have jurisdiction to proceed with trial of a suit already pending before it even with respect to properties situated in Burma. In this case the right to continue a suit duly instituted has been recognised by the court as a vested right. 23 In Rajesh Kanta Roy vs. Smt. Shanti Debi (23) a question came before the Supreme Court whether the interest of the sons who acquired certain rights in the properties left by their father under a registered trust deed were contin-gent or vested. 23 In Rajesh Kanta Roy vs. Smt. Shanti Debi (23) a question came before the Supreme Court whether the interest of the sons who acquired certain rights in the properties left by their father under a registered trust deed were contin-gent or vested. Learned Judges decided this question by saying that if the discharge of the debts under the trust was an uncertain event in the sense that neither the factum nor the time of such discharge was such that could be predicated with any certainty, and since the interest which A and B took was to be only after such a discharge, their respective interests therein were contingent. While considering other factors which by no means were uncertain, their Lordships said that the certain events which are bound to take place cannot involve an element of contingency. 24 On the basis of these observations of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court, the Advocate General asserted that there was nothing uncertain in this matter while determining the surplus area in the hands of the land-holder as every relevant factor had already taken place and, therefore, the rights of the State under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) are accrued rights and the duties to be discharged under sub sec. (2) of Sec. 30E is nothing but a liability incurred by the land-holder Another Supreme Court authority in Garikapati Veeraya vs. Subbiah Choudhary (24) the question raised before the Supreme Court was whether the right of appeal is a vested right or not and their Lordships held that when the suit was instituted if the right of appeal resided in the parties thereto at the date of institution then subsequent change in the law shall not have the effect of divesting the parties of such a vested right. 25. Dr. Singhvi went to the extent in making his submission that if the right created in favour of the State by the statute under sec. 30E (1) (a) without a right which really vested in the State even then such a right cannot be taken away by a subsequent legislation and on the basis of such inchoate right the State could claim protection under sec. 6(c) and (e) of the General Clauses Act We regret we cannot accept this wide contention of learned Advocate General. This question whether sec. 6(c) and (e) of the General Clauses Act We regret we cannot accept this wide contention of learned Advocate General. This question whether sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act protects the inchoate right or not under the repealed law, has been elaborately discussed by the Punjab High Court in Risaldar Major Amar Singh Uttam Singh vs. R.L. Aggarwal (25). Justice Tek Chand has dealt with this question very elaborately and has observed : "The next argument which may be examined relates to the effect of an unqualified repeal of a statute. It is well settled rule of interpretation, that an unqualified repeal of a statute, conferring civil rights or powers, operates to deprive the citizen of all such rights or powers which at the time of the repeal are inchoate, incomplete or unperfected or which have not accused or become vested. Of course, rights which have become vested, are not extinguished in the absence of express words to that effect and construction of a statutes is always avoided, where the result would be to impair contracts or vested rights, and for this purpose, a repealing statute would not be given a retrospective operation, If the rights acquired under a repealed Act has not developed into a jus in rem and has not yet fully not having progressed beyond an inchoative state, it cannot survive the repealed Act, and must fail with it, unless expressly saved. The distinction between a jus in rem a right in a thing which implies an absolute dominion, and a jus ad rem a light to a thing which signifies an imperfect right, assumes considerable importance in relation to survival, when the statute under which such a right has been created in unconditionally repealed." 26 In E.D. Sasoon and Company Ltd. vs. Comrnr. of Income-tax, Bombay City (26) a question arose in an income-tax master whether the income which has not been received by the assessee should be assessed and in that connection a point was raised that at a stage when the income becomes assessable it connotes a character of the income which is more or less inchoate. The learned Judges relying on a Calcutta case reported in Rogers Pratt Shellac Company vs. Secretary of State (27), observed : "It is clear therefore that income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt of the same. The learned Judges relying on a Calcutta case reported in Rogers Pratt Shellac Company vs. Secretary of State (27), observed : "It is clear therefore that income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt of the same. If the assessee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on its being ascertained. The basic conception is that he must have acquired a right to receive the income. There must be a debt owed to him by some body. There must be as is otherwise expressed debitum in presenti. solvendum in future see WS Try Ltd. vs. Johnson 19 6)1. All E.R. 532 at page 539 (T) and Webo vs. Stenton (1883) 11 QBD 518 at page 522 and 527 (U). Unless and until there is created in favour of the assessee a debt due by somebody it cannot be said that he has acquired a right to receive he income or that income has accrued to him......". 27. In the light of these observations we may now proceed to examine whether provisions of sec. 30-E(1)(a) and 30E(2) created a vested right in the surplus land which may be quantified in accordance with the provisions of the Act at a later date, in favour of the State or whether these provisions created only the rights to the property viz. the jus in rem It is true that on the date when the declaration was to be filed by the land-holder under rule 9 of the old Rules it could not in all cases be said what exact area of the land shall ultimately be surrendered as a surplus land by the 1 nd-holder to the State but it hardly makes any difference and has little relevance to de ermine the question whether the rights created in favour of the State under sec 30E of the old Law were rights accrued or vested right. The procedure to finally determine the quantum of the surplus area is given in the statute and the rules made thereunder but this procedure hardly affects the rights created in favour of the State. The procedure to finally determine the quantum of the surplus area is given in the statute and the rules made thereunder but this procedure hardly affects the rights created in favour of the State. As soon as the exact amount of surplus land is determined by taking resort to the procedure laid down in the old Act or the rules made thereunder that would enable the land-holder to pass on the possession of such surplus land to the State Government but that right of the Government to take such land would relate back to the point of time when the right was actually created by the law in favour of the State. In our opinion the right under sec 30E(1)(a) and 30E(2) vest in the State when the period prescribed under sub-sec.