JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a revision against the order dated April 15, 1974, passed by Sri B.N. Singh, Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division reversing the order dated November 30, 1971 passed by Assistant Collector First Class, Sultanpur in case No. 224 under Section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The revisionist had filed a suit for declaration of their sole bhumidhari or sirdar right in certain plot. Service on defendant was done by publication in the Gazette. On July 10, 1969 the trial court ordered the case to proceed ex parte as none of the defendants, including the State Government, had appeared. On July 18, 1969, the trial court recorded ex parte evidence of the plaintiff-revisionist and decreed the suit. On the same day, the defendant appeared and applied for restoration of the suit. This application was rejected by the trial court on November 30, 1971. The defendants Doodh Nath and others went up in appeal. The learned Additional Commissioner by his order dated April 15, 1974, allowed the appeal and set aside the ex parte decree. He also abated the suit as the village had come under consolidation operations. Moti Lal and others, plaintiffs, have now come up in revision against the order of the learned Additional Commissioner. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that the learned Additional Commissioner has acted illegally and with material irregularity in setting aside the order passed by the trail court as the defendants has been duly served and had full knowledge of the date on which the decree was passed i.e. July 18, 1966. 5. A perusal of the record shows that apart from the State of U.P. and Gaon Sabha, koripur, there were five defendants, Doodh Nath, Bankey Lal, Ram Lakhan, Nanku and Pyare Lal. Ram Lakhan and Bankey Lal were personally served, on March 10, 1969, on the same day Doodh Nath and Nanku were served by affixation of the summons at their residences in the presence of two witnesses. Pyare Lal was similarly served but it was also mentioned that he was living in Bombay in connection with this service. The registered summons sent were all returned unserved. In Addition there was also he publication of the summons in Sultanpur Samachar patra weekly dated June 23, 1969. Pyare Lal was similarly served but it was also mentioned that he was living in Bombay in connection with this service. The registered summons sent were all returned unserved. In Addition there was also he publication of the summons in Sultanpur Samachar patra weekly dated June 23, 1969. Doodh Nath, Bankey Lal, Ram Lakhan and Nanku had filed the vakalatnama of Devi Prasad, Advocate on their behalf on July 10, 1969. All this shows that the defendants had in face been duly served. In the application dated July 18, 1969, the defendants have themselves stated as follows: "Yesterday in the village the applicants learnt from the woman of the house that the above suit is pending in the Court of the Judicial Officer, Sultanpur in which today i.e. July 18, 1969, is fixed as the date of hearing." The application along with the presence of the defendants on July 18, 1969, fully establishes the fact that the defendants had due knowledge of July 18, 1969, as the date fixed for hearing of the case. 6. The point arising for determination is whether the trial court was entitled in decreeing the suit ex parte on July 18, 1969 when the defendants were in fact present in the court on same day even though they put in appearance after the ex parte order had been passed. Again, a further point for determination is whether having passed an ex parte decree, the trial court was required under law to set aside the ex parte proceedings when the defendants put in their appearance. 7. Order IX, Rule I CPC provides as follows: "1. Parties to appear on the day fixed summons for defendants to appear and answer. On the day fixed in the summons for the defendant to appear and answer, the parties shall be in attendance at the court-house in person or by their respective pleaders and the suit shall then be heard unless the hearing in adjourned to a future day fixed by the Court." It will be observed that the rule merely states that the parties shall be in attendance on the day fixed in person or by their respective pleaders. The rule does not requires that the parties shall be in attendance on the hour specified. This distinction is very significant in a Country like India where the majority of the people are illiterate and unpunctual. The rule does not requires that the parties shall be in attendance on the hour specified. This distinction is very significant in a Country like India where the majority of the people are illiterate and unpunctual. Thus, though the time specified in the summons as 10 A.M., interest of justice requires that the Court should take a liberty view and allow reasonable opportunity to the defendants to put in appearance on the day fixed rather then decree a suit ex parte merely because the defendants failed to appear at 10 A.M. Sometimes there is delay on account of transport, or because the parties have to search their lawyers or the location of the Court. All these factor are material and should be taken into consideration. If when the case is called for hearing and the defendants fail to put in appearance, the Court is entitled to proceed ex parte under Rule 6, Order IX C.P.C. if it is satisfied thar the defendants are not intending to appear. However, if and when the defendant to put in appearance subsequently on the same day, it would be just and proper for the trial court to set aside the ex parte decree against he defendant under Rule 13, order IX C.P.C. It is true that Rule 13 requires the defendant to prove that they were prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, but too strict an insistence on the date or time is not intended under Order IX Rule I E.P.C. and may defeat the very ends of justice. This is particularly for a trial court where the contesting parties have the first opportunity to establish their case. If this opportunity is denied to any party, gross miscarriage of justice may result. The position naturally differs in court of first appeal or second appeal or other higher courts, as it is not intended that the parties having got ample opportunity of establishing their case in the lower courts, may go on litigating unnecessarily and thereby defeating the end of justice by the process of delay. Th high Courts would, therefore, be entitled in laying grater stress on the observance of punctuality in the attendance or parties of their counsels before them. 8. Th high Courts would, therefore, be entitled in laying grater stress on the observance of punctuality in the attendance or parties of their counsels before them. 8. In the light of the above discussion, I would uphold the view of the learned Additional Commissioner that the ex parte decree against the defendants would result in miscarriage of justice in the present case and that the trial court should have restores the suit and set aside the ex parte decree. The learned additional Commissioner has rightly set aside the ex parte dated July 18, 1969 and the trial court order dated November 1, 1971. 9. Both parties to the dispute had agreed before the learned Additional Commissioner that the village had come under consolidation operations. The learned Additional Commissioner, therefore, rightly abated the suit under Section 5, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings act. 10. There is no force in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.