Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of an order passed by the lower Court dismissing the application filed by the appellant-judgment debtor in O.S. No. 51 of 1961 on the file of the lower Court seeking the dismissal of E.P. 477 of 1972 filed by the decree holder, the respondent herein, for delivery of suit properties as per the terms of the decree. 2. This matter has a long history and it is necessary to set out the same in brief for the purpose of a clear understanding of the rival contentions put forward by the parties in this appeal. The appellant herein filed a suit O.S. 26 of 1955 on the file of the Sub Court, Tiruchirapalli against her brother, one Palaniyandi for recovery of possession of 32 acres of wet and dry lands in Pattavaithalai village on the ground that the said lands had been granted as Devadasi Inam and that as the adopted daughter of the previous devadasi, Angamuthu, she has become entitled to the said inam lands. That suit was decreed on 16th March, 1957 under Ex. A-1. Pursuant to the decree she took possession of the properties under Ex. A-2 dated 19th August, 1958. Palaniyandi, the defendant in the said suit filed an appeal to this Court in A.S. 224 of 1957. In that appeal the appellant herein had been appointed as a party Receiver of the properties, and she continued to be in possession. 3. During the pendency of that appeal, the respondent herein who is the Devasthanam had initiated proceedings under S. 101 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act for recovery of possession of the lands from the appellant. In those proceedings, the appellant contended that as she is in possession of the property as a Receiver appointed by this Court, leave of this Court has to be obtained for initiating proceedings against the Receiver. Taking note of that contention, the Devasthanam approached this Court in C.M.P. No. 466 of 1960 for leave to proceed against the Receiver. This Court stated that until her receivership is terminated by an order of Court, her right to remain in possession of the property as receiver will be totally unaffected by any proceedings that may be initiated against the appellant in her individual capacity and, therefore, permission to sue the receiver cannot be given. This Court stated that until her receivership is terminated by an order of Court, her right to remain in possession of the property as receiver will be totally unaffected by any proceedings that may be initiated against the appellant in her individual capacity and, therefore, permission to sue the receiver cannot be given. Subsequently the appeal A.S. 224 of 1957 was dismissed on 10th March, 1961. 4. In the meanwhile the respondent-Devasthanam filed a suit, O.S. 51 of 1961 for recovery of the properties with mesne profits of Rs. 19,500/- or in the alternative for arrears of chathurbagam amounting to Rs. 4875/- on the ground that the appellant is not the adopted daughter of Angamuthu, the previous service holder, and, therefore, she is not entitled to the properties which constitute the service inam. 5. The said suit was resisted by the appellant on the ground that she is entitled to the suit properties as the adopted daughter of Angamuthu. The said suit was decreed on 11th January 1965 holding that the appellant was not the adopted daughter of Angamuthu and that therefore she is not entitled to the inam properties, and directing the recovery of possession with arrears of chathurbagam. There was an appeal to this Court against the said judgment by the appellant in A.S. 37 of 1965 and a cross appeal by the respondent. In that appeal this Court held that the appellant has not been adopted by Angamuthu, that the appellants possession of the properties was only in her capacity as a Receiver and that she was liable for mesne profits and not chathurbagam. On the basis of the said appellate decree the respondent levied execution and sought delivery of the properties in E.P. 477 of 1972. It is at that stage the appellant filed an application under S. 151 C.P.C., contending (1) that the decree passed by the Court against the Receiver without obtaining the leave of the Court to sue the Receiver is a nullity and inexecutable. (2) that as her possession of the properties has been found to be in her capacity as Receiver, it cannot be disturbed till after she is discharged from the Receiver. 6. (2) that as her possession of the properties has been found to be in her capacity as Receiver, it cannot be disturbed till after she is discharged from the Receiver. 6. The lower Court, however, held that sitting in execution it has no jurisdiction to declare that the decree is null and void, that the jurisdiction of the executing Court is very much limited, that getting leave of the Court to sue the Receiver is not a condition precedent for filing the suit and that in any event, the absence of grant of leave to sue the Receiver will not affect the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain and dispose of the suit. It also held that once the appeal A.S. 224 of 1957 during the pendency of which the appellant was appointed Receiver has been dismissed, the appellant should be deemed to have been automatically discharged from the receivership. In this view the executing Court dismissed the appellants application seeking the dismissal of the said E.P. 7. Mr. T.R. Mani, learned counsel for the appellant contends (1) that the Receiver appointed by a Court in a pending proceedings is not automatically discharged at the conclusion of the proceedings, and that unless there is a specific order discharging the Receiver by the Court which appointed her, the Receiver is entitled to continue even after the termination of the case, and that in this case, there being no order discharging the appellant from Receivership, her right to be in possession of the property is not affected even by the decree passed by this Court in A.S. No. 224 of 1957 affirming the decree passed by the trial Court in O.S. 26 of 1955 (2); That this Court having held in A.S. 37 of 1965 that the appellant came into possession of the property only in her capacity as Receiver, no decree for recovery of the properties from her can legally be passed unless leave to sue the Receiver has been obtained before filing the suit or at least during the pendency of the suit and that, in this case, no such leave having been obtained from this Court which appointed the Receiver, the decree passed in the suit is null and void and as such inexecutable. 