(2) of sec. 30E to surrender the surplus land is over because it is a statutory obligation for the landholder to surrender the surplus land to the State. If the landholder like an honest citizen acts in the manner prescribed by the law then there is no difficulty for him to find out the surplus land in his hand and to surrender the same to the Tehsildar. However if it is not done by the land-holder then the competent authority has a power under the statute to determine the excess land possessed by the land-holder after the declaration made by him under rule 9 of the old Rules. The theory of relating back would undoubtedly be attracted when the question of the right of the State in the surplus land is to be determined. 28. Our views are fortified by the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 30E of the old Act wherein it has been laid down that a person retaining possession of any land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him, shall be deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from such excess land. In the scheme of this section sub-sec. (4) makes the land holder by virtue of a legal fiction a trespasser in respect of the excess land even though such a land had not vested in the State under the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of the said section. In the scheme of this section sub-sec. (4) makes the land holder by virtue of a legal fiction a trespasser in respect of the excess land even though such a land had not vested in the State under the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of the said section. If a person is by virtue of the deeming clause is to be declared a trespasser then he will assume that character of being a trespasser not from the date when such a declaration has been made but he will be treated as a trespasser right from the date when that person un-authorisedly retained the possession of the land in excess of ceiling area after a declaration under rule 9 of the old law was made by him. It is not necessary that on the day of the filing of the declaration the computation of the excess land is factually completed. It is true that till the land-holder surrenders or is ejected from the surplus land it does not vest in the State (see sub-sec. 5 of sec. 30E) and till then according to Mr. Hastimal the land-holder remains the Khatedar of such land even though it may be found in excess of the ceiling area. But this assertion of Mr. Hastimal is hardly of any avail to the landholder when by virtue of a legal fiction introduced by the legislature in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 30-E of the old Act he can be decla-red a trespasser in his own land and that he would be a trespasser in respect of such surplus land since the date when he should have surrendered the same to the State after making a declaration under Rule 9 of the Rules. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the obligation not to retain land in excess of the ceiling area arises from the time prescribed under sub sec. (2) of sec. 30E of the old Act and from that date the rights of the State are perfected and cannot therefore be called inchoate right. The land-holder also incurs a liability to part with the land and to surrender it to the Tehsildar under the provisions of the law on the expiry of the period mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 30E. 30E of the old Act and from that date the rights of the State are perfected and cannot therefore be called inchoate right. The land-holder also incurs a liability to part with the land and to surrender it to the Tehsildar under the provisions of the law on the expiry of the period mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 30E. Such rights of the State which have accrued to it and the liability of the land holder incurred under the statute shall be governed by the provisions of clauses (c) and (e) of sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act. 29. The matter may also be viewed from another angle. The pending proceedings partake the nature of an investigation into a claim. The State was not trying to take any advantage under the old Law. That advantage had accrued to the State by the legislation i.e. by sec. 30E(1). That section was nothing but a mandate that no landholder shall, as from the notified date, continue to hold or retain in his possession in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or acquire, by purchase, gift, mortgage, assignment, lease, surrender or otherwise or by devolution or bequest, any land so as to effect an increase in the extent of his holding over the ceiling area applicable to him. There was a liability imposed under sec. 30E(2) on the landholders to surrender their surplus lands within six months of the notified date or three months of the acquisition. The State acquired a corresponding right to enforce that liability. The land-holders filled in their returns in form IV claiming that they were entitled to retain lands in excess of the ceiling area on the ground that the lands fell within any of the exempted classes under sec. 30J, or that the transfers effected by them should be taken into account because they were permitted transfers under sec. 30DD. At the time of repeal, the pending cases necessarily involved an investigation into these claims. The repeal of the old law does not affect such investigation under sec 6(e) of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act, and the investigation into the claims made by the land-holders had still to be adjudicated upon. For without such investigation and adjudication, there could be no quantification of the ceiling area of the land-holders in these pending cases. The repeal of the old law does not affect such investigation under sec 6(e) of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act, and the investigation into the claims made by the land-holders had still to be adjudicated upon. For without such investigation and adjudication, there could be no quantification of the ceiling area of the land-holders in these pending cases. Lord Morris in delivering the judgment of their Lordships in Director of Public Works vs. Ho Po Sang (15) observed : "It may be, therefore, that, under some repealed enactment, a right has been given but that, in respect of it, some investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is then unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. But there is a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether some right should or should not be given. On a repeal, the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The letter is not." 30. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had a similar problem in Free Lanka Insurance Co., Ltd vs. Ranasinghe (10) where the Ceylon Motor Ordinance of 1938 was repealed and replaced by the Ceylon Motor Traffic Act, 1951. The Act of 1951 contained no transitional provision designed to preserve rights or claims originating under the Ordinance of 1938, but by the Ceylon Interpretation Ordinance of 1900, S. 6(3)(b) which is analogous to sec. 6(c) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, the repeal was not to affect any right acquired under the repealed law Lord Evershedi in delivering the judgment of their Lordships observed that the claimant had "acquired a right" in respect of a third party insurance, which was something more than a mere hope or expectation. He further observed that he hid in truth as against the insurer a "right" within the contemplation of sec. 6 (3)(b) of the Interpretation Ordinance, although that right might fairly be called inchoate or contingent. The Privy Council quoted with approval the observations of Lord Morris in Director of Public Works vs. Ho Po Sang (15). Their Lordships stated that if, under some repealed enactment, a right has been given but that, in respect to it, some investigation or legal proceeding is necessary, then the right is unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. Their Lordships stated that if, under some repealed enactment, a right has been given but that, in respect to it, some investigation or legal proceeding is necessary, then the right is unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. That is precisely the case here. 31. Mr. Garg appearing on behalf of some of the appellants urged that the old Law was factually repealed by the Ordinance of 1973 and not by the new law. According to him when the new law (Act No. 11 of 1973) got the assent of the President the old law was not actually holding the field and, therefore, sec. 40 which no doubt speaks about the repeal of the old Law does not repeal the old Law but factually the old Law shall be deemed to have been repealed by the Ordinance and not by the Act of 1973. Therefore according to Mr. Garg resort to provision of section 6 of General Glauses Act cannot be taken by the State of keep the rights, if any, under the old Law intact. This argument was further developed by Mr. Bhargava who was allowed to intervene. 32. While giving the history of the legislation on the ceiling law we have mentioned the dates on which the different statutes came in to force. It is true that the Ordinance (Ordinance 1 of 1973) came into force on 1.1.1973 and it had the effect of repealing the old Law (Chapter III-B in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955), but thereafter when the new Law (Act No. 11/1973) was enacted by the legislature, it purposely made it affective retrospectively so as to come into force from 1.1.1973. It is by fiction of law that it shall be deemed that on 1-1-1973 the new Law was on the statute Book and for all intent and purposes it was in force on 1-1-1973 In this view of the matter sec. 40 of the new Act has the effect of repealing both the old Law as well as the Ordinance. It is on account of the legal fiction that the legislature enacted the new Law with effect from 1-1-1973 and therefore it is difficult for us to accept the contention of Mr. Garg and Mr. Bhargava that the old law was repealed by the Ordinance and not by the new Act. It is on account of the legal fiction that the legislature enacted the new Law with effect from 1-1-1973 and therefore it is difficult for us to accept the contention of Mr. Garg and Mr. Bhargava that the old law was repealed by the Ordinance and not by the new Act. This argument of learned counsel is based on misconception of the position of the new Law. Sec. 40 (1) makes it abundantly clear that the new Act repealed the old Law except the two provision which were to hold the field for a limited purposes mentioned in that sub-section. The new Act shall for all purposes be deemed to be in force on 1-1 73 and the only purpose of the Ordinance left after the new Act was given retrospective effect by the legislature would be that anything done or any action taken or any rule made under such Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under the new Act. As a matter of abundant precaution the legislature also mentioned that sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 shall apply to such repeal and re-enactment. In view of this history traced out hereinabove of the Ordinance as well as of the new Law it leaves no room for doubt for us to hold that the old Law though repealed by the Ordinance on 1.1.73 shall be ultimately taken to have been nationally repealed by the new Law, as it was made effective retrospectively with effect from 1-1-73. In view of the notional repeal of the old Law by the Act of 1973, the application of sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be ruled out. 33. It was next urged by Mr. Hastimal, Mr. Garg and Mr. Bhargava that sub-sec. (3) of sec. 40 of the Act of 1973, which applies sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act to the action taken under the repealed Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been taken under the new Law, makes it clear that the Legislature never intended to apply sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act, otherwise it should have provided specifically in the new Law like sec. 40(3) for the application of sec. 6 to safeguard the rights and liabilities accrued or incurred under the old law. In other words it is argued by Mr. 6 of the General Glauses Act, otherwise it should have provided specifically in the new Law like sec. 40(3) for the application of sec. 6 to safeguard the rights and liabilities accrued or incurred under the old law. In other words it is argued by Mr. Hastimal that the specific mention of the application of sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act by implication rules out the proposition that the rights accrued and liability incurred under the old Law were saved by she application of sec. 6 of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act. According to him if that had been the intention of the legislature then the legislature would have expressly mentioned the application of sec. 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. The learned Advocate General while meeting this argument, urged that the application of sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act to such repeal and re-enactment itself shows that the legislature was conscious of the fact that it wanted to save only those things which were done or action taken under the Ordinance and not under the old Law. According to Dr. Singhvi it was necessary to save the action taken under the Ordinance because of the peculiar circumstances prevailing in these cases The Ordinance came into force on 1-1-73 and repealed the old Law, but the new Law later on was enforced from that very day the Ordinance came into force and replaced the Ordinance from the very day when the Ordinance saw the light of the day and, therefore, it became necessary for the legislature to save certain actions taken under the Ordinance till factually the new Law was enacted. Dr. Singhvi is correct when he argues that if the legislature wanted to save the action taken under the old law as if it was taken under the new Law then the provision similar to sec. 40(3) would have been incorporated in Ordinance itself when the old Law was repealed by it, but it was not done by the legislature which throws considerable light on the intention of the legislature that it never wanted actions taken under the old Law to be treated as if such actions were taken under the Ordinance. Non-mentioning of the application of sec. Non-mentioning of the application of sec. 5 of the General Clauses Act, therefore, in these circumstances