Judgment 1. THIS appeal is by the plaintiff and it arises out of a suit for declaration of title to and for recovery of possession of certain land. The plaintiff's case is as follows:-The disputed land forms part of two plots, namely, plot No. 104 and 115 appertaining to Khatian Nos. 450 and 452 01 Mouza Nijasinthi. These two plots of lands formerly belonged to one Rai Bahadur Ajit Nath Das under whom one Krishna Behari Mondal was an occupancy raiyat. The plaintiff alleges that Krishna Behari abandoned the holding whereupon Roy Bahadur Ajit Nath possessed the lands for two years. It was further alleged that on October 16, 1939, he gifted the said lands to one of his sons, Kunja Kishore Das, Kunja Kishore mortgaged the said lands to Jnanendra Chandra Mondal on 15th March, 1940 and thereafter again on 1st August, 1940. Jnanendra Chandra instituted a mortgage suit namely, Mortgage Suit No. 88 of 1947 in the 5th court of the Sub-Judge and in execution of decree obtained therein in Title Execution No. 2 of 1955 the property was put up to sale. Jnanendra having died in the meantime his wife Sashimukhi was brought on record, The plaintiff auction purchased the said land on 10th August, 1956, and thereafter obtained symbolical possession on 30th September, 1956. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant trespassed into the land and tried to raise structures thereon and therefore he instituted the present suit. 2. THE defence admitted the tenancy of Krishna Behari but alleged that he did not abandon the holding but there was a surrender by him in favour of the landlord. The defence case is that after the surrender Roy Bahadur Ajit Nath Das granted settlement by two registered pates one on the 29th March, 1942 in respect of plot No. 104 as well as other lands in favour of Birendra Nath Gupta and the other on 13th March in respect of plot No. 115 as well as other lands in favour of Nripendra Nath Gupta. The lessees possessed the disputed land along with other lands for some time and thereafter on 1st May, 1946 they sold the disputed lands to the Suburban Bank Ltd. Suburban Bank Ltd. thereafter sold the disputed lands on 6th May, 1947 to Makhanlal Das, Makhanlal in his turn sold the same to Gostha Behari Ghose on 24th November, 1948. The lessees possessed the disputed land along with other lands for some time and thereafter on 1st May, 1946 they sold the disputed lands to the Suburban Bank Ltd. Suburban Bank Ltd. thereafter sold the disputed lands on 6th May, 1947 to Makhanlal Das, Makhanlal in his turn sold the same to Gostha Behari Ghose on 24th November, 1948. The present defendants are the purchaser from Gostha Behari Ghose by different sale deeds dated 5th May, 1954. The defendants contested the suit on the ground that the Deed of Gift executed by Roy Bahadur Ajit Nath in favour of Kunja Kishore was never acted upon and that Kunja Kishore had no title to or possession in the disputed lands. Alternatively, the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff's title, if any, was extinguished by adverse possession. The trial court found that the Deed of Gift in favour of Kunja Kishore was not acted upon and Kunja Kishore had no title to or possession in the suit land. The trial court further found that the defendants had acquired good title by adverse possession and accordingly it dismissed the suit. Against the said decision the plaintiff filed an appeal before the lower appellate court but the appeal was also dismissed upon the finding that the Deed of Gift was invalid and inoperative as it was hit by section 122 and section 126 of Transfer of Property Act. The appellate court found that Kunja Kishore did not acquire any interest in the property. The lower appellate court further found that Kunja Kishore was not in possession of the disputed land at any time. It was further found by the lower appellate court that Birendra nath and Nripendra Nath, the lessees under Roy Bahadur Ajit Nath Das, had been in possession since the date of their respective settlement, and thereafter possession had all along been with the predecessor in title of the defendants. On these findings the appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate court. 3. MR. Shyama Prosanna Roy Choudhury, learned Advocate, appearing in support of the appeal has contended that the findings of the courts below that the Deed of Gift, the original of which has been marked as Ext. 1 (b) and the two certified copies have been marked as Ext. 1 and 1 (a) respectively, is hit section 122 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act is erroneous. 