8. 8. In support of the first contention, the learned counsel refers to the following passage in paragraph 616 at page 386 of Halsburys Laws of England, Simonds Edition, Volume 32 which deals with the duration of appointment of a Receiver made by the Court. “Duration of appointment by Court; When a receiver is appointed for a limited time, as in the case of interim order, his office determines on the expiration of that time without any further order of the court, and if the appointments “until judgment or further order” it is brought to an end by the judgment in the action. The judgment may provide for the continuance of the receiver, but that is regarded at a new appointment. If a further order of the court, though silent as to the receivership, is incons istent with a continuance of the receiver, it may operate as a discharge. When a receiver has been appointed on an interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is not necessary to provide for the continuance of his appointment in the final judgment. The silence of the judgment does not operate as a discharge of the receiver or determination of his powers. So, also, the appointment of a receiver generally by the judgment in an administration action need not be continued by the order on further consideration.” Paragraph 762 at page 449 of the same volume has also been referred to which states that unless his appointment was for a limited time only, a receiver appointed by the Court can only be discharged by order, even though circumstances have rendered the appointment nugatory. Reference has also been made to the following decisions: In Ramzan Moosakhan v. Abubucker A.I.R. 1945. Sind. 75 the question arose as to whether the termination of the suit or proceeding in which a Receiver was appointed will amount to an automatic discharge of the Receiver. The Court took the view that although in certain cases by termination of the proceedings the legal occasion for the Receivership ceases, the Receivers duty to the Court still survives and therefore, termination of the proceedings does not operate to discharge the Receiver and reference has been made in support of that view to certain observ ations in Kerr on Receivers, 10th edition at page 342 and in N.D. Basu on “Law of Practice relating to Receivers” 1937 edition. The following passage in Woodroofes “Law relating to Receivers” 4th edition at page 268 was, however distinguished: “Since the final decree in the case is generally decisive of the subject matter in controversy, and determines the right to the possession of the fund or property held by me Receiver it is usually the case that such decree supersedes the functions of the Receiver since there is then nothing further for him to act upon. If, on the other hand, the result be favourable to the defendant the functions of the Receiver are at an end and it is proper to order him to account and be discharged. An order of dismissal of the suit which follows on the reversal of an order appointing a Receiver clearly operates as a discharge of the Receiver.” The Court has referred to a number of Indian authorities in support of the proposition that a Receiver continues in possession until he is finally discharged viz.: C.E. Grey v. Woogramohun Thakur I.L.R. 28 Cal.790, Dwijendra Krishna v. Surendra Nath A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 548, Nadirshaw Jamshedji v. Purushothamdas Gannatdas A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 279 and Mujhu Vira Reddi v. M. Venkatesa Mudali A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 967 and culled out a principle therefrom that as a general rule, a Receiver can only be discharged by an order of Court, that the Receivers powers do not terminate until he is discharged by the Court which appointed him, and that determination of the suit will not ipso facto discharge a Receiver whose functions must be terminated by a formal order of Court. The learned counsel also refers to the decision in C. Doraivelu v. G.R. Audikesavalu A.I.R. 1924 Madras 557=19 L.W. 388 wherein a Division Bench of this Court held that the effect of the order of the Court of appeal modifying the decree of the trial Court cannot, ipso facto discharge the Receiver. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent would, however, point out, that in this case the appointment of the appellant as Receiver was in an interlocutory application pending the appeal in A.S. No. 224 of 1957, that the appointment should be taken to be till the pendency of the appeal, and that therefore, the order appointing the Receiver should be taken to be for a limited duration, that is pendency of the appeal. The learned counsel refers to the application filed in A.S. 224 of 1957 for appointment of Receiver pending the appeal and the order appointing the appellant as Receiver. The application for appointment of Receiver in C.M.P. No. 6100/1958 in A.S. No. 224 of 1957 specifically says that the appointment of a Receiver is sought for pending the appeal. The order dated 20th November 1958 of this Court though does not specifically mention the duration, the opening sentence in the penultimate paragraph of the order which is extracted below seems to indicate that the court intended to appoint the appellant as Receiver