cannot be interpreted to mean that the legislature wanted to rule out its application to the rights and liabilities created and incurred under the old Law. 34. Mr. Advocate General vehemently urged that the word such used in subsection (3) of section 40 before the word repeal throws light on the intention of the legislature. According to him the word such applies to the repeal of the Ordinance alone. Sub-section (3) of section 40 undoubtedly deals with the action taken and things done and rules made under the Ordinance which have been saved by the legis-lature as things done, action taken and rules made under the new Law. It is by way of abundant precaution that the legislature applied the provisions of section 27 of he Rajasthan General Glauses Act, 1955 to "such repeal". It may be reiterated that while enacting Ordinance No. 1 of 1973, which repealed the old Law, the legislature did not provide that things done and action taken and rules made under the old Law should be deemed to have been done, taken or made under the Ordinance and, therefore, in this light if the words "such repeal" are properly interpreted, then it leaves no room for doubt to hold that the legislature wanted only to save the things done, action taken and rules made under the Ordinance as if they were taken, done and made under the new Law. It may also be mentioned that the scope of sec. 27 of the Rajastthan General Clauses Act is wider than what has been saved by the first portion of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 40 and, therefore, the legislature in order to clarify the situation beyond doubt, thought it proper to mention in sub sec. (3) of sec. 40 of the new Act the application of sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act to such repeal or re-enactment so as to save the actions taken, things done and rules made under the Ordinance as if they were taken, done and made under the new Law. In these circumstances it cannot be said that application of sec. 27 impliedly ousts the application of sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act to the new Law. We regret we cannot accept the proposition of law as canvassed by Mr. Garg, Mr. In these circumstances it cannot be said that application of sec. 27 impliedly ousts the application of sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act to the new Law. We regret we cannot accept the proposition of law as canvassed by Mr. Garg, Mr. Hastimal and Mr. Bhargava. 35. It is in the light of the aforesaid discussions that we propose to scrutinise the effect of the repeal of the old Law by the new Act. 36. Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act though it has been specifically mentioned in the repeal act or not, will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intension appears. In Mohar Singhs case (2) on which considerable stress has been laid by Mr. Hastimal, the Supreme Court while dealing elaborately with the effect of repeal, his observed : — "In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The Court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Sec. 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course, the consequences laid down in S. 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. Of course, the consequences laid down in S. 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application when a statute, which i of a temporary nature automatically expires by afflux of time." 37. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohar Singhs case (2) have been consistently followed in subsequent cases referred to above and relied upon by both the parties. The old doctrine of extinguishing or effecting the repealed law for all purposes and intent except for the acts past and closed has now given way to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mohar Singhs case. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition pressed before us by Mr. Hastimal that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is a repeal of the enact-ment followed by a fresh legislation. In this connection stress has been laid by Mr. Hastimal in support of the above argument on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bishambhar Nath Kohli vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (28). In that case section 58(3) was introduced in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. While dealing with the scope of section 58 (3) in the background of the provisions of sec 6 of the General Glauses Act, 1897 which is analogous to sec 6 of the Raj, Act, their Lordships observed— "This provision appears to have been enacted with a view to avoid the possible application of the rule of interpretation that where a statute expires or is repealed, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, it is regarded as having never existed except as to matters and transactions past and closed. This rule was altered by an omnibus provision in the General Clauses Act relating to the effect of repeal of statutes by any Central Act or Regulation. This rule was altered by an omnibus provision in the General Clauses Act relating to the effect of repeal of statutes by any Central Act or Regulation. But the rule contained in S. 6 applies only if a different intention does not appear; and by enacting S. 58(3) the Parliament has expressed a different intention, for whereas the General Clauses Act keeps alive the previous operation of the enactment repealed, and things done and duly suffered, the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities acquired or incurred, and authorises the investigation, legal proceeding and remedies in respect of rights, privileges, obligation, liabilities, penalties, forfeiture and punishment, as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. Sec. 58(3) directs that things done or actions taken in exercise of the power conferred by the repealed statutes shall be deemed to be done or taken under the repealing Act as if that latter Act were in force on the day on which such thine was done or action was taken. The rule so enunciated makes a clear departure from the rule enunciated in S. 6 of the General Glauses Act." 88. Further discussing that scope of section 58 (3) the learned Judges also observed "By the first part of S. 58 (3) which in terms negative, the previous operation of the repealed statutes survives the repeal Thereby matters and transactions past and closed remain operative so does the previous operation of the repealed statutes The previous law stands repealed, and it has not for the future the partial operation as is prescribed by S. 6 of the General Clauses Act All things done and actions taken under the repealed statute are deemed to be done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under the repealing Act, as if that Act were in force on the day on which that thing was done or action was taken. The previous operation of the statute repealed was also affirmed expressly, but things done or actions taken under the repealed statute are to be deemed by fiction to have been done or taken under the repealing Act. The previous operation of the statute repealed was also affirmed expressly, but things done or actions taken under the repealed statute are to be deemed by fiction to have been done or taken under the repealing Act. The use of the expression subject thereto (underlining is ours in the commencement of the positive part of S. 38 (3) cannot attribute to the previous operation of the repealed statute an overriding affect so as to deprive the authorities constituted under the repealing Act of their power to entertain appeals or revision applications, which they posses by the express enactment that the acts done or actions taken are deemed to have been done under the statutes." 