1 (b) and the two certified copies have been marked as Ext. 1 and 1 (a) respectively, is hit section 122 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act is erroneous. He contended that what was taken to be a consideration within the meaning of section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act by the courts below was not really a consideration as contemplated in that section. The relevant recital in the Deed of Gift is as follows:- "now in consideration of the donee's foregoing the claim of Rs. 20,000/- as per the said Deed of declaration of trust and family settlement voluntarily made by the said donor on the 14th day of October, 1939 and for natural love and affection the donor hereby intended to convey transfer and assign the contention of Mr. Roy Choudhury is that although the word consideration has been used in the Deed of Gift it is really a substitution of the interest and benefit which was conferred upon the donee by the Deed of declaration of trust and family settlement which was executed by the donor on the 14th October, 1939 as recited in the Deed of Gift. Mr. Roy Choudhury accordingly argued that looking from this point of view there was no consideration for the Deed of Gift and it was executed out of natural love and affection. We are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Roy Choudhury on the face of the clear and specific recital in the" Deed of Gift that "in consideration of the donee's foregoing the claim of Rs. 20,000/- as per the said Deed of Declaration". It is clear that apart from natural love and affection the consideration for the Deed of Gift is the donee's foregoing the benefit which was conferred upon him by the Deed of Declaration. 4. THE other branch of Mr. Roy Chowdhury's argument on this point is that the recital in the Deed of Gift to the effect that "provided also if the said donor so chooses he shall be entitled to call upon the donee to convey the property to him at a sum of Rs. 20,000/- by selling the garden and the said donee will be bound to do so if the said sum of Rs. 20,000/- by selling the garden and the said donee will be bound to do so if the said sum of Rs. 20,000/- be paid to him within two years from the date of execution of these presents" does not make the Deed of Gift revocable at the will of the donor. He contended that the above recital did not confer a right upon the donor to revoke the Deed of Gift at his will, but it was merely in the nature of agreement to recovery the property gifted, and the consideration for such reconveyance was fixed at Rs. 20,000/ -. The aforesaid provision for conveying the property to the donor by the donee cannot be said to be an agreement to sell immovable property. An agreement must confer rights upon both the parties, that is to say, it must be bilateral. In the present case the donee had no option in the matter. It created a right only in favour of the donor. Such a clause, in our view, cannot be said to be an agreement for sale of immoveable property. This contention raised by Mr. Roy Chowdhury cannot, therefore, be accepted. That being the position the plaintiff who is the purchaser at an auction sale in execution of a decree passed in a mortgage suit in which Kunja Kishore the alleged donee was the judgment-debtor did not acquire any title to the disputed property. This finding of ours is sufficient to dispose of the present appeal but since Mr. Roy Choudhury raised other points on behalf of the appellant we would briefly discuss the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the finding of the lower appellate court that the suit is barred by limitation is erroneous on the ground that the plaintiff had instituted the present suit on the 19th June, 1964 which is well within 12 years from the date on which he became entitled to possession. The contention is that the plaintiff purchased the property at a sale held in execution of a decree passed in a suit brought on a strength of an equitable mortgage. It was argued that an equitable mortgagee has no right to the present possession. His right or the right of the purchaser would only arise after the sale was held and. was confirmed. It was argued that an equitable mortgagee has no right to the present possession. His right or the right of the purchaser would only arise after the sale was held and. was confirmed. That being so it was argued that even assuming that Birendra Nath and Nripendra Nath were in possession from the date of their respective settlement in 1942 and 1943 that cannot affect the right of the mortgagee or the auction purchaser, because they had no right to immediate possession and their right arose only after the auction sale. In support of this contention Mr. Roy Choudhury relied upon the decision in Surendra Nath choudhury v. Barisal Loan Co. Ltd., 34 C. W. N. 519. He also relied upon the decision in Vyapuri and Another v. Sonamma Boi Ammani, ILR 39 Madras 811 and Priyasakhi Debi v. Bireswar Shamanta, 21 C. W. N. 177. These decisions are of little assistance to the appellant in the present case in view of the fact that Kunja Kishore never had any possession in the disputed lands. 5. MR. Roy Choudhury also addressed as on the question that the findings regarding possession of the disputed lands arrived at by the courts below were erroneous, inasmuch as, certain aspects of evidence was not properly considered by the courts below. We are not impressed by this argument advanced by Mr. Roy Choudhury, because apart from the fact that the finding on the question of possession being a finding of fact is not liable to be challenged in a Second Appeal. The Courts below considered the evidence in detail and arrived at the finding as to possession. We find from the judgments of the Courts below that the evidence on this point has been carefully gone into by the courts below and there is no reason why this concurrent finding of the fact arrived at by the Courts below should be disturbed. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will, however, be no order as to costs.