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1976 DIGILAW 36 (PAT)

Nagendra Prasad Sinha v. Brajnandan Pd.

1976-02-09

R.P.SINHA

body1976
JUDGMENT R. P. Sinha, J. This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') by the petitioners to quash an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan, passed on the 9th July, 1974, taking cognizance against them for an offence under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. On the 15th February. 1973, opposite party no. 1 filed a petition of complaint before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Siwan, alleging therein that, on the 22nd January, 1973, at 11 a. m, the petitioners had entered into two shop premises of his masters; one was a liquor shop situated in Telhata Bazar and the other was also a liquor shop situated in Sharda Nandan Bazar, in the town of Siwan. The proprietors of the two shops aforesaid were Ramnath Prasad and his son, Tripurari Saran, respectively. The complainant described himself as the Manager of the two shops aforesaid and in that capacity filed the petition of complaint for offences under sections 161, 379, 427 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code and section 42 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. 3. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate referred the matter for inquiry to Shree J. Jha, Magistrate and, on transfer of Shree J. Jha, it was sent to Shree Puri for inquiry. Subsequently, on the 10th June, 1974, Shree Puri sent back the papers to the Chief Judicial Magistrate without completing the inquiry. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, however, by his impugned order, held that no case had been made out against the petitioners for the offence alleged in the petition of complaint. He, however, found that an offence under section 448 of the Indian Pena] Code was made out against them. Hence, he summoned the petitioners to stand their trial for an offence under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that all the four petitioners happen to be public servants, being employees of the Bihar State Electricity Board-petitioner no. 1 was the S.D.O., Electric Supply Division, Siwan, petitioner no. 2 was an Electrical Overseer at Siwan, petitioner no.3 was a work Sarkar and petitioner no. 4 was an Electric Mistry of the Electric Supply Division, Siwan. 1 was the S.D.O., Electric Supply Division, Siwan, petitioner no. 2 was an Electrical Overseer at Siwan, petitioner no.3 was a work Sarkar and petitioner no. 4 was an Electric Mistry of the Electric Supply Division, Siwan. It has been submitted that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had lost sight of the fact that, under the provisions of section 20 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, these petitioners were duly authorised by the Electricity Board and were competent to enter the premises and remove the fittings and other apparatus; and under the provisions of section 56 of the said Act, (1) no suit, prosecution or other proceedings shall lie against any public officer, or any servant of a local authority for anything done, or in good faith purporting to be done under the Act, and (ii) no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under the Act, by a public officer except with the sanction (a) in the case of a person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government and (b)in any other case of the State Government. It has also been submitted that the learned Magistrate bas not taken notice of section 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, which reads as follows :- "81. All members, officers and servants of the Board shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to Act, in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act, to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code." Section 82 is in these words: "82. No suit, prosecution or other legal Proceeding shall lie against any member, officer or servant of the Board for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act." 5. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners has been that, in the first instance, the Chief Judicial Magistrate was not justified in taking cognizance against the petitioners without the sanction of the proper authority as they were public servants as defined in section 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners has been that, in the first instance, the Chief Judicial Magistrate was not justified in taking cognizance against the petitioners without the sanction of the proper authority as they were public servants as defined in section 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Secondly it was submitted that no offence was made out against any of the petitioners, much leis an offence under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code, in view of the fact that these petitioners, under the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, were authorised to remove the meter and disconnect the supply of electricity from the premises of the complainant's masters. Section 448 of the Penal Code reads thus ;- "448. Whoever commits house-trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both." Section 441 of the Penal Code gives the definition of 'criminal trespass' and section 442 defines house trespass’ and section 441 clearly states that whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property is said to commit 'criminal trespass'. Under section 442, whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit 'house-trespass'. From what has been stated above, it is quite clear that the Act, of the petitioners does not come within the mischief of the definition of 'criminal trespass' or 'house-trespass, as it cannot be said that they had entered the premises in question with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person, inasmuch as they had gone there with the sole purpose to perform their duties as public servants and as a part of their duty they had removed the meters and disconnected the supply of electricity on account of the fact that the wiring of the two shops were found to be defective and likely to cause enormous harm. 6. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party contended that it cannot be said that no offence under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out against the petitioners. But, for the reasons stated above, I find that there is no substance in his contention. It was also contended that no sanction under section 56 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 was necessary, if the Act, was in good faith. 'Good faith' has been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897 as follows :- "(22) a thing shall be deemed to be done in 'good faith' where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not." In view of the facts and the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the Act, done by these petitioners was not done in 'good faith'. 7. For the reasons stated above, the application is allowed and the impugned order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is quashed. Application allowed.