39. If we carefully peruse the provisions of sec. 58(3) in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 it will be clear that it had the effect of saving the things done or actions taken under the repealed statutes, as if such action is taken and things done under the repealing Act. This was held by the learned Judges on account of the fiction introduced in sec. 58(3) itself. We do not find a parallel provision in the new Act of 1973 which has repealed Chapter III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 and, therefore, the observations of their Lordships in Bishambhar Naths case (27) cannot be availed of to water down the principles of law laid down by their lordships in Mahor Singhs case (2). In our opinion this ruling hardly helps the contention of the appellants. 40. Having carefully gone through all the authorities cited by the parties as referred to above, we are of opinion that the new Act of 1973 does not have the sweeping effect of destroying all the rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the old Law. The law, as has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohar Singhs case (2) and consistently followed in the later judgments, clearly establish that the repeal of an Act followed by re-enactment does not automatically wash away the rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the repealed law unless a contrary intention appears in the repealing law. We have, therefore, to examine whether the new Law has expressly or otherwise manifests an intention to wipe out or sweep away those rights and liabilities which had accrued and incurred under the old Law. We have, therefore, to examine whether the new Law has expressly or otherwise manifests an intention to wipe out or sweep away those rights and liabilities which had accrued and incurred under the old Law. It is from this point of view that we will now proceed to look into the second contention of the parties. 41. The next argument of the appellants is that the provisions of the new Act clearly manifest the intention that after the passing of the new Act, it is only the Act of 1973 that will govern the proceedings regarding the fixation of ceiling and the surplus area and no other law will hold the field in that matter. The first point advanced in this direction is that the repealing clause of section 40 itself indicates that except as provided in second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 and in sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act, the provisions of clause (6A) of sec. 5 and Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) stand repealed On the strength of this provision of 1973 Act all the learned counsel, who addressed the Court on behalf of the appellants, went on to assort that the provisions of the old Act which have been repealed by the new Act cannot be used for any other matter except for two matters, namely, when the question is to be determined under the second proviso to section 4 of the new Act or when the old cases were reopened under section 15 within 3 years from the commencement of the new Act, and if authorities come to the conclusion that the ceiling area, as determined under the old law, was in contravention of the provisions of the repealed law (old law) then the case when reopened shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the old Law. 42. When section 40(1) is read with the second proviso to section 4(1) and sec. 42. When section 40(1) is read with the second proviso to section 4(1) and sec. 15(2) of the new Act, no doubt is left in our mind that the legislature was conscious of the fact that such a provision was to safeguard the policy of the new law that the ceiling area which was prescribed under the old law should firstly be reduced and if the ceiling area determined under the provisions of section 4 of the new Law exceeds the ceiling area as determined under the provisions of the old Law then the area determi-ned under the old Law shall prevail and to that extent the proceedings taken under the old law shall not be given a go-bye because such a provision was found necessary to be introduced in the new law so that the legislature could stick to its policy mentioned in the statement of objects and reasons that the disparity in the holdings of the agricultural land be reduced and the ceiling area be re-fixed in such a manner that most of agricultural lands be made available for the distribution to landless persons. The legislature by enacting this provision in section 10(1) of the new Act never meant to do away with the provisions of the old Law in respect of such rights as were accrued or liabilities incurred under the old Law which were automatically protected after the repeal of the old Law by virtue of section 7(c) and (e) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. The only purpose for incorporating this provision was to see that if under the scheme of the new Act the land-holder gets a larger ceiling area then what he could have otherwise got if his ceiling area had been determined under the old Law then in that event legislature wanted to reduce that ceiling area and it is only for this purpose that the the first portion of sec 40(10) was introduced in the enactment. From this provision of the law it is difficult to inter that by introducing this provision in the new law the legislature intended that old law cannot be used for any other purpose except the one mentioned in sec. 40(1) of the 1973 Act. 43. From this provision of the law it is difficult to inter that by introducing this provision in the new law the legislature intended that old law cannot be used for any other purpose except the one mentioned in sec. 40(1) of the 1973 Act. 43. As regards the application of the old Law in cases re-opened under section 15 of the new Act, it is obvious that it is only an enabling section which empowers the authorities under the Act to determine the ceiling area in accordance with the provisions of the old Law. It is but natural that if the ceiling area had once been determined by the authorities under the provisions of the old Law and if for one reason and the other, case is re opened under section 15 of the new Act then it is in all fairness that such a determination must be made in accordance with the provisions of the old ceiling law which were employed while determining the ceiling area. This provision, therefore, does not throw any light on the intention of the legislature and it cannot be said that the legislature by introducing section 15(2) in the Act wanted to rule out the application of section 6(c) and (e) of the General Glauses Act. We, therefore, do not find any substance in this argument either. 