only till the disposal of the appeal. “This appointment however should be subjected to one safeguard, viz., that this Velambal should deposit one half of the new income from the lands as and when realised till the disposal of the appeal.” “This appointment however should be subjected to one safeguard, viz., that this Velambal should deposit one half of the new income from the lands as and when realised till the disposal of the appeal.” The direction to the receiver to deposit half of the rental income from the lands as and when realised till the disposal of the appeal can only show that the appellants appointment as Receiver was only till the disposal of the appeal. If the Court contemplated the continuance of the Receiver even after the disposal of the appeal, such a condition restricting her liability to deposit till the disposal of the appeal would not have been made. In addition, it is not in dispute that the appellant, after the disposal of the appeal A.S. No. 224 of 1957 applied to the Court for cancellation of the security given by her and get it cancelled on the ground that the Receivership has come to an end. Therefore, on the facts of this case, I am of the view that the appointment of the appellant as Receiver was only for the duration of the appeal and that the disposal of the appeal, A.S. 224 of 1957 on 10th March 1961 has put an end to her Receivership. 10. This leads us to the second contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. This contention will arise only if the appellant was a Receiver when the suit O.S. 51 of 1961 was filed on 12th April, 1961. 10. This leads us to the second contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. This contention will arise only if the appellant was a Receiver when the suit O.S. 51 of 1961 was filed on 12th April, 1961. However, I shall deal with the contention for the sake of completion. Admittedly, leave to sue has not been obtained at any time either before the suit or during the pendency of the suit. But if the appellant has ceased to be a Receiver on the date of the filing of the suit, the question of getting leave to sue the Receiver will not arise. It has already been held that the disposal of the appeal A.S. 224 of 1957 on 10th March 1961 has put an end to the appellants Receivership. Even assuming that the appellant still continues to be a Receiver, as there is no order of Court discharging her from Receivership, the question is whether the decree passed in the suit is a nullity. In Ammukutty v. Manavikramann I.L.R. 43 Mad. 793 a Division Bench of this Court has held that where a suit was instituted against a Receiver appointed by Court without obtaining the previous sanction, the omission to obtain such sanction does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. In Venkata Narasimha v. Venkatalingama I.L.R. 1944 Mad. 717 a sale in execution of a decree of property in the possession of a Receiver without the leave of the Court which appointed him was held to be not void but voidable. In Venkata Narasimha v. Venkatalingama I.L.R. 1944 Mad. 717 a sale in execution of a decree of property in the possession of a Receiver without the leave of the Court which appointed him was held to be not void but voidable. In Subramania v. Thandavamurty I.L.R. 1942 Madras 933 though leave to sue the Receiver had not been obtained, an implied leave to sue was inferred from the circumstance that the Court which executed the decree itself passed the order appointing the Receiver, and therefore, it should be taken to be fully aware of the appointment of the Receiver when it allowed the sale of the properties in the hands of the Receiver to go on, and the principle of the said decision can very well be applied to the facts of this case where this Court while disposing of A.S. No. 37 of 1965 was fully aware of the fact that the appellants position was only as a Receiver when it sustained the decree of the trial Court directing delivery of possession from which it could be implied that there is an implied leave by the appellate court to sue the Receiver to recover the properties from him. It is well established that leave to sue is not a condition precedent before the filing of the suit and that leave can be granted even retrospectively by the Court. 11. A persual of the judgment of this Court in A.S. No. 37 of 1965 shows that the appellant did not raise this objection based on want of leave to sue the Receiver. It should therefore, be taken that the appellant has waived her right. As already, stated, the want of leave to sue the Receiver will not make the decree in the suit void but it is only voidable. If the appellant, assuming that she continues to be Receiver, has not raised this objection in the appellate Court which confirmed the decree for possession, the decree cannot be taken to be a nullity. Apart from this, it is well-established that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree and it can refuse to execute the decree only if it is a nullity. It is also well-established that nullity should appear ex facie the decree and that it is not open to the executing Court to go into the validity of the decree. Apart from this, it is well-established that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree and it can refuse to execute the decree only if it is a nullity. It is also well-established that nullity should appear ex facie the decree and that it is not open to the executing Court to go into the validity of the decree. This has been so held in Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 199 and Vasudev Dhanjibai Modhi v. Raja bhai Abdul Rehman A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1475. In any view of the matter, the appellant cannot succeed in avoiding the execution of the decree in this case. The appeal, therefore, fails, and it is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.