44. On the contrary, there is internal evidence in the Act to show that the pending cases have to be governed by the old Law Section 15 (2), inserted by Act No. 8 of 1976, supports that construction It runs thus : "(2) Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act, 3 of 1955), if the State Government, after calling for the record or otherwise, is satisfied that any final order passed in any matter arising under the provisions repealed by sec. 40, is in contravention of such repealed provisions and that such order is prejudicial to the State Government or that on account of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which has since come to its notice, such order is required to be re-opened, it may, at any time within five years of the commencement of this Act, direct any officer subordinate to it to re-open such decided matter and to decide it afresh in accordance with such repealed provisions." 45. The opening words of the section "without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Act No 3 of 1955)" clearly show that the pending cases have to be governed by the old Law. If transactions past and closed have to be reopened and decided afresh under the provisions of the repealed law, and the ceiling area under chapter III of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 has to the fixed under its repealed provisions, then it must follow as a necessary corollary, that the pending cases must be decided under the old law. 46. Referring to sections 3, 6, 9 and 19 it has been Vehemently urged that sections 3, 6 and 9 start with a non obstente clause which clearly throws light on the intention of the legislature that the legislature wanted to give an overriding effect of the provisions of the new law over all other laws then in force. Section 3 reads as follows:— "3 Act to override other laws, contract etc. —The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a court or other authority." 47. On the basis of the language of this Section it was vehemently argued that the rights and liabilities created under the old Law, even if saved by the application of the provisions of section 6 (c) and (e) of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act, cannot be determined in the pending cases in accordance with the provisions of the old Law, as the new Law has an overriding effect on all such laws which were for the time being in force and as the old Law was in force for the time being it cannot be used because of the language of Section 3 of the new law. It was also urged that section 3 Starts with a non-obstente Clause viz. "Not withstanding anything inconsistent constrained in any other law for the time being in force", which makes the intention of the legislature Clear beyond doubt that the legislature wanted no other law, except the new law, to gurged the rights and the liabilities of the landholder vis-a-vis the State. "Not withstanding anything inconsistent constrained in any other law for the time being in force", which makes the intention of the legislature Clear beyond doubt that the legislature wanted no other law, except the new law, to gurged the rights and the liabilities of the landholder vis-a-vis the State. It is further urged that the land holders had no doubt filed their declarations under rule 9 of the Rules of 1963 but such declarations cannot escape overriding effect of section 3 and, therefore, after the new Law had come into force the ceiling of the land holders shall be determined in accordance only with the provisions of the new Law. In support of this contention reliance has been placed by Mr. Hastimal on Chief Inspector of Mine a vs. Karam Chand Thapar (29), South India Corpo-ration (P) Ltd vs. Secretary, Board of Revenue (30), A.V. Fernandez vs. The State of Kerala (31), Kumaon Motor Owner Union Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (32). While referring to the recent fall bench decision of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Rahim vs. Amma Bar (33) Mr. Hastimal urged that this judgement applies on ail fours and it being a judgment of a Full Bench of thtat Court, it should be looked into with great respect. 48. Dr. Laxmi Mal Singhvi, on the other hand, urged that the expression law for the time being in force does not include within its ambit the law deemed to be in force and, therefore, the non absente clause of section 3 will not have an overriding effect on the old Law, which, under the circumstances of this case was not factually in force on the day the new Law came into force, but on account of the fiction of law the old Law shall be deemed to be in force and, therefore, the application of old Law for the determination of the ceiling area cannot be ruled out because of the language of sec. 3 of the new Law. 49. In the Chief Inspector of Mines and vs. Karam Chand Thapar etc. (29), the appellants were held guilty under sections 73 and 74 of the Mines Act for the contravention of some regulations which were not in force on the date of their contravention. 3 of the new Law. 49. In the Chief Inspector of Mines and vs. Karam Chand Thapar etc. (29), the appellants were held guilty under sections 73 and 74 of the Mines Act for the contravention of some regulations which were not in force on the date of their contravention. It is true that those regulations were deemed to be in force under the 1952 Act, but their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that this position did not in any way affect the case of the appellant, as the regulations were factually in force on the alleged date of contravention. While arriving at this conclusion their Lordships clarified the observations nude by them in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs. The State of Vindhya Pradesh (34), who was convicted for an offence which was actually not an offence on the date he was convicted, While discussing the doctrine contained in Article 20 of the Constitution, it was observed by the learned Judges,— "This however would be to import a some what technical meaning into the phase law in force used in Art. 20. Law in force referred to therein must be taken to relate not to a law "deemed to be in force", and thus brought into force but the law factually in operation at the time of what may be called the then existing law............ It cannot therefore be doubted that the phrase "law in force" as used in Art. 20 must be under stood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at the time of commission of the offence as distinct from the law "deemed" to have become operative by virtue of power of legislature to pass retrospective laws." 50. In A.V. Fernandez vs. The State of Kerala (31) the effect of the non-obstente clause was discussed by the learned Judges and it was observed;— "It should first be ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and the non obstente clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws which is inconsistent with the new enactment." 51. In South India Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Secretary, Board of Revenue (30) the scope of the non-obstente clause, as used in Article 278 of the Constitution, came up for the consideration of the Supreme Court and their Lordships said : — "The phrase "notwithstanding anything in the Constitution" is equivalent to saying that in spite of the other articles of the Constitution, or that the other articles shall not be an impediment to the operation of Art 278 While Art. 372 is subject to Art. 278, Art. 273 operates in its own sphere inspite of Art. 372. The result is that Art 278 overrides Art. 372, that is to say; notwithstanding the fact that a pre-Constitution taxation law continues in force under Art 372, the Union and the State Government can enter into an agreement in terms of Art. 278 in respect of Part B States depriving the State law of its efficacy. In one view Art. 277 excludes the operation of Art. 372, and in the other view, an agreement in terms of Art. 278 overrides Art. 372. In either view, the result is the same,namely, that at any rate during the period covered by the agreement entered into between the President of India and the Rajpramukh of the State of Travancore-Cochin dated 25.2.1950 the State ceased to have any power to impose the tax in respect of "words contracts" under the T.C. General Sales Tax Act (1125 M. E.)" 52. In Kumaon Motor Owners Union Ltd. and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (32) the point for consideration was whether in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other them this Act. There was definitely certain apparent conflict between section 48 on the one hand and section 68-B of the Motor Vehicles Act read with section 6(4) of the Defence of India Act on the other hand and that conflict had to be resolved. While considering the arguments of both the paries their Lordships resolved the conflict by making the following observations :— "The only way to do it is to decide whether in such situation S. 43 of the Act will prevail Sec. 68-B of the Motor Vehicles Act will prevail. We are of opinion that Sec. 43 of the Act must prevail. While considering the arguments of both the paries their Lordships resolved the conflict by making the following observations :— "The only way to do it is to decide whether in such situation S. 43 of the Act will prevail Sec. 68-B of the Motor Vehicles Act will prevail. We are of opinion that Sec. 43 of the Act must prevail. In the first place S. 43 appears in an Act which is later than the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, in such a situation unless there is anything repugnant, the provisions in the later Act must prevail. Secondly, if we look at the object behind the two statutes, namely the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act, there can be no doubt that the Act, which was passed to meet an emergency arising out of the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 must prevail over the provisions contained in Ch. IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act which were meant to let a situation anting out of the taking over of motor transport by the State, Thirdly, if we compare the language of S. 43 of the Act with S. 68-B of the Motor Vehicles Act we find that the language of S. 43 is more emphatic than the language of S. 68-B. Section 48 provides that the provisions of the Act or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than the Act. This would show that the intention of the legislature was that the Act shall prevail over other statutes. But we do not find the same emphatic language in S. 68-B which lays down that the provisions in Ch. IV-A would prevail notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Ch. IV of Motor Vehicles Act or in any other law for the time being in force." 53. In the light of these decisions of the Supreme Court if we look at the collocation of the words in section 3 viz. "law for the time being in force" then we see that the intention of the legislature, while enacting section 3 in the new Act was that only those laws which were factually in force, were to be affected by the overriding effect of these sections of the new Law which contained the non-obstence clause. "law for the time being in force" then we see that the intention of the legislature, while enacting section 3 in the new Act was that only those laws which were factually in force, were to be affected by the overriding effect of these sections of the new Law which contained the non-obstence clause. It cannot be denied that at the time when 1973 Act came into force the old Law had been factually repealed by the Ordinance No 1 of 1973 and it was only the Ordinance that was holding the field. It is true that the new Law was given retrospective effect by the legislature and was made effective from 1-1-1973, a date on which the Ordinance came into force. It is also true by the fiction of law Ch. III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 was repealed by the new Law as 1973 Act was applied from 1-1 1973, but factually the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act were not in force on the date the Act of 1973 was published in the Official Gazette. Therefore in this background we have to see whether the expression used in section 3 of the new Act "law for the time being in force;" would cover the provisions of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which was factually not in force. The learned Single Judge has repelled the argument of Mr. Hastimal in respect of the overriding effect of section 3 of the new Law by saying that the old law was not in force on the date when section 3 was enacted by the legislature and, therefore, it was held that that section cannot have an overriding effect on the application of the old Law on the pending cases especially when chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was not in force. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge and we feel that with ail the emphasis with which sec. 3 was enacted by the legislature, it cannot have its overriding effect on the application of the old Law on pending cases. 54. The Full Bench Authority of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Rahim and other vs. Amma Bar and Others (33), no doubt appears to support Mr. 3 was enacted by the legislature, it cannot have its overriding effect on the application of the old Law on pending cases. 54. The Full Bench Authority of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Rahim and other vs. Amma Bar and Others (33), no doubt appears to support Mr. Hastimals contention, but on a careful perusal of the entire judgment we find a distinguishing feature in the Kashmir law that was under consideration of that Court and it is that in sec. 52 of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act (26 of 1972) made specific provisions for pending cases. Section 52 of that Act reads as follows :— "52 All applications, suits and proceedings pending before any Revenue Officer, Civil or Revenue Court, any authority acting under the J. and K. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1962. or the Government on the appointed date under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 51 shall abate." 55. Section 47 of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act was no doubt analogous with the provision of section 3 of the 1973 Act. When the scope of section 47 was dealt by the learned Judge, who wrote the judgment for the Court, he expressed his opinion that the provisions of section 47 and the Rules made thereunder shall be primary rule of action, but it cannot be overlooked that the provisions of section 52 were heavily weighing in his mind when considered the questions of pending cases and observed thus : "Broadly speaking, a pending action will survive if, by or under the new Act. the right be Dot a quired; and even if not so acquired, it be not lost or destroyed either; and, the remedy too be not haired or changed. It will not survive if, in consequence of the new Act, the right be acquired, lost or destroyed, and even if not so acquired, lost or destroyed, the remedy be barred or changed." 56. The subsequent discussion in the judgment reflects the mind of the learned Judge that he was all through conscious of the presence of the provisions of section 52 of that Act. We have no such provision in our law which can be called analogous to section 52 of the Jammu and Kashmir Act and, therefore, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of Mr. We have no such provision in our law which can be called analogous to section 52 of the Jammu and Kashmir Act and, therefore, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of Mr. Hastimal that the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court applies on all fours on the present matter. With all respect to the learned Judge we find it difficult, in the circumstances of these cases, to hold that the pending cases shall be governed by the new Law because of the non-obstente clause used by the legislature while enacting sec. 3 in the new Act. 57. It was next urged that the provisions of section 6 also indicate that the pending cases were to be governed by the new Law. The argument is that the transfers made on or after 26th September, 1970 and before 1st January, 1973, except bona fide transferee, shall be deemed to have been made to defeat the provisions of the new Act and shall not be recognised or taken into consideration while determining the ceiling area applicable to a person. On the basis of the provision of the new Law it is contended that bonafide transfers made upto January 1, 1973, were to be recognised by the authorities while determining the celling area because sec. 6 starts with a non obstente clause which gives an overriding effect over all other laws. Mr. Hastimal also urged that the old Law did not recognise transfers beyond 26th September, 1970, and therefore no effect would be given to the provisions of sec. 6 unless this sec. over-sides the provision of the old Law. 58. While discussing the scope of this argument in respect of section 3 we have considered at length the meaning that should be given to the expression law for the time being in force. While construing the ambit of sec. 6 the same meaning which we have given to the expression "any law for the time being in force", in sec. 3 shall have to be given in this sec. also. In this view of the matter there can be no escape from the conclusion that the non-obssence clause in sec. 6 does not in any manner turn the table in favour of the appellants. 59. On the parity of the same reasoning we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Hastimal that sec. also. In this view of the matter there can be no escape from the conclusion that the non-obssence clause in sec. 6 does not in any manner turn the table in favour of the appellants. 59. On the parity of the same reasoning we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Hastimal that sec. 9, the opening words whereof gives an overriding effect to the provision of any other law, also indicates the intention of the legislature that the new Law would apply to the pending matters. 60. Sec. 19 is also pressed into service by learned counsel for the appellants to support their contention that it makes the intention of the legislature clear that the tew Law will govern the pending cases. We regret that we cannot accept this proposition as this section deals with the payment of compensation to the land-holders whose lands are to be transferred to the State as surplus lands. While enacting the new Law the legislature specified certain rates for determining the compensation to be paid to the land-holders which amount would undoubtedly be different from the one provided under the old Law, but from this difference in the amount of compensation provided under the new Law, and the old Law, it cannot be said that the intention of legislature was that old matters will be decided under the new Law. In our opinion the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellants do not in any manner further their cause. 61. It may be observed that secs. 3, 6, 9 and 19 of the new Law do not create any inconsistency with the provisions of the old Law nor do they go to destroy any rights and liabilities created under the old Law and, therefore, the appellants cannot take resort to the provision of these secs. to submit that they will oust the application of sec. 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act to the pending cases. They basic approach for determining the controversy raised in these appeals requires us to find out whether the rights created in favour of the State under clause fa) of sub-sec. (I) of sec. 30-E of the old Law and the liabilities cast on the land-holders to part with their surplus lands under sub sec. (2) of that sec. They basic approach for determining the controversy raised in these appeals requires us to find out whether the rights created in favour of the State under clause fa) of sub-sec. (I) of sec. 30-E of the old Law and the liabilities cast on the land-holders to part with their surplus lands under sub sec. (2) of that sec. were destroyed by the enactment of the new Law, and if we find that the liabilities a and the rights incurred and created under the old Law have not been touched by the new Law, than we cannot feel hesitate to hold that the pending cases relating to the rights and liabilities created under the old Law shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of that Law. From the discussions referred to above, we have come to the conclusion that the rights and liabilities created under Sec. 30E of the repealed ceiling law have not, in any manner, been affected by the enactment of the new Law. Therefore all the cases initia-ted under the old Law and pending before the competent authorities shall be disposed of in the manner and under the provision of the old Law. As is clear from the affidavit filed by the Officer in-charge, only 166 old cases are pending decisions and the rest of the cases, namely, 8494 cases were decided after 1 1-73 in accordance with the provisions of the old Law and surplus land to the extent of 2,95,812 acres has been taken from the land-holders and distributed among the landless tenants including the Hari-jans and Scheduled Tribes people. Learned Advocate General is correct in his submis-sion that if on a technical ground a different view is taken in respect of the pending 166 cases then it will create an upheaval in the state and the rights created in favour of the new allottees in the surplus lands, shall have to be disturbed and thousands of the landless tenants will be effected if the technical argument of Mr. Hastimal is accepted. We see force in this argument. Though we may make it clear that this ground of learned Advocate General has weighed with us the least but at the same time this practical aspect could not altogether be ignored by us. 62. For the reasons given above we do not find any life in these appeals. They arc, therefore, dismissed. We see force in this argument. Though we may make it clear that this ground of learned Advocate General has weighed with us the least but at the same time this practical aspect could not altogether be ignored by us. 62. For the reasons given above we do not find any life in these appeals. They arc, therefore, dismissed. Looking to the circumstances of these case3 we leave the parties to bear their own costs.